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In this thesis, I focus on the experiences of the Greeks of Istanbul and 
Imbros/Gökçeada, who were exempted from the compulsory population exchange 
between Greece and Turkey in 1923. Particularly in the years c.1950-1980, members of 
these communities were faced with persecution in Turkey, and overwhelmingly left 
their places of birth to resettle in Greece, their purported ‘national homeland’. Drawing 
on oral history testimonies, written documentation, and participant observation, I 
explore how the expatriated Greeks of Turkey appealed to and reworked the past as they 
attempted to establish belonging in their new place of residence, make sense of their 
recent historical experiences, and communicate these understandings to others. Part I 
sets out the conceptual, methodological, and historical background of the thesis. In part 
II, I consider the representation of self and others by the Greeks of Turkey, arguing that 
they sought to assert both belonging and distinctiveness within the Greek national 
community by emphasising the specificities of their own local heritages. Part III 
investigates the ways in which activists and writers from the expatriated community, in 
their efforts to raise awareness of their experiences of persecution, adopted and adapted 
archetypes both from Greek nationalist history and the mnemonic repertoires of other 
communities, and I discuss these discourses in relation to the recent ‘transcultural turn’ 
in memory studies. In part IV, I turn my attention to the seasonal, semi-permanent, and 
permanent return of the Greeks to Imbros after 1988, documenting how these more 
recent developments have impacted upon the community’s relationship to the Greek 
state, and the transmission of memory and identity to the younger Greek-born 
generation. I conclude by suggesting that anthropologists and historians can make 
significant contributions to current scholarly debates concerning national identity and 
social memory by examining the internal heterogeneity and malleability of ethnicity and 
nationhood, and how the transcultural circulation of memories makes its presence felt 
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Overview, sources, and methodology 
 
In Tassos Boulmetis’ film Polítiki Kouzína, set against the backdrop of the deportation 
of Greek citizens from Istanbul in 1964, protagonist Fanis recalled how his parents’ 
bickering ‘always began with unimportant details, but always ended with world 
historical events’ (Boulmetis 2003). So, for instance, in a flashback to a family meal in 
Istanbul in 1959, the Byzantine past was drawn into a household dispute over cookery, 
after a young Fanis clandestinely mixed cinnamon into his mother’s meatballs. 
Although she initially protested her innocence, Fanis’ mother ultimately found herself 
justifying the use of the spice by implying that Constantine Palaiologos, the last 
emperor of Byzantium, was known to be in the habit of having his meat prepared with 
cinnamon. Fanis’ father – consuming the meatballs – reacted with incredulity to these 
claims: 
 
Father: Palaiologos?! Who taught you about Palaiologos? 
Mother: It is written in all of the books. 
Father: Do not talk about Constantine Palaiologos again, okay? […] I graduated 
from the Great School of the Nation [i.e. Phanar Greek Orthodox College, a 
prestigious school in Istanbul]. They never told us that the Emperor ate meat 
with cinnamon! (Boulmetis 2003). 
 
In this scene, the most mundane everyday discourse was steeped in the archetypes of the 
distant past, culinary decisions justified through reference to the dietary habits of a 
figure who inhabited the city 500 years previously.
2
 I am concerned in this thesis with 
such ‘past presencing’, that is ‘the empirical phenomenon of how people variously 
experience, understand and produce the past in the present’ (Macdonald 2013:52). This 
is not merely a question of how contemporaries might talk about the past, nor how 
particular aspects of the past might endure unchanging in the present, but rather 
concerns the ‘interplay of pasts and presents’ (Macdonald 2013:55) through which 
individuals, consciously or otherwise, simultaneously interpret contemporary situations 
in view of historical experience and reimagine the past according to present concerns 
and conceptions (Cubitt 2007a:17; Macdonald 2013:216). More specifically, I am 
interested in how a group of individuals – in my case, the Greeks of Turkey – who were 
pressurised into leaving the country of their birth and subsequently resettled in a 
somewhat ambivalent ‘national homeland’, appealed to and reworked the past as they 
                                                 
2
 For a discussion of how food permeates memory, see Sutton (2001). 
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attempted to establish belonging in their new place of residence, make sense of their 
recent historical experiences, and communicate these understandings to others. 
 
The thesis is composed of four sections. The first, comprising chapters 1-2, is a 
methodological and historical introduction: in the present chapter, I outline the structure 
of my thesis, detail the primary materials to be used, and elaborate upon my 
methodology for the production of oral history testimonies; and in chapter 2, I sketch 
out an historical background for the Greeks of Turkey. Parts II and III are each made up 
of two chapters, prefaced by a review essay that establishes their scholarly and 
argumentative context. In part II, I focus on the representation of self and others by the 
Greeks of Turkey, and ask what these can tell us about the relationship between the 
locality and the nation. In part III, I investigate the ways in which activists and writers 
from the expatriated community constructed their historical and commemorative 
narratives, and discuss these discourses in relation to the recent ‘transcultural turn’ in 
memory studies. Part IV explores more recent developments, by investigating Greek 
return migration to Turkey and the transmission of memory and identity to the younger 
Greek-born generation. 
 
Greeks without Greece: thesis overview 
 
My research engages primarily with three bodies of literature – those concerning social 
memory, national identity, and diaspora – that have in recent years shared two common 
and overlapping analytical concerns: 1) understanding the relationships between the 
local, the national, and the global (particularly in light of an increasingly interconnected 
world); and 2) challenging a perceived ‘methodological nationalism’ bequeathed to each 
discipline by earlier scholars. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, students of 
national identity have extensively debated whether globalisation has weakened or 
strengthened nationalism and national identification, reaching sometimes radically 
opposing conclusions (Ariely 2012:461). At the same time, there has been renewed 
interest in the ways in which ‘ordinary people’ experience national identity on local 
levels, leading some scholars to question the assumed salience of the nation in everyday 
life, and to criticise earlier work for taking supposedly coherent and tangible national or 
ethnic groups as the starting points for their analyses (see review essay I). Scholarship 
on diaspora and transnational migration has likewise argued over the concept of an 
‘epochal shift’ from ‘the age of the nation-state to the age of diaspora’ (Brubaker 
12 
 
2005:8), and exhibited concern that previous treatments of diaspora were constrained by 
simplistic and unidirectional understandings of ‘home’ and ‘host’ rooted in the logic of 
the nation-state (see chapter 3). Within the field of memory studies, meanwhile, there 
has been significant discussion as to the impact of globalisation and mass media on the 
power and coherence of national memory cultures, coupled with a growing 
dissatisfaction with earlier scholarship for allegedly taking for granted that the nation is 
the sole or principal mnemonic community commanding people’s allegiance and 
orientating their memories (see review essay II). 
 
The Greeks of Turkey are a particularly appropriate community through which to 
develop and reflect upon these research agendas. They have typically been studied 
either through the lens of ethnicity and nationalism as a community with a relatively 
unambiguous national or ethnic identity (Alexandris 1980; Alexandris 1992; Alexandris 
2004; Vryonis 2005), or as a community that transcends or represents an exception to 
national distinctions (Babül 2004; Babül 2006a; Babül 2006b; Örs 2006). In part II, I 
argue that neither perspective takes full measure of the heterogeneity or complexity of 
national belonging and national identity, nor of the ways in which the latter is adaptable 
to particular individuals in different local contexts. The Greeks of Istanbul and the 
island Imbros/Gökçeada, faced with discrimination on the basis of their ethnic and 
religious identity, overwhelmingly left their birthplaces in Turkey during the period 
c.1950-1980 and resettled in what many regarded as their ‘national homeland’: Greece. 
Here they received something of a lukewarm reception, both from a government that 
saw them as abandoning historic Greek territories, and from segments of the population 
who viewed them with suspicion due to their Turkish birthplace (see chapter 2). In 
chapter 3, I consider how the expatriated Greeks of Turkey responded to these 
challenges to their legitimacy as members of the national community by drawing upon 
the particularities of their own local heritages. I further this discussion of identity and 
belonging in chapter 4 by exploring the variable ways in which members of the 
expatriated community depicted two ‘others’ in their personal testimonies: the Turks 
and the Elladítes (or Greeks of Greece). In each case, I describe how the Greeks of 
Turkey sought to establish their authenticity as members of the Greek national 





As I discuss in chapter 2, the Greeks of Turkey commonly express a profound 
disappointment with the level of support they received from the Greek state, both whilst 
they were living in Turkey and after their arrival in Greece, and a sense of dismay at the 
lack of general awareness amongst the Greek populace about their community and its 
experiences in Turkey. In part III, I investigate how expatriate activists and writers, in 
their efforts to combat this diplomatic and historical marginalisation and raise 
awareness of the persecution and expatriation of the Greeks of Turkey in domestic and 
international forums, adopted and adapted archetypes both from Greek nationalist 
history and the mnemonic repertoires of other communities. Chapter 5 focuses in 
particular on the commemorative activities organised by the expatriated Greeks of 
Istanbul for the anniversaries of the 1955 Istanbul Riots and the 1453 Fall of 
Constantinople, exploring how expatriate organisations created linkages between local 
experience and national history. In chapter 6, I examine the ways in which the Greeks of 
Turkey drew parallels between their own experiences and those of other minority 
communities, namely the Armenians, the Assyrians, the Jews, and the Kurds. I explore 
what these discourses might reveal about the transcultural movements of memories, and 
how these relate to the dynamics of remembrance on local and national levels. Part IV 
draws together the threads developed in preceding chapters. In chapter 7, I turn my 
attention to the growing seasonal and permanent return of Greeks to Imbros, 
considering how the possibility of return has affected the returnees’ sense of self and 
belonging, the relationship of the community to Greece and Greek nationalist history, 
and the identity of the younger, Greek-born generation that increasingly visit the island 




I collectively refer to the Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros as ‘the Greeks of Turkey’, by 
which I mean those Orthodox Christians who were exempted from the 1923 population 
exchange between Greece and Turkey, distinguished from the ‘Asia Minor refugees’ 
(those who were exchanged in 1923) and the ‘native Greeks’ (loosely speaking, those 
born in the Greek state).
3
 I refer to the Greeks of Istanbul as Polítes – singular Polítis 
(m.) or Polítissa (f.) – a contraction of Konstantinoupolítes (‘Constantinopolitans’), and 
use the English adjective ‘Constantinopolitan’. My informants generally referred to the 
                                                 
3
 The Greeks of Tenedos – neighbouring island to Imbros – were also exempted from the 1923 exchange, 
but are not dealt with in this thesis. 
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city as Konstantinoúpoli or simply Póli (I translate both as ‘Constantinople’). I call the 
Greeks of Imbros/Gökçeada Imvriótes – singular Imvriótis (m.) or Imvriótissa (f.) – and 
deploy the adjective Imbriot.
4
 This terminology reflects my informants’ own 
terminological choices, and is not intended to pass comment in any way on the political 
sovereignty of Istanbul or Imbros/Gökçeada.  Members of both communities also called 
themselves Romioí – i.e. Orthodox Christians or the descendants of the Eastern Roman 
Empire – and/or Έllines. Although both words are sometimes translated, particularly in 
non-scholarly work, as ‘Greeks’, distinguishing between the two terms is important for 
my purposes (see chapter 3). I translate Έllinas (m.), Ellinída (f.), Έllines (pl.), 
ellinismós (noun), and ellinikós (adj.) as Hellene/Hellene/Hellenes/Hellenism/Hellenic, 
and preserve Romiós (m.), Romiá (f.), Romioí (pl.), and romiosýni (noun) in the original 
Greek, as no appropriate translation exists (although I use the adjective ‘Romaic’). I 
reserve the English word ‘Greek’ and its derivatives for when it is not profitable (or 
possible) to distinguish between the Hellenic and the Romaic.  
 
As a collective noun to refer to those Polítes and Imvriótes who left Turkey after 1923 
(the vast majority of both communities), I have settled upon ‘expatriates’. This term is 
far from perfect, but has been chosen as a compromise that best reflects the diverse 
experiences of the Greeks of Turkey. Within the community, there is significant 
uncertainty over how they should categorise themselves, and different individuals 
present their emigration from Turkey in different ways. Interviewees generally (though 
not exclusively) avoided the label ‘refugee’.
5
 With the exception of those expelled as 
Greek citizens in 1964 (who commonly call themselves ‘expellees’), they were not 
forcibly removed from Turkey. At any rate, in Greek discourse the term ‘the refugees’ is 
typically used to refer specifically to those who left Turkey as part of the compulsory 
population exchange with Greece in 1923. The umbrella term ‘forced migrants’ would 
be inappropriate for similar reasons, whilst ‘exile’ has connotations of politically-
motivated displacement. Nevertheless, the majority of my informants felt that they had 
been compelled to leave Turkey by factors beyond their control, and accordingly 
generally eschewed the term ‘migrant’, lest it be interpreted that they relocated to 
Greece for economic reasons. Community organisations founded by the Greeks of 
                                                 
4
 Imvriótes is the term typically preferred by the Imbriot Society when publishing material in English. 
Greek and Imbriot writers also commonly refer to the Greeks of Imbros as Ίmvrioi. For clarity and 
consistency, I translate Ίmvrioi (and its singular equivalents) as Imvriótes (and its singular equivalents) 
throughout this thesis. 
5
 Rita referred to the Polítes as ‘modern refugees’, distinguishing her community in that way from the 
1923 refugees, whilst Thanasis dubbed himself ‘the last refugee’ (Rita 21/11/2011; Thanasis 06/02/2012). 
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Turkey in Greece have often used the terms ekdiochthéntes (literally: ‘those who have 
been driven out’) and ekpatristhéntes (‘those who have been expatriated’), and when 
publishing material in English have typically preferred variations upon ‘the expatriated 
Greek community of Istanbul’ (Ouzounoglou 2014a). This terminology presents 
problems of its own, partly as its etymology (from the Latin ex- (‘out’) and patria 
(‘fatherland’)) implies a rather unidirectional and static understanding of homeland 
somewhat inappropriate to the Greeks of Turkey (see chapter 3), and partly because in 
British usage ‘expat’ is commonly taken to mean an individual living outside their 
country of birth by choice, often for the purposes of work or retirement. Taken more 
literally, however, to mean ‘those living outside their native country’, the term 
‘expatriates’ has the distinct advantage of covering the diverse range of reasons given 
by the Greeks of Turkey for their emigration from the country of their birth, from those 
who were forcibly expelled as Greek citizens to those (few, amongst my informants) 




My principal sources are oral history interviews with Polítes and Imvriótes, primarily 
produced during ethnographic fieldwork in Greece (see methodology, below). I 
conducted six fieldwork expeditions to Greece between 2011 and 2015: in Thessaloniki 
(November-December 2011); Athens (January-February 2012); Western Thrace 
(February-March 2013); Thessaloniki/Athens (May-June 2013); Athens (February-
March 2014); and Thessaloniki (September 2015).
6
 Additionally, I was invited to join 
the Imbriot Society on their annual summer return to Imbros in August 2013 (see 
chapter 7). In total, I collected testimonies from 107 first- and second-generation 
expatriates (49 Polítes, 58 Imvriótes; see appendices 1-3), which are referred to in the 
text by pseudonym and date of interview in the format: (pseudonym dd/mm/yyyy). Most 
informants were interviewed just once – as Alessandro Portelli observed, a twice-told 
tale with the same interviewer and narrator is at best a ‘surrogate’ (1991:62) – although 
I had further, less formal discussions with a handful of informants at later dates. I also 
                                                 
6
 Two interviews were conducted in Sheffield, and one via Skype. I also collected testimonies from 
members of the Turkish communities in and around Komotini and Alexandroupoli, Greek descendants of 
Orthodox Christian refugees from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, and Greek expatriates from Tenedos. 
These are not explicitly dealt with in this thesis, although they often helped to inform my approach. At the 
outset, I had intended to incorporate the Greeks of Tenedos in my study, but, due to the relatively small 




conducted interviews with Giorgos Isaakidis of the Constantinopolitan Society and 
Nikos Ouzounoglou of the Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans about the 
work of their respective organisations: both consented to be referred to by name in the 
thesis. 
 
I located my interviewees in a variety of ways. The expatriate community organisations 
in Thessaloniki and Athens – in particular the Union of Constantinopolitans of Northern 
Greece, the Constantinopolitan Society, the Ecumenical Federation of 
Constantinopolitans (henceforth referred to as the Federation of Constantinopolitans), 
and the Imbriot Society (on which, see chapter 2) – were crucial, introducing me to their 
members, and providing a setting both for conducting and arranging further interviews. 
I branched out from these central contacts through a ‘snowball’ technique (Bertaux and 
Bertaux-Wiame 1981:176), asking interviewees to introduce me to friends and relatives, 
which helped to ensure the diversity of my sample by reaching those unaffiliated with 
community organisations.
7
 Other informants were found through mutual native Greek 
acquaintances, chance encounters, or approaching shopkeepers whose establishments 
boasted likely-sounding names. Although some practitioners stress the importance of a 
closely-controlled and strictly-disciplined interview environment (see Yow 1994:55-81 
for a particularly prescriptive method), I preferred to allow my informants to choose a 
setting with which they themselves felt comfortable. Some interviewees chose to 
conduct interviews in private so that their narrative would not be disturbed, whilst 
others preferred to be interviewed in public, sometimes involving friends or passers-by 
in the discussion. As a result, interviews were conducted variously in community 
organisations, people’s homes, cafés, even, on one occasion, outside a nightclub, and, 
although most interviews were one-on-one, not infrequently other interlocutors would 
intervene in the dialogue, often with interesting and productive results. 
 
                                                 
7
 There is, nonetheless, something of a gender imbalance in my sample (71% male, 29% female), which 
can be accounted for in large part by the fact that men (particularly amongst older age groups) were more 
likely to frequent the expatriate associations than their female counterparts, with the result that it was 
more difficult to make contact with potential female interviewees. I actively sought to address this 
imbalance during my fieldwork, particularly by asking contacts and other interviewees to introduce me to 
female relatives and friends who might be interested in speaking about their experiences. Here too, 
however, I sometimes ran into difficulties due to the perception seemingly held by some potential 
interviewees – male and female – that speaking about history (or at least the kinds of history it was often 
assumed that I was interested in) and talking to a foreign ethnographer were characteristically ‘masculine’ 
activities. On one particular occasion, for instance, I had arranged by telephone to meet a female 
informant, only to arrive at the meeting and find that her husband (with whom I had never spoken) had 
come in her stead. 
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In addition to these oral histories, I make use of 47 interviews conducted by Turkish 
researchers and published as Constantinople, My Nostalgia: Refugee Narratives and the 
Nostalgia of the Romioí of Constantinople (Turan et al. 2010). This project was 
conducted as part of Istanbul’s tenure as the European Capital of Culture 2010, and was 
‘designed to find out the nostalgic aspects of Istanbul as pronounced by its former 
dwellers […] and their reasons for departure’ in order to facilitate ‘any programme 
aiming at preserving the heritage of the city’ and to provide ‘a positive contribution to 
the civil dialogue between Greece and Turkey’ (Turan et al. 2010:243). The interviews 
were primarily conducted in Turkish and in Athens or Thessaloniki, and were presented 
alongside biographical information and personal photographs (Turan et al. 2010:249). 
The interviewers’ voices have been silenced in the transcripts, and as such it is not 
possible to determine what questions were asked. It is also unclear to what extent the 
testimonies have been abridged. So that they can be distinguished from my own oral 
histories (referred to simply by a pseudonymous given name), I reference testimonies 
taken from this volume by the informant’s full name and date of interview (given name 
surname dd/mm/yyyy; see appendix 4). I also take into consideration 50 testimonies 
from witnesses to the 1955 Istanbul Riots collected by Ekdóseis Tsoukátou, the 
publisher of the expatriate newspaper O Polítis (see below), and published as 
Septemvrianá 1955: The ‘Kristallnacht’ of the Hellenism of Constantinople (1999). 
These testimonies were mostly solicited by O Polítis and sent in by witnesses – 
sometimes anonymously, sometimes not – although the volume also includes 
testimonies from the archive of the Constantinopolitan Society, and two testimonies 
adapted from Leonidas Koumakis’ semi-autobiographical novel The Miracle (1996; see 
chapter 6). These testimonies are numbered 1 to 50, and my in-text references to this 
volume follow this convention, in the format: (testimony x). 
 
I incorporate a range of other written materials in addition to these personal testimonies, 
primarily drawn from the archives of the expatriate organisations. In particular, I 
conducted an extensive study of the two most prominent expatriate newspapers: the 
Constantinopolitan O Polítis
8
 (particularly issues from 1967 to 2002, from the archive 
of the Constantinopolitan Society) and the Imbriot Imvriakí Ichó/Ίmvros
9
 (particularly 
from 1971 to 2002, from the archive of the Imbriot Society). O Polítis was founded in 
1967 by members of the Association of Hellenic Citizens Expelled from Turkey, 
                                                 
8
 ‘The Citizen’ or ‘The Constantinopolitan’. 
9
 Imvriakí Ichó or ‘Imbriot Echo’ was renamed Ίmvros in 1975. 
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although as it emphasised in its inaugural issue it was to cater not just to those Greeks 
forcibly expelled from Turkey in 1964 but to the entire expatriate Constantinopolitan 
community (O Polítis June 1967). Since then, the paper has been in continuous monthly 
publication, dealing particularly with issues relating to the Greeks of Turkey and 
broader Greek-Turkish relations, as well as domestic developments in both Greece and 
Turkey. It also prints news from other Constantinopolitan communities scattered across 
the globe, regular features relating to Constantinopolitan history and culture, poetry and 
serialised fiction or autobiography, press releases from the expatriate community 
organisations, letters from readers, and obituaries. According to a source at Ekdóseis 
Tsoukátou, in 2012 the newspaper had 4000 subscribers; the majority of these were 
resident in Greece, followed by subscribers living in Turkey. Imvriakí Ichó was first 
printed in 1971 by the Imbriot Society in Athens with the intention of filling the gap left 
by the discontinuation of two Imbriot journals (Imvriakí Ichó October 1971). The 
newspaper is published monthly, bimonthly, or occasionally tri-monthly, and from the 
January-February 1975 edition its name was changed to Ίmvros. It is first and foremost 
a community publication and organ of the Imbriot Society, but also deals with issues 
affecting Greece and Turkey more generally. 
 
Oral history methodology 
 
I initially developed my interview technique by observing the archaeologist Paul 
Halstead (my father) conducting ethnographic fieldwork with agricultural communities 
in the Mediterranean. For him, an ethnographic encounter is a relatively informal and 
fluid conversation, so much so that in a monograph based on his findings he keeps the 
word ‘interview’ at arm’s-length: 
 
Informants did not sign ‘informed consent’ forms. Some, whom I had known for 
decades, would have treated any such request with disbelief. Others I met for the 
first time when I ‘interviewed’ (i.e., talked with) them, and any invitation to sign 
a printed form would have ended our acquaintance before it began. A few were 
illiterate, some had failed eyesight, and several died before I thought of writing 
about what they told me. Informants often provided greatest insight when they 
strayed from the preplanned questions that a consent form would have covered 
(P. Halstead 2014:ix). 
 
My approach is similar. I avoided a rigid pre-determined questionnaire that would have 
risked unnecessarily imposing my own pre-conceived ideas and narrative structure upon 





 I began all my interviews by soliciting a ‘life history’ (or ‘life story’, 
Bertaux 1981a:7), usually with the statement ‘tell me about your life’.
11
 My intention 
was to see what topics and themes my informants’ narratives would gravitate towards 
without external guidance. As Isabelle Bertaux-Wiame, a pioneer of the life history as a 
sociological tool, argued, ‘[t]he forms of life-stories are […] as important as the facts 
which they contain. And because of this, freedom of self-expression is all-important’ 
(1981:259).
12
 For instance, an interviewee’s narrative velocity – ‘the ratio between the 
duration of the events described and the duration of the narration’ (Portelli 1991:49) – 
can provide insights into what the past means to people today. Many of my 
interviewees’ narratives, for example, either emphasised particular incidents of violent 
intercommunal strife whilst eliding benign aspects of daily life, or stressed harmonious 
everyday coexistence whilst skipping over intercommunal flashpoints, reflecting 
divergent contemporary understandings of self and belonging (see Halstead 2014b). 
 
There are, nevertheless, limitations that must be borne in mind when working with these 
life histories. It is impossible to remove the social presence of the interviewer from the 
interview context – even if he/she says very little – as testimony is always delivered 
with an audience in mind (Mann 1998:81-83, 94-96; Portelli 1991:54-55; Portelli 
1997:9-10; Thompson 1978:139-140, 157; Tonkin 1992:2, 54). In Portelli’s terms, 
‘informants tell [researchers] what they believe they want to be told and thus reveal who 
they think the researcher is’ (1991:54). Or, as he wrote elsewhere: 
 
Typical beginnings, such as “I have nothing to say,” or even “What do you want 
me to say,” may be coy manoeuvrings, but they may also indicate that the 
narrator feels entitled to speak only because of a mandate from the interviewer: I 
only speak because you ask me to (and, often, I will say what you want to hear) 
(Portelli 1997:9). 
 
Indeed, whilst the majority of my informants were content to embark upon a sustained 
opening narrative without significant prompting, a number were reluctant to offer a 
                                                 
10
 As Halstead wrote, although field interviews often defied close control, ‘such lack of discipline proved 
invaluable, because my questions reflected the limits of my understanding and the most revealing 
“answers” were unsolicited’ (P. Halstead 2014:6-7). 
11
 Before beginning interviews, I told my informants that I was conducting research at the University of 
York, and was interested in hearing their memories of life both in Turkey and Greece. Interviewees were 
told that their names would be pseudonymised in the final text. 
12
 So, for instance, Bertaux-Wiame observed through interviews with retired bakers in Paris that those 
who remained workmen for their whole working lives tended to recall their apprenticeships negatively 
and stress exploitation by the master bakers, whereas those who had gone on to become independent 
bakers ‘seem to have forgotten all this’, remembering that their apprenticeships involved long hours but 
eliding the persecution of the master (1981:258; 1982:194). 
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detailed life history – asking, ‘what should I tell you?’ – or sought confirmation that 
what they were saying was appropriate, and that others had given similar answers.
13
 
Equally, informants sometimes assumed that my research would focus on a particular 
topic or period, and selected the material for their narrative accordingly. At a meeting of 
the Union of Constantinopolitans of Northern Greece, I was introduced as ‘a young man 
who is writing a thesis about the Istanbul Riots’, though all I had myself said is that I 
wanted to write about the memories of the Greeks of Istanbul. After the meeting, I was 
approached by Ioanna, who immediately launched into a narrative about her life in 
Istanbul and migration to Greece structured around her experiences during the riots in 
1955, delivered at a frenetic pace with liberal back-and-forth between the traumatic 
experiences of the past and her contemporary nostalgia for the city of her birth (Ioanna 
21/11/2011). When we met for an in-depth interview at a later date in the more relaxed 
setting of her home, the narrative velocity of her life history was notably changed, and 
her account was furnished with details that were absent in our original encounter 
(Ioanna 23/11/2011). As this example demonstrates, the content and form of a life 
history is significantly influenced by the particular context of its capture, as well as 
narrative genres/archetypes and prior rehearsals typically unavailable to the researcher 
(Bertaux-Wiame 1982:193; Leydesdorff et al. 1999:15; Portelli 1991:61; Schrager 
1998:284). Life histories are not ‘transparent self-portraits’ (Tonkin 1992:57) but rather 
‘always have to be structured, according to known conventions, in order to convey the 
desire […] of this teller to present a self to this listener, at this particular moment’ 
(Tonkin 1990:34). 
 
It is, therefore, important to recognise that oral histories are inherently subjective and 
protean, or, in James Clifford’s terms, ‘partial truths’ (1986:6-7). Yet if it was this 
subjectivity that was commonly highlighted by the discipline’s detractors (as Daniel 
Bertaux (1981b:31), Portelli (1991:51), and Raphael Samuel (1994:4) have all 
observed), it may also be its most productive analytical asset (Portelli 1991:ix; 26; 
Tonkin 1992:8; Thompson 1978:160; Yow 1994:25). Selective emphasis, omission, and 
even demonstrable historical error in oral accounts can themselves generate important 
                                                 
13
 For instance, Spyros – whose life history was structured around key historical events affecting the 
Greeks of Turkey – seemed to seek confirmation from me that his periodisation was appropriate, asking if 
he should proceed to the 1955 Istanbul Riots after finishing his discussion of the conscription of young 
men into forced labour battalions during the Second World War (02/12/2011). Occasionally, informants 
were either reticent about introducing me to other potential interviewees – seemingly worried that this 
meant they had not provided enough information themselves, causing them to make an attempt to fill in 
the gaps (cf. P. Halstead 1989:46) – or, conversely, were reluctant to go into detail on particular issues on 
the basis that other people would be able to cover them more adeptly. 
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observations about the meaning that individuals derive from historical events (Portelli 
1991:15); as Portelli has stressed, ‘“wrong” statements are still psychologically “true”’ 
and may tell us ‘less about events than about their meaning’ (1991:50-51). In a classic 
example, Portelli described how the death of Italian steelworker Luigi Trastulli in a 
1949 walkout protesting Italy’s signature of the North Atlantic Treaty was subsequently 
shifted in oral testimonies (collected in the 1970s and 1980s) to street fights in 1953 
resulting from the laying off of thousands of steelworkers (1991:13-26). Rather than 
decry his informants’ ‘faulty memory’, Portelli demonstrated what the chronological 
shift might reveal about the meaning of the past in people’s minds, noting that the death 
was difficult to accept in the context of a minor and ultimately unimportant scuffle in 
1949, whereas the 1953 layoffs remained ‘the most important dramatic event in the 
town’s working-class history’ and were therefore a more suitable setting for Trastulli’s 
sacrifice (1991:15-16). Based on the potential analytical productivity of such 
distortions, as well as the inevitability of the researcher’s imprint upon an informant’s 
testimony, Portelli criticised a ‘positivistic fetish of noninterference’ (1991:43) amongst 
certain practitioners of oral history that ‘turns the dialogue into two monologues: 
informants supply a monologue of brute facts, while historians and anthropologists will 
supply – later, from the safety of their desks – a monologue of sophisticated ideas that 
the informant never hears about’ (Portelli 1997:11-12). Rather, according to his 
perspective, ‘the changes that our presence [as interviewers] may cause’ might be 
considered to be ‘some of the most important results of our field work’ (Portelli 
1991:44).  
 
For these reasons, after giving my interviewees the opportunity to offer a life history for 
as long as they wished, I followed up with a more fluid dialogue in which I allowed 
informants to explore and question my perspectives as well as vice-versa. As Portelli 
put it, the ‘inter/view’ is a ‘mutual sighting’ between researcher and informant 
(1991:31), and a respectfully challenging and dissenting interviewer is more likely to 
gain access to a narrative that dissents from formal or official discourse (1997:12). On 
occasion, I posed purposefully leading questions in order to see how interviewees would 
react to my perceived assumptions, or introduced loaded terminology such as ‘identity’ 
or ‘nation’ to explore how they would respond to these categories. Sensitive, however, 
to J. Paul Goode and David R. Stroup’s warning that ‘those who go looking for ethnic 
behaviour will assuredly find it’ (2015:13), I began the dialogic portion of my 
interviews with more open-ended questions, adopting a ‘wait-and-listen approach’ (Fox 
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and Miller-Idriss 2008a:556-557) to see what discursive frameworks my informants 
would choose for themselves. This often required a degree of orchestrated naivety, such 
that the interviewee, ‘in an effort to teach or inform the interviewer’ (Goode and Stroup 
2015:13), might reveal information that would otherwise have seemed too ‘obvious’ to 
them, or explain and deconstruct familiar categories or narratives for the researcher’s 
benefit. For similar reasons, I did not attempt to prevent interviewees going ‘off-topic’, 
as when they did so it commonly opened up interesting and hitherto unconsidered lines 
of enquiry (cf. Yow 1994:62). In light of Portelli’s criticism of research that omits the 
interviewer’s voice, thereby giving ‘the impression that a given narrator will always say 
the same things, no matter what the circumstances’ (1991:54-55), I take care to 
document below the discursive context in which informants’ narratives were produced. 
As Elizabeth Tonkin advised, ‘professional historians who use the recollections of 
others cannot just scan them for useful facts to pick out, like currents from a cake. Any 
such facts are so embedded in the representation that it directs an interpretation of them’ 
(1990:27; 1992:6).  
 
Oral histories, following Portelli, are typically ‘told with the present in mind’ (1991:65). 
They are marked by extensive ‘narrative shuttlework’ between past and present or ‘the 
use of history as a repertory of examples’ (Portelli 1991:65), and involve ‘grouping 
together multiple instances […] matching aspects of experience with the capacities of 
various pieces of memory to depict them’ (Schrager 1998:295). In Luisa Passerini’s 
terms, they can ‘be seen as constructions of single mythbiographies, using a choice of 
resources, that include myths, combining the new and ancient in unique expressions’ 
(1990:59). Such multitemporality (Macdonald 2013:54-56) makes oral history an ideal 
methodology with which to explore past presencing, or how the past impinges upon the 
present (and vice versa) and what it means to people in their contemporary lives. It does 
not follow, of course, that we should unthinkingly equate discourses solicited in the 
course of an oral history interview with the ways in which people talk about the past on 
a day-to-day basis. Interviewees may feel freer or more constrained when discussing a 
particular topic in an interview context than they would with their peers in quotidian 
interactions, or may simply have recourse to categories that do not serve as salient 
frameworks in their everyday lives (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a:555). As Jon Fox and 
Cynthia Miller-Idriss wrote regarding the utility of formal interviews in exploring the 




Ordinary people’s practical mastery of the idiom of the nation, reproduced for 
social scientists in research settings of their own choosing, does not, in itself, 
explain the salience of such idioms in everyday life. Rather, it reflects a basic 
familiarity with the content and contours of nationhood that, when elicited, can 
be more-or-less competently deployed (2008a:555-556). 
 
Accordingly, I supplement the findings of my oral histories with information drawn 
from participant observation – most comprehensively through participation in the 
annual return to Imbros (see chapter 7), but also by attending social and cultural events 
with members of the communities – as well as conducting interviews in diverse social 
settings and, in some cases, with multiple participants, in order to observe how 
changing discursive contexts might influence individuals’ narratives. An important 
benefit of a less rigid and more dialogic approach to oral history production is that it 
draws us closer to the ‘conversational remembering’ that David Middleton and Derek 
Edwards saw as constitutive of collective memory (1990a; 1990b). Nevertheless, I want 
to emphasise that whilst oral histories may not be able to tell us anything about the 
salience of particular categories or discourses in everyday life, it would be a mistake to 
assume that their content is somehow created ex nihilo at that particular moment in 
time. Oral histories are not the same as everyday discourse, but they do commonly draw 
on narratives that have been acquired, developed, and tested in the course of everyday 
life. As Samuel Schrager has argued: 
 
[T]he oral historian is an intervener in a process that is already highly developed 
[…] In any such performance there is new and unique creation [in which] the 
oral historian has a participatory role. But here, as in most circumstances of 
storytelling, most of what is told has been said before in a related form […] An 
account’s previous tellings give it validity apart from the moment of the 
interview. If it belongs to the teller’s repertoire of narrative, it is grounded in his 
or her life and in the social world in which that life is lived (1998:284-285). 
 
In what follows, I attempt to keep in mind ‘that versions of events cannot be taken 
merely as windows upon individuals’ mental representations, but have to be studied in 
their social, conversational context’ (Middleton and Edwards 1990b:35), whilst also 
reflecting the fact that ‘remembering is an important part of everyday life and develops 
so as to meet its demands’ (Shotter 1990:128). In other words, I will not interpret oral 
testimonies as a static representation of how people would talk about the past in any 
context, but nor will I treat informants’ responses to the discursive challenges 
occasioned by the oral history interview as necessarily alien to those emerging in 
response to the challenges of everyday life. I will seek to understand oral histories 
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within their discursive context without disregarding their potential to tell us something 





The Greeks of Turkey 
Historical background 
 
In this chapter, I sketch out the historical trajectories of the Greeks of Istanbul and 
Imbros after 1923, based on a combination of secondary material and first-person 
testimony. My intention is not to construct an indisputable historical record against 
which my informants’ testimonies might be measured (see Macdonald 1993:14), but 
rather to provide context for some of the salient narratives offered by my interviewees 
in later chapters, and accordingly I attempt to document where there is dispute over the 
unfolding of past events, or discrepancies between the histories written by scholars and 




At the turn of the twentieth century, around 300,000 Orthodox Christians were living in 
Istanbul and its environs, accounting for around a quarter of the population, and 
controlling up to half of the economy and up to 80% of the trade (Örs 2006:83; Vryonis 
2005:7). They formed a significant part of Istanbul’s entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and 
skilled working class, and in the past some had risen to influential economic positions 
within the Ottoman Empire, for instance as bankers and even financial advisers to the 
Sultans (Alexandris 1992:31; Millas 2002:np; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165; Vryonis 
2005:10). Their mother tongue was mostly Greek, albeit with a significant distinctive 
vocabulary, and whilst some claimed an extended genealogy in Istanbul as far back as 
the Byzantine Empire, others traced their roots elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire or the 
Greek state (Örs:80; Tunç and Ferentinou 2012:907).  
 
After the First World War, Greece embarked upon a disastrous military campaign in 
Asia Minor, precipitating the 1919-1922 Greek-Turkish War. This conflict was brought 
to an end by the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, by which time a large 
proportion of Turkey’s Orthodox Christian population had been displaced, fleeing to 
Greece and elsewhere ahead of the advancing Turkish army after the collapse of the 
Greek forces. In an attempt to solve this post-war demographic chaos, the Convention 
Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was drawn up, envisaging 
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a compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. The defining 
characteristic for the exchange was religion: Muslims resident in Greece were to be 
expelled to Turkey, and Orthodox Christians living in Turkey were to be expelled to 
Greece. At the negotiations, Turkey pushed for the inclusion in the exchange of the 
Greeks of Istanbul – who had been comparatively unaffected by the conflict as Istanbul 
had been under Allied occupation – to which Greece was strongly opposed, ostensibly 
due to the additional demographic pressure this would place on Greece, although the 
place of the city in the Greek nationalist imagination and fears over the future of the 
Orthodox Patriarchate were probably equally decisive (Alexandris 1992:84-93; Oran 
2004:99).  
 
Ultimately, it was agreed that the Orthodox Christians of Istanbul, as well as those 
resident on the islands of Imbros and Tenedos (see below), would be exempted from the 
population exchange, along with the Muslims of Western Thrace in Greece who would 
act as a counterweight.
14
 As Turkey was pushing for proportionality in terms of these 
exempted minorities, it was agreed that only those Orthodox Christians settled in 
Istanbul prefecture before 30 October 1918 – called établis – would be exempted, as a 
result of which some 38,000 Polítes became subject to the exchange (Alexandris 
1992:96; Oran 2004:100). Additionally, Turkey blocked the return of around 40,000 
Orthodox Christians who had left Istanbul in 1922 in fear of an impending Turkish 
takeover of the city, on the basis that they had left Turkey on Allied documents rather 
than Turkish passports (Alexandris 1992:82, 101). Around 1500 Greeks, along with 
their dependents, were also expelled because they had served with the British 
administration during Allied occupation (Alexandris 1992:102). Accordingly, between 
1920 and 1924, some 60,000 Greek citizens resident in Istanbul, 40,000 non-
exchangeable Orthodox Christians who had left before the signing of the treaty, 38,000 
individuals established after 1918, and 20,000 Orthodox Christians from Istanbul’s 
suburbs left the city (Alexandris 1992:104). Around 110,000 Orthodox Christians thus 
remained in Istanbul after 1923, of whom two thirds, who had been Ottoman subjects, 
were given Turkish citizenship, whilst one third, Greek nationals who had been 
established in the city before 30 October 1918, retained Greek citizenship (Alexandris 
2004:118; Hirschon 2004a:8). These Greek citizens were not necessarily less 
                                                 
14
 The Muslims of Western Thrace, who have their own grievances with their treatment by the Greek 
state, are not dealt with in detail in this thesis (for discussion of this community, see for instance Akgönül 
1999; De Jong 1980; Demetriou 2006; Featherstone et al. 2011; Helsinki Watch 1990; Hüseyinoğlu 2012; 
Karakasidou 1995; Oran 1988). 
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indigenous to Turkey than their counterparts who held Turkish citizenship: many had 
never set foot on Greek soil, and held Greek nationality purely because their forebears 
had come from former Ottoman territories that became part of the Greek state after 




After a lengthy debate at the treaty negotiations, the Patriarchate was permitted to 
remain in Istanbul, providing it renounced any political and temporal authority and 
acted in a spiritual capacity alone.
16
 By a Turkish decree of 1923, only members of the 
Greek Orthodox clergy who held Turkish citizenship were to be eligible for the office of 
Patriarch (Alexandris 2004:121). Section three of the Treaty of Lausanne granted the 
Greek minority the right to the free exercise of religion and the free use of any language 
in public or in private, as well as the right to establish and operate (at their own 
expense) charitable, religious, educational or social institutions (Treaty of Lausanne 
1923: articles 38-40). Turkey undertook to extend the same rights to non-Muslims as 
Muslims, to treat all inhabitants equally before the law, and to ‘assure full and complete 
protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, 
nationality, language, race or religion’ (Treaty of Lausanne 1923: articles 38-39). The 
treaty also stipulated that in any town or region with a significant non-Muslim 
population provisions should be in place to allow educational instruction in primary 
schools to take place in the minority’s own language, although Turkey retained the right 
to also make the Turkish language compulsory in those minority schools (Treaty of 
Lausanne 1923: article 41). In addition to these safeguards to minority rights put in 
place by the Treaty of Lausanne, the Greeks of Turkey were also (in theory) protected 
by article 88 of the 1924 Turkish Constitution, which provided for the complete equality 
of all citizens regardless of race or religion (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165). Although 
in principle the legal position of non-Muslims was thus improved by the Treaty of 
Lausanne and the Turkish Constitution relative to what it had been in the Ottoman 
Empire, in practice the role of non-Muslims in Turkish public life declined after 1923 
(Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165). Although non-Muslims could be Turkish citizens, the 
perception remained that they could not be Turks, which was a serious impediment to 
their realisation of equal status (Alexandris 1992:139; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165). 
                                                 
15
 Several informants stated that they did not know whether their friends were Greek or Turkish citizens 
until the expulsions of Greek citizens began in 1964, or until male Turkish citizens were called up to 
serve in the Turkish army (Anastasia 05/02/2012; Ioanna 23/11/2011; Konstantinos 05/02/2012; Petros 
26/11/2011). 
16




For instance, with the enactment of the 1926 Civil Servant Law, non-Muslims were 
effectively barred from civil service, as the law required civil servants to be Turkish 




The fortunes of the Polítes fluctuated in the course of the twentieth century. In the tense 
post-war environment of the 1920s, there were various transgressions of the terms of the 
Treaty of Lausanne regarding minorities by both Greece and Turkey (Oran 2004:102; 
Alexandris 1992:105-142). In the 1930s, a period of Greek-Turkish rapprochement 
under Eleftherios Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal (beginning with the conclusion of the 
Ankara Convention in June 1930, which settled outstanding property claims relating to 
the 1923 exchange) heralded improvements for the Greeks of Turkey (Alexandris 
1992:177-180). In October 1930, the Convention of Establishment, Commerce and 
Navigation was signed, which reiterated the right of those Polítes with Greek 
citizenship to remain in Turkey (Alexandris 1992:179-180; Alexandris 2004:118). In 
1933, Turkey permitted the foundation of a community organisation bearing an ethnic 
appellation in the form of the Hellenic Union of Istanbul, although only Greek citizens 
were allowed to be members (Alexandris 2004:118). In February 1934, Greece and 
Turkey entered into a mutual defence treaty by signing the Balkan Pact alongside 
Romania and Yugoslavia. Yet despite Greek-Turkish rapprochement, some restrictive 
measures affecting the minority were also implemented by Turkey in the 1930s. In June 
1932, apparently in an effort to tackle economic difficulties arising from the depression 
(Alexandris 1992:185), law 2007 was passed, banning foreign nationals from over 30 
professions, and forcing some to emigrate (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:165-166; Turan et 
al. 2010:245; Vryonis 2005:33).
18
 In 1934, the Law of Family Names was passed, 
which required all Turkish citizens to take a surname, and banned surnames denoting, 
amongst other things, nationality (Alexandris 1992:183). The 1930s also saw the launch 
of the ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaign, in which pressure was put on minorities to 
adopt the Turkish language (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:167; Alexandris 1992:183). 
Although problems thus persisted for the Polítes, Alexis Alexandris has suggested that 
Turkey’s treatment of its minorities in the 1930s ‘compares admirably’ with other 
Central and Eastern European nations (1992:191). 
 
                                                 
17
 According to Çimen Turan et al., under Article 48 of the Civil Servant Law in 1965 the requirement 
was changed from being a Turk to being a Turkish citizen (2010:245). 
18
 The Federation of Constantinopolitans claimed that around 12,000-13,000 Greek citizens left Istanbul 
as a result of this measure (2014a; 2015a:6). 
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During the Second World War, in which Turkey remained neutral and Greece fell to 
Axis occupation, the Polítes came under renewed pressure. In 1941, Turkey mobilised 
non-Muslims between the ages of 18 and 45 into labour battalions to construct roads 
and buildings in Anatolia (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:15; Turan et al. 2010:246). 
According to Greek sources, the labourers faced harsh conditions and many lost their 
lives (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:15; Vryonis 2005:33). In late 1942, Turkey 
adopted the Varlık Vergisi or wealth tax, which disproportionately targeted non-
Muslims with harsh and sometimes unpayable duties (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:169; 
Alexandris 1992:215-219).
19
 In Istanbul, 87% of the taxpayers were from the non-
Muslim population (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:169).
20
 Debtors were required to pay the 
tax within 15 days, or within 30 days with interest, and non-payers had their property 
confiscated and/or were deported to forced labour camps (Alexandris 1992:221-222; 
Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:170; Turan et al. 2010:246; Vryonis 2005:34-35). According 
to the Constantinopolitan Society and the Federation of Constantinopolitans (on which, 
see below), 21 debtors lost their lives in the labour camps (Constantinopolitan Society 
2009:15; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015a:8). Under international pressure, the 
tax was abolished in March 1944, non-payers were released, and the outstanding sums 
were written off (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:170). Although the ostensible purpose of 
the tax was to tackle inflation (Alexandris 1992:211; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:169) 
many commentators – both Greek and Turkish – have argued that the intent of the law 
was to wrest control of commerce from the non-Muslim minorities (Akar cited in Turan 
et al. 2010:246; Alexandris 1992:215-219; Güven cited in Turan et al. 2010:246; Oran 




In the post-war period, mutual fears of Soviet expansion led to more cordial Greek-
Turkish relationships, and culminated in August 1954 in a formal alliance between 
Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia (Alexandris 1992:234-237). Both Turkey and Greece 
were concerned by Russian attempts to undermine the ecumenical character of the 
Patriarchate in Istanbul, leading to some Turkish concessions towards the Patriarch and 
his Greek flock (Alexandris 1992:237-243). Patriarch Athenagoras I – elected in 1948 – 
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 For instance, Michalis told me that his father was subject to a substantial tax that he was not able to pay 
on his modest income as a newspaper seller, resulting in the seizure of pieces of furniture from the family 
home, including Michalis’ cot (29/01/2012). 
20
 Turan et al. give the slightly lower figure of 70% for the proportion of the tax paid by Armenians, 
Greeks, and Jews (2010:246). 
21
 Indeed, some Polítes reported that relatives were forced to sell commercial properties in order to pay 
for the tax (for instance Kalliopi Sofiadou 04/03/2010; Elisavet Kovi 09/03/2010). 
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reciprocated by taking measures to improve relationships with the Turkish authorities, 
for instance flying the Turkish flag outside the Patriarchate on Sundays (Alexandris 
1992:246-247). In 1954, an agreement between Greece and Turkey set the number of 
Greek citizens allowed to teach in minority schools in Turkey, and reciprocally the 
number of Turkish citizens allowed to teach in minority schools in Western Thrace, as 
well as permitting each country to supply the minority schools in the other with 
textbooks (Alexandris 1992:249). Tensions over Cyprus, however, and the rise of the 
Greek Cypriot guerrilla movement EOKA – whose goal was to achieve independence 
from the British Empire and union with Greece – disrupted this period of reconciliation 
(Alexandris 1992:253). Segments of the Turkish press accused Greek Orthodox 
archbishops of raising money to fund the Greek Cypriots, and lambasted the Patriarch 
for maintaining neutrality (Alexandris 1992:253-254). Popular opinion was also 
inflamed by the Cyprus is Turkish Association, which was supported by the ruling 
Democratic Party (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171). 
 
The 6-7 September 1955 Istanbul Riots, known in Greek as the Septemvrianá, occurred 
against the backdrop of these tensions,
22
 and are generally agreed to have been state-
organised or at least state-sanctioned (Alexandris 2004:119; Campbell and Sherrard 
1968:256-257; Güven 2008:9-15; Oran 2004:113; Vryonis 2005:97-99; de Zayas 
2007:137-138).
23
 The riot was ostensibly triggered by an attack on the birthplace of 
Kemal in Thessaloniki on the night of 5 September, although later investigations 
revealed that the explosion that occurred near the house in question was caused by a 
bomb planted by an agent of the Turkish intelligence services (Oran 2004:113; 
Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171; Vryonis 2005:94-95). The bombing was reported in the 
Turkish press and radio the following day, and on the evening of 6 September a crowd 
of demonstrators gathered in Taksim Square, seemingly primarily made up of students, 
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 Although the Septemvrianá has commonly been interpreted as closely connected with escalating Greek-
Turkish tensions over the future of Cyprus (Calotychos 2003:188; Clogg 1992:153; Foti no date), several 
scholars have emphasised that the riots are better understood within a broader history of national 
homogenisation in Turkey (Güven, cited in Foti no date; Güven 2015:45; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:172), 
a perspective frequently reiterated by the Federation of Constantinopolitans (2013c; 2015a:5, 30; 2015b). 
Speros Vryonis saw these two concerns as interconnected, writing that the ‘long-term evolution in 
Turkey’s treatment of its non-Muslim minorities forms a kind of matrix within which the Cyprus conflict 
was fitted’ (2005:41). 
23
 After the riots, the Turkish government initially blamed communist agitators, before suggesting that the 
riot was a spontaneous popular reaction to events on Cyprus (Vryonis 2005:29; Özkirimli and Sofos 
2008:172). 17 members of the Cyprus is Turkish Association were tried and acquitted in 1957 (Özkirimli 
and Sofos 2008:172). After a military coup in May 1960 against the Menderes government, several 
prominent figures within the Democratic Party – amongst them Adnan Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu – 
were executed for violating the Turkish Constitution by undertaking actions that included the 1955 riots 
(Vryonis 2005:522-525, 529). 
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workers, and residents of nearby villages transported into central Istanbul by the Cyprus 
is Turkish Association or the Democratic Party (Alexandris 1992:257; Özkirimli and 
Sofos 2008:171; Vryonis 2005:72). Rioters proceeded to attack non-Muslim property, 
which had apparently been marked in advance by the Cyprus is Turkish Association and 
the trade unions (Vryonis 2005:104).
24
 According to Umut Özkirimli and Spyros Sofos, 
the attack unfolded based on lists of non-Muslim homes and establishments that were in 
the possession of group leaders, and with weapons that had been distributed to the 
crowd (2008:171). Several scholars have reported that the police and the army did 
nothing to stop the rioters, prevented junior officers from interfering, and sometimes 
even participated in the rioting (Alexandris 1992:264; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171; 
Vryonis 2005:186). 
 
The rioters attacked, looted, and in some cases set fire to houses, businesses, places of 
worship, and schools belonging to Istanbul’s non-Muslim populations. Estimates as to 
the damage caused by the riots vary, although there is a general consensus that around 
4000 shops (Clogg 1992:153; Constantinopolitan Society 2009:17; Güven cited in 
Turan et al. 2010:247; Vryonis 2005:551), between 2000 and 4000 homes 
(Constantinopolitan Society 2009:17; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171), some 70 to 80 
places of worship (Clogg 1992:153; Constantinopolitan Society 2009:17; Güven cited 
in Turan et al. 2010:247), and 20 to 30 minority schools (Constantinopolitan Society 
2009:17; Güven cited in Turan et al. 2010:247;  Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171) were 
attacked. Based on figures given by the Turkish scholar Dilek Güven, Özkirimli and 
Sofos estimated that of 5317 buildings targeted, 59% belonged to Greeks, 17% to 
Armenians, 12% to Jews, and 10% to Muslims (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:171). 
Contemporary reports from the British and American embassies based on hospital 
attendance indicated that 60 women were raped (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:172), 
although many Greek sources cite underreporting and give higher estimates of 200 to 
300 rapes (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:17; Federation of Constantinopolitans 
2012:2; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015a:20; Vryonis 2005:220, 224). Estimates 
as to the number of deaths vary considerably, with most Greek sources offering a figure 
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 This accusation was also made by some of my informants, including Petros who recalled people 
coming through the Péra neighbourhood and asking the children playing in the street for the names of 
their fathers, passing by if they gave a Turkish name or marking the house with a red sign if they gave a 
Greek name (26/11/2011). 
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of between 15 and 37 fatalities.
25
 The rioting also spread to some of the Princes’ 
Islands, a chain of small islands off the coast of Istanbul in the Sea of Marmara. Speros 
Vryonis has described how rioters were ferried across from Istanbul, allegedly 
supported by elements of the islands’ Turkish population, to attack non-Muslim 
property on the islands of Chálki and Prínkipos, although on Prótos and possibly 
Antigóni the local Turkish authorities refused to allow the rioters to disembark 
(2005:182).
26
 Information from my own interviewees confirmed that incidents occurred 
on Prínkipos (Maria 09/05/2013; Evangelos 08/05/2013) and Chálki (Dimitris 
30/11/2011) but not on Prótos (Nikolaos 30/01/2012), and suggested that Antigóni was 





Vryonis lamented that representatives of many groups within Turkish society 
participated in the riots, and that whilst some ‘Muslim secularists (and Turkish 
communists)’ came to the aid of non-Muslims this was ‘very limited in extent’ 
(2005:76, 531). A number of my informants did indeed report that they saw friends and 
neighbours participating in the rioting or directing the crowd to Greek properties, or 
alleged that their neighbours first protected the Greeks in their own neighbourhood 
before travelling to another part of Istanbul to join in the rioting there (for instance, 
Apostolis 03/02/2012; Michalis 29/01/2012; Marios 29/01/2012; Milena 30/11/2011; 
                                                 
25
 In the immediate aftermath of the riots, British and American diplomats asserted that one Greek lost his 
life (Vryonis 2005:212). A 1992 Helsinki Watch report claimed that 15 Greeks lost their lives (1992:8), 
the same number reported by Turkish author Rıdvan Akar (cited in Turan et al. 2010:247). A 2009 
Constantinopolitan Society report stated that there were ‘no less than 17 deaths’ (2009:17), whilst in 2012 
the Federation of Constantinopolitans reported in excess of 30 deaths (2012:2) and in a 2015 presentation 
gave a figure of 37 (2015a:20). Vryonis has made the most systematic attempt to establish the number of 
dead. He noted that the available sources for establishing fatalities are problematic, partly due to 
confusion over the identification of certain victims, and partly due to the absence of official statistics 
(Vryonis 2005:213, 581). Indeed, a list of 37 potential fatalities reproduced in an appendix by Vryonis 
includes unidentified victims whose remains were recovered after the riots or whose deaths were reported 
in contemporary Turkish newspapers (2005:581-582). Further difficulties are encountered due to the fact 
that the cause of death is not always clearly established (three of the victims listed in Vryonis’ appendix 
are stated to have ‘died from fright’), and that in at least one incident the same victim has been counted 
twice (Vryonis 2005:213, 582). Additionally, it has been suggested that several victims may have died 
from their injuries sometime after the riots (Vryonis 2005:213). It is certainly the case that several of my 
informants traced the subsequent deaths of relatives back to the events of 1955: Rita’s father suffered a 
heart attack after returning home on the night in question, which she held accountable for his death two 
years later, and Paris felt that a contributory factor in his grandfather’s death in around 1960 was the 
‘great shock to his health’ he experienced after his shop was destroyed in the riots (Paris 01/02/2012; Rita 
21/11/2011). One of my informants challenged the number of deaths commonly given in such accounts, 
accusing some of his compatriots of deliberately shifting deaths that occurred at other times to 1955. 
Vryonis himself concluded that at least 30 Greeks were killed during the riots (2005:213). 
26
 Vryonis noted that different sources are contradictory as regards events on Antigóni (2005:182). 
27
 According to Evangelos, the local Turkish policeman stopped rioters from the mainland from 
embarking onto the island at gunpoint, telling them ‘I shall kill anyone who disembarks’ (08/05/2013). 
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Rita 21/11/2011). Yet there are reasons to be cautious about Vryonis’ pessimistic 
dismissal of intercommunal assistance as ‘very limited in extent’.
28
 Although frequently 
absent from published Greek accounts of the Septemvrianá, many oral testimonies 
contained stories of Muslim Turkish friends and neighbours providing support or 
protection to the Greeks (see also Örs 2006:83 and chapter 4), either by offering cryptic 
warnings (mentioned, for instance, by Alexandros 11/03/2014; Fotis 01/02/2012; 
Gerasimos 06/02/2012; Michalis 29/01/2012), advising them to turn on their lights and 
hang out a Turkish flag in order to mislead the rioters (Fotis 01/02/2012; Panagiotis 
24/11/2011),
29
 opening their houses to provide shelter (Antonis 10/08/2013; Andreas 
11/02/2012; Stavros 29/11/2011), diverting the rioters by telling them that there were no 
Greeks in the area (Mimis 13/08/2013; Rita 21/11/2011), guarding streets or multi-
storey apartment blocks and preventing the crowd from entering (Andreas 11/02/2012; 
Petros 26/11/2011; Tasos 13/03/2014), or personally intervening to prevent acts of 
violence (Alexandra 22/07/2011).  
 
The Septemvrianá has become the centrepiece of the Polítes’ narratives of persecution 
in the Turkish Republic (see chapter 5), and in Greek sources is commonly directly 
associated with the expatriation of the community. Vryonis, for example, wrote that the 
events of 1955 ‘destroyed the Greek community of Istanbul in a matter of some nine 
hours’ (2005:27). Certainly, the psychological ramifications of the attack were severe, 
leaving many Polítes with a profound sense of insecurity and despondency as regards 
the future of the community in Turkey, and several interviewees recalled that fears of a 
repetition of 1955 were playing on their minds when they did leave the country some 
years later. Nevertheless, the scale of Greek emigration from Turkey was at this stage 
comparatively minor. According to the Federation of Constantinopolitans, only around 
10% of the community left the country in the immediate wake of the Septemvrianá 
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 Vryonis calculated, for instance, that in the Ekdóseis Tsoukátou compilation of witness testimonies to 
the Septemvrianá at least 10 of the 50 accounts made reference to warnings or personal intervention by 
Muslims (Vryonis 2005:531), although my own reading of this volume indicated that there are references 
to Muslims either protecting or warning Greeks in at least 19 and possibly as many as 23 of the 50 
accounts (Ekdóseis Tsoukátou 1999; it is possible that Vryonis felt that some of these warnings were too 
cryptic to be counted). At least 14 of the 49 testimonies – a conservative figure – collected in 
Constantinople, My Nostalgia mentioned some form of aid being offered by Muslim neighbours (Turan et 
al. 2010). As Hercule Millas argued in relation to the history of the Ottoman Empire, although we must 
not ignore intercommunal tension and violence, accounts of positive neighbourly relationships deserve 
our analysis, ‘if only because Greek nationalist historians have so often claimed the contrary’ (2002:np). 
29
 Panagiotis remembered an Armenian woman married to a Turkish policeman who lived opposite them 
shouting across to his mother, ‘hang a Turkish flag out of the window!’ In the ensuing panic, his mother’s 
red dress was hung out of the window instead of the flag, prompting the neighbour to once again shout 
across, ‘no, not a red dress! A red flag! The Turkish flag!’ (24/11/2011). 
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(2014a). In the remainder of the decade, the Polítes were faced with further difficulties. 
According to the Constantinopolitan Society, in the late 1950s the Greek community 
was affected by a propaganda campaign pressurising Muslim Turks not to shop at 
Greek-run businesses, in which leaflets were distributed with slogans such as, ‘this shop 
belongs to an infidel. Prefer the shop next door, it belongs to a Turk’ (2009:17). The 
Constantinopolitan Society also reported that at around the same time the ‘Citizen, 
speak Turkish!’ campaign of the 1930s was reignited (2009:17). In April 1958, the 
Hellenic Union was shut down after a court ruled that it was engaged in anti-Turkish 
activities (Alexandris 1992:272).
30
 After the Zürich agreements established an 
independent Cyprus, Greek-Turkish bilateral relations improved, and had it not been for 
the military coup in Turkey in 1960 a renewed friendship agreement might have been 
concluded (Alexandris 1992:275-276). Nevertheless, these improved diplomatic 
relationships heralded a better period for the minority between 1959 and 1964 
(Alexandris 1992:277). 
 
In early 1964, however, as tensions once again flared in Cyprus, there were renewed 
problems in Istanbul. In March 1964, ostensibly in retaliation for the murder of several 
Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus at Christmas in 1963 (Oran 2004:104), Turkey unilaterally 
denounced the 1930 Convention of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, and 
began to expel from Turkey those Polítes with Greek citizenship (Alexandris 1992:280-
281). According to Alexandris, expellees were forced to sign a declaration by which 
they admitted to committing currency offences, being members of the banned Hellenic 
Union, and financing Greek Cypriot guerrilla fighters, and agreed to leave Turkey of 
their own accord (1992:284; the father of one of my interviewees was expelled in this 
manner (Lazaros 10/05/2013)). The names of those who were to be expelled were 
published in the Turkish press, their assets were frozen and their property confiscated, 
and they were compelled to leave Turkey with little notice, taking only minimal 
possessions and small amounts of money (Alexandris 1992:284; Constantinopolitan 
Society 2009:21; Mills 2005:447; Turan et al. 2010:248). In addition to those expelled 
as ‘enemies of the state’, other Greek citizens were forced to leave later when their work 
permits expired (Lazaros 10/05/2013). Between 12,000 and 13,000 Greek citizens were 
expelled in total (Mills 2005:447; Oran 2004:104; Turan et al. 2010:248; Vryonis 
2005:565), and by 1967 almost all Greek citizens had been removed from Turkey 
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 Konstantinos told me that his father was among some 15 Greek citizens expelled from Turkey in 1958 
as members of this Union (05/02/2012). 
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(Alexandris 1992:284; Alexandris 2004:119). An estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Turkish 
citizens followed the expellees out of the country, commonly because members of their 
family had been expelled as Greek citizens (different members of the same family often 
held different citizenships, such that an entire family might decide to leave Turkey after 
one individual was expelled) (Alexandris 1992:284-286; Alexandris 2004:119; Mills 
2005:447; Oran 2004:104; Turan et al. 2010:248; Vryonis 2005:565). In purely 
numerical terms, the expulsions of 1964 were thus by far the most damaging single 
blow for the Polítes. 
 
Many interviewees also reported that during the 1960s they were pressurised not to 
speak Greek in public, and noted the appearance of graffiti or notices on Greek 
establishments with variations on the theme: ‘every cent that you give to the infidel 
becomes a bullet which kills our brothers in Cyprus’ (recalled, for instance, by Petros 
26/11/2011; Tomas 21/11/2011; Giorgos Karanatsoglan 03/03/2010; Kostas 
Mavromatis 04/03/2010; also documented by the Federation of Constantinopolitans 
2014a). In 1971, the Patriarchate’s ability to train clergy in Turkey was impeded when 
the theological seminary on Chálki was closed by the Turkish authorities, which had 
potentially serious ramifications as only those holding Turkish citizenship were eligible 
for the office of Patriarch (see above) (Alexandris 2004:121; Oran 2004:106). After 
Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 in response to the Greek-sponsored coup d’état, there 
was a further substantial exodus of Greeks from Turkey (Alexandris 1992:294; Turan et 
al. 2010:248). Informants reported an increasingly difficult and fearful atmosphere in 
this period, in which they were once again afraid to speak Greek in public, and worried 
that an incident like the Septemvrianá might occur again.
31
 Accordingly, by 1975 less 
than 10,000 Greeks remained, and by the late 1990s there were only some 2500 year-
round Greek residents (Alexandris 2004:119; Turan et al. 2010:243). 
 
In terms of quotidian intercommunal relationships between the non-Muslim minorities 
and the Muslim Turkish majority, personal testimonies painted a varied picture (see 
chapter 4). As I noted in chapter 1, in their life histories many Polítes placed emphasis 
either on harmonious everyday interaction between Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and 
Turks, or on intercommunal antagonism, distance, and strife (Halstead 2014b:399-405). 
Several informants articulated both narratives, either when remembering different 
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 Alexandros recalled that after the 1974 conflict on Cyprus he and his Greek friends shortened their 
names when addressing one another in public in an effort to conceal their ethnicity (11/03/2014). 
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periods in time or different neighbourhoods within Istanbul, or in shifting discursive 
contexts within the interview (Halstead 2014b:408-411). Oral accounts commonly 
suggested that majority-minority relationships were tenser in central Istanbul and more 
harmonious in the suburbs or on the Princes’ Islands. Generally speaking, male Polítes 
had a greater degree of contact with Muslim Turks than their female counterparts, due 
to sharing places of work and completing military service together. Mixed marriages 
were very rare, although not entirely unheard of (Tunç and Ferentinou 2012:910), and 
many Polítes, in particular women, recalled that their parents vehemently discouraged 
them from forming romantic relationships with Turks. The post-1950s generation of 
Polítes showed greater signs of integration into Turkish society and culture than their 
parents, largely due to the increased prominence of the Turkish language and culture in 
the minority schools, as a result of which relationships between Greeks and Turks, 
particularly in commerce, were on the increase in the 1950s and 1960s (Alexandris 
1992:297). Many Polítes attended Turkish universities and joined Turkish sports clubs 
and athletic associations, and talented Polítes even represented Turkey internationally.
32
 
The standard of Turkish spoken by members of the Greek minority varied, primarily 
depending upon their degree of interaction with Turks and length of time spent in the 
education system, but many were fluent, and some spoke better Turkish than Greek. At 
home and amongst themselves, most Polítes spoke Greek rather than Turkish, although 
there were a few individuals, such as Minas Orfanidis’ father, who spoke only Turkish 
(03/03/2010). 
 
In accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, the Polítes were predominantly educated in 
Greek minority schools, in which the classes took place roughly half in Greek and half 
in Turkish (so, for instance, history, geography, literature, and national studies were 
taught in Turkish, whilst maths, the sciences, and the Greek language were conducted in 
Greek).
33
 Due to the 1954 agreement between the two countries, the Greek minority 
schools were supplied with textbooks from Greece, although a number of informants 
recalled that certain pages relating to Greek national history had been cut out 
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 Greek footballer Lefteris Antoniadis, born on Prínkipos and known in Turkey as Lefter 
Küçükandonyadis, was capped 50 times by the Turkish national team, and is one of the Istanbul-based 
team Fenerbahçe’s most celebrated players. Paris Danto’s brother played basketball for the Turkish 
national team, and Elisavet Kovi’s husband, Nikos Kovis, was capped by the Turkish national football 
team (Paris Danto 10/03/2010; Elisavet Kovi 09/03/2010). 
33
 Some of my interviewees, for various reasons, attended mainstream Turkish schools. Apostolis felt that 
attending Turkish secondary school would improve his Turkish language, making it easier for him to gain 
access to Turkish universities (03/02/2012), whilst Dimitris was forced to attend Turkish primary school 




(Alexandros 11/03/2014; Fotis 01/02/2012; Kostas 07/06/2013; Kyriakos 03/02/2012).
34
 
The students at the Greek minority schools observed Turkish national holidays, just as 
the children in the minority schools in Western Thrace participate in Greek national 
holidays (see Demetriou 2006). Some interviewees reported that they were unfazed by 
the compulsory participation in these events, whilst others recalled feigning illness or 
absconding (Alexandros 11/03/2014; Lazaros 10/05/2013; Maria 09/05/2013; 
Evangelos 08/05/2013). There were no minority secondary schools on the Princes’ 
Islands, and residents either had to relocate to Istanbul during the school term, or 
commute daily by boat (Lazaros 10/05/2013). Alongside the minority schools, the 
Orthodox Church was a focal point of Greek community life in Istanbul, ‘the place 
where you met your friends, the first flirtations’ (Fotis 01/02/2012).
35
 The Polítes were 
generally not involved in party politics, with a few exceptions, and tended not to have 
strong political leanings to either the left or the right (Apostolis 03/02/2012; Gerasimos 
06/02/2012; Marios 29/01/2012; Spyros 02/12/2011; Evangelos 08/05/2013; for 
exceptions see Halstead 2012:103-114).
36
 Men who held Turkish citizenship were 
required to perform national service in the Turkish military.
37
 Generally, 
Constantinopolitan women did not work outside the home after marriage, a tradition 
which has continued for some couples in Greece (Nikolaos 30/01/2012; Sofia 




Imbros/Gökçeada is an island in the Aegean Sea, in the Çanakkale Province of Turkey. 
Despite becoming part of the Ottoman Empire following the Fall of Constantinople, at 
the end of the nineteenth century the population was overwhelmingly Greek-speaking 
and Orthodox-Christian: only 99 Turkish-speaking Muslims were resident on Imbros to 
                                                 
34
 Kostas recalled that he and other fellow students were given the task of tearing these pages out, and 
remarked on the futility of this exercise: ‘I remember tearing out pages: first, I would see what the page 
said!’ (07/06/2013) Kostas was born on Imbros but, due to the abolition of the Greek language in 
minority schools on the island (see below), received his education in Istanbul. 
35
 Many interviewees reported that they attended church comparatively infrequently or not at all in 
Greece. Reasons commonly cited included the fact that the church was no longer the central meeting 
place for conversing with other Greeks, the suggestion that the ceremonies and liturgies were less 
authentic in Greece than they were in Istanbul (and Imbros), and an alleged lack of respect amongst the 
native Greeks for the church and religion (for more detail, see Halstead 2012:42-43). 
36
 As Dimitris Papagiannis put it, ‘[w]e Polítes do not have a good relationship with politics, we are more 
interested in food’ (08/03/2010). 
37
 Some interviewees gave a positive account of their national service, insisting that their Muslim Turkish 
comrades protected them from discrimination (see also Turan et al. 2010:260), whilst others – particularly 
those who served during moments of heightened Greek-Turkish tension – felt persecuted, or even feared 
for their lives. 
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9357 Orthodox Christians (Alexandris 1980:6). In 1912, an expanding Greek state took 
control of the island following the First Balkan War. Although the island should have 
reverted to Ottoman control after the Treaty of Athens in 1913, due to the outbreak of 
the First World War the island remained in Greek hands for ten years, and Greek 
authority over the island was confirmed in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres (Tsimouris 
2008:12; Xeinos 2011:145). Following the Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1922, Imbros – 
alongside its neighbouring island Tenedos – was ceded to the Turkish Republic by the 
Treaty of Lausanne. The Orthodox Christians of Imbros and Tenedos, like those of 
Istanbul, were exempted from the population exchange between the two countries. 
Article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne dealt specifically with the two islands: 
 
The islands of Imbros and Tenedos, remaining under Turkish sovereignty, shall 
enjoy a special administrative organisation composed of local elements and 
furnishing every guarantee for the native non-Moslem population in so far as 
concerns local administration and the protection of person and property. The 
maintenance of order will be assured therein by a police force recruited from 
amongst the local population by the local administration above provided for and 
placed under its orders. 
The agreements which have been, or may be concluded between Greece and 
Turkey relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations will not 
be applied to the inhabitants of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos (Treaty of 
Lausanne 1923: article 14). 
 
In theory, article 14 granted the Orthodox Christian population of Imbros a significant 
degree of local self-rule, of a sort not applied to the minority in Istanbul (Alexandris 
1980:5-13; Xeinos 2011:129-146). In practice, however, the provisions of the Lausanne 
Treaty were never implemented, and the Turkish authorities took over direct 
administrative control of the island (Alexandris 1980:16-17; Xeinos 2011:147). Around 
1500 Imvriótes who were abroad when the treaty was signed were declared personae 
non-gratae and not permitted to return (Xeinos 2011:147). In 1927, Turkey published 
the law 1151 dealing with the ‘special administrative organisation’ of Imbros and 
Tenedos, which put an end to the idea of administrative self-control and brought the 
islands under central Turkish authority (Alexandris 1980:20-23; Babül 2004:4-5; 
Tsimouris 2008:59-66).
38
 Furthermore, the 1927 law provided that all education on 
Imbros was to be Turkish, secular, and public, preventing the Greek language education 
that should have been guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty (Babül 2004:5; 
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 According to Alexandris, the provisions of law 1151 were applied to the island even though the law 
was never officially enacted, and were designed to appease signatories to the Lausanne Treaty by 
superficially providing an impression of administrative autonomy whilst in practice granting Turkey 
complete control over the island (1980:20-22). 
39 
 
Constantinopolitan Society 2009:13; Helsinki Watch 1992:14, 28; Tsimouris 2008:130-
131).
39
 Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the 1930s brought some improvements for the 
islanders – they were, for instance, permitted to elect a local Greek mayor – although 
during the Second World War some Imvriótes were caught up in the forced labour 
battalions and the discriminatory wealth tax (Alexandris 1980:23; Xeinos 2011:148). In 
1946 the Turkish administration attempted (largely unsuccessfully) to settle Muslim 
Turks from the Black Sea on the island, in what Elif Babül has classified as the first 
attempts at Turkification on Imbros (Babül 2004:5; Babül 2006b:46; Xeinos 2011:148).  
 
With renewed Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the 1950s, the law 5713 was passed in 
1951, abolishing the educational provisions laid out in the 1927 law, and thus permitting 
minority schools teaching half in Greek and half in Turkish to open in 1952 (Babül 
2004:5; Alexandris 1980:24; Xeinos 2011:149). This marked the beginning of 
something of a golden age for the Greek minority on Imbros, which was accompanied 
by improvements in the island’s infrastructure alongside economic and touristic growth 
(Alexandris 1980:24; Tsimouris 2008:50). Greek-Turkish tensions over Cyprus in the 
early 1960s, however, heralded a disastrous decade for the Imvriótes, known locally 
simply as ‘the events’ (also sometimes referred to as the ‘dissolution programme’ from 
the Turkish eritme programı). In 1964, the prohibition of Greek language education was 
reinstated, and henceforth classes took place only in Turkish (Tsimouris 2008:134). As 
the island’s population was still overwhelmingly Greek-speaking, most of the Imbriot 
children spoke little or no Turkish, which made their education on Imbros highly 
problematic. As Voula – a child of primary school age in 1964 – recalled: 
 
In my third year of primary school, the Greek language was abolished. The 
school operated as normal, and I studied in Turkish for one year. I forgot Greek, 
and nor did I speak Turkish. We had a Turkish teacher then, who, the poor thing, 
struggled to get us to understand […] One time, he was explaining and 
explaining something, he wanted to tell us something, and we looked at him 
blankly. In the end he drew it for us on the blackboard, he tried to explain it to 
us using hand gestures, and eventually he became frustrated and he went and 
banged his head on the blackboard, the poor man! (12/08/2013) 
 
In addition to these practical difficulties, Imbriot parents overwhelmingly felt that their 
children should learn Greek and not grow up speaking only Turkish (Imvriakí Ichó 
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 Alexandris stated that in applying this provision Turkey took advantage of ‘the fact that the local 
regime of the islands was not directly subjected to the minority clauses of the Lausanne Treaty’ 
(1980:21). The islanders were permitted a part-time Greek-language teacher for up to one hour per day at 
their own expense and remaining under the supervision of the Turkish authorities (Alexandris 1980:21). 
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September-October 1974). As Mirela recalled, after the Greek language was abolished 
in the schools, her youngest son ‘started to speak to us in Turkish. It was then that we 
were driven mad and decided to leave’ (10/05/2013). Indeed, it was largely as a result of 
the school closures that a Greek exodus from the island began (Tsimouris 2008:134). 
Initially, many children were sent to Istanbul to be educated in the Greek minority 
schools there, which required either the entire family to uproot to the city, or the 
children to move without their parents, staying variously with relatives, with strangers, 
or even in orphanages (Pavlos 29/05/2013; Tsimouris 2008:134).
40
 Decamping to 
Istanbul involved a major cultural shock for the islanders, who were accustomed to a 
rural lifestyle and often felt overwhelmed in their new urban environment. Moreover, 
intercommunal tensions were often running high in Istanbul in the 1960s and 1970s (see 
above), and the Imbriot children had to adapt to a more tense and controlled 
environment than that prevailing in the Greek villages on Imbros. Pavlos, who went to 
live with an aunt in Constantinople at the age of six in order to attend primary school, 
described the experience as follows: 
 
I was amongst the lucky ones because my father had three sisters who lived in 
Constantinople, and one of them provided me with hospitality, and treated me 
like her child. Despite all of that, of course, for a six-year-old child to live 
without his parents is not the best thing. We are talking about many tears when 
they dropped me off and left [… It was an] unbelievable change. From being a 
child of five years who is left to do what he wants [on Imbros], to be taken to 
school by the hand, to be protected [you became] a prisoner [in Istanbul]. 
Literally a prisoner […] (29/05/2013) 
 
Many families and children made the move to Istanbul in the hope that the situation 
with the Greek-language education on Imbros would be temporary, and that they would 
be able to return to the island. Ultimately, however, the majority were forced to migrate 
again, either to Greece or elsewhere, whilst others left for Greece directly from Imbros 
in their search for a Greek-language education. 
 
At around the same time, the Turkish authorities began to expropriate farming land on 
the island (ultimately amounting to around 90% of cultivatable land, according to Greek 
sources; Imbriot Society no date-b; Tsimouris 2001:2-3; Tsimouris 2008:120; Xeinos 
2011:150), and militarise the island, which in turn led to restrictions on entrance (Babül 
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 Most children returned to Imbros during the school vacations. 
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2004:5; Tsimouris 2008:120; Xeinos 2011:149).
41
 These expropriations were 
particularly damaging as the Imvriótes were predominantly agriculturalists (Tsimouris 
2008:296). Between 1965 and 1966, Greek olive groves near the village of Schoinoúdi 
were expropriated for the establishment of an ‘open prison’ for serious offenders 
brought from the Turkish mainland. These free-roaming prisoners committed various 
acts of vandalism, theft, assault, and even murder (Alexandris 1980:25-26; Babül 
2004:5; Tsimouris 2008:120, 145; Xeinos 2011:150).
42
 Meanwhile, from as early as 
1966 and particularly during the early 1970s, the Turkish authorities began in earnest to 
settle Anatolian Turks and Kurds on the island (many themselves from nationalised 





These measures intensified the exodus of the Imvriótes, who declined in number from 
5487 in 1960 to 2571 in 1970; in the same period, the Muslim population rose from 289 
to 4020 (Babül 2004:6). They mostly migrated to large Greek cities, although some also 
settled elsewhere, particularly Australia, America, and Europe (Xeinos 2011:152). This 
was due in no small part to the obstructive stance of the Greek government in issuing 
visas to the Imvriótes for entry to Greece, which was seemingly an attempt to preserve 
the Greek minority on the island (Tsimouris 2008:271). Many islanders worked around 
this obstacle by entering Greece via other European countries where the local Greek 
embassies were unaware of the visa embargo, which sometimes resulted in convoluted 
and costly detours across the continent (Tsimouris 2008:82; Xeinos 2011:151). Others 
left the island illegally by boat to neighbouring islands (Tsimouris 2008:256). In 1970, 
the island was officially renamed Gökçeada, completing the symbolic transition from 
the ‘Greek’ island of Imbros to the ‘Turkish’ island of Gökçeada (Babül 2006a:52; 
Babül 2006b:46). As in Istanbul, the conflict on Cyprus in 1974 caused the situation on 
Imbros to deteriorate further (Imbriot Society no date-b; Tsimouris 2008:146), and 
during the 1970s and 1980s there were reports of further expropriations, assaults, and 
murders (Constantinopolitan Society 2009:23, 25; Imbriot Society no date-b). By 1985 
only 472 Orthodox Christians remained on the island to 7138 Muslims (Babül 2004:6), 
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 Many interviewees reported that they were left with only mountainous, largely uncultivatable land, and 
that the recompense they were issued by the authorities amounted to a small fraction of the value of the 
expropriated land. In Kostas’ words, ‘in the end, an olive tree was sold for the price of an egg’ 
(07/06/2013). 
42
 Giorgos Xeinos referred to the murder of six individuals (2011:150). 
43
 See Babül (2004:13-16) for an interesting discussion of the differing ways in which the Anatolian and 
Kurdish settlers conceptualised their relationship to Imbros and to the Turkish state. 
42 
 
and by 2000 there were around 200 Orthodox Christians and 8000 Muslims, an almost 
complete reversal of the 1923 demographic situation (Babül 2006a:50). 
 
Before ‘the events’ Imbros had seven principal settlements. The biggest was the capital, 
known locally as Panagía Baloméni, where most of the island’s few Turkish residents 
were located. The remaining six settlements were villages. Of these, Schoinoúdi was the 
biggest and, due to its proximity to the open prison and the confiscated lands, 
experienced one of the fastest and most dramatic drops in population in the 1960s. This 
sprawling settlement – which according to local anecdote was once the biggest village 
in Turkey – was joined by the mountainous Agrídia, the picturesque Άgios Theódoros, 
the seaside village of Kástro, the northeastern Glyký, and Evlámpio, close to the capital. 
After 1970, five new settlements were created for the Turkish and Kurdish settlers – 
Eşelek, Şahinkaya köyü, Şirinköy, Uğurlu köyü, and Yeni Bademli köyü – who have also 
taken up residence in large numbers in Panagía (now Çınarlı), Evlámpio (Yenimahalle), 
and Kástro (Kaleköy), as well as in smaller numbers in Άgios Theódoros (Zeytinli köyü), 
Glyký (Bademli köyü), and Schoinoúdi (Dereköy); until recently, at least, no Turks (or 
Kurds) had settled in Agrídia (Tepeköy).  
 
Oral accounts, particularly from older Imvriótes, tended to paint a picture of life on the 
island prior to ‘the events’ as one of hard work and poverty but also autonomy and 
simplicity. Informants stressed that the islanders produced most of the food they 
consumed, importing only a few items such as salt, sugar, coffee, cigarettes, or rakı.
44
 
Imbros did not have electricity until 1970, nor piped water in the houses in earlier years, 
and communication with the outside world was often difficult. Winters could be harsh, 
as residents – particularly in the more mountainous villages – were often cut off by 
snow, and families had to ensure that their larders were well-stocked for the winter 
months.
45
 Although Imbros is an island, only the residents of the seaside village of 
Kástro had a close connection with the sea, and most Imvriótes were farmers rather than 
fishermen (in contrast to Tenedos where fishing was an important part of the economy) 
(Tsimouris 2008:296). The island’s numerous churches and chapels were a focal point 
for the community; as Kostas put it, ‘the church was not just a religious place, but a 
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 The production of homemade rakı – an anise-flavoured spirit – was prohibited due to the state 
monopoly, although some Imvriótes did produce bootleg liquor clandestinely (Argyris 08/08/2013; 
Damon 08/08/2013).  
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 Many families kept a pig or lamb that they slaughtered at Christmas, and the Imbriot women 
traditionally produced handmade clothing (Damon 08/08/2013; Themis 11/08/2013; Orestis 06/08/2013). 
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place of ethnic expression, where we could all gather together to show that we are 
Hellenes, that we are something different’ (07/06/2013). In common with the Greeks of 
Istanbul, Imvriótes who held Turkish citizenship performed national service in the 
Turkish army.
46
 As there were few Turkish residents on Imbros prior to the settlements 
in the 1970s, many Imvriótes – in contradistinction to the Polítes – only had the 
opportunity to interact with Turks when dealing with the island’s authorities, serving in 
the Turkish army, travelling to the Turkish mainland (for instance for medical care), or 




Most of the Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros settled in Greece, principally in the urban 
centres of Athens and Thessaloniki. In Athens, many settled in the seaside 
neighbourhood of Palaió Fáliro, claiming that it reminded them of the Bosporus or the 
Princes’ Islands, as well as in the adjacent former refugee neighbourhoods Néa Smýrni 
and Kallithéa.
47
 They established numerous community organisations in their new 
places of settlement, mirroring those established earlier by refugees from the 1920s, 
which served both as social and cultural associations and as pressure groups. The oldest 
of these is the Constantinopolitan Society, founded in January 1928 by 
Constantinopolitan refugees who came to Greece as a result of the Greek-Turkish war 
and the population exchange. Its purpose was to address the particular problems faced 
by Polítes in Greece as well as to preserve Constantinopolitan culture and traditions 
(Constantinopolitan Society 2008:3). Based in Kallithéa in Athens, from the 1930s the 
Society also undertook charitable social work in the local area, for instance establishing 
a doctor’s surgery, running a canteen supplying food to schoolchildren, and, during the 
Second World War, operating an orphanage and an infirmary for war casualties 
(Constantinopolitan Society 2008:4, 8).  
 
When expatriated Polítes began to arrive in Greece in growing numbers after 1955, 
many chose to join the Constantinopolitan Society. During the 1970s, in particular, 
these expatriates rose to prominence within the Society’s organisational structure, 
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 Like the Polítes, some informants had positive memories of their military service, whilst those who 
served at times of heightened intercommunal tension often experienced difficulties. 
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 Manos jovially observed that the concentration of expatriates in Palaió Fáliro is indicated by the 




taking over from the 1923 Constantinopolitan refugees, and the Society became 
increasingly active in publicising the persecution of the Greek minority in Turkey, 
organising seminars, protests, exhibitions, and awareness-raising anniversary memorials 
(Constantinopolitan Society 2008:14; Isaakidis 2014; see chapter 5). The Society 
produces its own publications as well as making representations to the Greek 
government and European and international organisations (Constantinopolitan Society 
2008:13). It has worked towards the resolution of issues such as uncertainty over 
pensions and national service obligations in Greece, as well as the long-standing 
struggle over the acquisition of Greek citizenship (see below) (Constantinopolitan 
Society 2008:15). The Society’s stated aims also include the protection and 
development of culture, and it boasts an extensive library as well as supporting research 
and running seminars about Byzantine history and culture, hosting theatrical, musical, 
and traditional dance performances, and offering French and Turkish language lessons 
(Constantinopolitan Society 2008:16, 18, 20, 22, 35). Additionally, it has organised 
pilgrimages to Istanbul and other places in Turkey, and hosts social events such as the 
traditional New Year ceremony for the cutting of the vasilópita (Constantinopolitan 
Society 2008:28, 33). 
 
Whilst some expatriates joined the existing Constantinopolitan Society, others felt that 
there was a need for an organisation that more immediately differentiated between the 
different circumstances faced by the 1923 refugees and the post-1923 expatriates, and 
accordingly in 1963 founded the New Circle of Constantinopolitans (Constantinopolitan 
Union no date-b).
48
 The Association of Hellenic Citizens Expelled from Turkey was 
founded at around the same time, in order to deal specifically with the problems faced 
by those Greek citizens forcibly removed from Turkey in 1964, and saw itself as the 
natural successor to the Hellenic Union established in 1933 for Greek citizens living in 
Istanbul and dissolved by the Turkish authorities in 1958 (see above) 
(Constantinopolitan Union no date-c). Since 1981, these two organisations have 
together constituted the Constantinopolitan Union, based at the Constantinopolitan 
Cultural Centre in the Ampelókipoi neighbourhood of Athens (Constantinopolitan Union 
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 Although such differences of opinion may have been of crucial significance to some, several 
informants suggested that geographical proximity and happenstance in terms of one’s acquaintances and 
relatives were often decisive in determining whether Polítes became affiliated with one association or the 
other. Events organised by the expatriate associations at which I have been present have generally been 
well-attended. Nevertheless, those expatriates who became actively involved in the associations’ political 
or activist endeavours were in a minority amongst the expatriate population at large, and, moreover, many 
Polítes, including several of my interviewees, had no significant involvement with any association. 
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no date-a). The Constantinopolitan Union and its composite organisations, in common 
with the Constantinopolitan Society in Kallithéa, pursue social, cultural, and 
philanthropic activities, as well as operating a library and lobbying both domestic and 
international institutions on issues pertaining to the expatriate community 
(Constantinopolitan Union no date-a; Constantinopolitan Union no date-b; 
Constantinopolitan Union no date-c). There are also several expatriate associations 
outside Athens, such as the Union of Constantinopolitans of Northern Greece based in 
Thessaloniki, as well as many smaller organisations catering for more specific 
communities, such as former residents of the Princes’ Islands, or the alumni of 
particular schools in Istanbul. 
 
After two abortive attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to create an umbrella organisation 
that would unite and provide a common voice for the entire expatriate community, in 
2006 the Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans was founded by 25 
Constantinopolitan associations in Greece and abroad (Federation of 
Constantinopolitans 2008:7; Ouzounoglou 2014a). Its stated aims were to unify the 
efforts of the expatriated Polítes and strengthen their ties with the community that 
remained in Istanbul, in order to study and raise awareness both domestically and 
internationally of the difficulties faced by the Greeks of Istanbul, Imbros, and Tenedos, 
provide support for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and promote measures for ensuring the 
preservation of a Greek community in Turkey (Federation of Constantinopolitans 
2009b). In more recent years, using as its basis resolution 60/147 adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005,
49
 the Federation has appealed to the 
Turkish government to offer remedy and reparation to the expatriated Greeks of Turkey, 
which would include the restitution of Turkish citizenship to former Turkish citizens 
and their descendants, the restoration of property titles lost due to the circumstances of 
emigration, the resolution of issues facing the Patriarchate and the minority schools, and 
the establishment of a repatriation programme for those wishing to return to Turkey 
(Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015b).
50
 To this end, the Federation has since May 
2010 been engaged in direct negotiations with representatives of the Turkish authorities 
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 ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law’, adopted on 16 December 2005. 
50
 As of October 2015, progress had been made on several of these fronts, including the restoration of 
Turkish citizenship to expatriates and the ability of Greek-born descendants of former Turkish citizens to 
acquire Turkish citizenship (though only from the paternal side), and the re-opening of Greek minority 
schools on Imbros (see chapter 7) (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015b). 
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(Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015b). The Federation also organises an 
international conference to coincide with the anniversary of the Septemvrianá, and since 
2007 has assumed responsibility for the annual memorial parade to mark the Fall of 
Constantinople in 1453 (see chapter 5). The Constantinopolitan Society, the New Circle 
of Constantinopolitans, and the Association of Hellenic Citizens Expelled from Turkey 
are all members of the Federation, although there have been significant differences of 
opinion between the board of the Constantinopolitan Society and that of the Federation, 
particularly as regards the latter’s direct dialogue with Turkey (see chapter 5). 
 
There are, additionally, several Imbriot organisations, both in Greece and elsewhere 
(Tsimouris 2008:251-255), the largest of which is the Imbriot Society founded in 
Athens in 1945 (Tsimouris 2008:263). Following a hiatus of almost a decade after 1947, 
the Imbriot Society began to operate again in 1956, and its principal aims were, firstly, 
to unite and to provide support for those Imvriótes living in Greece – tackling 
difficulties relating to work and residence permits, citizenship, pensions, et cetera – and 
secondly to support the community remaining on the island (Imbriot Society no date-a; 
Ίmvros September-October-November 1995; Tsimouris 2008:251). In 1999 the Imbriot 
Society relocated to new multi-story premises in Néa Smýrni, funded by expatriate 
donations as well as state aid (Tsimouris 2008:267), which with its attached café serves 
as a social hub for the expatriated islanders. As well as addressing itself to the 
difficulties faced by Imvriótes both in Greece and on Imbros, the Society organises 
historical and cultural events including theatrical, musical, and dance performances, 
activities for younger-generation Imvriótes, and Turkish language lessons (Imbriot 
Society no date-a; Tsimouris 2008:268). It is also instrumental in orchestrating the 
annual summer return to the island (see chapter 7), and like its Constantinopolitan 
counterparts attempts to raise awareness of the persecution the islanders faced through 
petitions to domestic and international bodies, and by publishing books and the 
newspaper Ίmvros (Tsimouris 2008:267). Currently, one of its central preoccupations is 
the effort to prevent property on the island passing into non-Imbriot hands, and to help 
younger Imvriótes claim rights of inheritance on the island (Tsimouris 2008:251, 269, 
276-277; see chapter 7). Giorgos Tsimouris has argued that, by comparison with other 
Greek diaspora organisations in Greece, the Imbriot Society has tended to be less driven 
by a nationalist discourse and offered greater criticism of Greek diplomatic indifference 




Emigration to Greece represented both an escape from fear and harassment and a 
traumatic and daunting uprooting, and accordingly is recounted in different ways by 
different individuals in different contexts (see chapter 3 and Halstead 2014b). On the 
one hand, the expatriates had moved from a country where it was sometimes dangerous 
to speak Greek in the streets to one where Greek was ubiquitous, and from a country 
where they were a religious minority to one that overwhelmingly (Hirschon 2010:68) 
shared their Orthodox Christian religion. On the other hand, many had lost much or all 
of their financial and material wealth, and their early years in Greece were often 
difficult. Many interviewees recalled that they or their parents had to work several 
different jobs in order to make ends meet, commonly taking on lower-paid and less 
prestigious employment than that which they had undertaken in Turkey. Migration to 
Greece also represented something of a culture shock for many informants, particularly 
as the country and its inhabitants often failed to conform to images they had formed 
whilst living in Turkey. Despite being of the same religion and speaking the same 
language, the expatriates were distinguishable from the native Greeks by their accent 
and idiom as well as certain differences of culture and mentality (see chapter 4). 
Particularly for those who had resided in cosmopolitan Istanbul, first impressions of 
Greek cities were commonly that they were ‘like villages’ and their inhabitants 
‘villagers’ (see also chapter 3 and Örs 2006). As Sotiris put it, describing his arrival in 
Athens from Istanbul in 1970: 
 
I was born and grew up in an urban environment, where all of the ethnic groups 
were city-dwellers. Here in Greece, then, the urbanisation of Athens was still 
underway. And I laughed at the state of the new Athenian, who was still a 
villager, he wasn’t an urbanite […] If it was possible they would even have fowl 
on their balconies! Unthinkable things for someone who has grown up in a city 
(08/02/2012). 
 
When the Asia Minor refugees arrived in Greece after 1922, they received a sometimes 
ambivalent, sometimes hostile welcome by the native Greeks, who saw the refugees ‘as 
somehow less Greek than themselves’ (Karakasidou 1997b:147), questioned their 
claims to Hellenic identity by deriding them as ‘seeds of the Turks’ (Hirschon 
2004a:19), and distinguished themselves as dópioi, i.e. ‘natives’ or ‘people of this 
place’ (Cowan 1997:153).
51
 The expatriated Greeks of Turkey sometimes encountered 
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 As Anastasia Karakasidou observed, this self-descriptor referred ‘more to what they were not, rather 
than to what they actually were’ and in effect ‘masked internal cleavages and differences among the 
“local” population’ (1997b:152). For their part, the refugees typically referred to the native Greeks as 
‘Palioelladítes’ (‘old Greeks’), ‘Hellenes’, or ‘Vlachs’ (in this case meaning ‘yokels’) (Hirschon 1998:4). 
The refugees came from diverse backgrounds and were distinguishable both from each other and from the 
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comparable (if less severe) antipathy. They found that many native Greeks knew little 
about the contemporary Greek communities of Istanbul and Imbros or the reasons why 
they had left Turkey, and that the Greeks of Greece viewed the new arrivals with 
suspicion. Interviewees recalled that their Hellenic and Orthodox Christian credentials 
were called into question: ‘did you have churches?’ ‘Did you learn Greek?’ ‘Were you 
baptized?’ A great many reported that sections of the native Greek population referred 
to them as ‘Turks’ or derided them, like the refugees before them, as ‘seeds of the 
Turks’. Michalis and Thanasis both remembered that native Greeks would direct 
customers to their shops by sending them to ‘the Turk’ (Michalis 29/01/2012; Thanasis 
06/02/2012), whilst Michalis’ daughter Theodora was one of several informants to 
recall that as a child she got into a fight with a classmate who called her ‘little Turkish 
girl’ (Theodora 19/04/2012).
52
 During the Cyprus crisis in 1974, the native Greek 
neighbours of Lefteris’ mother started to treat her with suspicion, falling into silence 
and muttering ‘look out, the Turk is passing’ when she was walking down the road 
(Lefteris 12/05/2013). Sometimes, the expatriates’ birthplace was betrayed in 
unexpected ways: Fotis related how a bank worker pegged him as a Turk after noticing 





Many informants also expressed profound disappointment with their treatment by the 
Greek state (see also chapter 4). Chief amongst their grievances was the issue of 
citizenship. The Greek state is notoriously reluctant to issue citizenship to foreign-born 
people (Hirschon 1999:169). Amongst foreign-born migrants, a distinction is commonly 
made between those who are omogeneís – i.e. of Greek descent – and those who are 
                                                                                                                                               
natives by a ‘minutiae of detail’ (Hirschon 1998:246; see also Hirschon 2004a:18-19; Karakasidou 
1997b:148-149). Whilst they shared the same religion and, for the most part, the same language with the 
native Greeks, different refugee groups were distinguishable by, for instance, language and dialect 
(Hirschon 2004a:19), music and dance (Gauntlett 2004; Hirschon 2004a:18), cuisine (Hirschon 
2004a:18), awareness of cultural diversity (Hirschon 2004b; Hirschon 2006; Hirschon 1998:28-30), and 
even farming practices (P. Halstead 2014:333-334). 
52
 On occasions such as these, the intention on the part of the native Greeks may not always have been to 
offend: in some cases, the label ‘Turk’ might have been intended to refer to citizenship or birthplace 
rather than ethnicity (see Brubaker et al. 2006:213), in much the same way as an individual of Greek 
descent born in, or who has lived in, the USA or Germany might sometimes be called ‘the American’ or 
‘the German’. Nevertheless, such experiences were often deeply upsetting for my interviewees, both 
invalidating their traumatic uprooting from Turkey, and casting doubt upon an image of Greece as a 
national homeland; in the words of Markos, ‘I don’t know if they called us Turks out of meanness, but it 
bothered us because we had suffered at the hands of the Turks’ (04/05/2013). 
53
 My informants were generally in agreement that such problems were firmly in the past, although it is 
noteworthy that a number of my younger, Greek-born interviewees themselves reported being called – or 
mistaken for – Turks by classmates in Greece on the basis of their parents’ birthplace (Eva 13/08/2013; 
Lia 13/08/2013; Yiannis 15/08/2013). 
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allogeneís – of non-Greek descent – with the latter category particularly unlikely to be 
awarded citizenship (Christopoulos 2009:1-16). Although the expatriated Greeks of 
Turkey would be forgiven for assuming they fell into the former category – especially 
in the context of irredentist nationalistic rhetoric that made them ‘unredeemed Greeks’ – 
most were denied Greek citizenship for years or even decades.
54
 In the meantime, the 
expatriates were required to periodically attend the Aliens’ Bureau in order to renew 
work and residence permits. Lack of Greek citizenship brought a variety of practical 
problems, including difficulties in purchasing property, acquiring financial loans, 
working in the public sector, or voting in elections. Some expatriates lost their Turkish 
citizenship (most commonly because they had failed to report for their military service) 
and became stateless persons. Others were afraid to make return visits to Turkey on 
their Turkish passports, lest they be detained to fulfil unpaid national service. As well as 
these practical considerations, the denial of Greek citizenship to the expatriates 
provoked sentiments of rejection – particularly amongst those who had felt that Greece 
was their national homeland – as well as exacerbating popular suspicion about their 
ethnicity. Interviewees commonly encountered confusion and even hostility when they 
presented their Turkish identity papers in banks or public offices. Pavlos, for example, 
recalled an incident in which an official at the Aliens’ Bureau turned to him and said, 
‘and how do I know that you are not a Turk?’ This precipitated an angry exchange that 
finished with a frustrated Pavlos shouting at the man, ‘you are the Turk!’ (Pavlos 
29/05/2013) 
 
Ultimately, principally through action taken by the community organisations, most 
expatriates who wanted to obtain Greek citizenship were able to do so from the early 
1980s onwards.
55
 Most interviewees also felt that by the turn of the century, at least, 
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 As with the denial of visas to the Imvriótes, the most plausible explanation for this impasse lies in the 
Greek government’s unwillingness to allow the Greek minority in Turkey to disappear (it was commonly 
suggested by informants that the Patriarchate in Istanbul was instrumental in encouraging this decision). 
The only exception was those Turkish citizens who were the sons and daughters of Polítes who held 
Greek citizenship, and a handful of Turkish citizens who acquired citizenship through personal 
connections (Isaakidis 2014). 
55
 The tale of how this impasse was broken was told to me by former Constantinopolitan Society 
president Isaakidis. According to Isaakidis, an agreement had at length been reached between the 
Constantinopolitan Society and the New Democracy government of Georgios Rallis for the Polítes to be 
awarded citizenship at a rate of 500 people per year, when the latter’s government lost the October 1981 
general election to Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK. Representatives of the Society successfully persuaded 
the newly appointed Minister of the Interior Stathis Panagoulis to honour the agreement made with the 
previous administration, but neglected to mention the yearly limitation, and thus enabled unrestricted 
numbers of expatriates to make successful applications for Greek citizenship. This favourable climate 
persisted for two or three years, at which point there was another moratorium on citizenship allocation to 
expatriates, again resolved through direct negotiation with the Interior Ministry. Since then, more and 
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popular suspicion towards the expatriate community had largely dissipated, and several 
informants pointed to the 2003 release and subsequent popularity of the film Polítiki 
Kouzína (see chapter 1), with its sympathetic portrayal of the plight of the Polítes, as a 
moment of catharsis in this regard. For many, however, their treatment in the first few 
decades of their settlement in Greece was a source of profound disillusionment, and it is 
common to hear expatriates offer variations of the lament: ‘in Turkey we were the 
Greeks, and in Greece we were the Turks’. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
more expatriates have taken the decision to apply for Greek citizenship, although there have occasionally 
been further bumps on the road. Many expatriates have, for a variety of reasons, chosen to retain their 
Turkish citizenship (Isaakidis 2014).  
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Review essay I 
Patrída as a local metaphor 
 
Over the past decade, there has been renewed academic interest in the everyday 
reception and articulation of nationhood by ‘ordinary people’, i.e. non-elites (Brubaker 
et al. 2006; Edensor 2006; Fox and Jones 2013; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a; Fox and 
Miller-Idriss 2008b; Goode and Stroup 2015; Hearn 2007; Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg 
2012; Piwoni 2015; Skey 2009; Todd 2015), building on earlier discussions that had 
attempted to address a perceived imbalance in favour of elite or top-down perspectives 
in the classic literature on nationalism, typically associated in particular with Ernest 
Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Anthony Smith (Billig 1995; Brubaker 2004; Cohen 
1996; Confino 1993; Edensor 2002; Eriksen 1993; Herzfeld 1997; Mavratsas 1999; 
Sutton 1998; Thompson 2001).  
 
In an early intervention in 1993, anthropologist Thomas Hyland Eriksen advocated an 
analytical distinction between ‘formal nationalism’ – associated with the state, the 
written word, and mass media – and ‘informal nationalism’ – expressed through civil 
society, speech, and face-to-face communication (1993:2, 19). Writing in 1996, 
Anthony Cohen similarly urged scholars of nationalist rituals to discriminate ‘between 
the intentions of their producers and the readings made of them by audiences’ by taking 
account of ‘personal nationalism’ or how ‘nationalists refract nationhood through their 
own personal experience and aspirations’ (1996:804; 807-808; cf. Hearn 2007:663-
666). The study of informal nationalism was taken in an important new direction by 
Michael Billig in 1995, who placed emphasis upon the ubiquitous and unconscious, and 
therefore largely imperceptible, ‘flagging’ of national identity in the course of everyday 
life, what he called ‘banal nationalism’ (1995:6-8). Taking issue with previous 
scholarship for ignoring nationalism in the West due to its familiarity and routinisation, 
Billig focused not on public ceremonies or moments of national crisis, but on the 
‘mindless’ and ‘mundane’ ‘reminders of nationhood’ embedded in everyday life 
(1995:8-9, 41, 50-51, 58-59); on the ‘unwaved flag’ rather than the ‘waved flag’ 
(1995:39-43). In 2002 Tim Edensor, in part building on Billig’s account (Edensor 
2002:12), similarly argued that ‘national identity is usually neither spectacular nor 
remarkable’ but rather ‘is generated in mundane, quotidian forms and practices’ 
(Edensor 2002:vi), which he conceived of as a ‘national habitus’ comprising practical 
53 
 
everyday knowledge, embodied habits, and everyday routines (Edensor 2002:92-96; see 
also Edensor 2006:531-539). In contrast to Billig, however, Edensor placed greater 
emphasis on the heterogeneity and dynamism of national identity, stressing that the 
national habitus is constantly challenged and reworked by everyday performance 
(Edensor 2002:29, 33, 100-102, 188; although cf. Billig 2009:347-348). 
 
More recent scholarship has confirmed the dynamic nature of nationhood whilst also 
calling into question its salience as a component of everyday life. In a study of ethnicity 
in the Transylvanian town Cluj, Rogers Brubaker and colleagues – in contradistinction 
to Billig and Edensor – emphasised the weakness and intermittency rather than 
pervasiveness of nationhood in day-to-day life (Brubaker et al. 2006:5-6, 11, 168, 191, 
206-208, 219, 237-238, 363). Drawing on Brubaker’s earlier criticism of ‘groupism’ – 
that is, ‘the tendency to take discreet, bounded groups as basic constituents of social 
life’ (Brubaker 2004:8) – they conceptualised ethnicity as something one does or 
becomes rather than has or is, something that happens in specific contexts rather than 
exists generally (Brubaker et al. 2006:208-209). For them, conceiving of ethnicity not as 
an entity but as ‘a way of seeing, a way of talking, a way of acting’ (Brubaker et al. 
2006:207) would allow us to challenge ‘overethnicized interpretations’ and avoid 
uncritically equating ‘the political centrality of nationalist rhetoric with the experiential 
centrality of nationness in the lives of ordinary people’ (Brubaker et al. 2006:167, 263). 
In recent years, analysts – including Fox, one of Brubaker’s co-authors – have been 
drawing on these earlier interventions in an effort to fine-tune a methodology for 
studying everyday nationhood, using personal testimony, participant observation, and 
group discussion to focus attention on ‘ordinary people as active producers – and not 
just passive consumers – of national discourse’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a:539, 555-
556; see also Fox and Jones 2013; Goode and Stroup 2015; Miller-Idriss and 
Rothenberg 2012; Piwoni 2015; Skey 2009; and cf. Smith 2008). 
 
In part I, I contribute to these ongoing debates by exploring what nationhood means to 
my interviewees, and what they do with national identity and national stereotypes in 
their oral testimonies. I begin, in this review essay, by surveying influential studies of 
Greek national/ethnic identity
56
 through the lens of everyday nationhood. I suggest that, 
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 There is in (non-academic) modern Greek no comparable distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’, 
both of which are covered by the term ethnikós (Deltsou 2000:31; Herzfeld 1997:41-42). Greek 
ethnikótita (‘ethnicity’ or ‘nationality’) cannot be equated with the possession of Greek citizenship or 
loyalty to the Greek state (Millas 2008:np). In Karakasidou’s terms, ‘the nation of the Hellenes is a 
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in the Greek case at least, discussion of the quotidian dynamism of nationhood and its 
active reproduction at local levels has not been quite as lacking as some recent 
scholarship has tended to imply. At the same time, I consider how the historian Alon 
Confino’s characterisation of the nation as a ‘local metaphor’ might provide a useful 
framework for describing the relationship between ‘ordinary people’ and nationalist 
discourse. 
 
Patrída as a local metaphor 
 
In a study of nation-building and national identity in Germany and India, Confino and 
Ajay Skaria criticised existing scholarship for conceiving of the relationship between 
the local and the national according to a ‘logic of transcendence’ that focused on ‘how 
elites, modernity, and the nation penetrated and moulded the locality’ and ‘how the 
local is historically transcended into higher levels of generality and abstraction’ 
(2002:8-9). According to this logic of transcendence, the local is not itself ‘a shaper of 
nationalism’ but rather ‘a repository of national belonging created elsewhere’, 
something pre-existing that was waiting for the advent of the nation in order to be 
nationalised, modernised, or awakened (Confino and Skaria 2002:9). Confino and 
Skaria argued that such approaches sidelined another kind of local, one which they 
dubbed the ‘other local’ (2002:9), a space where the nation was subordinated to, and 
drew meaning from, the local, as well as vice versa (2002:10-12). This local is not 
exhausted, sublated, or transcended by nationalism, but rather ‘continues to live, in the 
era of nationhood, not so much outside the national but beyond and alongside it’ 
(Confino and Skaria 2002:10).
57
 It is this ‘other local’ in Greek nationhood with which I 
am concerned in this review essay. 
 
The notion of the ‘other local’ drew on Confino’s earlier criticism of scholarship on 
nationalism for its ‘failure to encompass the malleability of nationhood’ (1993:43). He 
explored how the nation found expression as a local metaphor through which people 
‘devise a common denominator between the intimate, immediate and real local place 
and the distant and abstract national world’ (Confino 1993:44). Confino developed this 
argument through a discussion of the German concept of Heimat. This word lacks a 
                                                                                                                                               
conceptual entity entirely distinct from the citizens of Greece’ such that ‘many Greeks today are forceful 
critics of the state and those who work for it, while at the same time they are equally impassioned 
defenders of the nation’ (1997b:26; see also Herzfeld 1997). 
57
 Comparable discussions have taken place within the study of globalisation about the relationship 
between the local and the global (see, for instance, Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst 2005:1-7).  
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direct equivalent in English, but is often loosely translated as ‘homeland’, and ‘denotes 
one’s emotional attachment to a territory conceived as home, be it a small locality or 
large, abstract homeland’ (Confino 2014:64). In German nation-building, the Heimat 
idea thus represented belonging, but was taxonomically malleable, ‘an interchangeable 
representation of the local, the regional and the national community’ (Confino 1993:50). 
A Heimat movement rose to prominence in the 1880s, and found expression principally 
in local and regional Heimat associations, Heimatkunde (Heimat studies) on the school 
curriculum, Heimat museums, and Heimat publications (Confino 1993:50-51). The aim 
of this movement ‘was not simply to represent local communities, but to give meaning 
to the national whole’, and thereby to ‘endow[] the abstract nation the tangibility of 
local experience’ (Confino 1993:60-61). According to Confino: 
 
By allowing the localities and regions to emphasize their historical, natural and 
ethnographical uniqueness and, at the same time, by integrating them all, the 
Heimat idea was a common denominator of variousness. It balanced the 
plurality of local identities and the restrictions imposed by the imperatives of a 
single national identity. A thousand Heimats dotted Germany, each claiming 
uniqueness and particularity. And yet, together, the Heimats informed the ideal 
of a single, transcendent nationality (1993:62). 
 
In other words, belonging to the national collectivity in Germany was largely 
constructed through attachment to one’s local area: ‘[a]rmed with hometown patriotism, 
every locality wrote its own Heimat history, emphasising its own historical importance 
and inheritance’ (Confino 1993:55) and ‘publiciz[ing] [its] singularity in national and 
local history’ (Confino 2014:65). 
 
We can draw certain parallels between the importance of the Heimat idea in German 
nation-building, and the significance of the Greek notion of patrída in Greek national 
belonging, a term that we might also translate as ‘homeland’.
58
 Writing in 1910, the 
folklorist John Lawson observed that if a Greek ‘be asked what is his nation land 
(patrida), his answer will be, not Greece nor any of the larger divisions of it, but the 
particular town or hamlet in which he happened to be born’ (quoted in Peckham 
2001:62). In this sense, patrída and the sense of belonging it evoked were firmly rooted 
in the locality. Yet in Greece as in Germany, ‘the logic of nation-state formation 
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 It is not my intention to equate these two terms, which have distinct etymologies and histories, but 
rather to suggest certain commonalities as regards the relationship between the local and the national in 
Greek and German nation-building. I translate patrída as ‘homeland’, although, for etymological 
exactitude, it could also be translated as ‘fatherland’, which, as Danforth observed, would make the 
common expression mitéra patrída (‘mother fatherland’) something of a mixed metaphor (1995:82). 
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harmonized extraordinarily well with the persistence of localist ideologies’ (Herzfeld 
1997:74). As Robert Peckham identified, the construction of Greek national identity 
was ‘closely bound up with the celebration of local, regional identities’, expressed 
through literature, folklore, and local historical and topographical studies (2001:67-68). 
German Heimatkunde inspired a patridografía (patrída studies) movement in Greece in 
the 1880s, in which ‘the “local” homeland or patrida was emphasized as an essential 
cultural and historical constituent of the national space’ (Peckham 2001:76). In line with 
this movement, school curricula in Greece ‘increasingly focused on students’ 
acquaintance with the localities before moving outwards to engage with other larger 
geographical categories’ (Peckham 2001:76), thereby endowing the nation, in Confino’s 
terms, with a sense of ‘coziness’ by making use of ‘personal, recognisable experiences, 
which were immediately familiar and capable of being projected onto larger entities’ 
(Confino 1993:70). In this way, patrída, like Heimat, simultaneously represented the 
locality and the nation, such that, for instance, amongst the Greek refugees from Asia 
Minor, patrída could refer both ‘to a physical homeland, from which people were 
obliged to emigrate’ and ‘embody the notion of a national collectivity and refer to a 
national homeland’ (Karakasidou 1997b:150-151). Each Greek could envisage the 
national patrída through the lens of their own local patrída, and feel belonging to an 
abstract national collectivity grounded in belonging to a tangible local community.
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The national patrída thus drew its appeal and durability from its ambiguity and 
malleability; or, to modify Confino’s formula: 
 
To fit every patrída in Greece, the Greek patrída had to fit no specific one. To 
enable every Greek to imagine his or her own individual patrída, the Greek 
patrída had to fit any place and no place, thus becoming applicable to every 
local and regional identity in Greece (Confino 1993:66; I have replaced 
‘Heimat’ with ‘patrída’, and Germany/German with Greece/Greek). 
 
Understanding patrída as a local metaphor for national attachment helps us to avoid a 
logic of transcendence that juxtaposes local and national identity and sees the former as 
subordinate to the latter (Confino and Skaria 2002:9), and instead to perceive how 
Greeks can be ‘at one and the same time, say, local and national’ (Confino 1997:1399). 
Michael Herzfeld spoke of an elderly Cretan man who was moved to tears when relating 
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 In 1993, against the backdrop of a growing seasonal return to Imbros on the part of the expatriated 
Greeks (see chapter 7), one writer in Ίmvros captured this interdependency of local intimacy (familiar 
places and people) and symbols of national unity (common language and traditions) when he 
characterised patrída as ‘the world on the scale of man, the familiar environment, our language, our 
traditions, the earth where the bones of our forefathers are buried, the house in which we were born and 




an incident in 1866 in which a group of Cretans surrounded by Turks in a monastery 
killed themselves rather than submitting to their opponents. Herzfeld posed the 
question: 
 
Is he, at that moment, celebrating kin, local, Cretan, or Greek identity? Only a 
literalist would insist that we should choose only one level of identification, for 
his performance resonates at all of them. Yet this adumbration of concentric 
loyalties runs counter to the exclusivism of nation-state ideology. While the old 
man might wish to identify with the national ideal, his message is always 
potentially subversive, because it raises the possibility that one of the less 
inclusive levels of solidarity might eventually prevail and command a more 
immediate attachment (1997:81-82). 
 
As this anecdote demonstrates, national identity has a ‘unique capacity to represent the 
nation without precluding adherence to any number of other identities’ (Confino 
1993:44). But there is more to it than that. Herzfeld has also written about Cretan sheep 
thieves who find justification for their defiance of Greek law by portraying their 
‘exploits as emblematic of Cretan daring and of the Greeks’ unquenchable love of 
independence’ (Herzfeld 1987:45), a cornerstone of Greek nationalist narratives of 
resistance to the Turks. In this sense, local dissent from national authority can still 
represent idealised national values (Herzfeld 1997; see below). Cretan sheep thieves can 
see themselves as quintessentially national precisely because of their local, Cretan 
particularities, even as these are in direct defiance of national authority. Put differently, 
we are dealing not simply with the capacity for an individual to be both national (Greek) 
and local (Cretan), but with the two as overlapping realms such that national identity is 
made tangible through local particularity, whilst local particularity takes on broader 
significance through national abstraction (Confino and Skaria 2002:11). This is the 
‘other local’ where the locality and the nation are mutually reinforcing rather than 
locked in an antagonistic contest in which one must trump the other. I develop these 
observations in greater detail in chapter 3, but first I turn my attention to Greek national 
identity, which, notwithstanding its surface simplicity and near universal acceptance in 
Greece (Just 1989:71), is premised upon the incorporation (and not just the silencing) of 
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 Although for reasons of space I focus below primarily on studies of Greek national identity, it should 
be noted that the contextual and performative variability of ethnic identity has long been recognised and 
discussed in other contexts, particularly within anthropology and sociology (see, for instance, Barth 1969; 
Chapman, McDonald and Tonkin 1989; Eriksen 1991; Eriksen 1995; Eriksen 2001; Fitzgerald 1974; Hall 
1996; Macdonald 1993; Schein 1975). 
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Through the looking glass: continuity, invention, imposition 
 
A key debate in the historiography of modern Greece – as in scholarship on nationalism 
generally – has been whether modern Greek identity should be conceptualised in terms 
of awakening (the nationalist and primordialist position), invention (Hobsbawm 1983) 
or imagination (Anderson 1983) connected with modernisation, or structural and 
symbolic continuity (the ethnosymbolist perspective; see, for instance, Smith 1998).
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Greek nationalist scholars, in Anastasia Karakasidou’s words, have often tended to 
‘imply that a Greek nation, apparently impervious to change, has survived since ancient 
times as a vestibule of high culture in the path to civilisation, both for the world in 
general and for the Balkans in particular’ (1997b:15; a point echoed by Cowan and 
Brown 2000:12; Danforth 1984:53-58; Mackridge 2012:39-40; Özkirimli and Sofos 
2008:6; Theodossopoulos 2006:12; Tzanelli 2006:40-42).
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 To cite one example – far 
from the most strident but pertinent to the present study – the Greek American historian 
Vryonis, introducing his account of the Septemvrianá, declared that: 
 
Along with the Jews, Egyptians, and Italians, the Greeks possess one of the 
longest, most continuous, and most extensively recorded histories in the 
Mediterranean basin. Because of this unbroken chronological presence – as well 
as the role of the ancient element of this history in the formation of Western 
civilization and Byzantium’s contribution to the formation of the civilization of 
much of Eastern Europe – the Greeks are extremely sensitive to their historical 




A desire to demonstrate commonality between the ancient and the modern Greeks has 
been a feature both of domestic nationalist discourse and that of many foreign admirers. 
The history textbooks used in Greek schools, for instance, have often strived to 
demonstrate cultural and territorial continuity from prehistory via ancient history to the 
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 Ethnosymbolism emerged as a challenge to modernist interpretations of nationalism, such as those of 
Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson, and was characterised by an emphasis on the pre-modern origins 
of nationalism and nationalist sentiment. For a critical appraisal of ethnosymbolism in the Greek and 
Turkish context, and in particular the work of Anthony Smith, one of its chief proponents, see Özkirimli 
and Sofos (2008:6-11). See also Özkirimli (2003) for an avowedly anti-nationalist critique of 
ethnosymbolist perspectives. 
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 As Dimitris Theodossopoulos observed, the use of the term ‘occupation’ in Greek historiography to 
refer to the time when current Greek territories were under Ottoman rule is symptomatic of a tendency to 
assume that the Greek nation is a timeless and ahistorical phenomenon (2006:14). 
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 Alexandris – opening his study of the Greek minority of Istanbul – made comparable remarks about 
Greek ethnic continuity in Constantinople/Istanbul: 
The Greeks have been one of the leading ethnic groups to have inhabited Istanbul. They alone 
can justifiably claim kinship with the original founders of the city who colonised it in 658 B.C. 
Similarly, members of this community are considered as Romioi, the direct descendants of the 




present day, sometimes blurring ‘empirical archaeological facts and mythology’ in the 
process (Hamilakis 2003:45, 48, 50, 54-55), whilst numerous non-Greek classicists and 
folklorists have scoured the Greek countryside for the vestiges of ancient Greek 
civilisation, such that the contemporary Greeks became ‘nothing more than a blank 
screen on which we can project our romantic fantasies of ancient Greek life’ (Danforth 
1984:53, 64). 
 
Karakasidou – in her exploration of nation-building in Macedonia in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries (see below) – characterised such nationalist historical 
narratives as ‘looking-glass histories’ that, 
 
search backwards over the hills and valleys of historical events to trace the 
inexorable route of a given (or “chosen”) population to the destiny of their 
national enlightenment and liberation. They transform history into national 
history, legitimizing the existence of a nation-state in the present-day by 
teleologically reconstructing its reputed past (1997b:17). 
 
Through the looking-glass, ‘many national scholars in the southern Balkans have failed 
to recognize the fundamental truism that reality is constructed, as are our cultural 
representations of Self and Other’ (Karakasidou 1997b:18); to recognise, in Hercule 
Millas’ terms, that Greeks (and Turks) as national entities did not exist prior to the 
nineteenth century (Millas 2009:np; Millas 2011:np). The inappropriateness of this 
national looking-glass is exacerbated by the fact that, before the nineteenth century, 
what are today national identities were often labour or religious identities: Greeks were 
called ‘Greeks’ because they were merchants, or Bulgarians ‘Bulgarians’ because they 
were peasants (Cowan 1997:156; Danforth 1995:59; Mackridge 2009:56), whilst for 
non-Ottomans, ‘Greek’ meant Orthodox Christian of the Ottoman Empire, in much the 
same way as ‘Latin’ meant Catholic (Mackridge 2009:47).  
 
In response to these looking-glass histories, several scholars have highlighted the 
processes of construction and contestation involved in the proliferation of Greek 
national identity in Macedonia before, during, and after Greek acquisition of territory in 
the region in 1913. Loring Danforth – in his study of the emergence of a Macedonian 
national identity and its conflict with Greek nationalism
64
 – argued that nation-building 
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 Danforth was particularly interested in the conflict that emerged in the 1990s between Greece and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) over historical claims to the name and territory of 
Macedonia. As a corrective to the nationalist positions taken up by both sides, Danforth attempted to offer 
an alternative ‘third history’ emphasising that Macedonian national identity emerged not in the ninth 
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in Macedonia involved the imposition of national identities on previously-existing and 
comparatively fluid ethnic, linguistic, and religious distinctions (1995:57, 61). Under 
the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia was host to Greek-speaking and Slavic-speaking 
Orthodox Christians, Turkish-speaking and Albanian-speaking Muslims, and smaller 
numbers of Vlachs, Jews, and gypsies (Danforth 1993:3), many of whom had no clearly 
defined national consciousness (Mackridge and Yannakakis 1997:5). In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian nationalist 
movements competed for the allegiance of these populations (Danforth 1995:58).
65
 
Danforth described how Greece, after its territorial acquisitions in 1913, pursued an 
assimilationist agenda in an effort to ‘Hellenise’ the inhabitants of southern Macedonia, 
particularly targeting Slavic-speaking Christians by changing Slavic toponyms and 
clamping down on the use of the Slavic language (1993:4; 1995:69-70). This 
Hellenisation process, comparatively successful amongst the Greek and Albanian-
speaking Orthodox Christians and the Vlachs, encountered significant resistance 
amongst the Slavic-speaking population, some of whom, in Danforth’s terms, ‘came to 
identify themselves in a national sense as Macedonians, not as Greeks’ (1995:71). By 
the mid-twentieth century, therefore, comparatively fluid nineteenth-century ethnic 
identities had been ‘transformed into sharply polarized and mutually exclusive national 
identities’, and ‘[p]eople who had previously identified themselves primarily as local 
Macedonians in an ethnic rather than a national sense […] were forced under very 
difficult circumstances to adopt a national identity and become Greeks, Bulgarians, or 
Macedonians’ (Danforth 1995:73). 
 
Karakasidou offered an equally forceful critique of nationalist histories based on 
research in a central Macedonian village in Greece in the 1990s, which, according to 
informal local histories, had in the late Ottoman period been peopled by Slavic-speaking 
agriculturalists, Greek-speaking merchants, Turkish-speaking landowners, and others 
(Karakasidou 1997b:10). She argued that the apparently ‘primordial sentiments’ that 
                                                                                                                                               
century (FYROM’s position) nor under Tito (Greece’s position) but in the nineteenth century (1995:56). 
His work has been criticised both by Macedonian scholars unhappy with his deconstruction of 
Macedonian national identity, and by Greek scholars who have charged him with demonstrating bias in 
favour of Macedonian nationalism (on these debates, see Danforth 1997:668; Karakasidou 2000:422). 
65
 Danforth suggested that, initially, Macedonian villagers were able to negotiate and manipulate the 
national identities propagated by competing national movements (1995:61). According to the 
contemporary observations of British journalist Henry Noel Brailsford, one Macedonian village had 
previously identified as Greek but switched to a Bulgarian national affiliation ‘because the Bulgarians had 
sent the village a teacher and a priest, while the Greeks had only sent a teacher’ (Danforth 1995:61; 
Danforth’s words). Danforth argued, however, that by the end of the century these choices had 
increasingly become externally-imposed and mutually-exclusive national categories (1993:3; 1995:73). 
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bound contemporary villagers together as ‘descendants of ancient Hellenes’ were ‘a 
constructed tradition’ that was ‘not so much a matter of choice or primordial attachment 
as it was a result of historical contingency’ (Karakasidou 1997b:74). According to 
Karakasidou, Greek nation-builders transformed ‘the population of a diverse ethnic 
tapestry into Greek nationals’ (1997b:25) by ‘reviving a vision of Byzantine or ancient 
Greek culture, and projecting it onto the region’s population through the medium of an 
increasingly Greek version of Orthodox Christianity’ (1997b:94). Like Danforth, 
Karakasidou lamented how Greek nation-building ‘imposed a homogeneity on the 
Macedonian region and its inhabitants’ (1997b:94), such that ‘the boundaries that 
people once crossed with relative ease were tightened, reified, or closed’ (Karakasidou 
1997b:21). In this sense, Greek national identity and history were written over pre-
existing ‘localized memories of personal experience’ (Karakasidou 1997b:235). As she 
wrote elsewhere: 
 
Viewed from above, nation-building “elevates” cultural and ethnic identities 
from a local and particular context, attempting to replace them with a newly 
created and propagated national consciousness. Seen from below, from the level 
of everyday life and social interaction, however, it uproots families, destroying 




Karakasidou, in common with Danforth, stressed that for some Macedonian inhabitants 
– particularly those ‘who had not yet acquired a national identity’ – the acquisition of a 
Hellenic identity ‘was gentle, even profitable’ (Karakasidou 1997b:72, 227). Equally, 
she emphasised that the spread of Greek national identity was not simply the ‘result of a 
heavy-handed acculturation campaign directed by national elites’, but was also a 
‘dialectical product of the interaction of state and local interests, in which perceptions of 
solidarities and differences were reshaped by conflict, challenges, and contests in 
everyday life’ (Karakasidou 1997b:188).
67
  Nevertheless, she concluded that nation-
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 Karakasidou emphasised that this suppression of alternative, localised identities led many of the 
villagers with whom she interacted in the 1990s to feel uncomfortable acknowledging aspects of their past 
history or current culture that might be considered ‘non-Greek’, such that ‘a great deal of self-censorship 
is often exercised [… by villagers] in conversation with outsiders, consciously or not’ (1997b:125). 
67
 In Danforth’s account, there is some ambivalence about the role of individual agency in the acquisition 
of national identity. Whilst he commonly emphasised the importance of external hegemonic imposition 
and/or ascription by others (Danforth 1995:59-60, 70, 73, 199, 221-222), he also stressed that ‘it is 
ultimately the individual who chooses what national identity to adopt, or in some cases whether to adopt 
any national identity at all’ (Danforth 1995:198). Discussing diaspora communities in Australia, he 
argued that individuals ‘are Greeks or Macedonians because they choose to be Greeks or Macedonians’ 
(Danforth 1995:228), noting that some migrants switched their national identity after relocation to 
Australia (Danforth 1995:239, 243). He also gave examples of individuals who refused to identify 
themselves with either (Danforth 1995:231, 236), although he cautioned that ‘it is difficult for a person to 




building in Macedonia – especially for those who had already formed an allegiance to 
an alternative ethnic or national identity – was ‘nasty, brutish, and short’ (Karakasidou 
1997b:72, 227). 
 
Danforth and Karakasidou shared an admirable desire, in Karakasidou’s words, to 
challenge ‘the charade of modern chauvinism’ and ‘make an effort at dismantling 
boundaries rather than raising them’ (Karakasidou 1997b:82; Danforth 1997:668-669; 
Danforth 2003:212). I do not contest their portrayals of the ways in which Greek nation-
builders attempted to proliferate Greek national identity in Macedonia, nor of the often 
damaging implications of these attempts for particular local populations. In terms of 
understanding the complexities of national belonging after these initial processes of 
nation-building, however, and the range of ways in which national identity might relate 
to local particularities, both studies are somewhat limited by a logic of transcendence. 
Danforth contrasted the pre-national ethnic identities of the nineteenth century with the 
national identities imposed by elites in the twentieth century, and viewed the latter as 
transcending or sublating the former. Karakasidou, similarly, saw national identity as 
existing in an antagonistic, one-way, and ultimately destructive relationship with local 
identities, pre-national heterogeneity replaced by national homogeneity. Although she 
showed awareness of how nation-building functioned by incorporating local discourse, 
for instance considering how local village myths of ancestral descent from Alexander 
the Great linked ‘the locale to the nation of the Hellenes’ (Karakasidou 1997b:32, 36), 
the locality in her study remained ‘only the context for the national idea’ (Confino and 
Skaria 2002:8), and the ‘other local’ that continues to exist alongside the nation, 
adapting and reshaping its contours in the course of everyday life, is left unexplored. 
Simultaneously, by placing emphasis on the homogenising impact of Greek nation-
building in the region, both authors discounted the possibility that Greek identity today 
might mean different things to different people in diverse local settings.
68
 In this sense, 
they risked assuming that identity can only be fluid and multifaceted insofar as 
individuals have access to distinctive ethnic or linguistic heritages, in the process 
downplaying the performative plasticity of national identity itself. When Karakasidou 
argued that the nation-building process in northern Greece, 
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 Although cf. Karakasidou’s discussion of ‘natural enculturation’ amongst Slav-speaking women in 
northern Greece, in which she emphasised that ‘[a]s long as the meanings behind the symbols of Greek 
nationhood remain sufficiently ambiguous to permit a latitude of interpretation, Greek national identity 
need not be incompatible with a Slavo-Macedonian ethnic identity’ (1997a:99). 
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has been enormously successful. Most of the inhabitants today, regardless of 
their ethnic background and how their ancestors might have defined themselves 
100 or even 50 years ago, conceive of themselves now as nothing less than 
Greek (1993:5) 
 
she was almost certainly right. But it is also probable that many would conceive of 
themselves as more than simply Greek: to feel, for instance, that they are Greek 
Macedonian, and that this is different from being, say, Greek Peloponnesian, or that 
they are ‘native Greeks’ and that this is different from being of refugee descent; and 
perhaps, moreover, that it is this local particularity that makes them particularly Greek 
(see chapter 3). This is not mere pedantry, nor an attempt to deny the role of coercion 
and imposition in the proliferation of national identities. Rather, it is to suggest that we 
cannot understand the contemporary success and appeal of nationalism by focusing on 
its homogenising effect alone, to the exclusion of how its unifying potential is partly 





The ‘usable past’: the everyday life of national identity 
 
As K. S. Brown and Yannis Hamilakis observed, ‘[m]any accounts of the construction 
of Greek national identity construct a picture of a monolithic, imposing, and 
overarching political and ideological structure (the nation-state) which dominates the 
lives, bodies, and minds of its citizens’ (2003:6). To a greater or lesser degree, this is 
the impression created by the studies considered in the previous section. Brown and 
Hamilakis argued for an alternative perspective, one which would recognise Greek 
nationalism as a ‘complex and internally fragmented phenomenon’ (2003:8); as 
Hamilakis put it, ‘the national “usable past” is a matter of constant (and often 
successful) negotiation in people’s everyday lives’ (Hamilakis 2003:61). In this section, 
I present the work of several scholars who have paid attention to this ‘usable past’, and 
suggest that they are better equipped to avoid the logic of transcendence and uncover 
the different ways in which nationhood becomes meaningful in people’s lives. 
 
In his study of tradition and modernity on the Aegean island of Kalymnos, David Sutton 
sought to demonstrate that ‘historical consciousness inheres in everyday, sensuous 
                                                 
69
 It does not follow, of course, that any local particularity can or will be assimilated to the national ideal, 
as illustrated, for example, by the experiences of minority communities such as those created by the 




experience’ and that it is ‘from this everyday experience that reference to the past takes 
its power’ (1998:207). For Sutton, studies of nationalism had focused disproportionately 
on uncovering and debunking ‘invented traditions’ and exploring ‘the construction of 
the past from above’ (1998:6), rather than considering how nationalist movements 
‘often achieve their appeal by accommodating themselves to local-level discourses, and 
by mobilizing already existing cultural ideas’ (1998:174).
70
 He argued, for instance, that 
Kalymnian indignation over the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ by FYROM was better 
explained not in terms of a susceptibility to nationalist discourse, but by examining 
local kinship and naming practices (Sutton 1998:179-191). He pointed to the 
importance of ‘ancestral names in constructing family continuity’ on Kalymnos, which, 
he claimed, islanders saw paralleled in the ‘use of historical names in constructing 
national continuity’ in Macedonia (Sutton 1998:189).
71
 This pattern was observable 
more generally. Kalymnians frequently used local kinship metaphors to explain national 
politics – referring, for example, to neighbouring countries as ‘bad neighbours’ – and, 
vice versa, deployed metaphors derived from national politics to explain local situations 
– as when one Kalymnian woman compared her dictatorial father to the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus (Sutton 1998:124). Through such examples, Sutton was able to 
demonstrate that national history was a resource that people on Kalymnos actively 
deployed to make sense of the day-to-day present, a ‘usable past’ (Hamilakis 2003:61) 
that was not simply imposed by nationalist elites but was ‘grounded in everyday human 
activity’ (Sutton 1998:10). Moreover, he showed that national history was, in turn, 
interpreted and made meaningful through local experience, thereby ‘anchoring the 
imagined community in daily practice’ (Sutton 1998:123). In this way, Sutton drew 
attention to the interpenetration of national and local experience in everyday discourse, 
confirming that the durability of nationalism is premised on the mutual accommodation 
of the nation and the locality rather than (solely) the transcendence of the latter by the 
former. To borrow terms from Confino and Skaria, Kalymnians ‘imagined nationhood 
as a form of localness, while [in turn] the immediate local world imparted on the 
abstract national one a sense of physicality, everydayness, and authenticity’ (2002:11). 
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 In this regard, Sutton singled out the work of Danforth and Karakasidou for fixating on historicising 
national identities (Sutton 1998:179). 
71
 Although cf. Peter Allen’s review of Sutton’s book, in which he complained that popular indignation 
over the Macedonia issue occurred across Greece, including in areas that do not share Kalymnos’ kinship 
naming systems (1999:194). 
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Fellow anthropologist Herzfeld expressed similar scepticism about top-down 
approaches to the study of nationalism, which he argued not only disregarded the 
impact that ordinary people have ‘on the form of their local nationalism’, but also 
glossed over the fact that ‘national identity comprises a generous measure of 
embarrassment together with all of the idealized virtues’ (1997:6). As an ‘antidote to the 
formalism of cultural nationalism’, and in an effort to demonstrate that ‘conceptually 
the nation-state is constructed out of intimacy’, Herzfeld proposed the concept of 
‘cultural intimacy’ (1997:13-14). According to this theory, an intimate knowledge of 
national imperfection, which is kept hidden from outsiders, is commonly acknowledged 
in informal everyday discourse, and provides the basis for internal solidarity and 
communality amongst members of the national community (Herzfeld 1997:3). For 
Herzfeld, studying this cultural intimacy would allow us to see beyond the ‘deceptively 
transparent surface’ of the nation (1997:2) and recognise that ‘[t]here is no single 
“national view”’ except that presented externally in an effort to hide an intimate 
knowledge of imperfection (1997:171). His argument was not only that such 
imperfection is kept hidden from national outsiders, but that ‘it is paradoxically the 
insubordinate values and practices that make patriotism attractive from day-to-day’ 
(Herzfeld 1997:169), as in the case of the Cretan sheep thieves (see above) who evoked 
national ideals of resistance and independence as justification for contravening the 
authority of the Greek state (Herzfeld 1987:45-46).
72
 As Herzfeld put it, people can be 
‘fiercely patriotic and just as fiercely rebellious at one and the same time’ (1997:55). 
 
Herzfeld’s study of cultural intimacy flagged the disjuncture between the idealised 
statism of nationalist discourse and the imperfect contours of nationhood in everyday 
life. He observed that ‘because national ideologies are grounded in images of intimacy, 
they can be subtly but radically restructured by the changes occurring in the intimate 
reaches of everyday life – by shifts of meaning that may not be registered at all in 
external cultural form’ (Herzfeld 1997:30). In other words, nationalism’s apparently 
‘semantically stable terminology’ belies a quotidian plasticity, as ‘nationalism invests 
certain kinds of identity with a rigidity that they do not commonly possess in everyday 
discourse’ (Herzfeld 1997:42-43). This has significant implications for how we interpret 
people’s usages of ethnic or national signifiers. In Herzfeld’s terms, ‘[f]ixity of form 
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 Although both Greek officials and the thieves themselves consider those involved in animal theft to be 
deeply patriotic, both also ‘conventionally attribute the incidence of rustling to Turkish influence’ 
(Herzfeld 1987:45). In this sense, ‘Turkish’ characteristics may be a mark of familiarity and intimacy, 
partly because they are officially rejected (Herzfeld 1987:45-46). 
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does not necessarily entail a corresponding fixity of meanings and intentions’ (Herzfeld 
1997:22). He gave the example of the term ‘Vlach’, which in Greek discourse could 
refer to a member of the pastoralist Koutsovlach community, to a northern Greek 
shepherd more generally, or figuratively to a country bumpkin. For most Greeks, the 
context in which the term was used would be sufficient for them to ascertain what 
meaning was intended (Herzfeld 1997:44). Herzfeld referred to these identity labels as 
‘ethnic shifters’ (1997:51). He wrote that, ‘[n]ational and ethnic terms allow for a 
surprising amount of semantic slippage; their appearance of semantic fixity allows 





The plasticity of national and ethnic labels has also been explored by Jane Cowan and 
K. S. Brown, in their introduction to a collection of essays on identity in Macedonia. 
They were critical of the ‘endlessly reiterated metaphors of macédoines, mosaics and 
cheese boards’ that scholars used to characterise identity and difference in the region 
(Cowan and Brown 2000:9).
74
 By the logic of such metaphors, Cowan and Brown 
suggested, conflict in Macedonia was seen as a product of the essential differences 
between its various inhabitants, and each of its groups was treated as a distinctive 
component of an ethnic fruit salad, ‘maintaining their separate but juxtaposed identities 
or flavours’ (2000:3). Even as scholars ‘tirelessly declared’ the self-evident 
‘“constructedness” of nations’, they thus reinforced a perception of ethnic groups ‘as 
discreet and irreducible “billiard balls” in collision’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:3). 
Consequently, the variability and contingency of identity labels were ‘rendered 
invisible’, setting up ‘“odd equivalences” such that Albanians are considered to be the 
same whether in the Republic of Macedonia or Kosovo, whilst Macedonians in Greece 
are the same as Macedonians in Bulgaria’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:13). The ways in 
which individuals responded to national categories and their ‘differing orientations to a 
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 Nevertheless, although ‘[r]egularities, which seem to be embedded, are subject to negotiation […] the 
deformation of norms requires a skilled appreciation of what others consider the norms to be’ (Herzfeld 
1997:154). Herzfeld discovered this to his cost, when he followed the example of locals on a 
Dodecanesean island by referring to the practice of ‘setting firecrackers off immediately in front of 
people’ as a ‘barbarous custom’, only to be angrily reprimanded by a passing islander. As Herzfeld 
explained: 
As a visitor I adopted the term from local speakers, only to discover the hard way that this act of 
appropriation had in itself been sufficient to change the term’s meaning. The moral is clear: 
(Western) Europeans have a particular obligation to respect the semantically rigid mutual 
exclusion of Greeks and barbarians. Only those with privileged access to the intimacy of Greek 
culture may engage in the play of semantic fluidity that permits self-denigration (1997:47-48). 
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 Karakasidou, for example, referred to Ottoman Macedonia as ‘a diverse ethnic tapestry’ (1997b:25). 
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“shared” identity’ were, in the process, given comparatively little thought (Cowan and 
Brown 2000:13). In contradistinction to such approaches, Cowan and Brown sought to 
‘emphasise the contingent and context-specific ways in which identity and difference 
are expressed, or eschewed’ (2000:3). Like Brubaker et al. (see above), they stressed 
that ethnicity is ‘not always and everywhere an equally salient rubric for organising 
individual lives, biographies and social relations’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:15). They 
offered the term ‘inflections’ as an alternative metaphor for identity in the region, one 
which would reject ‘a notion of the signifier as singular and univocal’, and instead 
capture how ‘a single word is altered by the particularities of enunciation – tone, colour, 
voice, emotion – within particular contexts, enabling a rich variability in connotation 
and, ultimately, denotation’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:20). By exploring the inflections 
of ethnic identities, Cowan and Brown, like Herzfeld, took ‘the meaning of a word to 
inhere not in the word itself, but in its enunciation within particular performative 
contexts’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:20).  
 
In a methodological critique of the field of memory studies, Confino posed the 
following question: 
 
National memory […] is constituted by different, often opposing memories that, 
in spite of their rivalries, construct common denominators that overcome on the 
symbolic level real social and political differences to create an imagined 
community […] Conflicts over memory exist. Differences are real […] But all 
of this only begs the question: how, then, in spite of all these differences and 
difficulties, do nations hold together? (1997:1399-1400). 
 
The above discussion offers us a solution to this conundrum. The terminological 
stability of ethnic and national categories provides an illusion of fixity and commonality 
that facilitates large-scale solidarity between co-nationals: everyone ‘knows’ that ‘we’ 
are all Greek and, therefore, ‘we’ are all the same. At the same time, the capacity of 
identity labels to produce variable semantic inflections in everyday performative 
contexts allows for considerable flexibility in terms of what it means for an individual 
to be ‘Greek’ at any given moment. In fact, because idioms of national belonging and 
national virtue are so readily subordinated to local particularity (Sutton 1998), ‘being 
Greek’ is often given substance through the familiar local world rather than the abstract 
national one. Nationalism is intimately malleable, and therefore comforting and 
recognisable, but is simultaneously formally static, thereby providing a common 
denominator that draws together individuals otherwise separated by ‘real social and 
68 
 
political differences’ (Confino 1997:1399-1400). In Herzfeld’s terms, ‘state ideologies 
and the rhetorics of everyday social life are revealingly similar’ (1997:2) in that both 
‘depend on a semiotic illusion: by making sure that all the outward signs of identity are 
as consistent as possible, they literally create, or constitute, homogeneity’ (1997:30). In 
this sense, ethnic shifters are semantically neither fixed nor free-floating, but ‘hollow’ in 
that they have ‘quanta of available empty space that can be loaded with additional 
properties: more virtues, more glories, more blame’ (Theodossopoulos 2006:3). They do 
not lack content, but rather have no fixed content beyond their surface form, and can 
thus be differently configured and reconfigured in order ‘to allow new sets of meaning 
to dwell in their available hollowness’ without severely disrupting the illusion of 
national unity (Theodossopoulos 2006:18, 23).  
 
In this review essay, I have sought to demonstrate that there is a strong body of work 
that has treated ordinary Greeks ‘as active producers – and not just passive consumers – 
of national discourse’ (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a:539). I have drawn connections 
between this literature and Confino’s characterisation of the nation as a local metaphor, 
in order to elaborate a conceptual framework for describing how ordinary people 
experience and construct national attachment through the particularities of their own 
local experiences. In the next chapter, I pursue this discussion by exploring how the 
Greeks of Turkey developed their sense of self and belonging as residents of the Greek 





More than simply Hellenic 
Belonging and inclusive particularity 
 
The Greeks of Turkey have sometimes been referred to as a diaspora community (Örs 
2006:91). But what exactly makes a community diasporic? As Brubaker observed, 
different definitions and conceptual usages of the term abound, to the extent that one 
might refer to a ‘“diaspora” diaspora – a dispersion of the meanings of the term in 
semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space’ (2005:1). In Ulrike Meinhof and Anna 
Triandafyllidou’s words, diaspora in a ‘narrow sense carries connotations of alienation, 
displacement, nostalgia and with it a wish to return to a “motherland”’ (2006:200; see, 
for instance, Connor 1986; Safran 1991). Yet if diaspora, following Walker Connor, 
thus refers to ‘that segment of a people living outside the homeland’ (1986:16), it is 
unclear whether the Greeks of Turkey were a diaspora community whilst living in 
Turkey and were thus repatriated to a Greek ‘motherland’, or whether they only became 
diasporic when they were expatriated from Istanbul and Imbros. On the one hand, many 
informants recalled possessing an emotional attachment to Greece whilst living in 
Turkey – some would walk past the Greek embassy in Istanbul so as to be able to see 
the Greek flag, or collect soil on visits to Greece to take back to Turkey – and saw 
Greece as a national patrída that would protect them, or in which they might seek 
refuge from persecution.
75
 As Gerasimos, who came to Greece as a teenager in 1964, 
put it to me: 
 
Of course [we saw Greece as a patrída], because we are Hellenes, we speak 
Greek. We are Christians, and we were in a country where everyone was 
Muslim, and was hostile towards us. So, yes, we saw it as a patrída, a place 
where you would like to live (06/02/2012). 
 
At the same time, however, Greece was for many an alien place, and numerous 
informants stressed that they never had any intention to cross the Aegean until 
circumstances forced them to think otherwise. As the newspaper Imvriakí Ichó wrote in 
its inaugural issue: 
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 Anna – born in Istanbul in 1923, and a resident of the city until emigration in 1937 – remembered her 
excitement when friends visiting from Greece brought two eggs with them: ‘I still remember those eggs, 
because I ate eggs from Greece!’ (28/11/2011). 
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In its narrowest sense patrída begins from the home, our village, it broadens and 
it is called Imbros. Away from its shores, from its narrow horizons the meaning 
of the word patrís begins to be lost for us. Away from Imbros what is our 
patrída? Where do we belong? (Imvriakí Ichó October 1971). 
 
Furthermore, many expatriates were profoundly disappointed with the reception they 
received in Greece when they arrived (see chapter 2 and chapter 4): as Vasilis lamented, 
‘we saw Greece as a mother patrída, but unfortunately Greece did not accept us as her 
children’ (12/08/2013); or, as a relative of Fani more colourfully put it, ‘we did not 
return to our mother patrída; it was rather a stepmother patrída’ (Fani 07/06/2013). 
This led many interviewees to express a feeling of disconnection from Greece as a 
physical place. In the words of Thanasis, a resident of Istanbul from his birth in 1953 
until emigration in 1971: 
 
Here 90% of Hellenes have the tendency to buy plots of land. I will never buy a 
plot of land. I bought a house; I bought a car; I bought a shop; I established a 
business; I’ll buy a second shop: [but] I’ll never buy a piece of earth. That 
means I am a refugee: I do not have the culture of the land (Thanasis 
06/02/2012). 
 
From this perspective, as İlay Romain Örs has written, emigration from Istanbul and 
Imbros was an act not of ‘return’ but of ‘expatriation’, and the Greeks of Turkey could 
be seen as ‘a Greek diaspora community inside Greece’ whose ‘only homeland’ is 




Yet whilst this represents an accurate description of the discursive positions taken up by 
some of my interviewees (see below), it fails in three ways to capture the multiplicity of 
belonging commonly in evidence in expatriate narratives. Firstly, it disregards those 
who felt that they had two homelands, that they belonged both in the patrída of their 
birth and in the Greek national patrída: individuals like Panagiotis – born in Istanbul in 
1946 and a resident of Greece since 1963 – who has decided to acquire dual Greek and 
Turkish citizenship because he has ‘two patrídes’ and wants to feel like a ‘free citizen’ 
in both (24/11/2011). Secondly, it ignores the possibility that a particular place might be 
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 Aslı Tunç and Ariana Ferentinou similarly wrote of Greek women still living in Istanbul that they ‘do 
not consider themselves as “migrants” or diaspora subjects. They are indigenous to Turkey’ (2012:911; 
my emphasis). As far as my interviewees are concerned, however, it would be somewhat misleading to 
say that they felt (or feel) indigenous to Turkey, as they were often at pains to emphasise that their patrída 
was Istanbul or Imbros rather than Turkey generally. As Konstantinos put it, ‘our patrída was there, but it 
didn’t have any connection with Turkey. In our minds, we separated Constantinople from Turkey’ 
(05/02/2012). It was not uncommon for expatriates to localise their sense of belonging even further, 
referring to the particular neighbourhood or village in which they were born as their patrída: in Stella 
Skarlatou’s terms, ‘Panteíchi [Pendik, a district of Istanbul] was our patrída’ (11/03/2010). 
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invoked as a patrída in a certain context for ‘strategic’ purposes. In the pages of the 
newspaper Ίmvros, for instance, it was particularly common for writers to refer to 
Imbros as their only patrída, and to characterise their presence in Greece as an exile in 
foreign lands, when they were encouraging their compatriots to direct their energies 
towards the preservation of a Greek community on the island (see chapter 7), and 
conversely for them to invoke Greece as their ‘true patrída’ (Ίmvros December 1980) 
when advocating for support from the Greek state or protesting about the treatment of 
the expatriates as ‘aliens’. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it does not take 
account of the (somewhat obscure) distinction between the abstract concept of the 
national patrída and the physical territory of the Greek state (Karakasidou 1997b:26). 
During our interview, Aris initially characterised Greece as his patrída, commenting 
that every group has a place to which they return in times of need, but, when asked if he 
felt that he was returning home when he migrated to Greece, he responded, ‘no, [it was] 
like I was going to a foreign place’ (23/05/2013). For him, Greece was a patrída in an 
abstract and collective way, but not a home in a tangible and individual sense, a 
diachronic historical homeland rather than a contemporary physical one. In Artemis 
Leontis’ terms, a place becomes a homeland not when it is inhabited but when it is 
mapped with history and meaning (1995:3). From this point of view, an individual 
might feel alienation from the physical territory of the Greek state but simultaneously 
feel attachment to the abstract Greek homeland, the latter constructed and sustained 
through attachment to their own local patrída (see review essay I, and below). Or, 
alternatively, they might feel a sense of belonging both to their old patrída in Istanbul 
or Imbros and to their new home in Greece, the two localities made proximate by the 
encompassing abstraction of the Greek national patrída. In this sense, the Greeks of 
Turkey complicate ‘the very ideas of “home” and “host”’ (Cohen 1997:127) by 
adhering to a more ambivalent sense of belonging that need not be precisely or 
singularly ‘located’ in one place or another.  
 
Definitions of diaspora, however, have moved beyond ‘a teleology of origin/return’ 
(Clifford 1994:306) to focus on the centrality of ‘boundary-maintenance’ and, 
increasingly, ‘boundary-erosion’ (Brubaker 2005:6). For the Greeks of Turkey, 
boundary-maintenance – that is ‘the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-á-vis a host 
society’ (Brubaker 2005:6) – has certainly been a feature of their experiences, both in 
Turkey, where they attempted to preserve a distinctive identity as Greek-speaking 
Christians in a predominantly Turkish-speaking Muslim country, and in Greece, where 
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many distinguished themselves from the native Greeks by emphasising cultural and 
historical differences (see below and chapter 4). Boundary-erosion, meanwhile, has in 
particular been emphasised by scholars who saw the dynamics of diaspora as 
antithetical to those of nationalism. Andreas Huyssen, for instance, argued that whilst 
national memory ‘presents itself as natural, authentic, coherent and homogenous’, 
diasporic memory ‘in its traditional sense is by definition cut-off, hybrid, displaced, 
split’ (2006:85). The expatriated Greeks of Istanbul and Imbros have often been written 
about in comparable terms, as communities that transcend nationalism and national 
distinctions (Babül 2004; Babül 2006a; Babül 2006b; Örs 2006; see below). Certainly, 
the expressions of expatriate identity that I examine in this and the following chapter 
undermine dichotomous and essentialist concepts of self and other, and disrupt the 
‘deceptively transparent surface’ of national identity (Herzfeld 1997:2). I share, 
however, Brubaker’s scepticism about a ‘conceptual antithesis between nation-state and 
diaspora’ (2005:10). In a sense, such approaches constitute an extension of the logic of 
transcendence (see review essay I), as they imply that complex or hybrid identities can 
flourish only by transcending national categories, thereby disregarding the possibility of 
hybridity existing within national categories. As Brubaker observed, whilst 
‘[s]ophisticated discussions are sensitive to the heterogeneity of diasporas […] they are 
not always as sensitive to the heterogeneity of nation-states’ (2005:10).  
 
In this chapter, I aim to lay bare the heterogeneity of national identity often rendered 
invisible in juxtaposition between the locality and the nation or the nation and the 
diaspora. I explore how the expatriated Greeks of Turkey expressed their sense of self 
and belonging in Greece through the adaptation of two historical legacies: Romaic 
Byzantium and Classical Hellenism. I demonstrate that the expatriates commonly 
deployed the particularity of their local heritage both to differentiate themselves from 
the Greeks of Greece and to affirm the authenticity of their Hellenic credentials. 
Responding to the perception of some native Greeks that their Turkish birthplace made 
their ethnicity suspect, my interviewees commonly emphasised the specificity of their 
origins in Istanbul and Imbros in order to suggest that they were particularly Greek; 
‘Greeker’, even, than the Greeks of Greece. Such narratives of inclusive particularity 
suggest that claims to national belonging in Greece may be premised on the 





The Helleno-Romaic dilemma 
 
Patrick Leigh Fermor wrote that ‘inside every Greek dwell two figures in opposition 
[…] the Romios and the Hellene’ (1983:106). He outlined 64 parallel characteristics that 
distinguish the Romaic figure from the Hellenic one: the Romiós is concrete and 
tangible, whilst the Hellene is an abstract ideal; the former worships the Byzantine 
Empire and the dome of the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, whilst the latter adores Ancient 
Greece and the Parthenon; nevertheless, they share the practice of ‘settling the world’s 
problems over endless cups of Turkish coffee’ (1983:107-113). The terms Hellene and 
Romiós, sometimes interchangeable, sometimes oppositional, have experienced 
fluctuating fortunes through the ages.
77
 Although the Ancient Greeks saw themselves as 
Hellenes in the sense that they were different from ‘barbarians’, prior to the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 there was no strictly defined ‘Greece’ 
or ‘Greeks’ (Just 1989:73). The term Romioí, meanwhile, probably originated from the 
Ancient Greek for ‘Romans’ (Mackridge 2009:51), and indeed the Byzantines called 
themselves Romaíoi, i.e. the inheritors of the Roman Empire (Just 1989:74; Mackridge 
2009:48). In the Byzantine period, the label Romioí became closely associated with 
Orthodox Christianity, whilst the term Hellene was commonly equated with paganism 
and Ancient Greece, although it did not disappear from contemporary usage altogether 
(Herzfeld 1986:6; Heurtley et al. 1965:36; Mackridge 2009:48-9).
78
 The Ottoman 
Empire took up this terminology, classifying its Orthodox Christian subjects as Rum, 
just as the Turkish Republic would categorise its Greek minority after 1923.  
 
In the build-up to the 1821 Greek Revolution, however, Greek intellectuals – inspired 
by Western narratives of Classical Greek glory – began to call themselves Hellenes, 
even though the peasantry who would fight the revolution against the Ottoman Empire 
continued to self-identify as Romioí, that is as Orthodox Christians, and fought less for 
the glory of Pericles than for freedom from their Muslim rulers (Herzfeld 1986:31; 
Herzfeld 1997:176; Just 1989:83; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:25). As Herzfeld has 
discussed, Greek nation-building thus involved two competing visions of Greece and 
Greek identity: the Hellenic thesis and the Romaic thesis. The Hellenic thesis was ‘an 
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 On the translation of these two words, see chapter 1. 
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 According to Peter Mackridge, the use of the word ‘Hellene’ to mean ‘Orthodox Christian’ in the late 
Byzantium period was ‘a rhetorical conceit confined to a small intellectual elite’, who did not intend ‘to 
be identified with the ancient Hellenes’ (2009:49). It was only from the late seventeenth century onwards 
that speakers of modern Greek came to be thought of as the descendants of the ancient Greeks, and this 
was based on language and region rather than any racial theory (Mackridge 2009:49). 
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outward-directed conformity to international expectations’ and evoked ‘ancient pagan 
glories’, whilst the Romaic thesis was ‘an inward-looking self-critical collective 
appraisal’ that identified with the more recent Byzantine past (Herzfeld 1986:20-23). If 
the Hellenic was the ideal oriented towards modern Europe, the Romaic represented the 
familiar, simultaneously the comfort of Orthodox Christianity and the stigma of oriental 
taint (Herzfeld 1986:20-23; see also Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:21-23).
79
 This contest 
was played out in debates over the Greek national language (Mackridge 2009:18) and a 
‘cartographic anxiety’ over Greece’s territorial boundaries (Peckham 2001:40), as well 
as through folklore, literature and historiography (Herzfeld 1986; Leontis 1995). 
Ultimately, it was the Hellenic thesis that became dominant, and the citizens of the new 
Greek state, in Peter Mackridge’s words, ‘were born again as Hellenes, having realized, 
as it seemed to them, who they truly were’ (2009:55; see also Just 1989:83). 
 
Yet if this foundling Hellenic identity looked forward to modern Europe and backwards 
to Classical Greece, its claims to historical continuity had to deal with a gap of some 
fifteen centuries in the Byzantine and Ottoman periods (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:22, 
83, 100). This situation was exacerbated both by the scholarship of Austrian historian 
Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer – who rejected the notion of modern Greek descent from 
Ancient Greece, claiming that the modern Greeks were derived from Slavic and 
Albanian populations of the late Byzantine era – and by the fact that Byzantine 
Christianity meant more to most of the Kingdom’s population than the legacy of 
Ancient Greece (Just 1989:85; Millas 2008:np; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:83). A 
solution was found by revisionist Greek intellectuals in the mid-nineteenth century, 
most famously the historians Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos and Spyridon Zambelios, 
and the folklorist Nikolaos Politis (Mackridge 2012:34; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:83-
88). Building on Zambelios’ conception of a ‘Helleno-Christian’ Byzantine period that 
achieved the fusion of ethnicity and religion, Paparrigopoulos reintegrated Byzantium 
into Greek national history by characterising the Empire as Greek (Mackridge 2012:34; 
Millas 2008:np; Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:84), such that Greeks today ‘learn about their 
Byzantine heritage first without questioning the validity of modern Greek claims over 
Byzantium’s history’ (Tzanelli 2006:42). In this sense, whilst it was the Hellenic thesis 
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acceptable in Greek culture, leading to attempts to purge ‘oriental’ or ‘Turkish’ traces (1987:5, 28; 
1997:15). Nevertheless, Mackridge has stressed that the decision of nation-building elites to call 
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that emerged triumphant from Greek nation-building, its consolidation required the 
accommodation of aspects of the Romaic legacy (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008:101). As 
Mackridge observed, it is important to distinguish between two different conceptions of 
this Byzantine past: Byzantium as Empire and Byzantium as Christianity (2012:38). 
Whilst dreams of resurrecting the former may have died in the wake of Greek military 
defeat in Asia Minor in 1922, it is arguable that the latter – on quotidian and informal 
levels, at least – still resonates more strongly with the residents of modern Greece than 
does the legacy of Classical Hellenism (Mackridge 2012:38-39). 
 
Although all residents of the Kingdom of Greece thus became Hellenes in the eyes of 
the Greek state, a Romaic sense of self persisted on local and informal levels, both 
amongst the native Greeks (even, to an extent, into the present day) and amongst the 
‘unredeemed’ Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, who were still officially called Rum 
(Herzfeld 1997:176; Holden 1972:29).
80
 Indeed, the Greeks of Turkey often used the 
term Romioí to distinguish those Greeks born in Turkey from the Hellenes of the Greek 
state: as Stefanos recalled, when a man came to visit his family from Thessaloniki, ‘we 
called him “the Hellene” […] we separated him in some way from us’ (01/12/2011). 
Sometimes, slightly more specifically, ‘Romioí’ was used to refer to those Greeks of 
Turkey who possessed Turkish citizenship and ‘Hellenes’ to those with Greek 
citizenship, regardless of birthplace (mirroring the official Turkish distinction between 
Rum and Yunan). Accordingly, when Savvas – formerly a Turkish citizen – recalled his 
first return to Imbros after his acquisition of Greek citizenship, he described himself as 
returning ‘as a Hellene now’ (14/08/2013). Interviewees also sometimes distinguished 
Greeks born in Greece (and occasionally Greek citizens born in Turkey) as Elladítes 
(singular: Elladítis (m.) or Elladítissa (f.)), i.e. ‘Greeks of Greece’, thereby preserving a 
more ecumenical meaning for the word Hellene. As Tasos put it, ‘the Elladítis is the 
Hellene who was born in Greece; the Romiós is the Hellene who was born and grew up 
in Constantinople’ (13/03/2014). 
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‘The Romiós is one thing and the Hellene is another’ 
 
For the expatriated Greeks of Turkey, the Helleno-Romaic dilemma is a matter of 
ongoing debate. In a characteristic opinion piece in O Polítis in 1988, one expatriate 
writer expressed disappointment at having recently heard an acquaintance say ‘we are 
Romioí. The Romiós is one thing and the Hellene is another’ (O Polítis April 1988). He 
countered that the term Romiós – once preferred by the Byzantines due to the 
association between Hellenism and idolatry, and later by the Ottomans to prevent the 
rise of national sentiment amongst Orthodox Christians – was in essence a synonym for 
‘Hellene’ that had ‘completed its historical role’ (O Polítis April 1988). He concluded 
that, ‘[t]here is no longer any reason for us to call ourselves Romioí as the correct 
definition of “Hellene” has been historically restored. And of course we are all proud 
that we are the descendants of Ancient Greece that has given so much to civilisation’ (O 
Polítis April 1988). The divergent positions on expatriate identity represented in this 
article concern both diachronic questions of history and ancestry and synchronic issues 
of belonging and commonality: should the Greeks of Turkey be distinguished from the 
Greeks of Greece and the Hellenic legacy, or should they see themselves as the siblings 
of the former and the descendants of the latter, separated only by happenstance of 
history and politics? 
 
These wider questions were commonly reflected in my interviewees’ oral history 
testimonies. Some informants used these two terms interchangeably, and when 
challenged argued that they were essentially synonymous. Others maintained a fairly 
narrow distinction based on citizenship or place of birth, or treated Hellene as an ethnic 
label and Romiós as a religious one. Many interviewees, however, placed emphasis on 
one identity to the exclusion of the other, explicitly choosing between the Hellenic and 
the Romaic legacies. On the one hand, those whose life histories stressed a sense of 
alienation and exile in Greece, and a longing to return to their patrída in Turkey, often 
presented a Romaic self. Vangelis – born in Istanbul in 1934 and a resident of Greece 
since 1980 – expressed profound regret about leaving Istanbul and a longing to return, 
stressing that he was well integrated into Turkish society and had only emigrated to 
fulfil his wife’s desire to leave. He was exceptionally disillusioned with life in Greece, 
complaining that the native Greeks ‘didn’t want me, they teased me’, and dismissing 
Greece as a ‘degenerate, barbaric land’ (Vangelis 03/02/2012). When we first met, he 
initially described his community as Hellenes, before immediately correcting himself: 
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You want to know how the Hellenes lived – not Hellenes, Romioí, right? There 
are no Hellenes in Constantinople. They baptised us as Hellenes. We don’t have 
any connection with them (Vangelis 03/02/2012). 
 
He proceeded to disassociate the Romioí from the Ancient Greeks, and was critical of 
the decision of Greek nation-builders to call themselves Hellenes: 
 
Look, the Hellenes finished 2000 years ago. Afterwards came the Byzantine 
Empire […] The Eastern Roman Empire. The Romiós is a Roman […] Because 
the nation of the Romioí, of the Romans, was the first nation to rise up within the 
Ottoman Empire, enthusiastic foreigners called them Hellenes. That was a big 
mistake, because afterwards, as Hellenes, they began to lose their identity. The 
identity of the Romiós is that which it was within the Ottoman Empire: the 
Christian Ottoman […] After [18]21, the Ottoman became a Turk and the 
Romiós became a Hellene […] Suddenly [Greek revolutionary leader Giorgos] 
Karaiskakis and co. stand up and claim to be the descendants of Socrates. Such 
things cannot happen; you cannot erase 1000 years of history and then suddenly 
go back further […] I adore Byzantium, or that which they call Byzantium […] 
If you read and you know the books, they speak of the Eastern Roman Empire, 
and that is what it is. I am a Romiós. The ‘Rum’ is correct. I’m not a Hellene, 
I’m a Rum, Romiós, Roman (Vangelis 03/02/2012; see also Halstead 2012:34-
35; Halstead 2014a:272-273). 
 
Vangelis’ rejection of Hellenic identity, which he saw as a corruption of a more 
authentic Romaic identity, reflected his deep-seated disenchantment with life in what he 
called the ‘Hellenic reality’ (i.e. Greece). By re-centring Greek history on Byzantium 
and disregarding the ancient Hellenic legacy, he emphasised his feeling of being in exile 
away from his true home in Istanbul. Ilias, who was born on Imbros in 1923, was 
similarly embittered with his experiences in Greece after his arrival in 1965, concluding 
his life history as follows: 
 
I came to Greece. I sold my business because the Turks took our schools […] 
They didn’t tell us to leave, [but] they took our schools, they also took our 
buildings. What could you do? So we came here to this place. This place is 
lovely. God gave it everything: sun, sea; but he gave it immoral people […] I go 
about my business with my Turkish identity card. I also have a Hellenic one. 
Look what I have done to it (21/05/2013). 
 
At this point, Ilias produced his Greek identity card, across the front of which he had 
scrawled ÓHI (‘NO’) in black marker pen. He explained: 
 
Ilias: “No”. It means, “I do not want you”. 
Halstead: I do not understand. Who wrote “no” on the card? 
Ilias: I did. I only got it in order to go to the bank. It is my identity card that I 




Halstead: Tell us exactly why you wrote “no” here. 
Ilias: I do not want it. I am a Turkish citizen (21/05/2013). 
 
Like Vangelis, Ilias juxtaposed his disappointment with Greek society with positive 
memories of Turkish society, and accordingly (unlike most of my Imbriot informants, 
see below) preferred to present a Romaic self: 
 
Ilias: I have good relations with Turkey, relationships that I work to create. Over 
here, they tell lies. They have stolen from me five times. Five.
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 I say to them, “I 
am a Romiós. I am not a Hellene.” […] 
Halstead [in a later phase of the interview]: You told me that you would 
describe yourself as a Romiós not a Hellene – 
Ilias: Look, as a Romiós, Orthodox Christian. I wanted to be a Hellene, but a 
proper Hellene. Not that kind. Not that kind of Hellene. I do not want to be that 
kind […] It is a shame: the place is nice, but the Hellenes are immoral. 
Halstead: So when you go abroad, what do you normally say? That you are a 
Hellene, or – 
Ilias: No, Turk. Turkish citizen, Turkish citizen (21/05/2013). 
 
Ilias expressed his disillusionment with the Greek state by defacing his Greek identity 
card, and presenting himself – wherever possible – as a Turkish citizen rather than a 
Greek citizen. His experiences in Greece had, he felt, tainted the very idea of Hellenic 
identity, and accordingly he preferred to characterise himself as a Romiós. For 
individuals like Vangelis and Ilias, rejecting Hellenic identity and adopting a Romaic 
self-presentation was a means of distancing themselves from the Greek state and its 
inhabitants, affirming a sense of alienation in Greece and belonging in Istanbul/Imbros. 
 
Informants, on the other hand, who presented their emigration from Turkey as an escape 
from persecution to the safety of Greece, often preferred to place special emphasis upon 
their Hellenic credentials. Gerasimos – who left Istanbul at the age of 15 when his 
father, a Greek citizen, was expelled in 1964 – contrasted a feeling of freedom in 
Greece with one of fear in Turkey, and portrayed Greece as a national patrída to which 
– as Hellenes – they would naturally want to come (see above). He persistently referred 
to the Polítes as Hellenes throughout his life-history narrative, and when I specifically 
asked how he conceived of his identity, he replied ‘Hellene, without any qualification’ 
(Gerasimos 06/02/2012). He expressed no particular objection to the application of the 
label Romioí to the Greeks of Turkey, but ventured that it was simply a broader term 
used to describe Hellenes living outside Greece, and did not see it as in any way distinct 
from Hellenic identity (Gerasimos 06/02/2012; see also Halstead 2012:30-31; Halstead 
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2014a:271). Vasiliki – who was born in Istanbul in 1950 to Greek Cappadocian parents, 
and relocated to Greece in the late 1970s – similarly evoked an atmosphere of perpetual 
fear in Istanbul, and suggested that it was the allure of freedom and equality that drew 
her family to Greece (21/08/2012). Asked to describe herself, she replied: ‘a Hellene of 
Cappadocia, born in Constantinople to Cappadocian parents, of Hellenic descent. But I 
never hesitate to say I’m a Hellene. In my life I have never thought of my identity as 
anything but Hellenic’ (Vasiliki 21/08/2012). When I asked her if she would call herself 
a Romiá, she replied: 
 
I might say it, as a Romiós [sic] of Constantinople, but the Romiós of 
Constantinople is still a Hellene. Many use that “Rum” to cut the Hellenism of 
Constantinople from its roots. It is a trap […] I’ve noticed Polítes who – Romioí, 
er, that is to say Hellenes of Constantinople who say, “I am not a Hellene, I am a 
Romiós”. “A descendant”, he says, “of the Roman Empire”. That is an error that 
was created over the years, and it is like – how can I explain it? – a disavowal of 
the Greek state that was indifferent towards them. Because, truly, it was 
indifferent towards us […] As long as we lived there, we did not feel the mother 
hugging its child, to put it metaphorically [… For that reason some Polítes] 
renounce their Hellenic descent and say, “we are Romioí” […] It is certainly true 
that our culture is different from the Elladítes, but that does not stop us from all 
being Hellenes. It has become a bit political, to disrupt the cohesion of 
Hellenism (Vasiliki 21/08/2012; see also Halstead 2012:31; Halstead 
2014a:272). 
 
Vasiliki’s objection was not to the use of the term per se – in the extract above, she 
herself defaulted to calling her community Romioí and, because of the context, was 
obliged to correct herself – but rather the particular performative inflection put on the 
term by some of her fellow expatriates. Vasiliki was afraid that the use of the term 
Romioí by some Polítes carried an implication that she and her community were 
somehow separate from Greece and the roots of Hellenism (which, as we saw above, 
was precisely the rationale behind Vangelis’ preference for a Romaic identity). 
 
Several interviewees shared Vasiliki’s concerns, telling me that they avoided the term 
Romiós as they saw it as a method used by the Turkish authorities to separate the 
Greeks of Turkey from the Greeks of Greece. Evangelos – who was born on the island 
of Prínkipos in the Princes’ Islands in 1945, and came to Greece 20 years later – 
categorised himself as ‘a Hellene of Constantinople’, and when I put it to him that some 




The [term] Romiós is in some ways bastardised. The Turks did not want to call 
us Hellenes, so they called us Rum. Just like here our people do not refer to them 
[the Turks of Western Thrace, presumably] as Turks, they call them Muslims, 
even though they are Turks (08/05/2013).  
 
Marios – who was born in Istanbul in 1941, left for Greece in 1966, and also described 
himself as a ‘Hellene’ – gave a similar response to the same question: 
 
The word Romiós is a misunderstanding. I don’t ever use it. It might be a correct 
phrase, but because the Turks use it – I mean, Romioí are [for the Turks] only 
those in Constantinople and in Cyprus. Those that are here [in Greece], they call 
Yunan. To separate them, and maybe to split them up. So I don’t use the word 
Romiós at all. I say, “Hellene”, always (29/01/2012). 
 
In attempting to ensure that the Greeks of Turkey were not fragmented from the Greek 
national body, and to indicate a sense of belonging and legitimacy in Greece, these 
narrators stressed a Hellenic identity and avoided Romaic distinctions. 
 
Inclusive particularity (1): Polítes and Byzantium 
 
In the above examples, interviewees appeared to take up antithetical perspectives on the 
Helleno-Romaic dilemma, stressing one identity over another and attempting to 
maintain terminological consistency throughout their narrative. These terminological 
choices, however, seemed to be primarily geared towards the articulation of a particular 
message for consumption by the interviewer: either that ‘we are Hellenes and therefore 
belong in Greece’ or that ‘we are Romioí and have nothing to do with Greece’. It is not, 
necessarily, to be assumed that these informants would strictly adhere to their chosen 
label in everyday discourse, and indeed, even within the context of their oral 
testimonies, they were commonly compelled to correct themselves when they erred. Nor 
were these alternative positions per se as clear-cut and dichotomous as they first 
appeared. Those who insisted on a Romaic self-presentation were explicitly airing their 
grievances with the Greek state and its inhabitants, but the precise relationship between 
this Romaic self and a Hellenic identity remained somewhat ambiguous. Ilias explicated 
his Romaic identity by cryptically stating that he ‘wanted to be a Hellene, but a proper 
Hellene’, implying that the Romiós might, in fact, be considered the true Hellene. 
Vangelis, for his part, quite emphatically disconnected his community from the ancient 
Hellenes, but did not clearly pronounce on the identity of the contemporary Greeks of 
Greece, leaving open the possibility that they were to be considered as Romioí 
misidentifying themselves as Hellenes. Those who presented a Hellenic self, 
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meanwhile, were concerned with demonstrating belonging in Greece and national 
commonality with its inhabitants, but this did not necessarily prevent them from 
identifying differences between the Greeks of Greece and the Greeks of Turkey based 
on the latter’s Byzantine heritage. Gerasimos generally played down cultural 
distinctions or social tensions between the two communities, but Vasiliki acknowledged 
them, characterising the Polítes as the ‘remnants of Byzantium’, though simultaneously 
stressing that these distinctions did not ‘stop us from all being Hellenes’. 
 
Indeed, for many of my informants, Hellenic sameness and Romaic distinctiveness were 
far from mutually exclusive, and to be a Romiós was to be Hellenic, but to be a 
distinctive kind of Hellene from the Greeks of Greece. Kyriakos was born in Istanbul in 
1951, where he completed university before emigrating to Greece in 1975, partly as his 
partner had left to study in Athens, and partly as he struggled to find work as a Greek in 
the wake of the conflict on Cyprus in 1974. He had predominantly fond memories of 
growing up in Istanbul and positive relationships with his Turkish acquaintances, and 
also recalled that he was quickly integrated into Greek society after his arrival in 1975. 
He characterised both Istanbul and Greece as patrídes, and expressed an emotional 
attachment to both. When I asked him how he would describe himself, he responded: 
 
How would I describe my identity? I would describe myself as an Orthodox 
Hellene of Our East [i kath’imás anatolí] […] I mean, I’m not an Elladítis […] I 
think of my identity as a Romiós. Not that I don’t love Greece. (Kyriakos 
03/02/2012). 
 
For Kyriakos, to be a Romiós was to be a Hellene of the East rather than a Hellene of 
Greece. Alexandros – born in Istanbul in 1962, and a resident of Turkey until his 
emigration to Greece in the mid-1970s – explained the usage of the self-descriptor 
‘Romiós’ in comparable terms: 
 
[When we were living in Turkey] we did not use the word Hellene, because 
Hellene was certainly a national entity and we did not want it. But we did use 
the word Hellenism, Greekness [ellinikótita]. “The Hellene”, meaning that you 
are a Hellenic citizen, is not something we said. We used the word “Romiós”. 
There was a distinction […] We did not [use the term “Hellene”] in a national 
sense, as in the state, but in a philosophical sense […] It does not mean that you 
are Hellenic with the Greek flag, but that you are Hellenic because you respect 
the philosophy of Hellenism (11/03/2014). 
 
Stefanos, who was born in Istanbul in 1950 and came to Greece as a teenager in 1964, 
likewise drew a distinction between the Hellenes of Greece and those of Istanbul. Like 
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Kyriakos, he placed emphasis upon the primarily harmonious relationships he enjoyed 
with other ethnic groups in Istanbul, as well as the positive reception his family received 
from the native Greeks when they resettled in Greece, referring to Thessaloniki as his 
‘second patrída’. He defined himself as follows: 
 
Ethnicity: clearly Hellenic. For accuracy, we also have to separate the Romiós. 
The Romiós of Constantinople was a Hellene but he was something separate. He 
didn’t think of his identity as Hellenic with the meaning of Greece. He thought 
of Greece as his patrída, if you like; yes, patrída. But the Romiós of 
Constantinople was something beyond Greece (Stefanos 01/12/2011; see also 
Halstead 2012:32; Halstead 2014a:273). 
 
In a separate interview, Stefanos’ younger sister, Tasoula, came to a similar conclusion. 
Tasoula was less well reconciled to Turkey and Turks than her brother, although she too 
recalled having Turkish friends as a child, and whilst she felt that the native Greek 
people had treated them well, she was angry with the Greek state for their failure to 
support the expatriate community in Greece (on which, see chapter 4). I asked her how 
she would describe her ethnicity: 
 
Tasoula: [Long pause] Hellene. 
Halstead: Not Romiá? 
Tasoula: What does Romiá mean? Hellene, it means. Except it distinguishes that 
you are the community from Byzantium, from Constantinople. For that reason I 
am proud that I am a Constantinopolitan – because I am not a simple Hellene 
(27/11/2011). 
 
Tasoula was proud to be a Constantinopolitan not because it distanced her from 
Hellenic ethnic or national identity, but because it marked out her distinctiveness as 
regards the Greeks of Greece: as a Romiá, she was a Hellene of Constantinople – of 
Byzantium – rather than just another Hellene of Greece. 
 
Such distinctions were drawn not only to emphasise pride at a particular local heritage, 
but also as a counter to the narratives of national inauthenticity aimed at the Polítes by 
segments of the native Greek population. Spyros was born in Istanbul in 1930 and came 
to Greece in 1984. At the beginning of his narrative, detailing the difficulties that 
precipitated his emigration from Turkey, he used the words ‘Romiós’ and ‘Hellene’ 
interchangeably to refer to his own community, and when asked to clarify explained that 
the two were one and the same. Later on in the interview, however, as he and Tasoula
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began to work each other up when discussing the cultural differences between the 
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Polítes and the Greeks of Greece – particularly in regard to etiquette, discipline, and 
piety – a clear terminological distinction emerged between the Romioí of Istanbul and 
the Hellenes of Greece. It was, nevertheless, emphasised by both informants that these 
Romaic distinctions made their community more rather than less Hellenic: the Polítes, it 
was alleged, showed greater respect for the Orthodox Christian religion, had a superior 
knowledge of the ancient Greek language, and positively influenced the culture of the 
native Greeks after their arrival from Turkey.
83
 Narratives of this sort reversed native 
Greek accusations of ethnic illegitimacy, by suggesting that the expatriates were not an 
alien body within the Greek nation but rather its more (or most) authentic members. As 
Spyros recalled, when native Greeks made fun of him by calling him a ‘Turk’, he would 
retort, ‘I hope you are as Hellenic as I am! In terms of religion, in love for your patrída’ 
(02/12/2011). 
 
Assertions of Hellenic authenticity premised on Romaic particularity were common in 
expatriate testimony. Fotini, born in Istanbul in 1943, relocated to Greece in the 1970s 
with young Istanbul-born children. In her oral testimony, she recalled that her son was 
mocked as a ‘seed of the Turks’ by his classmates in Greece. Fotini went to her son’s 
teacher to complain about this behaviour, protesting to her, ‘look, we are more Hellenic 
than the Hellenes here!’ (21/11/2011) Moments after she told this story, I asked Fotini 
how she would define herself. She replied: 
 
Romiá. [Pause] Not Hellenic, Romiá. There’s a difference. What are the 
differences? Well, we had many [different] influences, because Constantinople 
is a cosmopolitan place. It wasn’t a village, we didn’t have animals. That’s why 
we call it “The City”, with a big “C”. It is the only city that is written with a 
capital “C”: Byzantium. And that’s why we want to be Constantinopolitans 




At first glance, it may seem as though Fotini had contradicted herself: she initially 
claimed to be archetypically Hellenic, before moments later characterising herself as 
Romaic and not Hellenic. However, to borrow terms from Herzfeld, ‘these usages are 
inconsistent only if one adheres to the absolutist logic of official ethnicity rather than to 
the entirely different theoretical underpinnings of ordinary talk’ (1997:45). The ethnic 
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shifter ‘Hellenic/Hellenes’ was deployed by Fotini both to refer specifically to the 
Greeks of Greece – from whom she wished to differentiate herself – and to a more 
transcendent Hellenic ethnicity – of which, due to her Romaic heritage, she was not 
only a part but a distinctive part. 
 
These interviewees, when challenged to define their identities, were keen to separate 
themselves from a narrow association with the modern Greek state and its inhabitants, 
and to emphasise the specificity of their Byzantine or Constantinopolitan heritage, and 
accordingly adopted – to varying degrees – a Romaic persona. Yet this was a 
particularisation rather than a rejection of Hellenic identity: to be a Romiós or a Romiá 
was, for these informants, still to be ethnically Hellenic, but to be a different kind of 
Hellene from the native Greeks. This difference was considered to be rooted, firstly, in 
the cosmopolitan and urban culture of Istanbul (see also chapter 4 and Örs 2006), and, 
secondly, in an ethnic and religious authenticity deriving from the community’s 
Byzantine history. In this way, the Greeks of Istanbul sought to affirm the authenticity 
of their Hellenic credentials and, consequently, their legitimacy as residents of Greece, 
by emphasising rather than downplaying the particularities of their own locality and its 
Romaic heritage. This Romaic legacy – sidelined in Greek nationalist historiography yet 
commanding considerable popular resonance amongst the modern Greek population 
(see above) – provided the Polítes with an identity that was quintessentially Hellenic yet 
distinct from Greece; Hellenic, but more than simply Hellenic (Halstead 2014a:274).  
 
Renée Hirschon has documented how the Asia Minor refugees who arrived in Greece 
after 1923 responded to xenophobia from the native Greek population by stressing their 
own cosmopolitan culture and origins: a ‘knowledge of diversity’ stemming from the 
refugees’ experience of coexistence with Turks and other ethnicities in the Ottoman 
Empire, which provided them with a sense of identity that distinguished them from their 
native Greek detractors (2004b:325-343; 2006:61-78). Örs has made similar 
observations about the expatriated Polítes in Athens, suggesting that their knowledge of 
diversity from cosmopolitan Istanbul allowed them to differentiate themselves from the 
native Greeks (2006:87-89). Örs argued that the Polítes transcended the Greek-Turkish 
dichotomy, by rooting their sense of belonging not in Greek or Turkish ethnicity, but in 
a ‘wider cultural sense of “belonging” […] specifically centred on the urban 
cosmopolitan experience of being from Istanbul’ (2006:81). This was an identity 
premised on claims to descent from Byzantium, a heritage taken to embody the 
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civilised, urban, and cosmopolitan characteristics that make the community distinctive 
(Örs 2006:86-88). For Örs, the most noteworthy aspect of this cosmopolitan sense of 
belonging was that it could include Istanbul residents of all ethnicities/nationalities – 
including urbanite Muslim Turks – whilst excluding non-Istanbulite co-ethnics – i.e. 
native Greeks (2006:84-91).
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 She argued that the Polítes occupied ‘a conceptual space 
between and beyond categories’ (Örs 2006:90), and exhibited a ‘complex identity’ that 
‘challenges nationalism’ and ‘shows the limits of established terminologies – including 
concepts such as diaspora, minority or homeland – which are formed within a nation-
state-centred logic’ (Örs 2006:91-92).  
 
Örs was correct to identify that many Polítes saw significant cultural differences 
between themselves and the mainland Greeks, commonly expressed through the urban-
rural and multicultural-monocultural dichotomies. As she observed, this cosmopolitan 
sense of belonging was often deployed to distinguish the Polítes from the native Greeks, 
in certain contexts even excluding native Greeks at the expense of including non-Greek 
Istanbulites (see chapter 4). She also accepted that many Polítes would be ‘more than 
content’ to be identified exclusively as Greeks (Örs 2006:82) and that few ‘would 
accept that they are less than Greek’ (Örs 2006:85). Her emphasis, nevertheless, was on 
the ‘non-negligible segment’ of the community who exhibited ‘a refusal to go along 
with confinement into one of two opposed camps, in other words, being either Greek or 
Turkish only’ (Örs 2006:82). In this sense, her analysis was underwritten by a logic of 
transcendence: the adoption of either Greek or Turkish identity was taken to result in 
confinement and simplicity, and more nuanced understandings of self were only to be 
obtained by transcending these national categories. The possibility that there is 
considerable room for manoeuvre within national identity was therefore overlooked, 
resulting in a somewhat lopsided portrayal of the Polítes’ understanding of self. For 
most of my interviewees, a cosmopolitan Romaic heritage, whilst distinguishing the 
Polítes from the native Greeks in one sense, also made them quintessentially Hellenic: 
as the heirs to Byzantium, the Polítes could be both included in, yet distinctive within, 
the Greek national community. 
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Inclusive particularity (2): Imvriótes and Ancient Athens 
 
[P]erhaps, because we are few, we will continue to be the condemned, discarded, 
illegitimate children of Greece? […] Our only sin for which we suffer is that we 
were born on Imbros, while if we had for instance been born in a neighbouring 
island (apart from Tenedos) we would be free Hellenic citizens with all of the 
rights afforded by the Hellenic State. We too want to live as free people as 
Hellenes. And without having our Greekness [ellinikótita] doubted! We are 
more Hellenes than many Hellenes (Imvriakí Ichó January-February 1974). 
 
Elder Imvriótes, such as reluctant Greek citizen Ilias (see above), as well as those who 
lived in Istanbul for substantial periods of time (see Loukas, below), sometimes joined 
the Polítes in categorising themselves as Romioí (Tsimouris 2008:300). Generally, 
however, my Imbriot interviewees preferred to describe themselves as Hellenes and/or 
simply Imvriótes. Giorgos Tsimouris has suggested that a preference for Hellenic 
identity amongst younger Imvriótes may have represented a ‘strategic attempt’ to assert 
their Greekness in the face of a sceptical native population (2008:300). This may well 
be the case, although as I have argued above the use of the label Romioí by the Polítes 
might likewise be interpreted as a strategy for demonstrating national authenticity. The 
comparative disinclination amongst my Imbriot interlocutors to refer to themselves as 
Romioí might also be accounted for by cultural and historical differences between them 
and the Polítes. Pavlos – who was born on Imbros in 1970, and moved to Istanbul in 
order to attend a minority school in 1975 – described something of a culture clash 
between the two communities: 
 
There was a different culture. In the school that I went to – it was not a big 
school – most of the children were Imvriótes. So we had the upper hand. We 
were also more wild, in retrospect! [Laughter] Growing up, because as you grow 
up you understand more things, I realised that the Polítes thought of us as a 
lower class […] Certainly in Constantinople the people were urban, they were a 
different class. They ate with a knife and fork, whilst we were villagers 
(29/05/2013). 
 
In the mid-1960s, a young Fani similarly felt that the Polítes looked down on the 
children from Imbros: 
 
I felt very uncomfortable in the first years as a student in Constantinople. At 
school, they [the Polítes] thought of us in the same way that here [in Greece] 
they see the Vlachs. We had that particular dialect that we spoke, and the Polítes 
thought of themselves as cultured, regardless of the fact that they did not know 
how to speak Greek properly by comparison with us […] Recently, that 
behaviour has changed, but for many years the Polítes, young and old, saw the 
Imvriótes as second-class (07/06/2013). 
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As members of an agricultural island community, the Imvriótes may thus have had 
comparatively little interest in claiming a cosmopolitan, urban identity rooted in the 
Byzantine legacy that might be associated with a Romaic self-presentation. At the same 
time, some may have wished to differentiate themselves from the Polítes who did 
commonly characterise themselves as Romioí. From this point of view, Imbriot 
expressions of Hellenic identity may have had to do with differences between them and 
the Polítes as well as with attempts to demonstrate similarity with the Greeks of Greece. 
 
Indeed, the commonplace use of the identity label ‘Hellene’ by the Imvriótes did not 
prevent them from drawing distinctions between themselves and the Hellenes who 
inhabited the Greek state. Loukas was born in Istanbul in 1967 to Imbriot parents who, 
as schoolteachers, had moved to the city after the prohibition on Greek language 
education on Imbros in 1964. He lived in Istanbul until his emigration to Greece in 
1992, during which time he spent the summers on Imbros. He attempted to characterise 
his relationship to Greece as follows: 
 
In Greece I am, okay – [hesitates] I am not an Elladítis. I am a Hellene. 
However, not an Elladítis. That is the only way I can describe it, with those 
words. Because to be an Elladítis, at least in the sense that I mean, means that 
you […] are limited by experiences formed in a narrow country that is called, 
geographically, “Greece”. I offer it as a contrast: if I must distinguish, if I have 
to say I am not something, I am not that, let’s say. As a Hellene, I am not that 
(Loukas 08/05/2013) 
 
Loukas’ testimony uncoupled the ‘nation’ from the ‘state’. He saw himself as Hellenic, 
but was keen to underline that this sense of self was not narrowly defined by a 
relationship to the Greek state or its territorial boundaries; in fact, his Hellenic identity 
was defined as much in opposition to as through commensurability with the Greeks of 
Greece. In Loukas’ case, this involved distinguishing the native Greeks as ‘Elladítes’, 
although as often as not my Imbriot informants differentiated themselves without 
making such terminological distinctions. Markos was born on Imbros in 1953, and 
initially emigrated to the USA with his family in 1967 before ultimately resettling in 
Greece as a grown man. Asked how he would describe himself, he responded, ‘a 
Hellene of Imbros’. In this case, it was the self that was the Hellene. Explaining, 
however, why he felt that the Imvriótes required their own communal meeting place, he 




One way for people who are migrants, who are from other patrídes, to find one 
another, was to build their own place to meet up. Because only here [in the 
Imbriot Society] can we talk amongst ourselves, about Imbros, let’s say. If we 
go to another café, or restaurant, whatever, there might be Hellenes; and you 
cannot discuss things with them, because we do not have things in common. We 
want to have a place where we can talk and remember the past (Markos 
04/05/2013; emphasis added). 
 
In this context, the Hellenes had become the other against which the Imvriótes were 
defined (see also chapter 4), the two separated by a lack of common experience. 
Because the label ‘Hellene’ can mean different things in different performative contexts, 
Markos was able to differentiate himself from the Greeks of Greece without calling the 
‘Greekness’ of either party into question. Coming from a different patrída, Markos’ 
Hellenic self lacked local commonality with the Hellene of Greece, but both could 
nevertheless remain Hellenes on a national level. The variability of these identity labels 
typically went unacknowledged in my informants’ testimonies, allowing them to 
indicate difference without explicitly flagging it up. Kostas, however, who was born on 
Imbros in 1963 and came to Greece in 1981, noticed that he had been using the word 
‘Hellene’ both to refer to himself and to distinguish the residents of the Greek state, and 
remarked upon it as follows: 
 
I don’t know if you noticed, that there is a “Hellene”. I am a Hellenic citizen, I 
feel Hellenic, but I do not think of myself as Hellenic with the same meaning as 
someone who was born in Kalamata [a large city in the Peloponnese] and lives 
in Athens thinks. To tell you something funny, when my mother hears on the 
television about some serious crime [that has taken place in Greece], she says, 
“my my, what things are these Hellenes?” (07/06/2013) 
 
In Confino’s terms, Hellenic identity for Kostas represented a ‘common denominator of 
variousness’ (1993:63): there were many different ways to be Hellenic, such that 
commonality on a national level could coexist with a significant degree of local 
particularity. In light of these comments, I asked Kostas precisely how he would 
describe his own identity. He pondered his relationship to both Hellenic and Turkish 
identity, before concluding that he felt more Hellenic because he was from Imbros: 
 
I would say that I was born on Imbros, I am a Hellene, I mean I feel ethnically 
Hellenic. No one has dared to ask me how I feel in relation to Turkey […] I have 
asked to take my Turkish citizenship back […] I willingly take Turkish 
citizenship, not only for some practical needs, but because I feel both Hellenic 
and Turkish […] So I could belong to both countries and both sides. But, 
historically of course, I feel closer to the Hellenes, because I am an Imvriótis. 




Kostas saw himself as ethnically Hellenic, but this identity became tangible and 
meaningful through the locality (Imbros) rather than through the nation-state (Greece). 
He did not feel Hellenic despite being from Imbros, but rather that he was a Hellene 
because he was from Imbros.  
 
Indeed, as was the case with the Polítes, such local particularity was not only capable of 
existing alongside national commonality, but could itself drive narratives of national 
belonging. As Tsimouris has observed, the Imvriótes commonly deploy ‘as compelling 
evidence of Greekness’ the specificities of their island’s demographics, history, and 
built environment: the preponderance of Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians prior to 
the 1960s, the sheer number of churches and chapels, and references to Imbros in 
Homer and other ancient texts (2008:185). The maintenance of these characteristics, 
despite the island’s location within Turkish territory, was a source of particular pride for 
the community. As the newspaper Imvriakí Ichó put it in an appeal for support aimed at 
a domestic Greek audience: 
 
We were born Turkish citizens, but in the altar of our soul, we kept pure our 
Christianity and we preserved unaltered the Hellenic traditions. So as genuine 
Hellenes and Christians we ask the Hellenic press, the Hellenic Authorities to 
share our pain and to recognise our rights (Imvriakí Ichó October 1972b). 
 
In this way, the source of native Greek scepticism over the Imvriótes’ Hellenic 
credentials – that they were born in Turkey rather than Greece – could be turned into an 
asset that asserted the depth and resilience of a Hellenic identity cultivated outside the 
embrace of the Greek state.  
 
Nevertheless, appeals of this sort were not premised on a history of displacement from 
Greece, but on the notion that Imbros constituted a centre of Hellenism in its own right. 
Just as the Polítes drew on the Byzantine legacy to emphasise their national and 
religious authenticity, so the Imvriótes mobilised histories of their island’s distant past 
to bolster their claims on Hellenic identity. Imbriot historical narratives typically placed 
emphasis upon the island’s colonisation by Athenians in c.480 BC, and stressed that the 
history and culture of Imbros were thereafter closely intertwined with Athenian 
Hellenism despite repeated occupations by Spartans, Macedonians, Frankish crusaders, 
Ottomans, and others. Imbriot writer Giorgos Xeinos, for instance, in his history of 
Imbros and Tenedos wrote of the former that, ‘all of the evidence points to the fact that 
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from the moment that the island became an Athenian cleruchy,
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 despite its hitherto 
unadulterated pre-Hellenic character, it was culturally transformed into a miniaturised 
Athenian state’ (2011:28). In a 1977 article, the newspaper Ίmvros voiced its objections 
to the Greek state’s treatment of the expatriated Imvriótes as ‘aliens’ in similar terms: 
 
Aliens, those people who have the same roots in History (as is well known 
Imbros has been since antiquity a city of Ancient Greece with only small 
subjugations by the powers of the region) who have the same traditions, the 
same struggles, the same language, the same religion (Ίmvros August-September 
1977). 
 
Writing in 1994, another author in Ίmvros gave the following potted history of the 
island, again attempting to demonstrate the depth of its Hellenic identity, and its 
preservation from ancient to modern times, by highlighting references to Imbros by 
Homer, the intimacy of its relationship to both Classical Athens and the Byzantine 
Empire, and the resilience of its population in the face of foreign invaders: 
 
Known as ‘Ίmvrou ásty’ [i.e. ‘the city of Imbros’] in Homeric times.
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 Opposite 
the Troad, where around its walls Achaeans and Trojans fought with spears for a 
decade, to give material to the timeless poet to write his immortal epic the Iliad, 
and why not, also his other epic the Odyssey. Its first settlers were Pelasgians. 
Cleruchs of Athens colonised it in the years in which the ‘glorious city’, was 
living the peak of its fame. Then, the Imbriot deme was organised according to 
the Athenian prototype, such that it was called ‘Deme of Athens in Imbros’. 
Even the river-torrent of the island, the ‘big river’ as they call it today, was then 
called Ilissós[,] like one of the two rivers of the city [i.e. Athens] that Pallas 
guarded. It encountered the Spartans, Philip [II of Macedon] and the Romans. It 
embraced Christianity. It was a region of the Byzantine Empire for centuries, not 
so far from the Queen of cities [i.e. Constantinople], like other parts of today’s 
Greece. It knew the rule of the Franks and from 1460 the rule of the Turks. The 
expatriations and the persecutions did not stop. Imbros, however, retained its 
Greekness. And by 1893 it had 9357 Hellenes and only 99 – not even 100 – 
Turks! (Ίmvros May-June 1994b). 
 
At a conference organised by the Imbriot Society in 1984, one of the speakers likewise 
deployed the ancient history of the island in an effort to establish the Hellenic 
credentials of the Imvriótes: 
 
The Imbriot people, who happened to inhabit that tender and noteworthy 
geographic place [i.e. Imbros] for more than 3000 years, are purely Hellenic, 
descended from an ancient Hellenic race, derived from the crossing of the 
Hellenes with the pre-Hellenes […] Its national history began in […] 480 BC 
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when it was occupied by the general Miltiadis I, he surrendered it to the 
Athenians, who settled it with Athenian cleruchs from Attica, and constituted it 
“in the image and likeness of Athens” and thought of it as their adopted daughter 
(Ίmvros May 1984). 
 
Similar origin stories were offered by some of my interviewees. Stamatios, who was 
born on Imbros in 1945 and relocated to Greece in 1963, gave a particularly in-depth 
narrative of the island’s history. He began by answering his own rhetorical question: 
 
What are the Imvriótes? Imbros, in the years of the Athenian democracy, and 
later in the Roman years, was a deme of Athens. The Athenians, realising that it 
was a very important location for their defence and for trade from the Black Sea, 
did that which the Turks have done today: they removed the inhabitants and 
settled new ones there […] We Imvriótes are a mixture of pre-Hellenes and 
Athenians (Stamatios 30/05/2013). 
 
Stamatios proceeded to argue that certain rituals and traditions derived directly from the 
Ancient Athenians, which had passed out of usage in Greece itself long ago, persisted 
on Imbros into the modern era: 
 
When I went to high school and started to study ‘Introduction to Tragedy’ and I 
read Homer, things seemed familiar to me […] I said, “this is all familiar, this is 
our way of life”. And what made a big impression on me was when I started to 
read Tragedy. Where does Tragedy come from? From the worship of Dionysus. 
We lived the Dionysian rites, exactly as they were described, until 1964! […] 
The ban on public rituals issued by Justinian in 530 [A.D.] never reached Imbros 
[…] Another celebration which derives from antiquity […] is the slaughter of 
the oxen, which is a memory of the hecatomb to Zeus and the gods in Athens 
[…] Even today, in our burial rites, we have traditions drawn from ancient 
religion and not Christian religion (30/05/2013). 
 
With these comments in mind, I asked Stamatios if he felt that he was moving to a 
‘second home’ when he relocated to Athens in 1963, to which he replied in the negative, 
suggesting that no cultural or ceremonial legacy of the Ancient Athenians persisted in 
the modern Greek city. By claiming a ritual continuity with Ancient Greece allegedly 
lacking in modern Greece, Stamatios portrayed Imbros as a more authentically Hellenic 
space whose detachment from central authority had enabled ancient traditions to 
flourish. In this way, Imbros’ geographic marginality was deployed to reinforce rather 
than undermine its inhabitants’ national credentials: their position on the periphery 





Elif Babül has suggested that Imbros might be seen ‘as an “exception” to the national 
order of things’ within Republican Turkey (2004:3), insofar as the Imvriótes’ sense of 
belonging on the island derived from ‘pre-national forms of belonging through memory, 
spatiality and locality – in a word, nativity – rather than through citizenship’ (2006a:50-
51). In common with Örs, Babül discussed how her informants differentiated 
themselves from other Greek communities by ‘claiming an identity based on a specific 
locality’ and characterising themselves as ‘Rums’ (i.e. Romioí), which she interpreted as 
evidence of their sense of ‘marginality’ and ‘in-betweenness’ as regards nationalism and 
national categories (Babül 2006a:55-56; 2006b:47). Yet as Tsimouris has emphasised, 
the ‘use of the term “Romioí” alternately with the term “Hellenes” amongst elder 
Imvriótes does not place the Imvriótes in an intermediate field between the Hellenes and 
the Turks, but rather marks out their distinctiveness as Hellenes’ (2008:112). From this 
perspective, Imbriot attachment to the locality of Imbros, and their efforts to distinguish 
themselves from other Greeks, should not be interpreted as necessarily opposed or 
antithetical to ideas of national belonging. In contradistinction to my informants from 
the Greek community of Istanbul, my Imbriot interviewees did not commonly present a 
Romaic persona or draw connections between their community and the legacy of 
Byzantium. Yet like the Polítes, the Imvriótes nevertheless emphasised their 
particularity as Hellenes vis-à-vis the Greeks of Greece by drawing on the specificities 
of their local heritage. Through narratives of ancient Athenian colonisation of the island 
and the preservation of its inhabitants’ Hellenic traditions and Orthodox Christian 
religion under Turkish authority, the Imvriótes portrayed themselves as legitimately 
Hellenic because of, rather than in spite of, their distinctive origins on an island outside 
the territory of the Greek state. In this way, they hoped to demonstrate – to borrow 
terms from another speaker at the 1984 Imbriot Society conference – that ‘the Imvriótes 
are not the poor relatives of the Hellenic people but the carriers and continuation of the 





Building upon Ulric Neisser’s concept of the ‘remembered self’,
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 the psychologist 
Craig Barclay argued that autobiographical remembering requires the continual 
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construction of ‘protoselves’ that are developed through everyday social interactions 
and tested by the degree to which they are accepted by others (Barclay 1994:70). He 
wrote that, 
 
protoselves are composed through a skilled process of improvisation such that 
what is created anew is referenced and firmly tied to the past […] improvisations 
yield protoselves constrained by a life lived and a life being lived and by 
evolving social agreements regarding the range of culturally acceptable selves 
(Barclay 1994:72). 
 
This ongoing process of identity negotiation was in evidence in the autobiographical 
testimonies considered in this chapter: interviewees were constantly experimenting with 
different configurations of self (and other), improvising protoselves in their efforts to 
make sense of their own identity and to convey this sense of self to the interviewer. At 
the end of our interview, Andreas – born on Chálki in the Princes’ Islands in 1943, and 
a resident of Greece since 1973 – played across the whole range of the Helleno-Romaic 
dichotomy in an attempt to arrive at a suitable self-description: 
 
Many of us Constantinopolitans, of course, feel that they are Romioí. They make 
a distinction, they take a stance, they say, “I am a Constantinopolitan, I am a 
Romiós from Constantinople, the others are Elladítes”. They make a distinction. 
But – I too want to be a Romiós of Constantinople. Not that it bothers me – I am 
Hellenic. Not Elladítis. Constantinopolitan. Romiós. Hellenic 
Constantinopolitan. Hellenic Constantinopolitan doesn’t bother me 
(11/02/2012). 
 
Andreas’ musings demonstrate that the performance of nationality is far removed from 
the superficial simplicity of national identity labels: his attempts to arrive at a suitable 
self-description were complicated by multiple and overlapping concerns with both 
distinctiveness and inclusiveness, resolved – in this case – with a protoself that 
combined a national identity (Hellenic) with a local one (Constantinopolitan).  
 
The national self, nevertheless, is far from ‘infinitely multifaceted’ (Eriksen 2001:65). 
Daniel Albright has drawn a distinction between a ‘conventional remembered self’ and 
an ‘unconventional remembered self’: whilst ‘the conventional vision of self offers me 
security; the unconventional one frightens me and frees me’ (1994:39).
89
 Protoselves 
improvised along the lines of the Helleno-Romaic dichotomy could be conceived of as 
the expatriates’ conventional remembered selves: whilst the hollowness and plasticity of 
these categories enabled individuals to make identity meaningful on their own terms, 
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their superficial stability imbued them with a comforting illusion of fixity and 
homogeneity that could be translated into national solidarity. As I have demonstrated 
elsewhere – and as is in evidence in some of the testimonies considered above – some 
interviewees had reason to temporarily escape this conventional self and access a more 
unconventional, Turkish self (Halstead 2014a:280-283; see also Örs 2006:82). 
Typically, this was done for humorous purposes, or to critique the Greek state and 
nationalism generally, or to lampoon native Greek prejudices about the expatriate 
community (Halstead 2014a:280-283). Nevertheless, these forays into unconventional 
selves were generally cautious, partial, and temporary (Halstead 2014a:283). Turkish 
protoselves ran up against experiences of persecution in Turkey, as well as suspicions 
and prejudices both within and without the expatriate community, and informants 
generally stayed within the safer conceptual space of the conventional self, which still 
provided them with ample room for discursive manoeuvre. As Eriksen put it, identity 
cannot be created ‘out of thin air’, and its performative inflections must always be tested 
against the expectations of others and remain grounded in personal experience (Eriksen 
2001:50, 61-66). The latter point can be illustrated by expanding upon the testimony of 
Loukas (see above), who was born in Istanbul to Imbriot parents. Asked how he would 
describe himself, Loukas indicated that he felt both Imbriot and Romaic: 
 
I am an Imvriótis, in terms of consciousness. That is to say, Imbriot Romiós. 
That is how I feel. There is also the Romaic child, because I grew up in 
Constantinople. I also feel like a child of Constantinople, understand? In spirit I 
am a child of Constantinople, but in body I am a child of Imbros (08/05/2013).  
 
He proceeded to characterise himself as Hellenic, but also to differentiate himself from 
the Greeks of Greece on the basis of their different life experiences (see above). He 
concluded by ruminating on his relationship to Turkey: 
 
Beyond that, in relation to our discussion about the current [2013 Gezi Park] 
protests in Turkey, I feel very strongly about everything that is going on there. I 
mean, I feel like a part of that community, to the extent that they allowed me to, 
and to the extent that I am able to overcome those things through which we 
lived, in order to feel like a part of the contemporary community of 
Constantinople. And not of Turkey generally, specifically of Constantinople, 
because Constantinople has its own character which I think is much stronger 
than Turkey itself as a country (Loukas 08/05/2013). 
 
Loukas’ testimony is an anatomy of expatriate taxonomies of belonging. He saw 
himself both as Imbriot (due to his parentage) and Romaic (due to his upbringing), 
which made him Hellenic but, nevertheless, distinct from the Greeks of Greece. He also 
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felt like a part of Istanbul’s society, but emphasised that this sense of belonging was 
limited by his past experiences of discrimination in that city, and did not translate into a 
sense of belonging in Turkey generally. In this regard, his expressions of self were built 
upon, and made meaningful through, local experience: they could be stretched as far as 




In their discourses on self and belonging, my interviewees drew on two legacies that 
resonate strongly, if asymmetrically, in Greek nationalism: Romaic Byzantium and 
Classical Hellenism. Within the expatriate community, there has often been debate over 
which of these two histories was most appropriate to the Greeks of Turkey, reflected in 
the preference shown by some informants for one self-categorisation over the other. 
Whilst those who felt alienated or even rejected in the Greek state often tended to 
emphasise their Romaic identity, others for whom Greece was a national refuge to 
which they escaped from Turkish persecution commonly gave salience to their Hellenic 
self. From this point of view, the Hellenic self represented sameness, and the Romaic 
self distinctiveness; one had a patrída in Greece, the other a patrída in Istanbul/Imbros; 
one self had been repatriated, whilst the other lived in exile. Delving beneath the surface 
of these terminological distinctions, however, revealed that individuals’ notions of 
identity and belonging were not so easily pinned down. To be sure, many Polítes and 
Imvriótes were at pains to differentiate themselves from the Greeks of Greece, and 
commonly did so by placing emphasis on the particularities of their local heritages: 
respectively, the urban cosmopolitanism and Orthodox Christianity of Byzantine 
Constantinople, and the cultural legacy of ancient Athenian colonisation of Imbros, 
portrayed as having survived in spite of repeated conquests and changes in political 
authority on the island. These efforts at distinction based on local particularity have led 
both communities to be interpreted through what we might call a ‘cosmopolitan’ 
approach to diaspora (Meinhof and Triandafyllidou 2006:200), which sees diasporic 
groups as ‘caught up with and defined against […] the norms of nation-states’ (Clifford 
1994:307), and views the former as characterised by a heterogeneity, hybridity, and in-
betweenness absent in the latter. 
 
Such perspectives are compelling insofar as they seek to move beyond the prejudices 
and exclusions associated with dichotomous and immutable understandings of group 
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identity, but they are circumscribed by their assumption that attachment to the local is 
necessarily antithetical to attachment to the national, or, in other words, that ‘a strong 
identification with locality […] transgresses notions of ethnicity, religion and 
citizenship’ (Örs 2006:86). I have sought to demonstrate that the expatriated Greeks of 
Turkey commonly drew on their identification with a particular local place of origin in 
order to authenticate their claims to national belonging, and, consequently, advocate for 
their presence in – and support from – the Greek state. This inclusive particularity was 
simultaneously an act of boundary-maintenance and one of boundary-erosion: it 
allowed the expatriates to differentiate themselves from ‘those Hellenes’ of Greece 
whilst also establishing their distinctiveness as Hellenes (Tsimouris 2008:112) and, 
therefore, their membership of a broader national community. This is not to deny the 
friction that may be generated at the interface between local and national identities, but 
rather to suggest that there is significant room for manoeuvre within the allegedly 
‘narrow confines of national categories’ (Örs 2006:81). The Greeks of Turkey 
challenged their marginalisation in Greek national history, politics, and diplomacy by 
articulating their own narratives of national authenticity grounded in local particularity, 
drawing on history to bypass the modern Greek state and stake a more venerable claim 






Turks and Elladítes 
 
In the May-June 1994 issue of Ίmvros, Kyriakos Bakalis penned a reflective article on 
the relationship of the Imbriot community to both the Turks of Turkey and the Greeks 
of Greece. He wrote: 
 
“AND NOW WHAT WILL WE BECOME WITHOUT BARBARIANS?”* 
*C. Cavafy (1904) 
 
Every people, every nation, every person in the final analysis faced and faces in 
each phase of its history or life some “barbarians”. Someone who threatens their 
existence, their freedom, their autonomy. 
We Imvriótes have had the misfortune to be faced with […] two very clear and 
unscrupulous barbarians: on the one hand the Turk, who made a point of 
undoing us, and on the other the Elladítis, who not only took the decision to not 
take a stand against the work of the Turk, but even helped him! […] 
[W]e founded our [expatriate] associations […] and we all gathered together, we 
talked, we amused ourselves and we remembered those past beautiful years on 
our island and in our village. And then we cursed and swore at the Turk (he who 
is uneducated and uncivilised) and the Elladítis (who is two times more 
uneducated and uncivilised) […] 
However, my dear Imvriótis – I regret that I will displease you – but things have 
changed somewhat […] The barbarians have changed their attitude! 
One of them, the Turk, allows us to go freely […] to the island in the summers 
and to renovate our houses and our churches […] 
The other, the Elladítis, has awakened! Not a week goes by without Imbros 
being referred to either on TV, or on the radio, in magazines, in newspapers et 
cetera […] 
And now, however, what happens? What will we become without barbarians? 
[…] Who will we blame for that which happens from here on? (Ίmvros May-
June 1994c) 
 
For the author of this article, recent Imbriot history had been determined by the actions 
(or inaction) of two others: the Turk and the Elladítis. His principal message was that 
the changing stances of both represented an opportunity for the Imvriótes: no longer 
could they place blame for the situation on Imbros on Turkish aggression and Greek 
indifference, and they were faced with the decision either to consign the island to 
history or to take action to reclaim it (on this dilemma, see chapter 7). For the 
expatriated Greeks of Turkey, however, the figures of the Turk and the Elladítis 
provided not just objects of blame for their community’s plight, but also points of 
reference through which, or in opposition to which, they could process and articulate 
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their experiences and cultivate a distinctive sense of self. In the previous chapter, we 
saw how my interviewees deployed their local particularities to simultaneously 
distinguish themselves from the Greeks of Greece and lay claim to Hellenic identity. In 
this chapter, I explore how their representations of the Turkish other and the Hellenic 
other similarly allowed them to pursue both inclusiveness and distinctiveness as regards 
the Greek state and its inhabitants. Whilst stereotypes of Turkish barbarity, juxtaposed 
to Hellenic civilisation, served to constitute the expatriates as national martyrs 
deserving of state support, alternative representations of Turks as honourable and 
industrious, set against allegations of native Greek unscrupulousness and indolence, 
functioned as a critical mirror to spotlight shortcomings in Greek society. In both cases, 
the expatriates claimed a privileged knowledge of the Turkish other acquired through 
lived experience, which they used both to sustain and challenge Greek nationalist 
stereotypes. I draw upon Brubaker et al.’s (2006) distinction between ‘nominal’ and 
‘experiential’ ascriptions of ethnicity in order to consider how and why such stereotypes 




Ethnicity as an ‘interpretive prism’ 
 
Brubaker’s criticism of ‘groupism’ has become a touchstone for studies of ethnicity and 
national identity, particularly amongst scholars interested in the salience of these 
concepts in everyday life (see review essay I). Brubaker insisted that the commonplace 
tendency – both popular and academic – to divide the world up into discrete ethnic 
groups was, ‘what we want to explain, not what we want to explain things with; it 
belongs to our empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit’ (2004:9). For him, what we 
often refer to as groups – African Americans, Whites, Romanians, Hungarians – are in 
fact categories: ‘not things in the world, but perspectives on the world’ (Brubaker 
2004:12, 17, 20, 24). Accordingly, he suggested an analytical shift from ‘groups’ – 
conceived of as concrete and bounded things-in-the-world – to ‘groupness’ – moments 
of cohesion and collective solidarity that happen in particular contexts without 
necessarily pointing to the existence of enduring and tangible things called groups 
(Brubaker 2004:7, 12). Based on ethnographic fieldwork in the Romanian city Cluj, 
Brubaker and colleagues thus conceived of ethnicity as ‘an interpretive prism, a way of 
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 By contrast to Brubaker et al., I am primarily concerned in this chapter with perceptions of others’ 
ethnicity rather than ethnic claims about the self, and with the narrative contexts in which ethnicity 
becomes salient rather than its significance – or otherwise – in everyday life. 
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making sense of the social world’ and ‘a way of understanding and interpreting 
experience’ (Brubaker et al. 2006:15; 358). 
 
As Zsuzsa Csergo has observed, Brubaker et al.’s attempts to explore ethnicity and 
nationalism without evoking the language of groups frequently ran into conceptual 
problems, due to the difficulty of categorising individuals for the sake of 
comprehensibility without referring to them as ‘Hungarians’ or ‘Romanians’ in a 
generalising manner (2008:395). Brubaker et al. justified this disjuncture between 
theory and practice by distinguishing between nominal claims to ethnic identity – i.e. 
the ethnic nationality an individual would select if explicitly asked to choose – and 
experiential ethnicity – i.e. when ethnic nationality becomes experientially relevant and 
salient in a particular context (2006:209-210). They maintained that when they made 
reference to ‘the Hungarians’ or ‘the Romanians’ – as they often did – they were talking 
about individuals’ nominal rather than their experiential ethnicity (Brubaker et al. 
2006:12). They struggled, however, to persistently observe this dictum, sometimes 
writing as though individuals who nominally identify as Hungarian or Romanian might 
be expected to experience ethnicity in particular ways in given contexts, and thereby 
lapsing into treating Hungarians and Romanians, pace Brubaker, as ‘things in the 
world’ rather than ‘perspectives on the world’ (Brubaker 2004:17).  
 
I do not attempt to realise Brubaker’s theoretically ambitious yet practically problematic 
call for scholars to abandon a ‘groupist’ language in their analyses. I do, however, 
concur with the argument that ethnicity is something one does rather than possesses 
(Brubaker et al. 2006:208). Ethnic and national identities are not just straightforward 
labels for referring to specific, clearly demarcated groups of people, but are also devices 
for interpreting experiences, categorising situations and behaviours, and justifying 
contemporary stances and arguments about the past (Brubaker et al. 2006:15, 224-231). 
Evidence for this can be found in some of the studies of Greek nationalism and national 
identity considered above (see review essay I). Discussing views of outsiders on 
Kalymnos, Sutton observed that perceptions of Americans, Europeans, and the residents 
of neighbouring islands were all deployed by Kalymnians in different ways, ‘as a foil 
for those parts of Kalymnian society people want to criticize’ (1998:47). So whilst 
neighbouring islanders provided Kalymnians with ‘an anatomy of how various foreign 
(European, Turkish, American) traits “look” when grafted onto a common Greek body’, 
Europeans represented ‘the “modernist” future’ that Kalymnians saw with some 
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ambivalence, and Americans stood in for the island’s past, ‘the good old days, when 
people were more straightforward’ (Sutton 1998:47). Sutton found that he himself, 
despite being an American, was labelled ‘European’ by a neighbour based on the 
perception that he would require the facilities to wash every day. As he wrote: 
 
This example highlights how “European” is not used in any literal sense, since 
she well knew that I was from the United States; I was only “European” in my 
desire to bathe frequently (Sutton 1998:37). 
 
To borrow Brubaker’s terms, Sutton’s neighbour was well aware that the American 
anthropologist would not identify himself as a European in a nominal sense, but 
nevertheless categorised him as European in an experiential sense due to his (supposed) 
attitude towards hygiene. 
 
Although identity labels are thus evidently closely connected to stereotypes about 
others, they cannot always be interpreted narrowly as intending to indicate membership 
of a particular group, but may rather be an attempt to ascribe or explain a particular 
genre of behaviour. As several scholars have observed, it is not uncommon for a Greek 
to conceptually identify their own behaviour or that of another Greek as ‘Turkish’ 
(Brown and Theodossopoulos 2004:8; Delivoria 2009:111; Herzfeld 1997:30; 
Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003:190, 203-206; Sutton 1998:38), without them necessarily 
meaning to claim or ascribe Turkish ethnicity. This is the metaphorical and analogical 
‘Turk within’ who ‘serves to erect internal […] boundaries within communities, 
villages, towns and the state in general’ (Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003:190) and can even 
act as a critique of the self (Brown and Theodossopoulos 2004:8). During our interview, 
Tasoula became agitated whilst describing the obstructive stance of the Greek 
government regarding work and residence permits for the expatriates, and apologised, 
exclaiming, ‘I am becoming a Turk!’ Tasoula was not claiming to be ethnically Turkish, 
but rather drawing on Greek stereotypes of Turkish fanaticism (on which, see below) to 
idiomatically characterise her own emotional state. Cowan has made comparable 
observations about the use of ethnic symbols in the central Macedonian town of Sohos. 
She noted that whilst the Sohoians ‘vehemently reject the insinuation that they are 
anything but Greek’, in ritual and everyday life ‘they frequently communicate through 
and place especial value upon linguistic, gestural and celebratory forms which [they] 
themselves identify as “not Greek”; that is, forms that incorporate Turkish or 
“Bulgarian” linguistic elements or are conceptually identified as Turkish or 
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“Bulgarian”’ (Cowan 1997:153). Cowan stressed the disjuncture between the inflections 
of these labels and the ethnic groups they supposedly evoked: 
 
Ironically, and importantly, what these purportedly “ethnic symbols” seemed not 
to mark was “ethnicity”! I encountered no evidence whatsoever that Sohoians 
wished to identify themselves as Macedonians (in a non-Greek sense) or Slavo-
Macedonians or Bulgarians, nor any evidence that they considered their use of 
non-Greek forms as constitutive, or evidence, of one of these identities. Their 
deployment was not a means to a political end. Rather, they were viewed as 
intrinsically valuable, as part of the normal fabric of everyday interaction, and as 
a code for Sohoians to articulate (largely to each other) complex identities, 
relationships and historical experiences (1997:165). 
 
As an intimate everyday ‘code’, ethnicity permits individuals to categorise and interpret 
the world around them, articulate their own sense of self and explain the behaviour of 
others, and make their experiences meaningful to themselves and intelligible to others. I 
develop these insights below by exploring the fluctuating and overlapping 
representations of Turks/Turkey and Elladítes/Greece in expatriate discourse. 
 
Good Turk, bad Turks 
 
It is a commonplace to observe that national identity requires an ‘other’ in contrast to 
which it is defined (Danforth 1995:20; Eriksen 1995:427; Hall 1996:3-4; Hirschon 
2009:83; Mackridge and Yannakakis 1997:2; Millas 2004:144; Spyrou 2002:258-259; 
Triandafyllidou 1998:594, 598-599). In Anna Triandafyllidou’s terms, nationalism is 
premised on the assumption that ‘[f]ellow nationals are not simply very close or close 
enough to one another, they are closer to one another than they are to outsiders’ 
(1998:599). In modern Greece, the ‘significant other’ (Triandafyllidou 1998:600) has 
commonly been the Turks; as Sypros Spyrou put it, ‘there are Greeks because there are 
Turks’ (2002:259).
91
 Negative stereotypes of this Turkish other have often been 
overwhelmingly prevalent in official, media, and popular representations (Kirtsoglou 
and Sistani 2003:194-195; Terzis 2004:174-175; Theodossopoulos 2004:29; Yerasimos 
1988:40). Dimitris Theodossopoulos found that Greeks in the Peloponnesian town of 
Patras played ‘Greeks versus Turks’
92
 as children, with the weakest children taking on 
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 Triandafyllidou argued that every nation has at a given moment in time one significant other, amongst 
any number of potentially significant others, whose apparently ‘“threatening” presence’ influences 
national identity (1998:600). Accordingly, for instance, she identified that between 1991 and 1993 the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, rather than the Turks, was Greece’s significant other 
(Triandafyllidou 1998:604-605). 
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 As well as ‘Greeks versus Germans’ (Theodossopoulos 2004:34), another ‘significant other’ at various 
points in Greek history. 
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the role of the Turks, and when asked what the word ‘Turk’ had meant to them in 
childhood, most of his informants ‘responded to this question with only one word: 
“fear”’ (2004:31, 34). Nevertheless, an alternative narrative of harmonious coexistence 
between Greeks and Turks does exist, emerging particularly in ‘private conversation or 
during nostalgic recollections’ (Theodossopoulos 2006:16).
93
 Both Hirschon and 
Theodossopoulos have pointed to the lack of contemporary contact and shared 
experience between Greeks and Turks as central to the tenacity of mutually-held 
negative stereotypes (Hirschon 2009:83; Theodossopoulos 2004:30). Indeed, narratives 
of harmonious Greek-Turkish coexistence were common amongst Asia Minor refugees 
who had lived alongside Turkish people, in spite of their traumatic exodus from Turkey 
(Hirschon 2004b; Hirschon 2006; Hirschon 2009:85-86), whilst Greeks who meet Turks 
abroad frequently express ‘mutual amazement’ at shared cultural traits (Hirschon 
2009:91) and develop more favourable and differentiated perceptions of Turkish people 
(Bacas 2003; Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003:202; Theodossopoulos 2004:38). 
 
Unlike most residents of the Greek state, the expatriated Greeks of Turkey did have 
lived experience of the Turkish other. The degree of interaction that members of the 
Greek minority had with their Turkish fellow countrymen varied based on a number of 
factors (age, gender, occupation, area of residence, et cetera; see chapter 2). Men, for 
instance, generally had greater opportunities to interact with Turks than women, whilst 
those who lived in Istanbul had greater contact than those who lived (or remained) on 
Imbros. Interviewees sometimes portrayed majority-minority interaction in Turkey as 
limited and impersonal – particularly stressing that romantic entanglements with Turks 
were vociferously discouraged by parents – and remembered threats, insults, and 
physical clashes between the two communities. Several Polítes, for example, talked 
about being showered with abuse or bombarded by stones thrown by Turkish children 
en route to school. As Alexandra recalled: 
 
Unfortunately, every morning and every afternoon we lived with fear, because to 
get to school I had to pass through a Turkish neighbourhood, and the Turkish 
children – because we had to wear a uniform from school we stood out from 
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 Despite continued Greek-Turkish flashpoints at the diplomatic level – such as the Imia dispute over the 
ownership of two uninhabited islets in the Aegean Sea in 1996 (Pratt and Schofield 1996) – popular and 
political gestures of friendship and reconciliation are far from uncommon – as in the ‘earthquake 
diplomacy’ of 1999 (Ker-Lindsay 2000). James Ker-Lindsay has stressed that this rapprochement should 
not be seen purely as the direct result of the earthquakes that hit Greece and Turkey that year, but also as 
the product of pre-existing and more substantive diplomatic negotiations between the two countries, 
accelerated – but not created – by the natural disasters (2000:229). 
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them – they used to set up ambushes, and throw stones at us, shouting “the 
infidels are passing” (22/07/2011). 
 
Accounts of intercommunal harmony were, however, also common in informants’ 
narratives. Many – particularly, though not exclusively, residents of the Princes’ Islands 
– were at pains to put across an impression of peaceable fraternity between the 
Armenian, Greek, Jewish, and Turkish communities, telling stories of interfaith 
mingling at important religious festivals, intercommunal support and protection during 
flashpoints such as the Septemvrianá, and close friendships that prevailed beyond the 
emigration of the Greeks. In the words of Andreas, a resident of Chálki until 1973, ‘we 
played together, we grew up together with the Turks. We didn’t have any problems, we 
were like brothers with the Turks’ (11/02/2012). A number of interviewees recalled 
heart-wrenching farewells or emotional reunions with Turkish friends: Tasos, choking 
back tears of his own, told me that when his father left Turkey his Turkish fellow 
stallholders in the market in which he worked cried ‘even though it was a competitor 
who was leaving’ (13/03/2014); whilst Andreas recalled that when he was reacquainted 
with a childhood Turkish friend on a return visit to Chálki he embraced him so tight that 
a pencil he had in his shirt pocket bruised his chest (11/02/2012). 
 
Some informants presented either overwhelmingly positive or unreservedly negative 
portrayals of Turks and Greek-Turkish intercommunal relationships, reflecting an 
internal debate within the expatriate community between those derogatorily labelled as 
‘Turk-lovers’ for their supposedly idyllic impressions of Turks, and those lambasted as 
‘Hellenified’ due to their allegedly ‘uncritical’ absorption of native Greek anti-Turkish 
vilification (Örs 2006:84). Commonly, however, positive representations of Turks 
coexisted with negative generalisations in expatriate testimony (Halstead 2014b). As the 
Istanbul-born sociologist Millas has argued in relation to his own father’s discourse on 
Turks, it is too simplistic to dismiss such oscillation between positive and negative 
accounts as mindless contradiction (2006:47-48). Rather, for Millas, it reflected a 
tendency for narrators to ‘compartmentaliz[e] their perceptions of the Turks in parallel, 
but not overlapping, domains of experience’, such that stereotypes of the 
‘undifferentiated Turk as the ethnic Other’ were kept separate from favourable 
impressions of ‘actual, concrete people who happened to be the Others’ (2006:48, 57).
94
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 Millas noticed, for instance, that in Greek literature, ‘the Turks appear as negative personalities 
whenever they are portrayed as abstract characters and as potentially positive individuals when they are 
presented as concrete persons’ (2006:48); and likewise, whilst in the novels of Turkish writers Greek 
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In an exploration of Greek Cypriot children’s perceptions of Turks, Spyrou 
correspondingly observed that whilst ‘children often resorted to absolute, negative 
evaluations of the Turks’ such that ‘[t]here are no different kinds of Turks but “a Turk” 
who is homogenous, undifferentiated and captures the essential nature of all Turks’, 
when asked to elaborate on these impressions most stressed that ‘there are both good 
and bad Turks’, and often distinguished in this regard between Turkish Cypriots and 
mainland Turks (2002:260-261, 266). In Theodossopoulos’ terms, this was a distinction 
between the particularised Turk – seen as human and similar to the self – and the 
generalised Turk – perceived as inhuman and hostile to the self (2006:9). 
 
This tendency to differentiate between particular Turks and the generalised other was 
borne out in many of the testimonies I collected, including those of two of my younger, 
Greek-born Imbriot informants. Both recalled growing up with a somewhat negative 
impression of an abstract Turkish other. When, however, on later visits to Imbros with 
their parents, they encountered Turks as fellow human beings rather than as a ‘faceless 
and nameless’ mass, a ‘particularization of the generalized Turk’ took place 
(Theodossopoulos 2006:9-10). I asked Eva, who was born in Athens in 1991 to an 
Imbriot mother and a father from the Princes’ Islands, if she remembered what 
impression she had of the Turks before she visited Imbros for the first time. She replied: 
 
About the Turks generally, it is not that I have a negative opinion, but perhaps I 
do not have the most positive [opinion] that I could, as I would for another 
[ethnic group…] I don’t see the people themselves negatively, but generally 
when I say, “that is a Turk” or “Turkey”, I might see it slightly negatively. But 
with an individual personally who is a Turk I do not think I have a problem (Eva 
13/08/2013). 
 
Lia – also born in Athens in 1991 to an Imbriot mother – exhibited a comparable 
response: 
 
Halstead: Growing up, do you remember what impression you had of the Turks? 
Lia: Err. Yes [laughs]. Look, certainly it is not the same as “he is a Frenchman, 
German”. I mean, I would say “ah, the Turk”. I thought of him in a slightly 
derogatory manner […] But I personally do not have a problem, because we are 
okay here, they have received us well, and because we are reconciled things are 
good (13/08/2013). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
characters are almost all represented negatively, in the same authors’ memoirs Greeks are 
overwhelmingly represented in positive terms (2004:141-142; 2011). 
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In the narratives of both Lia and Eva, a distinction was drawn between actual people 
who happened to be – nominally – Turks, and ‘the Turk’, an abstract and somewhat ill-




First-generation, Turkish-born interviewees often accounted for their mixed experiences 
of intercommunal relationships, and the discrepancies in their representations of Turks, 
by drawing similar distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Turks. Some called attention 
to the attitudes of different groups within Turkish society, for instance contrasting 
educated or enlightened urban Turks with uneducated villagers or provincials, 
secularists and Kemalists with Islamists and fundamentalists, Westerners with 
Easterners or ‘Anatolians’, or moderates/left-wingers with right-wing nationalists.
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Interestingly, however, many combined the figures of the ‘good Turk’ and the ‘bad 
Turk’ into the same individual, distinguishing between the positive behaviour of an 
individual Turk and the collective mob mentality of the same Turks together (Halstead 
2014b:398-399). Menelaos was born in Istanbul in 1946, and left for Greece in 1989 
after his son finished primary school. When I asked him how he would characterise his 
relationships with his Turkish acquaintances, he responded: ‘one person, one-on-one, is 
good. As a crowd, when the government stirs them up – [for instance,] a [Turkish] 
neighbour who knew that the Septemvrianá would happen, would not come to tell you, 
“look, be careful, leave the house tonight, go elsewhere”, nothing [like that]’ (Menelaos 
06/02/2012). Tryfon, who was born on Imbros in 1929 and emigrated to Greece after 
1964 when the situation on Imbros began to deteriorate, put it rather more bluntly: ‘one 
Turk is God, [but] if there are three, four together they provoke each other and become 
dogs’ (21/05/2013). This alleged duality was commonly attributed either to the Islamic 
faith or to nationalist fanaticism. Lefteris, who was born in Istanbul in 1960 and left for 
Greece at the age of eight, maintained that the Turks’ religion might cause them to go 
from friend to foe in an instant: 
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different from that of Brubaker and colleagues, as I am referring to the ascription of ethnicity to others 
rather than ethnic self-identification. In the slightly modified sense that I use it, a nominal ethnicity is a 
‘general, context-independent’ characterisation that a narrator would ‘consistently and unambiguously’ 
ascribe if required to identify another’s ethnic identity, whereas an experiential ethnicity refers to the 
‘context-specific’ ways in which ethnicity becomes salient for the narrator in explaining another’s 
behaviour (quotes from Brubaker et al. 2006:209-210). 
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I think it is their religion that causes the problem. You might be a friend of 
theirs, a very close friend, but due to religion there might come a moment when 
they kill you, if you say something about their religion. They won’t wait to ask 
you, they might just kill you. We are talking about the uneducated types now, of 
course, not about the educated people (Lefteris 12/05/2013). 
 
Aris – born on Imbros in 1941, and a resident of Greece since 1969 – spoke favourably 
of the Turkish character, but likewise claimed that they were easily stirred up by their 
government: 
 
The Turks, the people, are good. Good? They are very patriotic. If the authorities 
say, “you will not bother anybody”, nobody will bother you. If they say, “on 
your feet, kill them”, they are on their feet. Such is their mentality. But if they 
are in the right frame of mind they are very good, honourable (23/05/2013). 
 
Alexandra, who lived in Istanbul from her birth in 1947 until her emigration to Greece 
in 1971, similarly juxtaposed the qualities of an individual Turk to the mob mentality of 
multiple Turks: 
 
The Turks are a people who are guided by their leaders. One-on-one, they are 
the best thing that God created. One-on-one. But more than two or three, they 
start to think like a crowd, and if given some direction from the state, they cease 
to be friendly people, and whatever the country says, that’s what they must do. 
There’s no such thing as friend, or mother, or brother. They are a people guided 
by the leaders, the individual does not have his own free will. Those who think 
differently are very few. Those who think logically and are cultured people, are 
perhaps 1 million out of 90 million, and they are easily lost. That’s difficult for 
someone to understand if they haven’t lived there, and don’t know their manner 
of thinking and behaviour (22/07/2011; see also Halstead 2014b:410). 
 
This supposed propensity for extremes of behaviour was often used to account for both 
positive and negative experiences of living alongside the Turks. In a written witness 
testimony to the Septemvrianá, Giorgos Gavriilidis thus wrote: 
 
The Turk has a fanaticism within him, which he shows at bad and good 
moments. I remember, for example, female Turkish neighbours, helping my 
mother and embracing our family, our problems. I remember those same people 
showing the vandals the Greek houses, on that night [in 1955] (witness 43:169). 
 
A stereotype of Turkish fanaticism was here used to account both for the lengths that 
the Turks will go to in order to lend assistance to their neighbours, and for their hostile 
behaviour at moments of intercommunal tension. It was, moreover, not uncommon for 
narrators to allege that the same Turkish individuals exhibited extremes of both honour 
and violence on the same night during the Septemvrianá. Writing about her memories of 
the 1955 riots, Maria Andreou Kanaki recalled that a group of rioters broke into her 
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family home, forcing the majority of the family to escape into a neighbouring house, 
leaving behind her bedridden elderly mother. She described how: 
 
The vandals got into the bedroom where we had placed my mother, and when 
they saw her in that state, they said to her: “you lie down there mother, do not 
worry” and they began to break and destroy [the property] (witness 2:66). 
 
This story was also related by Veniamin Kanakis, the grandson of the bedridden 
woman, who remembered that many of the rioters were acquaintances of his father: 
 
We heard a noise. Immediately a window was smashed […] As soon as my 
father heard the noise he ran outside. Half of those gathered there were known to 
him […] They said to my father, “you leave, do not stay here, take your family 
and leave. Do not worry.” […] The mob went into the house and devastated 
everything. They broke everything. Nothing remained standing […] They did 
not touch my grandmother. “Mama do not worry” they said to her (09/03/2010). 
 
In this example, whilst as a crowd the Turks were portrayed as acting violently, obeying 
their instructions to destroy Greek property, as individuals they were seen to show 
respect for the sick elderly woman, ensuring not to harm her and even attempting to 
reassure her. In a testimony published by the Greek newspaper Kathimeriní in 2015, 
Michalis Vasileiadis similarly alleged that on the night of 6 September 1955 his Turkish 
doorman, having first protected Michalis’ family – by standing outside the block of flats 
in which they lived waving a Turkish flag and telling the rioters that there were no 
Greeks living there – proceeded to join the rioters further down the road and participate 
in the looting of other Greek properties (Vasileiadis 2015:29-30). Michalis accounted 
for the doorman’s behaviour in the following terms: 
 
Later I understood why he did it. It was the difference of identity: the unknown 
Romiós who he saw simply as a Romiós and I who was little Michalis, my 
mother Mrs. Katina who cooked and gave him food to eat, who sent him to shop 
[for her] and gave him a tip[,] and he felt an obligation towards us. The Turk as 
an individual is an exceptional person, and if you do him a kindness, he will not 
forget it for 40 years, as his proverb goes. His weakness is one: as a member of a 
crowd he is beastly (Vasileiadis 2015:30). 
 
Alexandra – who was a young girl at the time of the Septemvrianá and was only saved 
from serious assault by the intervention of a Turkish friend of her father – made a 
comparable claim about the behaviour of her family’s Turkish neighbours in 1955: 
 
Alexandra: A Turk has a pride, a love that you won’t find in a Hellene, or any 




Halstead: But some Hellenes were protected [during the Septemvrianá] by the 
Turks? 
Alexandra: Our family was protected. ’55 was organised from 1950. All the 
Turks promised to throw a stone at an infidel house. Our friend promised on the 
Qur’an to throw a stone. So, after protecting our family, he went to go and throw 
his rock [at another family] (fieldnotes 05/02/2012; see also Halstead 
2014b:398-399). 
 
Through the good Turk/bad Turks dichotomy, these narrators found a rationalisation for 
their life experiences. Stereotypes of Turks as proud, honour-bound, and obedient to 
authority served to explicate otherwise jarring memories: Turks as individuals – 
remembered from work, leisure, and the neighbourhood – were depicted as fanatically 
honourable; but the same people as a crowd – seen as implicated or complicit in attacks 
on the Greeks – were portrayed as liable to become fanatically violent if dishonoured. In 
this sense, being a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Turk was not an immutable quality inherent to 
particular individuals, but rather was dependent on the context in which they were 
remembered (see also Halstead 2012:99-101; Halstead 2014b:398-399). 
 
Nominal and experiential Turks 
 
I have elsewhere observed that in Greek Cypriot oral testimonies whether a Turkish 
character was classified as a ‘Turk’ – and therefore ‘bad’ and hostile to ‘us’ – or a 
‘Turkish Cypriot’ – and therefore potentially ‘good’ and similar to ‘us’ – sometimes 
reflected not the actual birthplace of the subject but rather the context of their narration 
(Halstead 2014b:398). Turkish Cypriots remembered in benign or friendly settings – as 
fellow villagers or drinking partners – were generally called ‘Turkish Cypriots’, whilst 
other Turkish Cypriots remembered in antagonistic settings – such as in verbal 
confrontations on the dividing ‘green line’ – were labelled as ‘Turks’ (Halstead 
2014b:397-398). Spyrou has similarly noted that the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf 
Denktash – who stands out in Greek Cypriot children’s narratives as an archetypal ‘bad 
Turk’ – was generally seen by the children not as a Turkish Cypriot but as a Turk: ‘[f]or 
the children’, he wrote, ‘it makes much more sense to label Denktash as a Turk rather 
than a Turkish Cypriot because, unlike other Turkish Cypriots, he is seen as evil, similar 
in that sense to the Turkish occupiers’ (2002:266). In Brubaker’s terms, individuals who 
would nominally be identified as Turkish Cypriots – that is, if the narrator was directly 
asked to identify their ethnicity – were classified as Turks in an experiential sense – that 
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is, insofar as their reputed ethnicity became salient in categorising or explaining their 
behaviour. 
 
I develop this view of ethnicity as an ‘interpretive prism’ (Brubaker et al. 2006:15) by 
exploring the ethnic identities imputed to others in narratives of intercommunal violence 
and protection during the Septemvrianá, drawing on the testimonial compilation 
Septemvrianá 1955: the ‘Kristallnacht’ of the Hellenism of Constantinople, published 
by Ekdóseis Tsoukátou (1999; see chapter 1). Witness testimonies typically identified 
the perpetrators interchangeably as ‘Turks’, ‘rioters’, ‘vandals’, or ‘barbarians’, creating 
a casual equation between members of the mob and the Turkish population generally. 
One witness, for instance, described the riots as ‘those events during which groups of 
crowds Turks fanatics Muslims destroyed whatever they came across that was Hellenic 
in Constantinople’ (witness 41:165, my emphasis), thereby equating Turkishness and 
the Islamic faith with fanaticism and a mob mentality. Rarely was there any serious 
attempt to discern the composition of the mob, apart from vague (and derogatory) 
references to ‘Anatolians’, and absent was the suggestion, sometimes found in 
expatriate discourse, that many of the rioters were Kurds (see chapter 6). Every member 
of the mob was ‘Turkish’ and, indeed, in several of the testimonies the actions of the 
rioters were portrayed as characteristically ‘Turkish’. One witness wrote that the Turks’ 
‘wild instinct awoke, that afternoon of 6/9/1955’ (witness 22:117), whilst another 
avowed that, ‘it is well-known that one can only expect such atrocities from the Turks’ 
(witness 32:145). Two contributors quoted celebrated foreign writers in an effort to 
substantiate such claims: 
 
[…] I remembered the philhellene V. Hugo, who wrote in one of his poems: 
 The Turks passed by here, 
 everything is in ruins, 
 plunged into mourning. 
Yes, sirs, that is what happened on that ill-omened night (witness 21:115). 
 
[…] and then I took the big decision to leave, expatriated, and live elsewhere in 
another country, wherever in the world, leaving the holy earth where my 
forefathers lived and which was now trampled upon and contaminated by 
barbarians, “the blight of Asia”, as George Horton calls them […] (witness 
28:138). 
 
Spyrou observed that for Greek Cypriot children the stereotypical ‘bad Turk’ was ‘a 
minimised category which includes only those Turks they perceive as being “bad”’, 
with the result that ‘the national category itself (i.e. Turks) becomes a label for the 
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negative [aspects] of the “other”, not a label for the nation as a whole’ (2002:269). In 
other words, whilst all Turks might be nominally Turkish in the eyes of the children in 
the sense that, if pressed, they would identify them as Turkish rather than Greek, it was 
only in the context of perceived negative behaviour that others became experientially 
Turkish; i.e. that their Turkishness came to matter. Likewise, in the above examples, the 
ethnicity of the antagonists was significant for the narrators insofar as it explained their 
actions: the actual composition of the rioters and what their motivations might have 
been for engaging in acts of violence was disregarded in favour of the simpler answer 
that they did what they did because they were Turkish. It was, in a way, less the people 
who were Turkish and more the behaviour. 
 
What, then, of nominal Turks who did not behave ‘Turkishly’? As I mentioned in 
chapter 2, oral accounts of the Septemvrianá frequently featured stories of Muslim 
neighbours, co-workers, and friends warning or protecting members of the Greek 
community. The testimonies in the Ekdóseis Tsoukátou compilation were no exception, 
and at least 19 of the 50 accounts contained some reference to intercommunal 
assistance.
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 In many of these accounts, the authors stressed that their saviours were 
Turks; in the words of one witness: ‘the neighbours were Turks. We should not forget 
that the good people were good people and they have a conscience’ (witness 4:75). 
Some narrators, however, seemed to struggle to reconcile the violence of the mob with 
the assistance afforded by individual Muslims. Indeed, in 7 of the 19 intercommunal 
assistance stories, the protagonist was either explicitly presented as not ethnically 
Turkish or had their Turkish ethnicity ‘qualified’ in some way by the narrator. Of these, 
four stories featured Kurds. Petros Tsoukatos wrote that his apartment ‘was saved, 
because our doorkeeper – a Kurd from Van [in eastern Turkey] – Memetis, as we called 
him, a very good young man of 25-30 years, protected the block of flats where our 
relatives were staying’ (witness 37:158). Another, anonymous witness was likewise 
keen to stress that their saviour was Kurdish: 
 
At that moment, our doorkeeper Sadik came to ask us if we had a Turkish flag. 
However, as all of the tenants were Hellenes, we did not have a flag. 
In the meantime, they [the rioters] had arrived and were breaking the outer door. 
Sadik, however, put his body in the way, holding with his two hands the frames 
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 My reading of these testimonies is that at least 19 – and as many as 23, depending on how you interpret 
some of the stories – contained references to protection and/or warnings provided by members of the 
Muslim community to members of the Greek minority (although these sometimes appeared alongside 
negative stereotypes of the Turks). 
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of the door and shouting that everyone was away, that only his family was inside 
and that he would presently hang out a flag […] And so we were saved. 
Of course, our doorkeeper was a Kurd and the owner of our block of flats 
rewarded him the following day (witness 18:107-108). 
 
The house of Konstantinos Katsaros was similarly protected by the doorkeeper. In 
contrast to the two examples above, Konstantinos seemed unsure of the ethnicity of this 
doorkeeper, but nevertheless speculated that he might be of Kurdish extraction: 
 
When we returned to Constantinople, our house […] had been saved, because 
our doorkeeper Mr. Ömer, perhaps of Kurdish descent, prevented the barbarians 
from destroying it (witness 35:151). 
 
Simeon Vafeiadis, meanwhile, explained that his shop was saved by a man who was 
commonly thought to be a Kurd but was, in fact, descended from Armenians: 
 
Our shop did not suffer great damage once again thanks to a Turkish neighbour, 
an accountant, who as soon as he heard about the events got in touch with a 
stevedore, Hasan, and told him to run immediately to save our shop. He along 
with another Kurd stood in front of the shop and did not allow the rioters to 
destroy it. Thus it was saved with only minor damages.  
Everybody knew Hasan as a Kurd. In reality, however, he was of Armenian 
descent. In 1916, during the slaughters [i.e. the Armenian genocide], as a young 
child, he fetched up with a Turkish family (witness 1:61). 
 
Simeon also described how the neighbourhood in which he lived was saved from 
damage by a man named Ali Riza, twice stressing that he was a Turk from Crete 
(presumably a refugee from the 1923 exchange): 
 
Our neighbourhood passed without damage, thanks to a neighbour and friend, 
Ali Riza […] Ali Riza was a Turk from Crete and, as we learned later, he stood 
at the crossroads of our neighbourhood on the central road and did not allow the 
rioters to pass. Thus, thanks to that Turkish Cretan, the Hellenic houses of our 
neighbourhood were saved from the catastrophe (witness 1:58). 
 
Despoina Isaakidou similarly specified that the family living opposite her own that 
provided them with shelter in the middle of the riots was Turkish Cretan (witness 
33:147). Another anonymous witness, meanwhile, told the story of a neighbour who 
protected the women and children of the neighbourhood, and took care to point out that 
her mother was rumoured to be Greek: 
 
Mrs Chatzer, who had links with all of the Hellenic families there – they said 
that her mother was a Hellene – took almost all of the young mothers of the 




Finally, in the testimony of Apostolis Nikolaidis – reconstructed by Leonidas Koumakis 
and excerpted from his book The Miracle (see chapter 6, below) – it was emphasised 
that the wife of the Turkish Pontic neighbour who offered Apostolis’ family shelter was 
a crypto-Christian, who ‘went to church every Sunday morning, lit a candle and left 
without saying a word’ (witness 50:188).  
 
In each of these cases, the narrators placed special emphasis on the peculiar identity of 
their rescuers, seemingly so as to explain their ‘motive’ for intervening on behalf of the 
Greeks, or rather to offer an explanation as to why they did not behave ‘Turkishly’ like 
the ‘Turkish’ mob. It is, of course, quite possible that the protagonists of these stories 
genuinely were Kurdish (or Turkish Cretan or half Greek or crypto-Christian), even 
though it is clear in some of these cases that the narrators were drawing on speculation 
or hearsay rather than detailed personal knowledge of the individuals concerned (as in 
the case of Mr. Ömer who was ‘possibly of Kurdish descent’). Each of these individuals 
may indeed have had special motivation to intervene on behalf of the Greeks – the half 
Greek and the crypto-Christian out of commonality, the Kurds and the crypto-Armenian 
out of solidarity, and the Turkish Cretans due to memories of living in Greece – 
although all could also have had special reason not to get involved. What is significant, 
however, is that these subtle discriminations of origin or family history appeared only in 
the context of describing such acts of protection. These narrators felt it necessary to 
qualify the ethnicity of their saviours in this particular narrative context, even though it 
is likely that these same individuals would be identified as Turks in other contexts. 
Their imputed ethnicity became experientially relevant insofar as it accounted for their 
exceptional behaviour: they were not complicit in the general violence of ‘the Turks’ 
because they were not ‘really Turkish’, or at least more than ‘simply Turkish’. From 
this perspective, the ascription of a particular ethnic identity to others can be seen as a 
means to simplify and interpret experience, explaining behaviour both ‘expected’ and 
‘unexpected’. 
 
Privileged knowledge (1): the ‘bad Turks’ 
 
Alekos, who was born in Istanbul in 1971 but grew up in Athens, observed that the 





[W]hen Constantinopolitans are amongst one another, they tend to say, “ah, we 
got on so well in Constantinople, how good things were over there!” But when 
they speak with Elladítes, they tell a different story. They talk about their 
complaints both there where they felt discriminated against and they lived every 
day in fear, but also their complaints about Greece [… And if] the conversation 
happens to turn to Turkey, or Greek-Turkish relationships, they take the Turkish 
side […] And afterwards the native people here, quite correctly, say, “okay, if 
things were so good there and they treated you better there and the state was 
better there, why did you come over here?” And then they reply, “because they 
did not allow us to speak, we were afraid that our children might engage in 
mixed marriages and become Turkified, we did not know what would befall us 
the next day, blah blah blah” […] The repression that we had there as a minority 
and the repression that we feel here because everything is in a state of chaos 
become confused and agitate us (28/05/2013). 
 
As Alekos identified, fluctuations between positive and negative representations of the 
Turkish other in expatriate discourse reflected not only mixed experiences of 
intercommunal relationships in Turkey, but also the ambivalent position of the 
expatriate community in regard to Greece, and their attempts to convey both sets of 
experiences in different social and narrative situations. In Spyrou’s terms, stereotypes 
‘are not immutable attributions’ but rather ‘discursive strategies that take place within 
specific conversational contexts’ (2002:267). For the expatriated Greeks of Turkey, 
representations of the ‘good Turk’ served to critique perceived defects in the native 
Greek character, and thereby to express the expatriates’ sense of disillusionment with 
Greek society (see below). Stereotypes of the ‘bad Turks’, meanwhile, were, in 
particular, strategically expedient in the context of justifying the expatriates’ presence in 
Greece and bolstering appeals for support from the Greek state. 
 
In line with Alekos’ observations, interviewees commonly substantiated their decision 
to emigrate by juxtaposing a sense of fear and repression in Turkey with one of freedom 
and security in Greece. As Alexandra put it: 
 
When you leave a place where you feel enslaved, afraid to speak, to live as you 
want, it’s very difficult. The first years were a little bit difficult, difficult 
economic conditions. Afterwards, slowly slowly, things got a bit better, and I 
can say that in 40 years of living in Greece – if you exclude a few unpleasant 
events – for the most part I thank God that I am in Greece and that I am free. I’m 
not afraid to wear what I want, to wear my cross, to speak Greek (22/07/2011). 
 
More specifically, narratives of suffering in Turkey provided the expatriates with a 
means to respond to representatives of the Greek state who urged them to return to 
Turkey in the national interest. Tasoula, for example, who left Istanbul as a child with 
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her family in 1964, recalled that her family’s response to such suggestions was to invite 
the officials to try living in Turkey themselves: 
 
We had to go every month to get residence permits. Imagine! And some of those 
people [the officials in the Aliens’ Bureau] said to us, “return home [to 
Turkey]”. And our response was, “we’ve already eaten the cucumbers there. 
You, who is complaining to us, go there for a month and eat the Turkish 
cucumber yourself!” (27/11/2011). 
 
Expatriate writers often had recourse to similar dichotomies. In the newspaper O Polítis, 
stereotypes of Turkey as warmongering and untrustworthy – contrasted to the allegedly 
civilised and peaceable tendencies of Greece – functioned firstly as a discursive strategy 
for critiquing Turkish foreign policy towards the Greeks of Turkey and Greece itself. In 
August 1976, for instance, the newspaper characterised Greece as a ‘freedom-loving 
country par excellence’ and admonished Turkey for conducting ‘an undeclared war 
against Hellenism’ in Istanbul, Imbros, Tenedos, and Cyprus (O Polítis August 1976), 
whilst in a March 1987 piece it asked whether it was possible for a peace-loving country 
like Greece to work cooperatively with a warmongering one like Turkey (O Polítis 
March 1987). Secondly, however, representations of Turkish aggression could also 
sustain a critique of Greek policy. O Polítis, for instance, commonly prefaced 
complaints directed at the Greek state with accounts of the persecution the expatriates 
faced in Turkey, as in a January 1979 article in which the newspaper railed against 
Greek policy towards expatriates with Turkish citizenship in the following terms: 
 
Amongst the most serious problems faced here by the Constantinopolitans of 
Turkish citizenship, omogeneís [i.e. of Greek descent], those who were de facto 
forced, i.e. by every kind of unbearable Turkish pressure, occasioned by the 
Cyprus issue, to leave their homes, is, aside from their pensions, the problem of 
free residence and work, which remains unsolved. 
Those omogeneís who went to Canada, Sweden or other liberal countries, 
acquired the citizenship of the country they chose for their new patrída […] 
Those, however, who settled in their own patrída, in Greece, suffer from myriad 
hardships […] and the omogéneia of Constantinople, following the successive 
wounds that it received, without opposition from its natural protector, arrived in 
its current state, and now those responsible work in vain and the only thing they 
succeed in doing, unwittingly, is to fill the cash register of the Turkish Embassy 




And the Romioí […] are driven like sheep to the slaughter to the Turkish 
Embassy to pay their poll tax,
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 so unnecessary because all of them are NOT 
going to return to the Turkish paradise (O Polítis January 1979). 
 
In like manner, Ίmvros often contextualised its complaints towards the Greek state by 
first reminding its readers of the community’s suffering at the hands of the national 
other, for example writing in 1977 that the Imvriótes were treated as aliens in Greece 
despite being ‘victims of Turkish chauvinism’ (Ίmvros August-September 1977), or in 
1992 that Imbros was a casualty ‘not only of Turkish beastliness, but also of non-
existent Greek policies’ (Ίmvros November-December 1992). In the aftermath of 
Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the newspaper likewise paralleled the 
experiences of the Imvriótes with those of the Cypriots (see also chapter 5) in order to 
provide context for a protest about Greece’s reluctance to issue visas to the Greeks of 
Turkey: 
 
When, thoroughly fed up and resentful from the barbarities of the Turk (that 
have now become famous in the Panhellenic world, due to Cyprus, although we 
tasted them long before), the Imvriótes asked for visas from the Embassy so as 
to come here [Greece], to save themselves from the endless torment and anguish, 
the officials turned them away in the worst way or teased them with the “come 
tomorrow” and “come the day after tomorrow”, so that the people in the end 
would become weary and abandon their effort (Imvriakí Ichó July-August 
1974a). 
 
In 1993, meanwhile, Ίmvros reprinted a letter from the Imbriot Society to the 
Undersecretary for Hellenism Abroad in the Greek government, objecting in similar 
terms to the charge applied by the Aliens’ Bureau to those expatriates with Turkish 
citizenship for the renewal of their work and residence permits. The authors of this 
appeal asked the Undersecretary to put himself in their shoes: 
 
Can you imagine, Mr. Undersecretary, the pain of our compatriots who suffered 
untold hardships at the hands of Turkish ferocity and vulgarity, who lived 
through the humiliations, the derisions, the degradations, the beatings, the rapes, 
the murders, the plunder of their houses, the confiscation of their properties, 
only because they were born Hellenes, because they wanted to call themselves 
Hellenes, to feel like Hellenes and act as Hellenes[?] 
Those same people, Mr. Undersecretary, are called upon at the Aliens’ Bureau to 
prove that they are Hellenes with the confirmation of the Hellenic Embassy in 
Constantinople! Those people who, if it were possible to examine them 
ethnically, would have written on their chromosomes only Greece and Hellenic. 
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From those people the Aliens’ Bureau demands and levies 11,000 drachma to 
allow them to remain in their Mother Patrída (residence permits) and another 
11,000 drachma in order to allow them to work (work permits) (Ίmvros March-
April 1993b). 
 
In these examples, negative stereotypes of Turkish chauvinism were evoked in order to 
constitute the expatriates as national martyrs deserving of support and compassion from 
the Greek authorities: because they suffered as Hellenes in Turkey, it was suggested, 
they should be treated as Hellenes in Greece.  
 
Several expatriates felt that this first-hand experience of the Turkish other placed them 
in a unique position to advise the Greek government, and the wider Western 
community, on their diplomatic dealings with the Republic of Turkey. In a June 1976 
article, for instance, O Polítis complained about alleged Turkish duplicity in the 
following terms: 
 
Unfortunately we are obliged to observe it first, having painful experience of 
Turkish tactics, and to declare it with historical proof to all of the Christian 
world, the Islamic, everywhere, that the Turks live in their own world, with their 
political arsenal the lie, plunder, [and] treachery (O Polítis June 1976). 
 
This was an argument that was often advanced by the Constantinopolitan Society, as 
part of their efforts to influence Greek and European policy towards Turkey. In 1998, 
for example, the Society prefaced an invitation to a Greek political party to attend a 
memorial ceremony to mark the anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople (see chapter 
5) with the following remarks: 
 
As is well known the work of the Society, apart from socio-cultural, is also 
national. The executive committee and the various committees that assist with 
its manifold works […] are sensitised to the issues related to Greek-Turkish 
relationships, [and] have a first-hand experience of the Turkish way of thinking 
and acting and therefore advance thoughts and perceptions to International 
Organisations […] always in conjunction with the relevant political and 
diplomatic organs of the State […] (Constantinopolitan Society 1998; my 
emphasis). 
 
Paris, who was himself born in Greece in the early 1950s to a father from Istanbul, and 
was a prominent member of the Constantinopolitan Society, similarly argued that the 
Polítes were, 
 
the only ones out of the Hellenes who live here [in Greece] who know in 
substance the character and behaviour of the Turks, something that doesn’t show 
often, because when you meet a Turk, be he a simple person or in some state 
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capacity – diplomat, politician – you might think he is cosmopolitan, but in a 
given moment you understand that he has a guile that you cannot always 
immediately comprehend if you haven’t lived through the behaviour of the 
Turks (01/02/2012). 
 
Nikolaos – born in Istanbul in 1939 and a resident of Greece since 1964 – likewise 
maintained that the Constantinopolitan Society was founded by, 
 
people who had lived through both the Septemvrianá and the expulsions, and 
know the mentality of the Turk. The Hellenic authorities here still don’t know 
[…] As we were told by our parents, you cannot make a friend of the Turk, 
because they will catch you unawares. Turkish diplomacy sees many years 
ahead. Now it does not need to wage a war to defeat Greece, [it achieves it] with 
money and words. So, we know that they work from below, slowly slowly […] 
They dig, dig from below. Here, the Hellenes, the Hellenic authorities, don’t 
know that. That was the aim [of the Constantinopolitan Society], to be able to 
explain it to the Hellenic government so that they can understand (30/01/2012). 
 
Claiming a privileged knowledge of the Turkish other as first-hand witnesses, these 
narrators mobilised stereotypes of the ‘bad Turks’ to lend credence to their efforts to 
influence Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, and to present their community and its 
commemorative endeavours as an invaluable asset to the Greek state. 
 
In the above examples, representations of the Turkish other as warmongering and 
treacherous were juxtaposed to stereotypes of the Greeks as peace-loving and honest. 
As Brown and Theodossopoulos have emphasised, however, ‘[s]tereotypes about ethnic 
neighbours can sustain a critique of the Self as much as the Other’ (2004:8). Indeed, 
negative stereotypes of the Turks could sometimes be turned on the Greek state and its 
inhabitants. Testifying as a witness to the Septemvrianá, Iro Athinaioy made the 
following aside: 
 
I would like to insert a parenthesis here. The Turks regard the [Turkish] flag like 
a talisman, they worship it like a God. Not like us here, where we do not see it – 
unfortunately – not even at our biggest celebrations – 25.3 [Greek Independence 
Day], 28.10 [Óhi Day] – when the country should be submerged in the colour 
blue (witness 22:118). 
 
In this case, a stereotype of the ‘bad Turks’ as fanatic nationalists was deployed to 
critique a perceived lack of patriotism in Greece. Michalis similarly utilised a stereotype 





The Turkish soldier is illiterate. He does not have technical knowledge. If he is 
on his own, what can he do? But because of religion, he will do whatever the 
officer tells him. Without offering any resistance, without having any opinion of 
his own. To compare with the Hellenic army, the Hellenic soldier, even if he is 
on his own, will manage, he will find solutions to problems [… but] there is not 
that obedience, because the soldier believes that he is equal with the officer, and 
that is not good in the military (29/01/2012). 
 
The same stereotype of blind obedience to religious authority and lack of individual free 
will that was commonly used to account for the behaviour of the mob during the 
Septemvrianá here served to raise questions of the normally cherished Greek values of 
defiance to authority and disregard for hierarchy. In this sense, attributes of the other 
that were typically presented as undesirable could nonetheless function as critical 
viewpoints on the idealised virtues of the self. 
 
Privileged knowledge (2): the ‘good Turk’ 
 
If the expatriated Greeks of Turkey thus commonly validated stereotypical Greek 
representations of the ‘bad Turks’ by citing lived experiences of persecution in Turkey, 
they also challenged them through their first-hand accounts of the ‘good Turk’ whose 
character was often portrayed as superior to that of the native Greeks. As I have 
documented above (see chapters 2-3), many expatriates were profoundly disappointed 
with the reception they received in Greece, and reported significant social and cultural 
differences between themselves and the native Greek community. Those who had 
resided in Istanbul, in particular, perceived a contrast with the Greek cities of Athens 
and Thessaloniki in terms of modernity, urbanism, and cosmopolitanism, whilst 
informants from both Istanbul and Imbros commonly characterised the Greeks of 
Greece as impolite, lazy, and corrupt. Expatriate stereotypes of the ‘good Turk’ were 
frequently grafted onto these criticisms of the ‘Elladítes’, functioning – to borrow terms 
from Sutton – as a foil for critiquing Greek society (1998:47). 
 
A widespread complaint amongst my interviewees was that the native Greeks were 
rude, unchivalrous, and disrespectful in their day-to-day interactions, and comparisons 
were often made in this regard to the manners of the Turks. In a joint interview, Fotini 
and Rita – born in Istanbul in 1943 and 1948 respectively, and residents of Greece since 




Fotini: One thing I didn’t like when I came here [to Greece]: they spoke to me 
in the singular. I raised my children to speak to strangers in the plural. I go to a 
shop, and I address the young girl of twenty [the shop assistant] in the plural. 
And she turns to me and speaks to me in the singular, and it upsets me greatly. 
Here there was not the respect towards older people that there was in 
Constantinople. I mean, I get on the bus, if there was someone old on the bus, 
our mother would say to us, “get up, get up”. Whereas here the mother sits down 
with the child, and the old lady is left standing. 
Rita: I’m still in the habit of doing it, and one time I got up on the bus and I said 
[to an older woman], “sit down, grandma”. And she said to me, “who are you 
calling grandma?” There is no respect here. 
Fotini: The Turks, even today, the young people will address the elder people in 
the plural […] The Turks, when they see an older person, they go to kiss their 
hand. And we too, we kissed their hand (Fotini 21/11/2011; Rita 21/11/2011). 
 
Dimitris, who was born on Chálki in 1956 and moved to Greece in 1975, was likewise 
disappointed by the behaviour of the native Greeks: 
 
The Hellenes were always very different compared to us. I still hold onto that 
mentality. For example, I do not like to swear. Here swearing is their bread-and-
butter. They didn’t have the same mentality that we had. I mean, a young man 
on the bus, would not get up for an old woman. Whilst in Turkey they still do 
that. If you go to someone’s house, first you have to kiss their hand. Now maybe 
that is not a very good thing, but it does show respect (30/11/2011). 
 
Anastasia, who was born in Istanbul in 1939 and came to live in Greece in 1970, voiced 
similar complaints about the unchivalrous behaviour of her native Greek concierge: 
 
I knew Greece very well. However, I experienced difficulties in the beginning. 
Small things that were different. One thing, a small thing to which I had become 
accustomed from my doorman in Constantinople, was that he would help you 
with your shopping. When I came here, this is in 1970, I had a doorman in my 
block of flats, and I went shopping with my trolley, and [when I returned] there 
were stairs for me to get to the lift. And he was sitting there, watching me, he 
didn’t even get up to help. That, for me, was something foreign. Come on now, 
he sees a woman struggling with her shopping, and he doesn’t help? 
(05/02/2012). 
 
As I noted above, it was not uncommon for such positive accounts of the Turkish 
character to commingle with negative representations. Lefteris recounted a story in 
which he was looked after by two Turkish neighbours having badly injured his foot as a 
child in Istanbul. He concluded this anecdote as follows: 
 
I want to tell you that as people they [the Turks] have a totally different 
character from the Hellenes. They are much better than us in terms of character. 
I mean, if you are in the streets and you go and ask somebody for directions, he 
will take you where you want to go, he will drop whatever he’s doing and take 
you there, in order to look after you. Here in Greece, you won’t find that. Or 
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another thing. When you are on the bus. You get onto the bus, right, you are 
pregnant, you’re very big, right? Here, the young people will run to take the seat 
before you can get there. In Turkey, the young person will get up so that you can 
sit. Here they will run to sit down before you. They have a very different 
mentality as compared to us. They will help you. But: Allah. He might just kill 
you as well (Lefteris 12/05/2013). 
 
Many expatriates were also exercised by a perceived lack of respect for the church and 
the Orthodox Christian faith in Greece (on which, see Halstead 2012:42-43). During our 
interview, Spyros – the octogenarian from Istanbul encountered alongside Tasoula in 
the previous chapter enumerating on the cultural differences between the expatriates and 
the native Greeks – embarked upon a theatrical condemnation of native Greek piety by 
drawing comparisons with the way that Muslims in Turkey behaved in Christian places 
of worship (this despite having earlier characterised the Turks as fanatically Islamic): 
 
There [in Istanbul] we had respect for the church. Here I saw people going into 
the church with their hands in their pockets [at this point Spyros stood up, and 
imitated a native Greek attending church, walking around with his hands in his 
pockets, shoulders hunched, looking bored and distracted]. The Turks, when 
they go into the church, take off their hats. Kurds, who come in to see what the 
liturgy is like, he will take off his hat, sit down and watch (02/12/2011). 
 
Another common grievance, particularly amongst male informants, was that the native 
Greeks were lazy and dishonest in their work, looking for ways to shirk their 
responsibilities or to cut corners, and frequently depending upon clientelism (see 
Halstead 2012:150-157; Halstead 2014a:277-279). This, too, was a favourite topic for 
Spyros, who contrasted the idleness of Greek workers to the thirst for knowledge 
demonstrated by the Turks who used to work in his shop in Istanbul: 
 
The Turks, and their children, will say to you, “I don’t know, I don’t know, how 
do I do that?” Here in Greece, if you say, “I’ll tell you something”, [the native 
Greek says] “I know, I know”. That’s how we withered away. “I know, I know, 
I know” […] The Turk will say, “I don’t know”. All of the Turks, who came 
from inner Anatolia to work in our shops, said, “I don’t know, how do I do that 
boss?” And they don’t pay attention to what time they will knock off, like here 
[in Greece] with unionism and such (02/12/2011; see also Halstead 2012:159). 
 
Ilias – the elderly Imvriótis who defaced his Greek identity card (see chapter 3) – railed 
against corruption in the workplace in Greece by similarly drawing a comparison with a 




The Muslim is afraid of injustice, because of the haram
99
 […] In Turkey, if you 
were to give the doctor a little envelope [i.e. a bribe]
100
 as they do here, he 
would say no […] If you treat the Turk to a coffee, he will remember it for 40 
years. The Turk will not take money from you. Because he is afraid of the 
haram. Here? Don’t ask. We have already said many things about how Greece 
has become spoilt (21/05/2013). 
 
Several interviewees were also vexed by the political culture of Greece, which they felt 
tended unnecessarily towards partisanship, disunity, and anarchy. Istanbul-born 
Imvriótis Loukas, for example, spoke critically of political demonstrations in Greece, 
making contrasts with the (then ongoing) 2013 Gezi Park Protests in Istanbul: 
 
Whenever they have those protests here [in Greece], they break and loot 
everything. And they are not all agents of the deep state, as the left-wingers 
allege. It is the culture here, I would say. There is a culture of anarchy, a culture 
of destruction. A self-destructive mania. And they like to leave rubbish behind 
them and leave. With all of those things that have been happening in 
Constantinople in recent days, there has been a very strong community of 
demonstrators who remain there, after all of these days, to collect the rubbish, to 
clean up the place, they clean up the place before they leave. That shows a good 
manner of behaviour […] And when you try and say that here in Greece, they 
are bemused, they do not understand what you are saying. They think you are 
conservative, they will say that you are narrowminded (08/05/2013). 
 
Just as stereotypes of the ‘bad Turks’ could be used to constitute the expatriate 
community as the latest martyrs to Greece’s quintessential other, so representations of 
the ‘good Turk’ functioned as a critical mirror directed at the inhabitants of the Greek 
state, permitting the expatriates to distinguish themselves from the ‘Elladítes’ by 
drawing attention to virtues purportedly shared by the Turks and the Greeks of Turkey 




Ethnic stereotypes, as Brown and Theodossopoulos observed, have often been 
interpreted as ‘products of a form of false consciousness’, unselfconsciously reproduced 
by individuals who ‘lack the critical capacity to see beyond rumour, hearsay, 
propaganda and pseudo-science’ (2004:3). People, from this perspective, are passive 
sponges for a monolithic nationalist rhetoric that governs their interpretations and 
overrides their own experiences. The evidence presented in this chapter, however, 
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 Sinful actions prohibited by Allah. 
100
 For a discussion of the ‘little envelope’ and other Greek terms relating to corruption and bribery, see 
Atlantis Host (2015). 
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suggests that people ‘continuously make choices on when and how to talk about 
“others”’ (Brown and Theodossopoulos 2004:8); that, in other words, how and why the 
nominal ethnicity of others becomes experientially relevant varies in different discursive 
contexts. Ethnic stereotypes, like ethnic identities, rarely have fixed or unambiguous 
referents (Theodossopoulos 2003:178; Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003:207-208), even 
though their continued usage might contribute to the perpetuation of ‘groupist’ 
understandings of social organisation (Brubaker 2004:16). The expatriated Greeks of 
Turkey claimed a privileged knowledge of the Turkish other acquired through lived 
experience, which they mobilised both to validate Greek nationalist stereotypes of the 
‘bad Turks’ who are perpetually hostile towards the ‘civilised Greeks’, and to challenge 
these representations through their own stereotypes of the ‘good Turk’ whose sense of 
honour and duty stood in sharp contrast to the crudeness and idleness of the native 
Greeks. These stereotypes were not typically static or immutable categorisations of 
particular individuals, but rather functioned as malleable and contingent devices for 
explicating the behaviour of others, interpreting lived experiences, and plotting one’s 
own place in the world. Stereotypes, as Spyrou put it, ‘have depth, even if their depth is 
still to some extent stereotypical’ (2002:269).  
 
If ethnic stereotypes are durable and difficult for individuals to shed, it is, therefore, not 
so much because people are unwitting dupes of nationalist rhetoric, but rather because 
ethnicity is one of the principal lenses through which their experiences are rendered 
intelligible. Theodossopoulos reported that his Greek informants from Patras were often 
keen to critically appraise their unfavourable portrayals of the Turkish other – typically 
blaming the education they received in school – but as they ‘have no other patterns of 
historical causality to rely upon except those to which they have been exposed at 
school’ their efforts ‘rely heavily on the very sources they aspire to criticize’, making it 
difficult for them ‘to evade the conventional nationalism they would like to defy’ 
(2004:30-31, 42). In Theodossopoulos’ terms, stereotypes represent ‘convenient guides 
to the behaviours expected from members of other ethnic groups’, reflecting ‘a strong 
desire to reach an explanation, an exegesis for events that involve other people’ 
(2003:178-179). They provide, in other words, straightforward explanations for 
complex experiences (Spyrou 2002:267). The diverse range of behaviour exhibited by 
Muslim friends and neighbours during the Septemvrianá, for instance, could be 
accounted for through stereotypes of the Turks as fanatically proud and honour-bound. 
The violence of the mob, on the one hand, was portrayed as a characteristically 
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‘Turkish’ response to a perceived threat to the Turkish nation: ethnicity provided an 
easy explanation as to why otherwise close acquaintances turned on the Greeks in 1955 
and became complicit in mob violence. Those who went to sometimes dangerous 
lengths to protect the Greeks, on the other hand, were commonly either seen to be 
conforming to the stereotypical Turkish impulse to honour and respect those close to 
them, or were characterised as not (entirely) ethnically Turkish. In both cases, 
perceptions of others’ ethnicity served as an explanatory framework for experiences that 
were otherwise hard to process. These easy answers, however, ‘also nourish our fears 
and prejudices, and divert our attention from evidence that might lead towards 
contradictory conclusions’ (Theodossopoulos 2003:179). Explanations of 
intercommunal violence and solidarity based on ethnicity, for example, typically 
excused narrators from seeking more complex interpretations of mob violence, and 
impeded them from developing more differentiated impressions of ‘the Turks’ 
generally.  
 
Expatriate representations of the Turkish other, nonetheless, had at least as much to do 
with negotiating their place in the Greek state as with rationalising their experiences in 
Turkey. By presenting themselves as victims of Turkish chauvinism, juxtaposed to the 
civilised and democratic values of Greece, the expatriates sutured themselves into Greek 
nationalist history, thereby challenging the apparent indifference of the Greek state 
towards the community and its problems in Greece. If it is thus correct to say that the 
national self is defined in relation to a significant other, it does not necessarily follow 
that the latter’s defects serve solely to highlight the former’s virtues. In the figure of the 
honourable and industrious ‘good Turk’, the expatriates found a potent and provocative 
discursive weapon with which to spotlight perceived deficiencies within Greek society, 
namely the alleged rudeness, discourteousness, and laziness of its members. Even 
stereotypical Turkish attributes otherwise presented as unfavourable could in certain 
contexts foster a reappraisal of idealised Greek values. The same sense of duty and 
deference to authority often used to account for a Turkish propensity towards mob 
violence, for instance, could also draw attention to a supposed lack of responsibility and 
respect in Greece deriving from the normally treasured Greek love of individual liberty 
and democratic equality. In this guise, the other became a critical mirror for the national 
self, opening up opportunities for contrast that not only defined its unique attributes but 




* * * 
 
In part I, I have argued that ethnicity and national history were domains of active and 
varied use, negotiation, and contestation in the narratives of the expatriated Greeks of 
Turkey. By asserting the particularity of their own local relationship to both the national 
past and the national other, the expatriates sought to establish their authenticity as 
members of the Greek national community whilst simultaneously maintaining a sense of 
their distinctiveness vis-à-vis other Greeks. They were not narrowly confined or stifled 
by national identity, which offered them significant leeway to express heterogeneity, 
differentiation, and even dissent, although they were often somewhat reliant upon it as 
an explanatory framework for their life experiences.
101
 In part II, I turn my attention to 
the commemorative activities of the expatriated community. I take a broad definition of 
commemoration, encompassing the ways in which particular events from the past are 
brought to mind in formal anniversary ceremonies, institutional activism and 
publication, and individual narrative. In the first half of this thesis, I focused on 
evaluating the relationship between the local and the national. Part II adds a third 
dimension to this discussion, by exploring not only the connections between expatriate 
commemorations and Greek national history, but also how these relate to broader 
transnational histories associated with global human rights discourse. Accordingly, I 
begin below with a survey of the recent ‘transcultural turn’ in memory studies. 
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 It is, perhaps, unsurprising that a community whose experiences have been defined so much by Greek 
and Turkish nationalism should have recourse to a frame of reference based around Greek and Turkish 
ethnicity: to borrow terms from Michael Schudson, it was not so much that my interviewees chose the 
Greek-Turkish frame, but rather that ‘[i]t chose them. It imposed itself’ (1997:13). 
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Review essay II 
Everyday multidirectional memory 
 
[T]here is no universal memory. Every collective memory requires the support 
of a group delimited in space and time (Halbwachs 1980:84). 
 
In this frequently cited extract from his posthumous volume The Collective Memory, the 
French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs – a pioneer of the notion that memory is socially 
determined – envisaged a direct correlation between the vitality of a given collective 
memory and the persistence of a particular group. For Halbwachs, the contours of 
individual memory are always determined by that person’s shifting relationships to 
different groups, such that even ‘our most personal feelings and thoughts originate in 
definite social milieus and circumstances’ (1980:33). Accordingly, the ease with which 
an individual can access a particular memory is dependent on their degree of contact 
with the relevant group (Halbwachs 1980:30, 47), and, ultimately, a collective memory 
fades away when the group sustaining it ceases to be (Halbwachs 1980:78, 80). Each 
collective memory thus has a shelf life, ‘not exceeding, and most often much shorter 
than, the average duration of a human life’ (Halbwachs 1980:86). Halbwachs’ notion 
that every collective memory depends upon the active support of a particular and 
coherent group has underpinned much subsequent thought in the area of memory 
studies (Confino 1997:1392; Craps and Rothberg 2011:517); as Barbara Misztal stated 
in her 2003 survey of the field, Halbwachs’ ‘assertion that every group develops a 
memory of its own past that highlights its unique identity is still the starting point for 
all research in the field’ (Misztal 2003:51, my emphasis). 
 
In recent years, however, successive scholars have challenged Halbwachs’ taken-for-
granted connection between particular groups and particular collective memories 
(Crownshaw 2011:1; Erll 2011a:2; Rothberg 2010:7; Silverman 2013:176), criticising 
him for attaching a ‘framedness’ to memory connoting ‘boundaries and a certain 
stability’ (Erll 2011b:10; see also Rothberg and Yildiz 2011:43), and commenting on 
the unsuitability of his approach for a world marked by globalisation, mass media, and 
demographic mobility (Huyssen 2003:17; Huyssen 2011:615; Landsberg 2004:8). In 
particular, these interventions – which we might loosely group together as studies of 
‘transcultural memory’ (Crownshaw 2011:2) – have attacked the supposition that there 
is a close link between a given collective memory and a national or ethnic group, a 
perspective that has typically been associated primarily with the French historian Pierre 
127 
 
Nora and, to a lesser extent, the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann, both of whom 





Nora edited an exhaustive series dedicated to documenting sites of French national 
memory under the title Les Lieux de Mémoire. In his introductory essay, he drew a 
distinction between ‘real memory’ and history, the latter representing ‘how our 
hopelessly forgetful modern societies, propelled by change, organise the past’ (1989:8). 
The absence of real memory in the modern world, Nora argued, led to the consecration 
of ‘lieux de mémoire’ or ‘sites of memory’: archives, monuments, memorials, museums, 
and even historians that replaced an erstwhile natural and lived memory (1989:8); 
‘[t]here are lieux de mémoire’, he declared, ‘because there are no longer milieux de 
mémoire, real environments of memory’ (1989:7). It is not, however, the particularities 
of this argument that have been contested by proponents of a transcultural approach, so 
much as Nora’s decision to explore sites of memory within the specific framework of 
the ‘memory-nation’, which in his case meant focusing on a French national memory. 
Nora has thus been taken to task for ‘bind[ing] memory, ethnicity, territory, and the 
nation-state together’ (Erll 2011b:7), ignoring the memories of minorities and migrants, 
and disregarding cultural exchange within Europe and with the French colonies (Craps 
and Rothberg 2011:517; Erll 2010:310; Erll 2011a:4; Erll 2011b:7; Erll 2011c:25; 
Graves and Rechniewski 2010:3; Huyssen 2003:97; Huyssen 2011:615; Rothberg 
2010:7; Sundholm 2011:1). In the wake of Nora’s study, a plethora of scholars set about 
documenting sites of memory in other national contexts, thereby entrenching – it is 
commonly alleged – the assumed connection between collective memory and the 
nation-state (Erll 2010:310; Erll 2011c:25).  
 
If Nora’s study presupposed an association between collective memory and the nation-
state, Assmann similarly envisaged a correspondence between memory and cultural 
communities. Assmann sought to reformulate Halbwachs’ distinction between memory 
and history, and consequently Halbwachs’ suggestion that the former has a ‘limited 
temporal horizon’, by drawing attention to the ‘concretion of identity’ that takes place in 
‘objectivized culture’ (1995:127-128; all Assmann’s words). He distinguished between 
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 Halbwachs himself was more interested in smaller-scale mnemonic communities, writing that ‘the 
nation is too remote from the individual for him to consider the history of his country as anything else 
than a very large framework with which his own history makes contact at only a few points’ (1980:77). 
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‘communicative memory’, which is ‘based exclusively on everyday communications’ 
(Assmann 1995:126), and ‘cultural memory’, the comparatively fixed and stable aspects 
of memory that are ‘maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and 
institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance)’ (Assmann 1995:129). 
For Assmann, what Halbwachs had described as ‘collective memory’ was a facet of 
communicative memory, and failed to take into account the more lasting cultural 
memory. Nevertheless, in common with both Halbwachs and Nora, Assmann viewed 
memory as inextricably linked to group identity, writing that cultural memory 
‘comprises that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in 
each epoch, whose “cultivation” serves to stabilise and convey that society’s self-
image’ (Assmann 1995:132, my emphasis). This stance – which, like that of Nora, has 
been hugely influential for subsequent scholars – has earned Assmann criticism during 
the recent ‘transcultural turn’ in memory studies. Under the influence of these two 
scholars, in Astrid Erll’s words, ‘“culture” became slowly but persistently reified’, such 
that the analytical focus within the field, ‘shifted from the dynamics of memory in 
culture to the specific memories of (allegedly stable and clearly demarcated) cultures’ 
(2011b:6). 
 
Students of transcultural memory share a desire to break away from this 
‘methodological nationalism’ (Erll 2011a:2; Levy and Sznaider 2006:103), and to 
explore the ‘expanded field’ (Huyssen 2003:97) in which memories cross or transcend 
national boundaries. To trace, in Erll’s words, ‘the incessant wandering of carriers, 
media, contents, forms, and practices of memory, their continual “travels” and ongoing 
transformations through time and space, across social, linguistic and political borders’ 
(2011b:11). These interventions have come from a variety of disciplines, but have been 
driven in particular by studies of Holocaust memory and mediated memory (Craps and 




Since the 1990s, increasing interest has been shown in the transnational proliferation of 
Holocaust memory. Besides survivors and their families, as Arlene Stein noted, ‘other 
groups also tell Holocaust stories’ (1998:519). Significant cultures of Holocaust 
commemoration have developed both in Germany, the context of perpetration, and in 
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the United States, the country whose soldiers liberated many of the Nazi camps.
103
 As 
Hilene Flanzbaum observed, ‘[m]ost Americans seem so well acquainted with at least 
some version of the Holocaust that they freely invoke it in metaphor, and often with an 
inflammatory casualness’ (1999a:96-97). Indeed, language and imagery derived from 
Holocaust memory have entered into diverse national, regional, and local vernaculars, 
leading many scholars to speak of the ‘globalisation of Holocaust discourse’ (Huyssen 
2000:23). From this perspective, the Holocaust could be seen as a contemporary ‘moral 
touchstone’ (Kushner 2001; Levy and Sznaider 2002:93), a ‘foundational past’, in 
Confino’s terms, ‘that represents an age because it embodies a historical novum that 
serves as a moral and historical yardstick’ (2012:5; see also Confino 2005:54). No 
longer narrowly or specifically evoking a memory of Nazi genocide, the Holocaust 
‘begins to function as metaphor for other traumatic histories and memories’ (Huyssen 
2003:14), or as a ‘paradigm or template through which other genocides and historical 
traumas are very often perceived and presented’ (Assmann 2007:14; see also Levy and 
Sznaider 2004:156). 
 
Scholars have documented the reapplication of Holocaust discourse in a vast range of 
geographical, situational, and discursive contexts. Interpretive analogies have repeatedly 
been drawn, for instance, between the Nazi Holocaust and European colonialism 
(Alexander 2009:52; Confino 2012:29; Hansen 1996:311; Rosenfeld 1999:46; Rothberg 
2008:224-225; Rothberg 2009a). During and after the Algerian War of Independence, 
various groups drew parallels with the Holocaust and with the Nazi occupation of 
France, particularly in order to criticise the French colonial authorities (Cohen 2001:85-
87; Confino 2012:29; House 2010:20-21, 26-27, 37; Prost 1999:171-172; Rothberg 
2009a:196-266; Rothberg 2009b:130), but also to attack the Algerian National 
Liberation Front (Cohen 2001:85), and, on one occasion in 1987, to defend a Nazi 
facing trial by equating his crimes to those of the colonial French (Silverman 2013:18). 
The Holocaust was equally a common trope by which journalists, politicians, activists, 
and citizens alike framed conflict and genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and 
in Rwanda in 1994 (Alexander 2009:53; Assmann 2010:111; Flanzbaum 1999a:97; 
Levy and Sznaider 2002:98-99; Huyssen 2003:13, 23, 73; Stratton 2000:241). Whilst 
the Holocaust has frequently been deployed by Israeli politicians and journalists, for 
instance in the claims of right-wingers that Israel faces a ‘second Holocaust’ at the 
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 Dan Diners has characterised memory of the Holocaust as the unwritten constitution of Germany 
(cited in Giesen 2009:117). 
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hands of its Arab neighbours (Moses 2011:96; Rothberg 2011:535), it has also been 
turned against the Israeli state, both by Palestinians and their supporters who compare 
the Palestinians to Jewish Holocaust victims and the Israeli authorities to Nazis 
(Alexander 2009:49; Levy and Sznaider 2006:24; Rothberg 2011:532), and by Jewish 
settlers in the Occupied Territories protesting against a lack of governmental support or 
efforts to dismantle illegal settlements (Katz and Katz 2009:164; Rothberg 2011:535). 
Holocaust memory has also been invoked in discussions about nuclear weapons 
(Alexander 2009:52-53; Minear 1995:354-357; Petrie 2000:52), political violence in 
South America (Huyssen 2003:99; Jelin 2010:74; Molden 2010:80), abortion, women’s 
rights, and gay rights (Assmann 2010:111; Rosenfeld 1995:n.p.; Stein 1998:523-533), 
race relations in the United States (Flanzbaum 1999b:96-97), Japanese atrocity in China 
during the Second World War (Levy and Sznaider 2006:5), post-war German expellees 
from Eastern Europe (Confino 2005:54-55), the Turkish minority in Germany (Huyssen 
2011:622), the Great Famine in Ireland (Owen 2014:365-366), universal human rights 
(Alexander 2009:56; Levy and Sznaider 2004; Levy and Sznaider 2006:5), neoliberal 
capitalism (Saxton 2010:209), and environmental disaster (Rosenfeld 1995:n.p.). 
 
The ‘Americanisation’ and ‘globalisation’ of Holocaust discourse have had both their 
critics and their defenders. On the one hand, some scholars have deplored the 
metaphorical application of Holocaust memory to other contexts, arguing that it 
relativised or diluted the suffering of Holocaust victims (see examples in Petrie 
2000:50; Rosenfeld 1999:34). Others have interpreted such appropriation as 
intrinsically uncritical and self-involved. Alvin Rosenfeld, for instance, wrote 
scathingly that the tendency for Holocaust memory to be ‘dragged emblematically into 
contemporary American debates’ was symptomatic of ‘an age marked by narcissistic 
indulgences of a relentless sort’, and argued that it was impossible for representations of 
Nazi crimes to simultaneously ‘remain faithful to the specific features of those events 
and at the same time address contemporary American social and political agendas in all 
their multiplicity’ (1995:n.p.). James Young, in his discussion of the Holocaust 
Memorial Museum in Washington DC, similarly lamented that American 
commemoration of the Holocaust had become a kind of ‘national self-congratulatory 
spectacle’, acting to ‘reinforce America’s self-idealization as haven of the world’s 
oppressed’, and even constituting ‘a substitute for real action against contemporary 
genocide’ (1999:73, 82). At the same time, scholars have pointed to the possibility that 
Holocaust memory might act as a screen memory obscuring other histories of violence 
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and genocide (Craps and Rothberg 2011:518; Hansen 1996:311; Huyssen 2003:14, 16, 
99). Accordingly, for instance, it has been suggested that the status of the Holocaust in 
America as ‘the benchmark of oppression and atrocity’ (Novick 1999:14) has initiated 
an ‘implicit competition’ (Young 1999:81) or ‘struggle for precedence’ (Assmann 
2007:20) between different persecuted communities within American society, and 
therefore risks not only trivialising other atrocities, but also facilitating or encouraging 
the evasion of responsibility for American crimes against, for instance, African 
Americans and Native Americans (see also Stannard 1992). 
 
Yet scholars have also drawn attention to the ways in which Holocaust memory might 
facilitate and contribute to the articulation of other, lesser-known atrocities, operating, 
in Huyssen’s words, ‘like a motor energizing the discourses of memory elsewhere’ 
(2003:99; see also Craps and Rothberg 2011:518; House 2010:24, 31; Landsberg 
2004:115; Levy and Sznaider 2006:5; Rothberg 2009a:6, 9, 196; Rothberg 2011:523-
524). Gavriel Rosenfeld, for example, responding to David Stannard’s (1992) allegation 
that American indifference towards the plight of the Native Americans was a result of 
American preoccupation with the Holocaust, observed that American awareness about 
the genocide of the Native Americans ‘was hardly more widespread before the 
Holocaust’, and that in fact ‘a growing sense of shame for this dishonourable legacy, 
and horror of genocide in general, has been advanced, not inhibited, by our growing 
attention and sensitivity to the Nazi slaughter of European Jewry’ (Rosenfeld 1999:44). 
Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, similarly, answered critics of Schindler’s List (on 
whom, see Hansen 1996) by arguing that as a result of the film ‘a large public was 
increasingly sensitised to the evils of genocide and the moral responsibility not to stand 
by and witness the murder of innocent civilians’ (Levy and Sznaider 2002:98). Indeed, 
for Levy, Sznaider, and fellow sociologist Jeffrey Alexander (to whom I turn next), it 
was the universal or general moral implications of the globalisation of Holocaust 
memory that were in particular worthy of scholarly attention. 
 
In an influential essay first published in 2002, Alexander attempted to trace the 
historical evolution of Holocaust memory from the occurrence of the genocide to the 
contemporary era, focusing particularly on Holocaust commemoration in the United 
States. He argued that in the aftermath of the Second World War the Nazi atrocities, 
whilst ‘clearly perceived as dreadful’ for the victims, were generally understood within 
the wider framework of an especially brutal conflict, and within a triumphant narrative 
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of American victory over Nazi evil, and were not singled out for special attention by the 
American public (Alexander 2009:3, 19-20). This changed, however, in the mid-1960s 
and 1970s. Under the influence of literary and media representations, the televised 
Eichmann trial, and the consolidation of the label ‘the Holocaust’, the Nazi genocide of 
the Jews came to be seen not simply as typifying Nazi atrocity, but rather as 
representing evil generally (Alexander 2009:28, 30-31, 38-43). What was ‘once 
experienced as traumatic only by Jewish victims’ became a ‘trauma for all humankind’, 
and individuals and groups began to invoke the Holocaust in order to ‘measure the evil 
of a non-Holocaust event’ or to ‘parse ongoing events as good and evil’ (Alexander 
2009:31, 36, 50, 59). In this way, according to Alexander, the Holocaust became ‘free-
floating rather than situated’, creating a ‘universalized symbol whose very existence has 
created historically unprecedented opportunities for ethnic, racial, and religious justice’ 
(2009:3). 
 
In their analysis of the trajectories of Holocaust remembrance in the United States, 
Israel, and Germany, Levy and Sznaider similarly argued that the Holocaust was on its 
way to becoming a ‘cosmopolitan memory’ (2006:4). They rejected the common 
assumption that ‘memories, community, and geographical proximity belong together’, 
and derided the suggestion that nations are the sole or principal repository of memory as 
a ‘breathtakingly unhistorical assertion’ (Levy and Sznaider 2002:89; Levy and 
Sznaider 2006:2). They claimed that in an increasingly globalised world the ‘container 
of the nation-state […] is in the process of slowly being cracked’, and that accordingly 
the Holocaust ‘has been dislocated from space and time, resulting in its inscription into 
other acts of injustice and other traumatic national memories across the globe’ (Levy 
and Sznaider 2006:2, 5). Like Alexander, Levy and Sznaider placed emphasis upon the 
generalised moral potential of this dislocated Holocaust memory, arguing that it 
‘harbours the possibility of transcending ethnic and national boundaries’ and of 
becoming ‘the cultural foundation for global human-rights politics’ (Levy and Sznaider 
2006:4). They boldly proclaimed, for example, that ‘[i]t does not take a huge leap to go 
from identifying with Schindler to taking the ensuing role of liberating Kosovo’ (Levy 
and Sznaider 2006:141). They also made it clear, however, that they were not 
envisaging a universal memory that would hold the same meaning in every local context 
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(Levy and Sznaider 2006:8),
104
 and, to a greater extent than Alexander, stressed that 
global Holocaust memory must be ‘reconciled with old national narratives’ such that 
‘the result is always distinctive’ (Levy and Sznaider 2006:3). 
 
Notions of the Holocaust’s universality or cosmopolitan moral potential have been 
widely critiqued. Several scholars have expressed wariness at the notion that Holocaust 
memory has become dislocated or free-floating, objecting, in Huyssen’s terms, that 
‘discourses of lived memory will remain tied primarily to specific communities and 
territories’ (2011:616; see also Assmann 2010:108; Assmann and Conrad 2010:8; Katz 
and Katz 2009:157; Manne 2009:144).
105
 Equally, many commentators have questioned 
the predominantly optimistic accounts offered by Alexander, Levy, and Sznaider by 
drawing attention to contrary examples in which the circulation of Holocaust memory 
promotes antagonism rather than solidarity, as in the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict 
where it ‘locks Palestinians and Israelis in a fatal embrace’ (Moses 2011:103; see also 
Assmann 2010:107, 114; Erll 2011b:15; Jay 2009:108; Manne 2009:142; Rothberg 
2009a:263-265).
106
 As Robert Manne put it, ‘Israel is a society divided between a 
minority for whom the lesson of the Holocaust is the same as Alexander’s – “It will 
never happen again” – and the majority for whom the lesson is, rather, “It will never 
happen to us again”’ (Manne 2009:142). Critics have also pointed to the Eurocentric or 
Western-centric assumptions underpinning universality theories, in the sense that 
‘because they are generally better remembered, the atrocities of Europe are perceived as 
morally more significant than atrocities elsewhere’ (Craps and Rothberg 2011:518; see 
also Assmann 2010:108; Assmann and Conrad 2010:8).  
 
Indeed, a number of writers have emphasised that the Holocaust and Holocaust 
discourse should not be studied in isolation, but rather should be considered as part of a 
broader matrix of racial nation-building and genocide (Huyssen 2011:622; Moses 
                                                 
104
 For instance, during the conflict in Kosovo, the slogan ‘never again Auschwitz’ provided a frame of 
reference for radically different and opposed stances within German society, deployed by local actors to 
call both for German intervention and German non-intervention (Levy and Sznaider 2002:99). 
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 For Assmann, memory of the Holocaust is rooted in the cultural context of the West, which 
‘corroborates Halbwachs’ view that collective memory is by definition particular and limited, because it 
is based on experience and cannot be stretched beyond certain bounds to become all-inclusive’ 
(2010:108). 
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 A. Dirk Moses stridently wrote that, ‘[i]nstead of tending only in a liberal direction of transcultural 
understanding’, Holocaust memory in the Israel-Palestine conflict typically ‘contributes towards 
terroristic political action in the form of pre-emptive strikes and anticipatory self-defence to forestall 
feared destruction’ (2011:91). So, for instance, right-wing Israeli rhetoric that Israel faces a ‘second 
Holocaust’ at the hands of Iran carries the ‘obvious danger’ that ‘no limits can be set on action to prevent 
such a catastrophe from happening again’ (Moses 2011:96). 
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2002:18, 28, 33-36; Stone 2004:128-135). Literary scholar Michael Rothberg has 
recently made an influential contribution to this thesis, by exploring the construction 
and evolution of Holocaust memory in the context of decolonisation. Rothberg took as 
his starting point a claim made by African-American activist Khalid Muhammad that 
American commemoration of the Holocaust displaces and steals commemorative space 
from an atrocity much closer to home, namely the ‘black holocaust’ of slavery 
(2009a:1-2). He identified this position as symptomatic of the prevalent model for 
understanding the operation of memory in society, what he called ‘competitive 
memory’. According to his analysis, it has long been taken for granted that in advancing 
one’s own identity and memory, it is necessary to exclude others and suppress their 
memories (Rothberg 2009a:3-5). It is, therefore, typically assumed that particular 
memories attached to particular groups are locked in a ‘zero-sum struggle’, competing 
over ‘scarce’ mnemonic space in a contest with clear ‘winners and losers’ (Rothberg 
2009a:3). From the perspective of competitive memory, memories of the Holocaust and 
other traumas ‘crowd each other out’: either ‘too much emphasis on the Holocaust is 
said to marginalize other traumas’ or ‘adoption of Holocaust rhetoric to speak of those 
traumas is said to relativize or even deny the Holocaust’s uniqueness’ (Rothberg 
2011:523). 
 
Against this competitive model, Rothberg argued for a ‘multidirectional’ understanding 
of memory. He rejected the notion that memory is ‘ethnic property’ (Rothberg and 
Yildiz 2011:36) and challenged ‘the taken-for-granted link between collective memory 
and group identity’ (Rothberg 2011:524).
107
 According to Rothberg, memories are no 
more the exclusive property of particular groups than those groups are the unwitting 
drones of those memories: ‘memories are not owned by groups – nor are groups 
“owned” by memories’ (2009a:5). On the contrary, the borders of memory and identity 
are ‘jagged’, and different memories interact within a ‘malleable discursive space’ 
where they do not simply compete but are ‘subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-
referencing, and borrowing’, which can take place even across antagonistic social 
boundaries (Rothberg 2009a:3, 5). Memory is thus ‘productive’ not ‘privative’ 
(Rothberg 2006:307): rather than competitively blocking one another from view, 
interacting memories of, for instance, the Holocaust, slavery, and decolonisation have 
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 Rothberg criticised, for instance, ‘the taken-for-granted link […] that seems to bind, for example, 
Jewish memory and Jewish identity and to differentiate them clearly from African American memory and 
African American identity’ (2011:524). 
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contributed to each other’s articulation (Rothberg 2009a:6). In common with Alexander, 
Levy, and Sznaider, Rothberg was at pains to emphasise the progressive moral potential 
of multidirectional memory. Although he conceded that memory’s multidirectionality 
might function ‘in the interests of violence or exclusion’ (Rothberg 2009a:12), he 
repeatedly stressed that, ‘solidarity […] is a frequent – if not guaranteed – outcome of 
the remembrance of suffering’ (Rothberg 2010:11), and that multidirectional memory’s 
‘productive, intercultural dynamic’ has the potential to create ‘new forms of solidarity’ 
(Rothberg 2009a:5). 
 
Rothberg distinguished his approach, however, by indicating that memory is not a ‘one-
way street’ (2009a:6). He took these earlier scholars to task for ‘overlooking Holocaust 
memory’s dialogic interactions’ with other histories, and argued that the concept of the 
Holocaust’s particularity and universality was in the first place produced by the ways in 
which it was evoked in emerging discourses surrounding slavery and decolonisation 
(Rothberg 2009a:118-119, 265). In this sense, for Rothberg, the Holocaust was not a 
‘floating, universal signifier’, but rather ‘part of a multidirectional network of diverse 
histories of extreme violence, torture, and racist policy’ (2009a:244). At the same time, 
Rothberg disassociated memory’s spatial mobility from the narrow association with 
globalisation and mass media implied by Alexander and, particularly, Levy and 
Sznaider. He wrote that whilst ‘there can be no doubt that the dynamic of 
decolonization, transnational capital, and globalized media in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries have accelerated the flow of materials of memory across borders of all 
kinds’ (Rothberg 2010:9), memory is nonetheless ‘structurally multidirectional’, and the 
intersection of diverse histories in both individual and collective remembrance is 
timeless and inescapable (Rothberg 2009a:35, 313). Rothberg thus introduced a critical 
intervention to the literature by challenging the tendency to study Holocaust memory 
‘solely from the perspective of supposedly autonomous changes in the Holocaust’s 
meanings’ (2009a:265), and by uncoupling transcultural memory from the 




As Erll has remarked, ‘research on mediated memory can boast a comparatively long 
record of thinking about how media disseminate versions of the past across time, space, 
and mnemonic communities’ (2011b:9), even though here, too, the Holocaust has often 
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been the central object of study. Since the early 1990s, Marianne Hirsch has been 
refining a theory of ‘postmemory’ as a means of describing ‘the relationship that the 
“generation after” [the Holocaust] bears to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma 
of those who came before – to experiences they “remember” only by means of the 
stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up’ (2012:5). Although these 
experiences are not, in a literal sense, memories, they were nonetheless ‘transmitted to 
them [i.e. the generation after] so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute 
memories in their own right’ (Hirsch 2012:5, 31). Hirsch distinguished two types of 
postmemory: the vertical ‘familial’ postmemory that is passed generationally from 
parent to child, and the horizontal ‘affiliative’ postmemory that is conveyed 
contemporaneously between unrelated members of the same generation (2012:36). In 
this sense, Hirsch challenged a central tenant of Halbwachs’ theory of collective 
memory, by suggesting that it was possible ‘to reactivate and re-embody more distant 
political and cultural memorial structures’, such that a postmemory might ‘persist even 
after all participants and even their familial descendants are gone’ (2012:33; cf. 
Kansteiner 2014:404). 
 
The notion of an affiliative postmemory that might be taken up by individuals with little 
or no experiential or familial connection with an original event has been pursued by 
Alison Landsberg. Landsberg developed a theory of ‘prosthetic memory’ to refer to the 
phenomenon by which an individual ‘sutures himself or herself into a larger history’ 
through interaction with mass media at ‘an experiential site such as a movie theater or 
museum’ (2004:2). Prosthetic memories are ‘privately felt public memories’ in that they 
‘derive from a person’s mass-mediated experience of a traumatic event of the past’ 
(Landsberg 2004:19). A person acquiring a prosthetic memory, moreover, ‘does not 
simply apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more personal, deeply felt 
memory of past events through which he or she did not live’ (Landsberg 2004:2). 
Directly challenging the relevance of Halbwachs’ model in a global world, Landsberg 
argued that prosthetic memories ‘differ from earlier forms of memory’ insofar as ‘they 
do not emerge as the result of living and being raised in particular social frameworks’ 
(2004:3, 19). For her, under the influence of globalisation and mass media, ‘memories 
have ceased to belong exclusively to a particular group and instead have become part of 
a common public domain’, with the result that people can experience as genuine 
memories ‘that are not naturally – ethnically, racially, or biologically – one’s intended 
inheritance’ (Landsberg 2004:11, 26). Landsberg readily acknowledged that prosthetic 
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memories are ‘commodified’ due to their ‘interchangeability and exchangeability’, but 
also stressed that they ‘are not capsules of meaning that spectators swallow wholesale 
but are the grounds on which social memories are negotiated’, and can have real effects 
on individuals’ subjectivities and actions (2004:20-21). Although she conceded that 
prosthetic memories do ‘not always produce utopian results’, she emphasised that 
because they ‘feel real, they help condition how a person thinks about the world and 




Andrew Hoskins has similarly argued that globalisation, mass media, and digitisation 
have replaced ‘old memory’ with a ‘new memory’ that is increasingly ‘manufactured, 
manipulated and above all, mediated’ (2001:334). In contradistinction to Landsberg, 
however, Hoskins’ focus was not on Holocaust memory, but on the effects on individual 
and collective memory of visual mass media (Hoskins 2001) and, later, mobile and 
Internet communication (Hoskins 2009; Hoskins 2011a; Hoskins 2011b). He theorised a 
‘connective turn’, arguing that ‘contemporary remembering’ is driven by the ways in 
which individuals connect with (and through) a shifting array of digital media, such that 
every act of remembrance in the present emerges from existing media representations 
(Hoskins 2009:94; Hoskins 2011a:271-272, 278; Hoskins 2011b:20-21).
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 For Hoskins, 
the new connective memory is always mediated and, therefore, ‘always already 
“transcultural”’, insofar as it defies the ‘biological, social and cultural divisions and 
distinctions of memory and memory studies’ (2011b:21). Whether this applies only to 
the ‘new mediatized age of memory’ (Hoskins 2009:96), however, or is simply the most 
dramatic incarnation of an older phenomenon, is a matter of debate (Erll 2011c:132; Erll 
and Rigney 2009:7). As Erll has written, ‘there is no such thing as a pure, pre-media 
memory’ (2011c:132), and therefore, with Ann Rigney, ‘no historical document (from 
St Paul’s letters to the live footage of 9/11) and certainly no memorial monument (from 
the Vietnam Veteran’s Wall to the Berlin Holocaust Memorial) is thinkable without 
earlier acts of mediation’ (Erll and Rigney 2009:4). 
 
In this sense, according to Erll, we are ‘dealing not only with a fundamental media-
dependence of remembering’, which may be more or less marked in different historical 
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 In this sense, Landsberg echoed Levy and Sznaider’s argument that ‘there is a fallacy in thinking that 
impersonal representations are somehow fake and not connected to our real emotions and real identities’ 
(Levy and Sznaider 2002:90). 
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 Hoskins in fact referred to Landsberg’s prosthetic memory as a ‘pre-connective turn perspective on 
memory’, meaning that her theory ‘barely touches upon the radical networking and diffusion of memory 
ushered in with the advent of digital technologies’ (Hoskins 2011b:23). 
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periods, ‘but also with the fact that “the medium is the memory” in that it shapes our 
acts of remembering in ways of which we are often not even aware’ (2011c:116). This 
happens in two principal ways: ‘remediation’, or the ways in which ‘“[o]ld” mnemonic 
forms can […] be used to make sense of “new” and different experience’, and 
‘premediation’, or how ‘existent media circulating in a given context provide schemata 
for future experience – its anticipation, representation and remembrance’ (Erll 
2011b:14; Erll 2011c:142). Significantly, these processes of mediation commonly take 
place ‘across the boundaries of time, space, and culture’ (Erll 2009:131). Erll examined, 
for instance, how Indian novels dealing with the 1857 Indian Rebellion extensively 
remediated contemporary British newspaper accounts filled with ‘wild fantasies of rape 
and mutilation’, accounts which were themselves premediated by the literary genre of 
Gothic horror and mediaeval/Renaissance imaginings of hell, i.e. by medial schemata 
with which the British journalists were familiar (2009:114, 121-124). Seen from this 
perspective, memory of a particular moment from the past ‘usually refers not so much 
to what one might cautiously call the “original” or the “actual” events, but instead to a 
palimpsestic structure of existent media representations’ (Erll 2011c:141). Accordingly, 
in Erll’s terms, ‘all lieux de mémoire (and not only those “belonging” to two different 
nations) are “shared sites of memory”: they are shared by different social classes, 
political camps, generations, religious groups and regional cultures […] and not least by 
different media cultures’ (2009:131). 
 
This notion of memory as a palimpsest has more recently been taken up by Max 
Silverman, a scholar of Francophone film and literature. In common with Rothberg, 
Silverman was concerned with exploring the interconnectedness of supposedly distinct 
memories, focusing in particular on the mnemonic relationship between the Holocaust 
and decolonisation. Silverman argued that ‘memory does not function according to the 
linear trajectory of a particular ethno-cultural group and lead inexorably to the 
distinction (and often competition) between different groups’, but rather ‘according to a 
complex process of interconnection, interaction, substitution and displacement of 
memory traces’ (2013:28). Describing memory as ‘palimpsestic’, he called for a 
‘paradigm of hybrid and overlapping rather than separate pasts’, which would not just 
identify the coexistence of, or comparison between, different histories, but would also 
recognise that ‘the historical and physical base of cultural memory is a genuinely 
composite affair’ (Silverman 2013:18, 179). Silverman shared Rothberg’s conviction 
that uncovering the ‘interconnecting traces of different voices, sites and times’ might 
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form the basis for ‘new solidarities across the lines of race and nation’, and, in 
contradistinction to Hoskins and Landsberg, emphasised that memory ‘has always been 
deterritorialized in the sense of being a hybrid rather than pure category’ (Silverman 
2013:8). For Silverman, it is a fallacy to presume that ‘memory loses its attachment to a 
particular identity [only] once it moves into the global sphere’ (2011:627), an 
assumption that rests on the ‘singularity, autonomy, specificity and authenticity of the 
memory in the first place’ (2013:176). 
 
Everyday multidirectional memory 
 
To summarise, just as explorations of the transcultural circulation of Holocaust memory 
have helped to undermine the connection between collective memory and group 
identity, by demonstrating the mobility of a legacy previously assumed to ‘belong’ to a 
particular group and in a particular place, studies of mediated memory have destabilised 
the link between direct and indirect experience, and between originality and authenticity 
(Silverman 2013:176). If there is thus a broad consensus amongst the scholars discussed 
here on the flaws of earlier approaches, there are nevertheless several unresolved 
questions emerging from their discussions, which I attempt to address in the following 
chapters. To begin with, is the transcultural circulation of certain memories a 
phenomenon peculiar to a globalised or post-national world? Where Alexander, 
Hoskins, Landsberg, and Levy and Sznaider saw memory as loosed from its traditional 
moorings by the radical upheavals of globalisation, digitisation, and mass media, Erll, 
Rothberg, and Silverman challenged the idea that memory was ever firmly 
‘territorialised’ to begin with, opening up the possibility, to rephrase Rothberg, that 
memory is structurally transcultural (Rothberg 2009a:35). In Erll’s terms: 
 
What current discourses […] tend to overlook […] is that transcultural 
remembering has a long genealogy. It is actually since ancient times that 
contents, forms and technologies of memory have crossed the boundaries of 
time, space, and social groups, and been filled in different local contexts with 
new life and new meaning. The “transcultural” is therefore not only a category 
for studying memory in our current globalizing age […] but a perspective on 
memory that can in principle be chosen with respect to all historical periods […] 
(2011a:4-5). 
 
With this in mind, the common sense distinction between ‘national memory’ and 
‘transcultural memory’ becomes blurred, and our attention is turned once again to the 
‘great internal heterogeneity’ and ‘many fuzzy edges’ of national memories (Erll 
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2010:311-312; Erll 2011b:8; Erll 2011c:65). We are led to the recognition that even 
sites of memory that appear quintessentially national are often in practice transnational 
and transcultural constructions (Sundholm 2011:2), both in that they rely on 
‘repurposing’ older memory materials of diverse spatio-temporal origin (Erll and 
Rigney 2009:5), and insofar as they necessitate imaginative identification with people 
from the (distant) past who inhabited vastly different social and, sometimes, 
geographical worlds. I take these issues up in chapter 5, exploring the travels and 
palimpsestic layering of diverse ‘memory traces’ (Silverman 2013:28) that were 
inherent in expatriate efforts to carve out a place within Greek national memory. 
Moreover, precisely because every act of mnemonic ‘de-territorialization’ requires a 
subsequent process of ‘re-territorialization’, as Levy and Sznaider themselves 
recognised (2006:8), it is always possible, if not probable, that the global circulation of 
memories will ‘reinforce national memory communities that at first appearance they 
seem to supersede’ (Assmann and Conrad 2010:9). This is a strand that I develop in 
chapter 6, by considering instances in which travelling memories sustain rather than 
challenge national myths and essentialist identities. 
 
Chapter 6 also opens up discussion as to whether the dynamics of memory identified in 
the transcultural turn constitute a more ethical and inclusive way of remembering 
violent histories. As we have already seen, proponents of a transcultural approach have 
often placed emphasis upon the productive ethical and moral implications of the 
transcultural sharing of memories of suffering in replacing traditional enmities with 
nation-transcending solidarities. This has led other scholars to caution that ‘not every 
worldwide available object of remembrance will be turned into a cosmopolitan, an 
ethical, or an empathetic memory’ (Erll 2011b:15), and that ‘memory may also nurture 
human rights violations just as human rights is open to political abuse’ (Huyssen 
2011:621). Indeed, as Rothberg has emphasised in a more recent piece of work, 
memory competition must be considered as an aspect of memory’s multidirectionality 
(2011): if memory is indeed structurally multidirectional, then within this paradigm we 
must seek to explain not just instances of transcultural solidarity and understanding, but 
also the construction and perpetuation of hostilities premised upon national or ethnic 
distinctions. Although I do not necessarily share A. Dirk Moses’ assessment that the 
‘inescapable terror of history insists upon the constant instrumentalization of the 
Holocaust’ and therefore invalidates a ‘cosmopolitan’ approach to transcultural memory 
(2011:104) – Moses’ position could be said to represent a worst-case scenario where 
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Levy and Sznaider’s account constitutes a best-case scenario – I nevertheless address an 
imbalance in the literature by more systematically considering instances in which 
memory’s extraterritorial journeys serve to consolidate antagonisms or entrench hatreds, 
even if they simultaneously produce new transnational solidarities. 
 
Another area of debate concerns the specificity, or otherwise, of the Holocaust as a 
memory with transcultural reach. As Aleida Assmann has written, if the Holocaust has 
indeed become a global moral yardstick for measuring atrocity, the question remains as 
to ‘whether this universal norm can only be accessed via the exemplary history of the 
Holocaust or whether other historic traumas can also serve to back these moral 
commitments and values’ (Assmann 2010:113). Levy and Sznaider did not think that 
their model was applicable to other histories of violence, noting, for instance, that the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima by the United States has not become a ‘medium for 
cosmopolitan remembrance’ in the way that they felt the Holocaust had (2006:39). 
Alexander, meanwhile, pre-empting the criticism that his model might be seen as 
Western-centric (see above), suggested that scholars might explore the extent to which 
non-Western communities have developed traumatic memories that ‘reach[] beyond 
issues of national identity and sovereignty to the universalizing, supranational ethical 
imperatives increasingly associated with the “lessons of post-Holocaust morality” in the 
West’ (2009:69). Rothberg’s major contribution to the literature was to challenge such 
unidirectional perspectives, by suggesting that the apparently transcendent status of the 
Holocaust as a symbol of evil and suffering was in fact a symptom of the dialogic 
interactions between Holocaust memory and the memories of other atrocities.
110
 
Nevertheless, Rothberg and others who have confirmed his arguments have often done 
so through reference to Holocaust memory as one of the principal ‘vectors’ of the 
multidirectional memory network (House 2010:37). Although I do consider expatriate 
invocations of Holocaust memory in chapter 6, I focus on the ways in which the Greeks 
of Turkey articulated memories of suffering in dialogue with other traumatic legacies, 
most notably those of the Armenian Genocide and the ongoing Kurdish-Turkish 
conflict. In doing so, I ask whether a model of multidirectional memory developed in 
reference to the Holocaust, slavery, and decolonisation can be sustained when applied to 
other contexts of remembrance. 
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 Indeed, with regards to the American atomic bombing of Japan, Richard Minear has suggested that the 
term ‘holocaust’ came into use to refer to the Nazi genocide and the atomic bombings almost 
simultaneously, in part due to dialogic interactions between the two legacies (Minear 1995:354-357). 
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As well as this tendency to focus, in one way or another, on Holocaust memory, 
scholars of transcultural memory have often relied upon a particular genre of source 
material, namely the formal and rehearsed representations of the past found in academic 
or intellectual texts, literature and film, political discourse, and objectivised 
commemorative culture (monuments, museums, et cetera). As numerous interventions 
into the field of memory studies conducted, in particular, in the late 1990s and early 
2000s emphasised, a shortcoming of a source base such as this for studying memory in 
society is that we must either assume that ‘facts of representation coincide with facts of 
reception’ (Kansteiner 2002:195), or remain ‘satisfied to recount how the past was 
publicly represented’ at the expense of learning ‘how collective memories were 
internalized by individuals’ (Confino 2004:398, 409; see also Confino 1997:1392, 1395; 
Confino 2000:98; Confino and Fritzsche 2002:4; Erll 2011c:27; Erll and Rigney 2009:9; 
Novick 2007:28). In Michael Schudson’s terms: 
 
Memory studies suffer from the drunk-looking-for-his-car-keys-under-the-
lamppost phenomenon: we look for effective public memory at self-conscious 
memory sites not because that is where we will find what we are looking for but 
because that is where the illumination makes looking most convenient 
(Schudson 1997:3). 
 
Consequently, whilst we know a great deal, for instance, about the formal representation 
of the Holocaust by writers, politicians, journalists, and activists, we know 
comparatively little about the extent to which ‘the Holocaust has really entered the life 
world of broader segments of the population and has repercussions in their “everyday 
local experiences”’ (Assmann and Conrad 2010:8).
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 More broadly, we might ask 
when and how the multidirectional dynamic identified by Rothberg makes its presence 
felt in people’s lives, and whether linkages – explicit or otherwise – between different 
historical legacies are a commonplace and unavoidable feature of individual memory or 
simply a rhetorical tool confined to a ‘small but determined group’ (House 2010:37) of 
political activists. In other words, to borrow terms from Barry Schwartz, we are left to 
consider whether distant histories and the memories of others might be ‘invoked 
unwittingly rather than deliberately, solemnly rather than cynically, broadly rather than 
narrowly’ (2000:20; on the comparatively unconscious aspects of remembrance, see 
also Confino 1997:1395; Confino 2004:412; Erll 2011c:116, 174; Schudson 1997:13; 
Sutton 2008:85, 102).  
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Writing in 1997 to criticise the prevalence of what he saw as restrictively political 
understandings of memory’s operation in society, Confino urged scholars to broaden 
‘the field from the political to the social and the experiential, to an everyday history of 
memory’ (1997:1402).
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 The everyday, in this sense, does not refer narrowly to the 
mundane activities and discourses of daily life, but more broadly to the ‘anarchic 
quality’ of remembrance that ‘locates memory not only in monuments and museums but 
also in the ways people make it part of behaviour and of a mental world’ (Confino 
2004:412). In a similar vein, I suggest that we require an everyday history of 
multidirectional memory, which would explore ‘what people actually “do”’ (Confino 
and Fritzsche 2002:5) with the memories of other times, places, and people, and how 
these ‘made a difference in people’s lives’ and were ‘enacted on the local and private 
level’ (Confino 1997:1394).
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 In chapter 6, I embark upon this path, by considering, 
firstly, the ways in which transcultural memory is deployed ‘by specific people with 
specific agendas’ (Erll 2011b:15), and, secondly, the extent to which it is a feature of 
informal local experience and personal testimony as well as formal political discourse. 
By paying attention to this ‘localizing aspect’ of travelling memory (Erll 2011b:15) – 
the ‘locatedness’ rather than the hitherto emphasised ‘non-location’ of transcultural 
memory (Radstone 2011:111) – I aim to explore how individuals internalise the extra-
territorial flows of memory, and thereby to further my discussion about what the past 
actually means to people in the present. 
  
                                                 
112
 The ‘politics of memory’ approach criticised by Confino (see also Schwartz 2000) tended to focus on 
the centrality of power and competition in the construction of public memory, and often maintained a 
juxtaposition between a manipulative and selective official memory and a benign and truthful vernacular 
memory (Confino 1997:1401; see, for instance, Bodnar 1994; Popular Memory Group 1982; Thomson 
1990). 
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‘The Third Fall’ 
Commemorating the Septemvrianá 
 
In his foreword to Dimitris Kaloumenos’ The Crucifixion of Christianity, a 
photographic account of the 1955 Istanbul Riots, the Istanbul-born Greek sociologist 
Neoklis Sarris wrote: 
 
The real Fall of Constantinople, in the sense of the irreparable destruction of its 
culture and civilisation and its replacement with another city, inhospitable 
Istanbul […] took place not on 29 May, 1453 but on the night of 6 September, 
1955 (Sarris 2001:15-16). 
 
In this chapter, I explore how expatriate writers and activists created such linkages 
between temporally disparate moments from the past, relating their local experiences to 
pivotal events and archetypes from Greek national history. In particular, I focus on how 
and why the expatriated Greeks of Istanbul commemorated two specific historical 
events: the 1955 Septemvrianá and the 1453 Fall of Constantinople. In discourse 
surrounding the 1955 anniversary, the two episodes typically became palimpsestically 
linked (Silverman 2013), such that the events of 1955 came to be seen as a reliving or 
continuation of those of 1453. In commemorative narratives marking the anniversary of 
the Fall of Constantinople, meanwhile, the 1821 Greek revolution was commonly 
superimposed over the last stand of the Byzantines against the Ottomans, so that 
contemporary Greek freedom was portrayed as dependent upon the sacrifices of the 
Greeks of Constantinople in 1453. By considering such ‘knotted intersections’ 
(Silverman 2013:8) in expatriate efforts to write themselves into Greek national history, 
I aim to demonstrate memory’s multidirectionality (Rothberg 2009a) within as well as 
without national borders and ethnic boundaries. 
 
‘The 300 who stayed to guard Thermopylae’: thinking analogically 
 
During his fieldwork on the Greek island Kalymnos, Sutton noticed that it was 
commonplace for people to understand contemporary everyday experiences through 
‘analogic thinking’, i.e. through both horizontal references to current political situations 
and vertical references ‘appropriated from the length of Greek history’ (1998:127). For 
the islanders, Sutton wrote, ‘no event stands on its own, but must always be understood 
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in the wider context of similar events drawn from other times and other places’ 
(1998:127). In their efforts to represent the persecution and displacement of the Greeks 
of Turkey, native Greek and expatriate writers alike typically shared this impulse to 
explain contemporary experience through analogic reference to history. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Septemvrianá, for example, renowned Greek author and 
Asia Minor refugee Ilias Venezis, writing in the Greek periodical Néa Estía, 
characterised the riots by making comparisons to the flight of Greek refugees from 
Turkey following the Greek defeat in Asia Minor in 1922: 
 
The unbelievable barbarities of the mob from the other side of the Aegean 
against Hellenism and Christendom awakens in everyone here in the nation a 
fearful memory. Greece remembers again the days of 1922 – the days of flames, 
and wild cries, and blood, and hunted flocks, uprooted people, women and 
children and the elderly […] 
The days of September of 1955 take us back to the days of 1922. We see now 
that we were wrong to say that from one moment to another the wild beast might 
become human. No, it is apparent that this cannot be (Venezis 1955). 
 
On its front page, the Greek newspaper Emprós similarly broke the news of the Istanbul 
Riots by juxtaposing an image of the hanging of Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory V in 
Istanbul in 1821 for his failure to quash the Greek revolution with an artist’s depiction 
of the arson of churches in Istanbul in 1955, under the headline ‘History Repeats Itself’ 
(Emprós 10 September 1955). The newspaper Makedonía, meanwhile, compared the 
rioting to the Ottoman conquest of the city in 1453, writing that: 
 
The clamouring of the frenzied crowd, the insults directed at the infidels, the 
threats of their slaughter, the sounds of shop windows being smashed and 
shutters being broken, the wailing of those that had been ruined, the futile cries 
for help of women and children gave the characterisation of a second “Fall” 
(Makedonía 14 September 1955; quoted in Kaloumenos 2001:230). 
 
In 1993, Greek newspaper Apogevmatiní likewise marked the anniversary of the 
Septemvrianá with an article entitled ‘Constantinople Has Fallen’, likening 1955 to 
1453 and writing that Hellenism had once again come ‘face-to-face with the barbarians’ 
(Apogevmatiní 6 September 1993). As for the Greeks of Imbros, nationalist rhetoric has 
often likened the few hundred islanders who remained on Imbros to the 300 Spartan 
warriors of Leonidas who made a last stand against the Persians at Thermopylae in 480 
BC (Tsimouris 2001:8), reflecting a broader tendency in post-1821 Greek nationalism 
to associate the Persians and the Turks as the Asiatic others of Hellenism (Van Steen 
2010:90; see also chapter 6). 
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There was, as we have seen in earlier chapters, something of a disjuncture between this 
inclusive nationalist rhetoric that made the plight of the Greeks of Turkey a national 
concern, and the experiences of marginalisation recalled by many expatriates upon their 
arrival in Greece. As Babül observed, to take the example of the Imvriótes-Spartans 
analogy, whilst those Greeks who remained on Imbros were characterised as the ‘300 
Spartans’ and as evidence of the Hellenic character of the island, members of the same 
community who sought refuge in Greece were commonly perceived as not being 
Hellenic enough (2006a:55). We might accordingly have expected the expatriate 
community to eschew such nationalist rhetoric in their own discourse, and this was 
indeed sometimes the case. In 1974, for example, the newspaper Imvriakí Ichó wrote 
disparagingly of rhetoric likening the elderly residents of Imbros to the Spartans at 
Thermopylae, condemning the recently departed Greek military junta who ‘did not give 
us any importance, they sacrificed us saying: “stay in your land to guard Thermopylae. 
Stay as slaves, in the national interest”’ (Imvriakí Ichó July-August 1974a). It is hardly 
surprising, however, that the expatriates have often found such narrative frameworks to 
be compelling, ‘link[ing] their own fate to that of the wider Greek nation’ (Tsimouris 
2001:8) in the hope of attaining support and empathy from the Greek state and 
populace, and to endow their struggles with broader meaning and intelligibility. In 
1991, for instance, Imbriot Society president Christos Christoforidis, in a message 
published in Ίmvros after the election of a new committee, extended his greetings to, 
 
the Few, who in difficult times, the most difficult in our History […] remained 
There. There, so that the church bell does not cease to chime in the village, so 
that the last candle does not go out […] Those 300, like those then, “obedient to 
their laws”
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 guarding Thermopylae (Ίmvros January-April 1991). 
 
In this extract, two histories separated by millennia were blended into a single moment, 
thereby transforming the elderly community of Imbros into heroic defenders of the 
nation. In the process, Imbros – geographically and politically marginal to the modern 
Greek state – was redeemed as the national first line of defence, the frontline in an 
ongoing struggle between ‘Greeks’ and ‘Turks’. This was reflective of a wider trend in 
Imbriot discourse: as Christoforidis insisted in an interview with Greek television in 
1991 on the occasion of the 28 October Greek national holiday, ‘[t]he borders of 
Hellenism are in Imbros, are in Fener [in Istanbul], are in Kyrenia [Republic of Cyprus], 
are in Karpasia [Northern Cyprus]’ (Ίmvros October 1991). By thus expanding the 
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borders of Hellenism from those of the contemporary Greek state to ones that 
encompassed their own patrídes, expatriate activists called the bluff of Greek 
ideologues who evoked them by name from afar but failed to support and embrace them 
in practice, and in this way situated their own local history within the broader narrative 
of Greek national history. 
 
Though such palimpsestic images served largely to incorporate the Imvriótes into the 
national community, they could nevertheless simultaneously be used to critique the 
actions of the Greek state. In an editorial written in 1993 to coincide with the 70
th
 
anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, Christoforidis attacked ‘Greek 
diplomatic timidity and inaction’ on the issue of Imbros by once again comparing those 
remaining on the island to the 300 Spartans. He wrote: 
 
For 70 years now the Imvriótes, left to our fate, fight an unequal struggle with a 
very powerful but also barbarous state. 
For 70 years we resist and we are not defeated. 
As then, so now, 300 remain to prevent the barbarous Asian from passing the 
“opposing shore”. 
300 remain to defend the holy and the sacred, our altars and our lands. 
300 remain to defend the honour and the worth of the Nation (Ίmvros July-
August 1993). 
 
In this sense, the appeal of the national past as a discursive framework for orientating 
more contemporary experience lay not only in its inclusive and identity-affirming 
capacity, but also in its subversive or insubordinate potential (Herzfeld 1997:169). 
Reaching across time and space to cast themselves in the likeness of Leonidas’ 
Spartans, the Imvriótes resisted their marginalisation in Greek diplomacy by turning 
Greek nationalist mythology on the Greek state, implying that the latter had fallen from 
a state of grace to which the former still aspired. 
 
In common with Sutton’s Kalymnians, the Imvriótes had recourse not only to 
archetypes from the distant past, but also to contemporary and unfolding political 
events. Greek media reports of atrocities committed during the Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus in 1974, for instance, triggered a series of pessimistic comparisons between 
Imbros and Cyprus in the newspaper of the Imbriot Society. In the first issue published 
after the beginning of hostilities on Cyprus, the newspaper printed an article under the 
heading ‘Cyprus and Imbros’ extensively paralleling the experiences of the two 
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communities (Imvriakí Ichó July-August 1974a), and in a separate article in the same 
issue expressed a fear that similar violence was imminent on Imbros: 
 
We have ceased talking about schools, buildings and properties. We are gripped 
by the fear that maybe one evening they will slaughter everyone. Can anyone 
rule that out after what we have heard and seen committed on Cyprus? (Imvriakí 
Ichó July-August 1974b). 
 
Just as a legend of Spartan resistance to the Persians was remediated or ‘repurposed’ by 
Imbriot writers in their efforts to represent Imbros’ dwindling Greek community, so the 
unfolding conflict on Cyprus operated as a premediater through which they anticipated 
the future fate of their own community (Erll 2011c:142; Erll and Rigney 2009:5). In the 
years following 1974, Imbriot writers continued to represent the expatriation of the 
Imvriótes in terms of the conflict on Cyprus: in 1977, Ίmvros marked the anniversary of 
the division of Cyprus by writing that ‘[w]e live and feel the drama of the Cypriots, 
because Attila
115
 passed by our islands first’ (Ίmvros June-July 1977), and a year later 
again drew comparisons not only between Turkish actions on the two islands, but also a 
perceived inaction on the part of the Greek state in both cases (Ίmvros June-July 1978). 
My interviewees sometimes had recourse to similar analogies in their oral testimonies: 
Istanbul-born Imvriótis Loukas, for example, said of his childhood visits to Imbros that, 
‘we grew up going in the summers to an occupied Cyprus, in practice; because when 
you talk sometimes with Cypriots, those from the occupied part, you understand that it 
was the same thing, our experiences were the same’ (08/05/2013). 
 
I develop similar observations below by discussing the commemoration of the 
Septemvrianá and the Fall of Constantinople by the expatriated Greeks of Istanbul. I 
focus in particular on the anniversary events orchestrated by the Constantinopolitan 
Society, and commemorative articles printed in the newspaper O Polítis, both of which 
have typically relied heavily on interpretations based on a perceived pattern governing 
Greek-Turkish relationships across the ages. At the end of the chapter, I consider the 
anniversary events that have been more recently organised by the Federation of 
Constantinopolitans, which have tended to disassociate the community’s experiences 
from the longue durée of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, and instead to locate them 
within the context of Turkish domestic policy and international human rights 
legislation. 
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 Turkish military action on Cyprus in 1974 was codenamed ‘Operation Attila’.  
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Commemorating the 1955 Istanbul Riots 
 
The Constantinopolitan Society was founded in Athens in 1928 by Greek refugees 
displaced from Istanbul and its environs in the wake of the Greek-Turkish war (see 
chapter 2). Since 1978, by which time post-1923 expatriates had risen to prominence 
within the organisation’s administrative structure, the Society has organised an annual 
and public memorial day to mark the anniversary of the Istanbul Riots (Isaakidis 2014). 
The precise content has varied year by year, but the central theme of bearing witness in 
order to preserve and disseminate memory of past persecution has been consistent, and 
the events have formed part of a broader effort to raise awareness of the experiences of 
the Greeks and Turkey both domestically and abroad (O Polítis March 1998). The 
memorial day has generally centred around a photographic exhibition presenting images 
of the riots – seen by the organisers as essential in confirming the veracity of their 
claims – and a speech by an invited speaker relating to the Septemvrianá or to the 
history of the Greek community in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relationships more 
broadly (Isaakidis 2014). Other features incorporated into the event over the years have 
included a religious memorial for the victims of the rioting, roundtable discussions and 
panels of witness testimonies, readings from novels and academic studies dealing with 
the events, and audiovisual presentations and documentary film screenings. The Society 
has made a special effort to reach a wider audience amongst the Greek public, 
particularly on round-number anniversaries, which have commonly been marked by a 
series of commemorative endeavours. On the 40
th
 anniversary of the Septemvrianá, for 
instance, a full programme of activities was prepared, including radio and television 
broadcasts and two photographic exhibitions hosted in the War Museum and the 
Cultural Centre of the City of Athens (Constantinopolitan Society 1995a; 
Constantinopolitan Society 1995c; Constantinopolitan Society 1995d). 
 
For the Constantinopolitan Society, these commemorative events serve two primary 
purposes. First and foremost, they are seen as a way to address the perceived ignorance 
amongst the native Greek population about the plight of the Greeks of Istanbul. As the 
former president of the Society Giorgos Isaakidis put it to me in an interview: 
 
The Hellenic state does not deal with its own history. The events [of September 
1955] are part of the history of the Hellenes, and the people [in Greece] did not 
know about them. They did not even know if we in Constantinople were 
Christians, or if we were baptised, or why we spoke Greek. They knew nothing. 
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So our intention, the basic purpose when we started in ’78, was to inform people 
about those events and of the existence of a notable minority in Constantinople 
(Isaakidis 2014). 
 
Secondly, the Society is afraid that the grievances of the Polítes might be forgotten or 
disregarded as part of efforts to promote reconciliation with Turkey, what the president 
of the Society Antonis Lampidis derisively referred to in his introductory speech at the 
2012 commemorative event as the ‘genocide of memory’ undertaken by certain ‘well-
known circles’ within Greece (Lampidis 2012). The Society is concerned that this 
alleged historical amnesia might in turn breed a political complacency regarding the 
perceived threat to Greece posed by its Turkish neighbour, and/or be interpreted by the 
Turkish authorities as a sign of Greek weakness (Constantinopolitan Society 2012a). As 
the Society wrote on the 40
th
 anniversary of the Septemvrianá: 
 
The forgetting of evil is a licence for its repetition and all those who lived 
through the atrocities of the Turks must remind [others] of them, in order to 
prevent similar situations in the future that can now be clearly discerned with 
‘the naked eye’[:] the aggression of Turkey in Cyprus, the Aegean and in 
Western Thrace (Constantinopolitan Society 1995a). 
 
Accordingly, the Society has lobbied the Greek state to designate 6 September as an 
official national memorial day, which, they felt, would ‘constitute the beginning of the 
awakening of Hellenism, in order that the expansive schemes of the Turkish chauvinists 
do not come to pass’ (Constantinopolitan Society 1994b; Constantinopolitan Society 
1995b). 
 
The newspaper O Polítis, particularly in its earlier years, has often pursued a similar line 
to that of the Constantinopolitan Society in the articles it prints to mark the anniversary 
of 1955. In September 1979, for instance, it wrote: 
 
The Septemvrianá is a fearsome moment in the life of Romiosýni [see glossary] 
that must not be forgotten, because it constitutes the continuation of the official 
Turkish policy of annihilation against Hellenism[,] that has no end and that may 
be manifested elsewhere, if Hellenism does not stay alert and united. We see the 




 anniversary of the Istanbul Riots, meanwhile, against the backdrop of 
significant Greek-Turkish bilateral talks, O Polítis wondered, ‘if the committees that are 
meeting in Ankara and Athens have remembered what happened in those days in 
Constantinople in 1955, in order to appreciate accordingly the weight of responsibility 
that they assume’ (O Polítis October 1988b). In common with the Constantinopolitan 
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Society, O Polítis saw itself as responsible for preserving the memory of past 
persecution, and counteracting ‘the apathy of all of the Hellenes, those in government 
and those not’ towards the unfolding of the events of 1955 (O Polítis October 1990). 
For both organisations, bearing annual witness to the Istanbul Riots, and calling on the 
Greek government to institute a national day of remembrance on 6 September, 
represented an attempt to formally inscribe the Septemvrianá onto the Greek memorial 
landscape. In this way, they hoped to tackle a perceived popular ignorance about, and 
diplomatic indifference towards, the expatriate community, a situation that was seen not 
only as the root cause of the Polítes’ struggles in Greece, but also as a threat to Greece’s 
future security. 
 
Commemorating the 1453 Fall of Constantinople 
 
There is no official national memorial day in Greece to mark the anniversary of the Fall 
of Constantinople, in the way that there is for the beginning of the 1821 revolution (25 
March) or Greek resistance to Axis invasion and occupation during the Second World 
War (Óhi (‘No’) Day, 28 October). Writing in O Polítis in 1987, Kaloumenos lamented 
that the anniversary ‘has been forgotten by the Hellenic state, the press, the church, and 
the people’ (O Polítis June 1987). For some expatriates, this was symptomatic of a 
broader trend – deriving firstly from the desire to gain European support during the 
Greek revolution, and secondly from the need for ideological re-centring after the Greek 
defeat in 1922 put an end to the ‘Great Idea’ of re-establishing the Byzantine Empire – 
to sideline the Eastern Romaic tradition in favour of the Western Hellenic legacy (see 
chapter 3). Seen from this perspective, Greek disregard (on the formal level, at least) for 
the Byzantine past, and ambivalence towards, or lack of awareness of, the contemporary 
Greek community of Istanbul, were two components of a wider problem. This 
interpretation was put forward, for instance, by the president of the Federation of 
Constantinopolitans Nikos Ouzounoglou, who in an interview with me argued that, 
 
when [Greece] was founded in 1830, one of its basic political doctrines was the 
disavowal of Byzantium […] For the Constantinopolitans who remained after 
1923, the difficulty was that [successive Greek leaders], to a greater or lesser 
extent, followed the doctrine that the issue of the minority in Constantinople 
should not upset Greek-Turkish relationships. Even in ’55 and ’64 you see that 
Greece resists very tamely […] Under those conditions, for a long time, the 
question of the Hellenism of Anatolia was suppressed. The Fall was of course a 
long time ago, but the Septemvrianá, back then [i.e. when the expatriates 
arrived], was not well known, and is still not well known. And that is affected by 
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what I said to you before: that the Greek nation-state established after 1830, to a 
significant degree, was founded on the disavowal of Byzantium (Ouzounoglou 
2014a). 
 
It was, to a significant extent, in light of this perception that the Polítes’ struggles were 
a by-product of a broader historical amnesia that the expatriate organisations made 
efforts to mark the anniversary of 1453, hoping in this way to both restore their 
community and Eastern Hellenism generally to national history, and disseminate 
knowledge about their more contemporary experiences of persecution.  
 
As we saw in chapter 3, the Polítes commonly regarded themselves as the heirs to the 
Byzantine legacy. The Constantinopolitan Society is an institutional expression of this 
discourse, presenting itself as the ‘successor to the Byzantine tradition’ charged with 
preserving the memory of a period subordinated to the Classical Hellenic legacy in 
Greek historiography (Lampidis 2014; Isaakidis 2014; quote taken from Lampidis). 
Since 1931, the Society has correspondingly observed the anniversary of the Fall of 
Constantinople on 29 May 1453, when the city was taken by the Ottoman Sultan 
Mehmed the Conqueror, and the last Byzantine emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos 
was killed in battle (Constantinopolitan Society 2008:27). In the 1960s and 1970s, at a 
time when increasing numbers of Polítes were settling in the Greek capital, this 
anniversary memorial (sometimes co-organised with other expatriate organisations) 
consisted of the laying of a single wreath before a statuette of Palaiologos inside the old 
parliament building in central Athens, followed outside by a more extended wreath-
laying ceremony in front of the statue of Greek revolutionary hero Theodoros 
Kolokotronis (Isaakidis 2014). In this guise, the commemoration produced an analogy 
between 1453 and 1821, assimilating the defenders of Constantinople to the liberators 
of the nation, but also in the process subordinating the former to the latter, thereby 
replicating the sidelining of Byzantium in the national narrative.  
 
Several newer and younger members of the Constantinopolitan Society, including 
Isaakidis, accordingly sought to reconfigure the commemorative ceremony after their 
election to the executive committee in the late 1970s. They felt that commemorating 
1453 in front of a monument to a hero from the Greek revolution was not a fitting way 
for the Polítes to honour the memory of the Byzantine Emperor and his compatriots. As 
Isaakidis put it, ‘what do we Constantinopolitans, gathering together to commemorate 
the Fall, have to do with Kolokotronis?’ (Isaakidis 2014). The format of the 
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commemoration was therefore changed after 1978. In its new configuration, the event 
began with a liturgical memorial to the fallen Emperor and his fellow fighters in the 
Metropolitan Cathedral of Athens, on the nearest Sunday to 29 May. This was followed 
by a parade attended by members of the expatriate organisations, to which 
representatives of the Athenian municipalities, the Greek state and church, major 
political parties, and the Greek Armed Forces were invited. The parade culminated in 
the laying of wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier outside the Hellenic 
Parliament in the central Syntagma Square, in honour of the nameless dead who fell in 
the defence of Constantinople, accompanied by a rendition of the Greek national 
anthem (see fig. 1). After the erection of a statue of Palaiologos in the square outside the 
Metropolitan Cathedral (sometime after 1995), the parade was extended to encompass a 
memorial service dedicated to the Emperor, including speeches and an additional wreath 
laying ceremony, again accompanied by the national anthem (see fig. 2). In its 
revamped format, the 1453 commemoration combined elements common to official 
Greek national holidays, such as the ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the 
performance of the national anthem, and the attendance of important political and 
religious dignitaries, with features that emphasised the particularities of the Polítes, like 
the venerated hero Constantine Palaiologos and the flags carried by participants 
emblazoned with the double-headed eagle of Byzantium (see fig. 3). The central 
location in front of the bustling Syntagma Square, meanwhile, immediately made the 
event more conspicuous and striking, attracting the curiosity of both native Greeks and 
foreign tourists. 
 
By publicly observing an anniversary absent from the commemorative calendar of the 
Greek state, in a manner that both emphasised the expatriates’ belonging to the national 
community and the distinctiveness of their own origins, the Constantinopolitan Society 
and its associates aimed to fill a perceived void in Greek collective memory. This comes 
across in the invitations issued by the Constantinopolitan Society to dignitaries that they 
hoped would attend the event, which typically portrayed the memorial ceremony as a 
national duty undertaken by the organisation, and implicitly criticised the forgetfulness 
of the Greek state. Inviting the political party Synaspismós tis Aristerás kai tis Proódou 
(Coalition of the Left and Progress) to send a representative to the 1998 event, for 
instance, the Society wrote that, ‘believing that the past of our Nation must not be 
forgotten, every year we organise the memorial ceremony for the Fall of 




Fig. 1 Leonidas Koumakis, author of The Miracle (see chapter 6), lays a wreath at the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier on the anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople, 2004. Copyright Constantinopolitan 
Society. Reproduced with permission. 





Byzantium and those who fell with him’ (Constantinopolitan Society 1998). In a 1999 
invitation to the Archbishop of Athens, it was similarly declared that: 
 
The historic Constantinopolitan Society, founded in 1928 by the uprooted 
Hellenes of Constantinople, celebrates this year 71 years of presence in Greece 
and of contribution towards the Nation. 
The Societies of the Constantinopolitans, continuing the struggle for the 
preservation of the memory of the Nation, this year, as every year, put into 
practice the ceremony of remembrance for the FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE 
honouring in that way the heroic sacrifice of the final emperor Constantine 
Palaiologos and his fellow heroic fallen (Constantinopolitan Society 1999). 
 
In this manner, the 1453 anniversary was reconfigured in the guise of an official 
national holiday that nevertheless gave emphasis to the particularities of the Greek 
community from Istanbul. After 1978, the 1453 commemoration was thereby subtly 
changed from one that silently subsumed the Polítes into an already established national 
memorial landscape, to one that visibly and publicly carved out a distinctive 
commemorative niche for the expatriates within national memory. 
 
  
Fig. 3 Members of the Constantinopolitan associations, holding flags bearing the double-headed eagle of 
Byzantium, observe the wreath laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, 2004. Copyright 
Constantinopolitan Society. Reproduced with permission. 
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1453 and 1821 
 
In the words of former Constantinopolitan Society president Isaakidis, the primary 
objective of these commemorative events was ‘to show our presence’: to raise their 
public profile in Greece, in other words, and thereby to tackle their marginalisation 
within Greek society and bolster their claims for support from the Greek authorities 
(Isaakidis 2014). They formed part of a broader narrative of persecution commonly 
articulated in speeches and publicity materials relating to the anniversaries of 1453 and 
1955, reflecting the belief that the Septemvrianá was ‘not an isolated accidental 
incident, but part of a series of measures of the Turkish government aimed at the 
annihilation and uprooting of the Hellenism of Constantinople’ (Constantinopolitan 
Society 1995a). Archetypally, a poster distributed across Athens by the 
Constantinopolitan Society in 1979 under the heading ‘The Annihilation of the 
Constantinopolitans’ presented the expatriation of the Polítes as taking place over a 
period of some 500 years, beginning in 1453 with the Fall of Constantinople. Also 
included were the ‘intellectual and economic catastrophe’ that followed Greek defeat in 
Asia Minor in 1922, the Septemvrianá in 1955 – referred to as the ‘prologue to the 
complete extermination’ – the expulsions in 1964 – dubbed the ‘final extermination’ – 
and finally the accusation that in 1979 the Ecumenical Patriarchate was under threat 
(Constantinopolitan Society 1979; see fig. 4).  
 
 
Fig. 4 The Annihilation of the Constantinopolitans (1979), poster produced by the Constantinopolitan 
Society. Screen capture from the footage of the memorial event organised by the Constantinopolitan 
Society for the 560th anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople. Copyright Constantinopolitan Society. 
Reproduced with permission. 
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As I suggested at the outset, expatriate writers commonly linked such ‘local’ 
experiences to seminal moments from the national past, as in the following ‘brief 
historical detour’ offered by O Polítis on the 33
rd
 anniversary of the Septemvrianá 
(substantially abridged): 
 
AN EYE ON HISTORY THAT DOES NOT LIE 
[…] The Fall of Constantinople to the Turks, was, by general admission, a 
historical turning point, [and] not [a] pleasant [one] for our civilisation. 
Nevertheless, Hellenism struggled for more than four centuries to regain its 
freedom and continue its political life […] 
However, the Second World War came along and our “friend” Turkey […] 
destroyed in the most harsh and hostile manner the omogéneia of Constantinople 
and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos and sneakily sought to occupy the 
Dodecanese. [Turkey] raised the issue of the Aegean and then taking advantage 
of the struggle of the Greek Cypriots to shake off the English yoke, put […] its 
foot on martyred Cyprus. 
Another flourishing Hellenism that lived in Pontus, in Asia Minor and in Eastern 
Thrace, was lost thanks to the rapacious disposition of Turkey, and now 
struggles to rescue the ancestral land of Cyprus and the right for the Aegean that 
has constituted, since the Homeric age, the soul of Greece, to remain Hellenic (O 
Polítis September 1988). 
 
Rather than suffering alone as a result of specific decisions taken by particular Turkish 
governments after 1923, the Greeks of Istanbul were through such ‘strife narratives’ 
(Halstead 2014b) drawn into an historically and spatially deep national community of 
Greek victims. From this point of view, marking the anniversaries of 1453 and 1955, 
and assimilating these events to a diachronic clash between Greek civilisation and 
Turkish barbarity, formed part of a general endeavour to demonstrate that the Polítes 
were the victims of a systematic Turkish policy of de-Hellenification in Istanbul. 
 
Following Silverman, however, memory should not be understood simply as a linear 
series of discrete events, but rather as a ‘composite structure’ involving the 
‘superimposition and productive interaction’ of diverse memory traces ‘so that one layer 
of traces can be seen through, and is transformed by, another’ (2013:3-4). Indeed, the 
significance that the expatriate community drew from these historical events did not lie 
solely in their placement in a linear chronological narrative, but also in the ways in 
which they came to be palimpsestically linked, such that more recent memories were 
layered over, and reinterpreted through, moments from the distant past (and vice versa). 
To complement the 1453 commemorative parade, the Constantinopolitan Society 
organises speeches and produces publicity material expanding upon ‘the significance of 
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the Fall and the sacrifice of those who lost their lives’ (Isaakidis 2014). Particular 
emphasis is placed on the last stand of the Emperor Palaiologos and his soldiers on 29 
May 1453,
116
 which was described as follows in a 2004 English-language flyer aimed at 
curious tourists stumbling across the wreath-laying ceremony in Syntagma Square: 
 
The Emperor Constantine Palaeologos fights his enemies bravely. There are 
only dead bodies of his soldiers around him. All the defenders are dead and the 
Emperor is completely by himself. He is badly wounded, full of blood, with torn 
clothes and he cries like Christ on the cross: 
“Constantinople has fallen and I am still alive? Isn’t there any Christian to take 
(cut) my head off?” 
Today, we Constantinopolitans, confer honour to Constantine Palaeologos and 




In such eulogies, it was frequently suggested that the defiant last stand of the Emperor 
against the Ottoman Sultan in 1453 sowed the seeds for Greek revolution against the 
Ottoman Empire in 1821. Speaking at the commemorative ceremony in 2002, for 
example, the vice president of the Constantinopolitan Society Giorgos Gavriilidis 
addressed the following epitaph to the fallen Emperor: 
 
Constantine Palaiologos we call you [the] Marbled [Emperor]
118
 but 
nevertheless immortal for ever, in mind, in soul, in our hopes and our dreams. 
Your heroic death gave courage, patience and fortitude under 400 years of 
slavery for the nation, so that the New Hellenic State would be reborn from its 
ashes (Gavriilidis 2002). 
 
During the ceremony in front of the statue of Palaiologos outside the Metropolitan 
Cathedral in 2013, by which time the event was overseen by the Federation of 
Constantinopolitans (see below), a representative of a Laconian association in Athens
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gave a similar speech in which he first equated Spartan resistance to the Persians in 480 
BC with Byzantine resistance to the Ottomans in 1453, before linking both to 
contemporary Greek freedom. He characterised the Fall as ‘the new Thermopylae where 
the enemy was allowed to pass only over the bodies of its defenders’, and stressed that 
‘if there had been no Leonidas or Palaiologos there would have been no 1821 and the 
freedom struggle that followed, there would have been no “NO” [to the Italians] in 1940 
                                                 
116
 Greek history textbooks dealing with the Fall of Constantinople have likewise placed emphasis on the 
Emperor’s brave defiance and heroic self-sacrifice (Filippidou and Özbaş 2014:31, 34). 
117
 Note the use of direct quotation and the historical present in this extract, characteristics of Greek 
storytelling that ‘dramatize[] events and lend[] immediacy’ (Tannen 1983:365, 368). 
118
 The Emperor’s body could not be found after the battle, giving rise to the legend that he was turned to 
marble by God and secreted near the Golden Gate, to one day arise and take back the city (Herrin 
2008:319; Nicol 2002:101-102). 
119
 Who was in attendance, presumably, because Constantine had been the Despot of Morea at Mystra in 
Laconia before ascending to the throne in Constantinople. 
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The expatriate newspapers typically marked the anniversary in similar terms, tracing 
Greek insurrection against the Ottomans to the example set by Palaiologos on the walls 
of Constantinople in 1453, as illustrated in the following examples from O Polítis: 
 
The sacrifice of the Emperor was not in vain. The precious blood with which he 
watered that holy land sprouted the tree of freedom. Without the sacrifice there 
would have been no Resurrection [1821]. That sacrifice galvanised the souls of 
the Hellenes (O Polítis June 1973). 
 
With his death the Emperor gloriously closed a brilliant and millenary history, 
the history of the Byzantine Empire and opened a new history, the history of 
Neohellenism […] 
The sacrifice of the Emperor was the seed for the resurrection of Hellenism (O 
Polítis May 1983). 
 
There in 1453, at the Gate of St. Romanus the Emperor Constantine, alongside 
other nameless heroes, with his heroic death, stood worthy for the patrída. He 
did not betray history and with his sacrifice cast the seed of the resurrection of 
Hellenism, which was reborn after 368 years with another sacrifice, this time in 
Fener, of the Patriarch Grigoris V (O Polítis May 1984). 
 
The newspaper Palmós, printed in Thessaloniki by the Union of Constantinopolitans of 
Northern Greece, wrote in similarly poetic terms in 1998: 
 
Making a historical retrospection to the horrible day of 29 May we will see the 
shining example of sacrifice on the ramparts of the Queen of cities [i.e. 
Constantinople] by Constantine Palaiologos the last Hellenic emperor. His 
sacrifice became a legend and the legend brought about the rebirth of the nation. 
As a result today we live as free Hellenes (Palmós May-June 1998). 
 
As I noted earlier in the chapter, although narratives of this kind were constructed in 
ostensibly normative forms, drawing heavily on recognisable nationalist rhetoric, they 
could nevertheless be deployed to express dissent from official readings of the past and 
to critique contemporary national diplomacy. In a document issued on the 39
th
 
anniversary of the Istanbul Riots, for instance, the Constantinopolitan Society made the 
following declaration: 
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 Discursive linkages between 480 BC and 1453 AD are fairly commonplace in Greek nationalist 
discourse. Eleni Filippidou and Banu Çulha Özbaş, for instance, observed that Greek history textbooks 
dealing with the Fall of Constantinople likened Palaiologos’ refusal to submit to the Turkish Sultan to the 
response given by Leonidas to the Persians at Thermopylae (2014:31, 34). 
160 
 
This year when we reach 39 years since the painful anniversary of the 
Septemvrianá and 20 years since the invasion of Cyprus, Greece is obliged to 
not forget that there are still brothers of ours in their paternal lands who find 
themselves under the authority of Turkish politics and it [Greece] must follow a 
more dynamic politics. 
As the Constantinopolitan Society we once again this year address the Greek 
state and we exhort her to wake up and take responsibility for her obligations, 
because as a People we are strong and have both the power and the will to 
prevent the day from coming when we would shout alas! GREECE HAS 
FALLEN (Constantinopolitan Society 1994a). 
 
Mimicking the cry – ‘Constantinople has fallen’ – that purportedly rang out on 29 May 
1453 when the walls of the city were breached (Runciman 1965:139), the Society 
suggested that if contemporary Greek diplomats did not follow the example set by 
Palaiologos and his fellow soldiers and take action on the perceived threat from Turkey, 
then ultimately Greece itself might fall to the Turks. In this sense, the Fall of 
Constantinople was transformed into a national morality tale, the defiant last stand of 
the Byzantines in 1453 serving as a critical mirror for a perceived lack of Greek 
diplomatic resistance in response to more recent crises such as that of 1955. 
 
The discourses presented in this section inverted the analogy between 1453 and 1821 
encapsulated in the older commemorative ceremony hosted in front of the statue of 
revolutionary fighter Kolokotronis, which subsumed the Polítes into an existing national 
narrative and silenced their local idiosyncrasy. Rather than basking in the reflected 
glory of the revolutionary heroes of 1821, the expatriate organisations put forward their 
own martyr-hero in the figure of the last Byzantine emperor, whose heroic sacrifice was 
portrayed as the spark that ignited the Greek revolution. The putative ancestors of the 
Polítes were thus portrayed as the prototypical Greek freedom fighters, bestowing upon 
the expatriate community a privileged place within the national narrative. In this way, 
the expatriates were able to outmanoeuvre their domestic detractors by staking a claim 
to Hellenic authenticity derived from the idiosyncrasies of their own local history (see 
also chapter 3), and to critique contemporary Greek diplomacy towards the Greeks of 
Turkey by making unfavourable comparisons with the defiant last stand of their 





1453 and 1955 
 
As we saw at the very beginning of the chapter, just as Byzantine resistance in 1453 
came to be seen as a rehearsal for Greek insurrection in 1821, so the Istanbul Riots were 
frequently portrayed as a reliving of the Fall of Constantinople. In a 1987 article, for 
example, O Polítis wrote: 
 
The Hellenes of Constantinople, those uprooted from their homes during and 
after the wild persecutions of 6/7 September 1955 that they were subjected to by 
the Turks[,] will recall with pain the persecutions in the dark days that they lived 
in their historic birthplace, days that resemble the Fall, when the wild swarm of 
the Conqueror rushed into our Constantinople to loot (O Polítis September 
1987). 
 
More than simply implying, as in the above extract, a strong resemblance between these 
two events, such narratives commonly treated the Septemvrianá in 1955 as constituting 
the continuation or completion of the Fall of Constantinople that had begun in 1453. In 
1978, O Polítis thus declared that, ‘[o]n 29 May 1453 Constantinople was occupied 
politically. On 6 September it was occupied ethnically by the barbarian’ (O Polítis 
August 1978). In an interview with Greek newspaper Ta Néa in 1998, Septemvrianá 
victim Despoina Isaakidou similarly proclaimed that: 
 
For me the Fall of Constantinople happened in ’55. Because after those horrible 
events Romiosýni [i.e., in this case, the Greek population of Turkey] was roused, 
everyone left, [and] the uprooting happened (Ta Néa 12 January 1998). 
 
Shifting the fall of the city from 1453 to 1955 in this manner not only restaged the 
contemporary local experience of the Istanbul Riots in the guise of an infamous event 
from national history, but once again carried an implied criticism of the Greek state. For 
if Constantinople fell not, as commonly supposed, in 1453 (or even in 1922) but in 
1955, it followed that Greece gave the city up as lost prematurely when it might, even 
as late as 1955, have emulated the example of the Byzantines and resisted the Turkish 
‘conquest’. 
 
By the logic of such equations, two events otherwise separated by 500 years and 
numerous differences in historical circumstance were reimagined as components of a 
single event. As Isaakidis of the Constantinopolitan Society put it, explaining the 
rationale behind publicity materials like the 1979 poster discussed above, ‘we [always] 
write, “1453, 1922, 1941, 1942, 1955, 1964”, and that is where the Fall finishes. It 
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happened slowly’ (Isaakidis 2014).
121
 From this perspective, the Istanbul Riots came to 
be reframed in expatriate discourse as the ‘Third Fall of Constantinople’, the final act of 
a drama that was initiated in 1453 and for which the groundwork was prepared during 
the ‘Second Fall’ in 1922. On the 40
th
 anniversary of September 1955, Archbishop 
Iakovos of America – who was born on Imbros in 1911 – accordingly penned an article 
about the Septemvrianá entitled ‘The Third Fall’ in Greek daily newspaper Kathimeriní. 
He wrote that: 
 
Hundreds of shops were looted, whilst shopkeepers and employees were evicted 
and beaten and their merchandise burned to cinders. Churches and schools were 
looted and holy documents and books were given up to the flames and burned. 
So passed the third fall that was followed by the third refugee flight to Greece 
and the unjustifiable invasion of Cyprus and the occupation of two fifths of her 
land […] 
The above lines are a sparing description of that abhorrent night of 1955, which 
in terms of persecution and plunder surpassed the night of St Bartholomew 
(Archbishop Iakovos 1995). 
 
Iakovos here conjured a memory of the Septemvrianá that was, to borrow terms from 
Silverman, ‘contaminated by multiple elsewheres’ (2013:5): the 1453 Fall of 
Constantinople, the 1922 exodus of Greeks from Turkey, the 1974 conflict on Cyprus, 
and even the 1572 St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre (on such transnational cross-
referencing, see chapter 6). 
 
Young has observed that in Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel’s midrashic writings, not 
only did religious texts provide him with a means to interpret his own contemporary 
trauma, but this trauma in turn led him to re-evaluate the ancient texts, such that ‘his 
Holocaust experiences have had as great an effect on the ancient archetypes as the 
archetypes have had on his understanding of new experiences’ (1990:106). In a 
comparable manner, the superimposition of 1453 and 1955 reconfigured the 
significance of both events in expatriate discourse. On the one hand, through its 
interpretation in terms of the Fall of Constantinople, the Septemvrianá ceased to be an 
isolated act of mob violence situated in the narrow context of policies undertaken by the 
then Turkish government or the burgeoning Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, and 
instead became the ‘Third Fall of Constantinople’, the culmination of a sustained 
‘Turkish’ assault on Greek Byzantine civilisation. In this sense, the pre-existing 
                                                 
121
 These dates, in order, refer to the Fall of Constantinople, the ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’, the 
conscription of non-Muslims into forced labour battalions, the wealth tax, the Septemvrianá, and the 
expulsion of Greek citizens from Turkey. 
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paradigm of the Fall of Constantinople premediated memory of the Istanbul Riots, in so 
far as it acted ‘to transform contingent events into meaningful images and narratives’ 
(Erll 2009:114). This made the comparatively less well-known events of 1955 
recognisable and intelligible to a Greek domestic audience, casting the Polítes as 
victims of the barbaric Turkish other, and thereby furnishing the expatriate 
organisations with a resonant language with which to narrate their displacement as a 
national martyrdom. If the archetype of 1453 thus made the Septemvrianá more 
‘marketable’ to an external audience, by the same token it rendered it more ‘thinkable’ 
on an internal level, providing the expatriates with a means to reconfigure raw personal 
experiences that defied simple exegesis into more readily graspable historical patterns 
that gave that experience broader meaning and significance. 
 
On the other hand, seen through the lens of 1955, the distant historical events of 1453 
took on contemporary resonance and relevance, becoming, in Daniel Knight’s terms, 
‘culturally proximate’, insofar as they were evoked not simply as a dispassionate 
comparative framework, but because those concerned felt that they had in some sense 
relived the events of the past (2012:356). In expatriate commemorative ceremonies and 
narratives, personal memories of the Istanbul Riots were transposed onto, or 
superimposed over, the last stand of the city’s defenders in 1453, such that individuals 
might come to speak or even feel as though they have a personal connection to events 
from the distant past. At the Constantinopolitan Society’s 1981 memorial day, Greek 
journalist and invited speaker Giorgos Karagiorgas – who travelled to Istanbul in the 
immediate aftermath of the riots – closed his address by explicitly blurring 1453 and 
1955, steeping his personal narrative in remediated language and imagery derived from 
archetypal representations of the Fall of Constantinople. He proclaimed that: 
 
I have given to the photographs of Kaloumenos,
122
 life as I tasted it in the streets 
of the city, in its alleys, when herds of breathless people ran hastily to avoid the 
slaughter, those hours of the second catastrophe of Hellenism after the Fall. And 
as then, the sun over Constantinople darkened, when the Queen of cities was 
delivered to the hands of the Turks, and I heard in those unspeakable hours a 
voice brought from THEN cry slowly and moan: “sun shudder and earth groan, 
Constantinople has been overcome and the hour of our defence is over …”.
123
 
                                                 
122
 Kaloumenos’ photographs, which were taken in the aftermath of the Septemvrianá and documented 
the damage to Greek property and churches, constitute a significant part of the corpus of material used by 
the Constantinopolitan Society for the photographic exhibitions that are a central feature of their 
commemorative events (the photographs can be found in Kaloumenos 2001). 
123
 I cannot be sure of the precise provenance of the words quoted by Karagiorgas in this extract, but it 
seems probable that he intended to evoke similar words purportedly spoken by one Italian soldier to his 
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The third night of the disaster fell. The dampness of the earth sent its heavy 
burnt scent across Constantinople. The fear of a repetition of the attack kept the 
Hellenes awake during the greater part of the night (Karagiorgas 1981). 
 
From this perspective, expatriate commemoration of the Fall of Constantinople could be 
seen as a type of ‘postmemorial work’, in that it ‘strives to reactivate and re-embody 
more distant political and cultural memorial structures by reinvesting them with 
resonant individual and familial forms’ (Hirsch 2012:33). By identifying 1453 as their 
own, local historical heritage in this manner, expatriate writers and activists 
simultaneously wrote themselves into a broader national history. 
 
The Federation of Constantinopolitans 
 
In this chapter, I have focused primarily on commemorative events orchestrated by the 
Constantinopolitan Society, which, particularly between 1978 and 2006, were run in 
collaboration with the New Circle of Constantinopolitans and the Association of 
Hellenic Citizens Expelled from Turkey (Isaakidis 2014; O Polítis March 1998). In the 
remainder of the chapter, I take a look at the more recent commemorative activities of 
the Federation of Constantinopolitans, which was established in 2006 with the aim of 
uniting all the expatriate associations in Greece and abroad, and providing a unified 
voice for the expatriate community (see chapter 2). Although the Constantinopolitan 
Society is a founding member of the Federation, the two bodies put on separate events 
to mark the anniversaries of 1453 and 1955, reflecting a divergent outlook on the future 
of the Greek community in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relationships generally. 
 
The Federation of Constantinopolitans has since 2010 pursued direct dialogue with the 
Turkish authorities, on matters such as the reissuing of Turkish citizenship to the 
expatriated Greeks and their Greek-born descendants, the problems facing the Greek 
minority schools, and outstanding issues related to Greek property in Turkey 
(Federation of Constantinopolitans 2013c; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2012:9; 
Federation of Constantinopolitans 2015a:29-31; Federation of Constantinopolitans 
2015b). Federation president Ouzounoglou explained the rationale of these negotiations 
to me as follows: 
                                                                                                                                               
brother on the walls of Constantinople on 29 May 1453 upon seeing that the Ottoman forces had breached 
the city’s defences, as reported in the Chronicon Maius, an account of the Fall of Constantinople 
traditionally attributed to the Byzantine writer Georgios Sphrantzes but now thought to have been 
authored by Makarios Melissenos in the sixteenth century. 
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We do not place our issues within national politics, because we do not believe in 
that road, but we take them [to the Turkish government] directly, because we are 
citizens of that country. Just because we are Hellenes does not mean that the 
Hellenic government has to express my opinions (Ouzounoglou 2014a). 
 
Ultimately, the Federation hopes that these talks will encourage Turkey to undertake ‘a 
programme of repatriation, particularly for young people’ (Ouzounoglou 2014a) in 
order to prevent the Greek community of Istanbul from disappearing entirely.  
 
The Constantinopolitan Society, by contrast, has eschewed direct communication with 
the Turkish authorities, maintaining that the plight of the Greek minority in Turkey is a 
component of Greek foreign policy and should therefore be discussed only through 
official diplomatic channels (Isaakidis 2014). In particular, the Society has expressed 
concern that Turkey might use such negotiations to turn the Polítes into a conduit for 
Turkish foreign policy, and thereby both damage the expatriates’ reputation in Greece 
and weaken the diplomatic position of the Greek state (Constantinopolitan Society 
2012b; Constantinopolitan Society 2013a; Constantinopolitan Society 2013c). They 
have protested, for instance, that the Federation’s petition for Turkey to issue Turkish 
citizenship to the expatriates’ descendants in Greece, ‘facilitates the plans of Turkish 
foreign policy to create a “Turkish colony” in Greece’ (Constantinopolitan Society 
2012b; Constantinopolitan Society 2013a). The Constantinopolitan Society is also 
comparatively sceptical about the feasibility of attaining lasting Greek-Turkish 
reconciliation, and of reinstating a sizeable Greek population in Istanbul, and considers 
an admission of responsibility on the part of the Turkish government to be a prerequisite 
for productive bilateral dialogue (Constantinopolitan Society 1997; Isaakidis 2014). As 
Isaakidis put it to me: 
 
A very simple thing that the Germans did, is that they asked for forgiveness 
from the Jews […] For 30 years, we have been asking the Turks to ask for 
forgiveness, officially, for what they did. They do not even ask for forgiveness 
from the Armenians. How can you become friends, when the other side does not 
take responsibility for the damage they have caused? (Isaakidis 2014). 
 
Accordingly, whilst the Society has continued to organise its own memorial day for the 
Septemvrianá, the primary purpose of which is to keep the memory of 1955 in the 
forefront of Greek popular and diplomatic consciousness, the Federation has since 2008 
marked the anniversary through an annual international conference that is more 
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academic and scientific than commemorative (Ouzounoglou 2011).
124
 Rather than 
focusing on parallels with events from Greek national history such as 1453 or 1922, the 
Federation’s conferences have sought to identify commonalities between the Istanbul 
Riots and acts of anti-minority violence in other national contexts, in order to 
interrogate their common causes and consequences. The inaugural 2008 conference, for 
example, aimed ‘to heighten international awareness of the mechanisms underlying acts 
of state-sponsored terrorism and ethnic cleansing as illustrated in the cases of 
Septemvriana (Istanbul, 6-7/9/1955), Kristallnacht (Crystal Night) (Germany, 8-
9/11/1938) and other similar, but less well publicized, events’ (Federation of 
Constantinopolitans 2008:104). This reflected the Federation’s belief that events like the 
Istanbul Riots ‘had nothing to do with the Greek-Turkish bilateral relations but were 
related to the decline of the rule of law principles and democratic rights [in Turkey]’ 
(Federation of Constantinopolitans 2013d). Between 2011 and 2014, the annual 
conferences similarly focused on how Turkey might provide remedy and reparation for 
the victims of the Istanbul Riots, in line with the United Nations’ 2005 resolution 
(60/147) on the right for victims of human rights abuses to seek restitution within the 
framework of international law (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2013c; Ouzounoglou 
2011; Ouzounoglou 2014b). 
 
Although the Federation’s anniversary conferences share with the Constantinopolitan 
Society’s memorial days the stated aims of preserving the memory of the past and 
placing it within a wider historical framework, the reasons for doing so, and the salient 
framework to be used, are thus notably different. Whilst the Society believes that the 
experiences of the Polítes come firmly under the umbrella of a long-standing Greek-
Turkish conflict, and therefore are best dealt with through a robust foreign policy, the 
Federation considers the issues facing the community as arising from a national 
homogenisation project connected with the decline of democracy and rule of law in 
                                                 
124
 The Federation has often invited Turkish academics (as well as those from Greece and elsewhere) to 
speak at these conferences; on the 57th anniversary in 2012, for instance, Turkish political scientist 
Baskın Oran gave the keynote speech, in which he argued that the Greek minority of Turkey and the 
Muslim minority of Western Thrace would benefit from cooperating and supporting one another (Oran 
2012). Former Constantinopolitan Society president Isaakidis told me that they too invited a Turkish 
speaker on one occasion, but that he did not attend, apparently – in Isaakidis’ estimation – due to the 
Society’s stance towards Turkey (2014). 
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post-1923 Turkey. Accordingly, in place of a language of national martyrdom, the 




Since 2006, the Federation has also assumed responsibility for the ceremonial parade to 
commemorate the Fall of Constantinople. In principle, the format has remained largely 
unchanged, although the significance that the two organisations attach to the event 
differs somewhat. At the 2013 ceremony, for instance, speaking immediately before the 
Laconian representative who characterised the Fall as the ‘new Thermopylae’ (see 
above), Federation president Ouzounoglou placed emphasis not on the connections 
between 1453 and Greek national freedom, but on the cultural contribution of 
Byzantium to contemporary civilisation. He told the gathering assembled at the statue of 
Constantine Palaiologos that: 
 
The ultimate heroic resistance that was put up by the Hellenes of 
Constantinople, alongside their fellow fighters from the Christian West, has an 
exceptional significance for you to remember today, insofar as the defenders 
were fighting primarily not to protect the fortified Queen of cities, but for the 
values represented by its ancient tradition with its universal values. The 
defenders had a deep belief that they were the carriers of Christendom, of 
Orthodoxy, but also the synthesis of the Hellenic and Roman civilisation. That 
was the great historical achievement of the Eastern Roman Empire, that it 
created a synthetic universal civilisation […] That is the primary reason why we 





The Constantinopolitan Society, meanwhile, has protested that under the auspices of the 
Federation the memorial ceremony no longer achieves the purpose that they had 
envisaged for it after 1978; that is, to stage a memorial day with the trappings of an 
official national holiday that would serve as a visible demonstration of the community’s 
presence in Greece and emphasise their place within national history. In 2014, the 
Society accordingly wrote to the Federation expressing their disappointment with the 
level of attendance at the parade in recent years, maintaining that when they had 
organised the event they had always ensured a high turnout from members of the 
Society, ‘exactly as happens at all national anniversaries’ (Constantinopolitan Society 
2014a). 
                                                 
125
 This is not to say that the Constantinopolitan Society necessarily eschews a more transnational frame 
of reference: see Isaakidis’ comparisons with the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide (above), and 
chapter 6. 
126
 At a seminar held by the Federation in 2009 for the 556
th
 anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople, 
Ouzounoglou similarly stated in his introductory speech that the purpose of the event was to ‘demonstrate 
the universality of Byzantine civilisation’ (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2009a:3). 
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In line with these differing perspectives on the significance of the 1453 ceremonial 
parade, the Society and the Federation operate independent anniversary events, typically 
featuring talks by an invited speaker or speakers. These two events have much in 
common, but, as with the Septemvrianá commemorations, there are also perceptible 
differences to be discerned. On the 560
th
 anniversary of the Fall of Constantinople in 
2013, for instance, the Constantinopolitan Society hosted retired Greek general 
Frangoulis Frangos. His speech was preceded by greetings from the Society’s president, 
who characterised the Fall as ‘the most shocking event in the martyred journey of our 
race’ (Lampidis 2013), and by the reading of a poem commemorating the heroic 
sacrifice of Palaiologos by Prínkipos-born poet Giorgos Aimilios Eden, accompanied 
by his daughter on the harp. In the first half of his talk, Frangos characterised 
Palaiologos as an exemplary Greek martyr whose sacrifice ‘laid the foundations for the 
struggle in 1821’ and ‘inspires for all time the “NO” of Hellenism’, before proceeding 
to advance the idea that a substantial population of crypto-Christians live in 
contemporary Turkey (Frangos 2013). His speech was later praised by the Society in the 
following terms: 
 
With his directness of speech and the outspokenness that distinguishes him, he 
transported us to that ill-omened day, stressing that we must never forget all of 
the tragic events that followed up until today and sealed the fate of Hellenism, 
but also [that we must] demand our justice (Constantinopolitan Society 2013b). 
 
On the same day in 2013, the Federation – in conjunction with the municipality of 
Palaió Fáliro, a neighbourhood of Athens – hosted a talk by Greek professor of 
economics Michalis Psalidopoulos with the title ‘The Fall of Empires and Nations: 
Thoughts of an Economist’.
127
 The event began with a memorial prayer to the fallen led 
by the bishop of Palaió Fáliro-Néa Smýrni, and an address by the mayor of Palaió 
Fáliro, who, according to a Greek journalist who was in attendance, emphasised that 
‘such historical moments must teach us about the mistakes that we made in the passing 
of the ages’ so that they are not repeated in the future ‘but, conversely, keep us united’ 
(Vima Online 3 June 2013). After the main speaker, there was also a concert featuring 
the performance of dirges about the Fall of Constantinople (Federation of 
Constantinopolitans 2013a). This event seems to have been representative of the 
Federation’s 1453 anniversaries more generally, in that whilst it incorporated aspects of 
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 According to Dimosthenis, one of my Imbriot informants who attended this event, Psalidopoulos 
compared the fall of various empires from different eras (06/06/2013). Dimosthenis contrasted this with 
what he perceived to be the tenor of the Constantinopolitan Society events, which he summed up as ‘the 
Turks! Those bad people!’ (06/06/2013). 
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a memorial day (such as the religious service) its scope extended beyond a narrow focus 
on Greek-Turkish relationships. If the Constantinopolitan Society was concerned 
principally with making the Fall ‘culturally proximate’ as a national trauma and 
cautionary tale for the future, in an effort to ensure that the Polítes were not sidelined in 
Greek history or diplomacy, the Federation of Constantinopolitans has shown a greater 
interest in historicising the Fall, by viewing it within a broader historical context rather 




In this chapter, I have explored how both Greek and expatriate writers persistently 
interpreted the contemporary experiences of the Greeks of Turkey by analogic reference 
to archetypes from Greek national history. For the expatriates, adopting such rhetoric 
provided a means to counteract their sense of marginalisation in Greek society and 
abandonment by Greek diplomacy. Drawing upon the coincidental numerical 
equivalence of Leonidas’ Spartan warriors in 480 BC and Imbros’ extant elderly 
population after the 1970s, as well as perceived similarities between Turkish 
militarisation and resettlement policies on Imbros and Turkish military action in Cyprus 
in 1974, the Imvriótes rewrote their own local suffering as a national drama. In like 
manner, by identifying themselves with the defenders of Byzantium in 1453, linking 
this defiant last stand to Greek revolution in 1821, and delaying the ultimate Fall of 
Constantinople until their own experiences in 1955, the Polítes portrayed themselves as 
both the prototypical Greek freedom fighters against, and archetypal national martyrs to, 
Turkish aggression and expansionism. By constructing linkages between their own 
experiences and seminal moments from Greek national history, the expatriates thus 
drew on their local particularities to establish their belonging as part of the national 
community (see chapter 3). 
 
If the examples presented here were thus ostensibly normative, replicating Greek 
nationalist rhetoric for inclusive purposes, they also, following Herzfeld, demonstrated 
that ‘people know how to adopt the rhetoric of normativity in order to achieve non-
normative ends’ (1997:44). By casting themselves in the likeness of iconic and 
recognisable heroes and martyrs from the recent and distant national past, expatriate 
writers implicitly and sometimes explicitly cast aspersions on Greece’s contemporary 
diplomatic record towards the Greeks of Turkey, indicating, for instance, that if the 
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Greek state had resisted in 1955 as the Byzantines did in 1453 then the city might never 
have definitively ‘fallen’. In any case, it is noteworthy that although ‘the Turks’ were 
superficially the chief antagonists in many of the narratives discussed above, expatriate 
efforts to mark the anniversaries of events like 1453 and 1955 had at least as much to do 
with their complaints towards the Greek state, and a lack of awareness on the part of the 
Greek public, as with their grievances with Turkey. The fact that normative 
representations can sustain insubordinate discourses helps account for the resilience of 
nationalist readings of the past, as even when expressing dissent from national policy or 
history local actors often rely upon a national interpretive framework. In this sense, the 
expatriates might ‘participate through their very discontent’ (Herzfeld 1997:2) in the 
consolidation and perpetuation of the national frame of reference, reflecting Sutton’s 
observation that ‘even those […] who implicitly or explicitly challenge the content of 
national history, do not [necessarily] challenge its form’ (1998:128).  
 
If expatriate writers and activists’ uses of history in this chapter often seemed measured 
and deliberate – archetypes from the past conjured up in very particular contexts to 
serve quite clear discursive purposes – it does not necessarily follow that the past was 
simply evoked cynically and dispassionately as expedient packaging for personal 
experience (Knight 2012:356; Schudson 1997:5, 15). For many, a perception of the past 
as subject to certain rhythms and patterns was a prominent explanatory device for 
interpreting contemporary events or anticipating their future unfolding, such that they 
did not only see convenient comparisons between different historical moments, but 
rather felt that they were reliving – or were fated to relive – the events of the past 
(Knight 2012:356). From this perspective, widely available historical schemata might 
implicitly govern the reception and representation of new experiences in ways in which 
individuals are only partially in control (Erll 2011c:174; Schudson 1997:13). So, for 
instance, whilst Imbriot comparisons with Cyprus might in one sense be viewed as 
cynical attempts to harvest the widespread indignation in Greece about Turkish actions 
in order to generate sympathy for the struggles of the Imvriótes, it was also likely that 
omnipresent Greek media representations of unfolding events on Cyprus seemed so 
frighteningly plausible to expatriate writers as a model for future experience on Imbros 
that they were an almost unavoidable frame of reference. Likewise, for the Polítes, 
whilst presenting the 6-7 September 1955 as the culmination of events begun in 1453 
and 1922 was certainly politically expedient, it was not a discourse that required 
significant lateral thinking or substantial rewriting of received historical knowledge, but 
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was rather one that readily presented itself as a ‘common sense’ explanation for 
complex historical events. In both cases, particular historical archetypes and paradigms 
were ‘conjured up too instantly for [conscious] calculation to have been the whole 
story’: even though expatriate activists did ‘indeed rewrite the texts of history’, they did 
not necessarily ‘choose which texts to work on’ (Schudson 1997:15). 
 
To borrow terms from Kostis Kornetis, however, in many of these instances the 
relationship to the past was marked less by ‘proximity or affinity’, as in Knight’s case, 
and more by ‘temporal and semantic distance’ (2010:190-191). Indeed, it was in some 
ways the distance of 1453, and hence its hollowness and malleability, that made it a 
compelling interpretive framework for the contemporary experiences of 1955. The past, 
to paraphrase Kornetis, was made present not in the form of detailed historical 
knowledge, but in terms of a more abstract repertoire of resonant symbols (2010:190), 
which could be applied to contemporary events in order to give broader meaning, 
significance, and intelligibility to personal experience, and were consequently backfilled 
with personal resonance such that the events of the past appeared temporally and 
semantically proximate. In this way, the palimpsestic relationship between 1453 and 
1955 mutated the memory of both events: the Istanbul Riots became the Third Fall of 
Constantinople, directing their interpretation in terms of a diachronic and interminable 
Greek-Turkish conflict, whilst the Fall of Constantinople was reactivated but also 
absorbed by the more recent occurrences of 1955, obscuring much of ‘what one might 
cautiously call the “original” or the “actual” events’ from view (Erll 2011c:140-141). If 
the past thus indeed ‘seeps into the cracks of the present’ (Sutton 1998:210), equally the 
present seeps into the cracks of the past, as individuals attempt to make sense of their 
experiences, and make them intelligible to others, by thinking analogically. 
 
As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, memory is from this perspective 
‘multidirectional’ (Rothberg 2009a) regardless of whether or not it happens to cross 
artificial ethnic or national borders. If, as Erll argued, ‘all cultural memory must “travel” 
[…] in order to stay alive’ – must, in other words, be repurposed or reused to transcend 
the original context of its articulation – it invariably follows that these travels consist 
‘only partly in movement across and beyond territorial and social boundaries’ 
(2011b:12). Moreover, once we peer beneath its linear, unidirectional surface, we can 
perceive that national memory is itself a palimpsest, drawing together, in the case 
presented here, such disparate times and places as fifth century BC Thermopylae, 
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fifteenth-century Byzantium, mid-twentieth-century Istanbul, and late-twentieth-
Cyprus. It was through such multidirectional memory work that expatriate writers 
excavated a commemorative niche within Greek national memory, reconfiguring the 
already well-trodden journeys across space and time carved out by nationalist history. 
The national, then, is also fundamentally transcultural: in Jie-Hyun Lim’s terms, ‘[t]he 
most frequent misunderstanding of nationalism is that nationalism is national’ 
(2010:138). 
 
The national palimpsest, nevertheless, was not the only mnemonic framework to which 
expatriate writers had recourse when narrating their experiences of persecution. We 
have already seen how the Federation of Constantinopolitans – less concerned with 
integrating the expatriates within Greek national memory, and more interested in 
facilitating restitution, reparation, and repatriation within the framework of international 
law – typically structured its commemorative activities not so much through analogic 
reference to the national past, but by drawing connections across national boundaries in 
order to place the Greeks of Turkey within the context of global human rights discourse. 
In the next chapter, I turn my attention to such transcultural cross-referencing, 
demonstrating that memory is indeed a frequent flyer. I also observe, however, that the 
articulation of local experience within a transcultural frame of reference is far from 
incompatible with the maintenance of a national(ist) reading of the past, and may 





‘Kristallnacht in Constantinople’ 
Transcultural cross-referencing 
 
In this chapter, I focus on how the Greeks of Turkey drew parallels between their own 
experiences and those of other communities, most notably Turkey’s Armenian and 
Kurdish communities, and Europe’s Jews. Such mnemonic cross-fertilisation confirms 
that memories are commonly articulated within a transcultural field of reference, and 
that different histories of suffering need not necessarily be locked in a competition for 
primacy (Rothberg 2009a:3-6). Indeed, my discussion lends credence to the suggestion 
that analogic thinking on a transcultural level might lead to the elaboration of 
solidarities between different victim communities, or even lay the groundwork for 
reconciliation between historical antagonists. At the same time, however, I demonstrate 
that memory’s extraterritorial journeys do not necessarily have ‘cosmopolitan’ (Levy 
and Sznaider 2006) or even ‘post-national’ implications, and may frequently serve to 
consolidate rather than undermine national identities and intercommunal antagonisms. I 
suggest, moreover, that there is need for a distinction to be made between superficial 
historical comparisons that happen to reach across national or ethnic boundaries, and the 
more complex ‘knotting’ (Rothberg 2010:7; Silverman 2013:8) of memories and 
histories put forward in recent scholarship as evidence that ‘memory – individual as 
well as social – is fundamentally a transcultural phenomenon’ (Erll 2011c:66). This, in 
turn, has implications for our understanding of how (and when) transcultural memory is 
experienced by individuals on local levels, and how (and when) it finds expression in 
their personal narratives and in their day-to-day lives. 
 
‘Ask the Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds’: off-the-peg memories on YouTube 
 
Since the ‘connective turn’ (Hoskins 2011a:271; Hoskins 2011b:20-21; see review 
essay II), scholars have shown increasing interest in the relationship between memory 
and web 2.0 platforms such as Facebook (Garde-Hansen 2009), YouTube (Drinot 2011; 
Goode, McCullough, and O’Hare 2011; Hildebrand 2007), and Wikipedia (Ferron and 
Massa 2014; Pentzold 2009). Amongst other things, this has included a growing 
awareness of how collective memories might be shaped and contested through peer-to-
peer discussion in digital settings, such as in the ‘comments’ section of video-sharing 
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website YouTube, described by Paulo Drinot as ‘a crowded, very loud, and very angry 
debating chamber where everyone speaks at once, no one much listens to one another, 
and where arguments cannot be formulated without being wrapped in vitriol and 
invective’ (2011:375). In light of Landsberg’s suggestion that ‘mass culture makes 
particular memories more widely available, so that people who have no “natural” claim 
to them might nevertheless incorporate them into their own archive of experience’ 
(2004:9), I begin my discussion of transcultural cross-referencing by exploring Greek
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YouTube commenters’ uses of historical analogy within this rancorous, de-
territorialised debating chamber. 
 
I analysed the comments left on twelve YouTube videos dealing, in one way or another, 
with Greek-Turkish relationships.
129
 Despite the varied subject matter of the videos, the 
comments almost invariably descended into acrimonious clashes over the historical 
interactions between the two communities. Typically, these debates pitted Greek and 
Turkish users offering narratives of harmonious Greek-Turkish coexistence against 
users from both sides propounding narratives of strife and hostility, and/or Greek strife 
narrators against Turkish strife narrators (on ‘harmony’ and ‘strife’ in narratives of 
Greek-Turkish relationships, see Halstead 2014b). Harmony narrators from both 
communities revelled in shared cultural and linguistic features, told stories of 
intercommunal harmony in the Ottoman Empire and Cyprus, and greeted one another 
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 Where possible, I identify in the text the stated ethnicity of users based on the information provided on 
their YouTube channel, or, occasionally, by extrapolating from their usernames. Users typically wrote in 
English, Greek, and Turkish, although the comments quoted below were all made in English. 
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 The selection of these videos was made to include a variety of topics (political, cultural, historical), a 
range of different stances on Greek-Turkish relationships (antagonistic, neutral, pro-reconciliation), and 
varying degrees of popularity in terms of number of views/comments. Four of the videos were dedicated 
to the shared musical heritage of the two communities (‘BEKLEDIM’ 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFrQ6M6ZRoc [accessed 1 July 2013]); ‘Fedon-Dostluk Şarksı’ 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJYLVYRqBPI [accessed 1 July 2013]); ‘Greek Turkish Shared 
Musics – Kizim Seni Aliye (Istemem Babacim)’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XPPtZPZ6gzk 
[accessed 18 June 2015]); ‘Turkish songs recorded by Greeks in USA (old)’ 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NO8DHSi99bk [accessed 1 July 2013])), two were concerned with 
damage dealt to the Greek community during the 1955 Istanbul Riots (‘Istanbul pogrom’ 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhpvNmQuB04 [accessed 1 July 2013]); ‘Septemvrianá’ 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kKTrOX9U6Xo [accessed 1 July 2013])), two marked the 
anniversary of the Pontic genocide (‘19 May Pontian-Greek Genocide’ 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yW256u3ZMmw [accessed 18 June 2015]); ‘Yenoktonia Pontion – 
Pontian Hellenism Genocide’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_264tbl6wgw [accessed 18 June 
2015])), one condemned the ‘illegal turkish invasion’ of Cyprus in 1974 (‘Cyprus 1974’ 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHQXNKus03Q [accessed 1 July 2013])), one showed the opening 
scene of the film Polítiki Kouzína, that told the story of the Greeks deported from Istanbul in 1964 (‘A 
touch of spice’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZ_XI4QvJ5o [accessed 3 July 2013])), and two 
explicitly constructed solidarities between different communities (‘History of Turkish Ottoman Genocide 
of Armenians, Assyrians and Pontic Greeks’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rwpw5xVKstM 
[accessed 18 June 2015]); ‘Kurds Greeks Assyrians Cypriots Armenians united’ 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHdkrGOsWr8 [accessed 18 June 2015])). 
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with the portmanteau kalimerhaba. Meanwhile, Greek and Turkish strife narrators 
accused one another of a litany of historical atrocities, berated one another with claims 
of racial impurity and/or sexual impotency, and lambasted harmony narrators from their 
own communities for ethnic betrayal and historical ignorance, dismissing cultural 
similarity as being the result of contamination or theft. 
 
In articulating their narratives of suffering and grievance, Greek strife narrators on 
YouTube not only had recourse to events from Greek nationalist history – such as the 
‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’ in 1922 or the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, memories 
to which Landsberg might say they made a ‘natural’ claim (2004:9) – but also scoured 
history – and, frequently, the Internet – for comparisons and analogies to bolster their 
arguments. Commenting on the video ‘Istanbul Pogrom’, for instance, a Greek 
expatriate from Istanbul and witness to the Septemvrianá responded to the suggestion 
by another user that Greeks have also been guilty of committing acts of violence by 
writing: 
 
War brings out the worst in people. I don’t doubt that atrocities occurred on 
BOTH sides during the Greco-Turkish war of 1921-22. Unlike the Turks 
however Greeks never engaged in government directed genocide. This is a 
Turkish speciality. Ask the Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds. The atrocities 
committed against the Greeks of Constantinople occurred during peacetime. 
 
Calling upon other communities to testify as witnesses to Turkish atrocity, this 
YouTube user attempted to ‘prove’ the veracity, specificity, and severity of his own 
experiences in 1955 by suggesting parallels with other minorities alleged to have 
suffered at Turkish hands: saying, in effect, ‘if you don’t believe me, simply ask the 
Assyrians, Armenians, and Kurds’. In a similar manner, Greek users often implicitly or 
explicitly likened Turkish actions against ethnic or religious minorities to Nazi atrocities 
against the Jews. Responding to videos about the Istanbul Riots, for instance, several 
Greek commenters dubbed the events of 1955 ‘Turkish Kristallnacht’ or ‘Kristallnacht 
à la Turkey’, thereby equating the Septemvrianá to the Nazi attack on the Jews in 1938, 
whilst on the video ‘BEKLEDIM’ another Greek user reacted with incredulity to calls 
for Greek-Turkish friendship and reconciliation by declaring: 
 
We are the victims you fool!!! nazis are the turks!!! remember the genozid on 
armenians??? greeks??? the p[og]rom in konstantinopel 1955??? how many 
greeks are left??? 1974 cyprus??? now you will claim the Greeks also did wrong 
thin[g]s…but not 1955, not the Armenians, not the alevit in sivas [the 1993 
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Sivas massacre of Alevi intellectuals by a Salafist mob], the[y] burned them 
alive in a hotel only because they are alevit and this [in] 1993!!! 
 
Shortly afterwards, the same user wrote: 
 













 ……not long time ago [I] saw 
pictures [of] behead[ed] kurds (1998) how [many] Greeks are left, armenians 
you fool… 
 
In these extracts, the experiences of Armenians, Alevis, Cypriots, Greeks, and Kurds 
were allowed to commingle, thereby broadening the field of victims of Turkish actions, 
whilst Turkey was villainised and demonised through equation with Nazism. If recent 
photographic depiction of Kurdish suffering was cited as visual proof of Turkish 
atrocity, echoes of the Armenian genocide were evoked to emphasise Greek 
vulnerability, the writer exhorting the users of YouTube not to forget the fate of the 
Armenians. On occasion, some Greek users even seemed to vicariously enact revenge 
on Turkey through the envisaged future actions of the Kurds. On the video ‘A touch of 
spice’, one Greek commenter taunted a Turkish user by stating, ‘[d]o not worry PKK 
[the Kurdistan Workers’ Party] will fix you well. Your time will come’, whilst on the 
video ‘Septemvrianá’ another Greek user commemorated the victims of the Istanbul 
Riots with the epitaph, ‘[m]ay the souls of the murdered Greeks rest in Peace. Turkey 
will pay it. Kurds will bring them the bill’. Whilst references to the Armenian and 
Assyrian genocides thus served primarily to validate Greek claims against the Turks by 
providing precedents for Greek victimhood, linkages with the ongoing Kurdish-Turkish 
conflict additionally allowed commenters to reframe historic Greek suffering in a 
contemporary setting, providing a present-day visualisation of the past as well as 
vicarious vengeance for its injustices.
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 I.e. the flight of Greek refugees from Asia Minor. 
131
 I.e. the conflict on Cyprus. 
132
 This is a reference to the two uninhabited islets at the centre of the 1996 military incident between 
Greece and Turkey. 
133
 Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou were two Greek Cypriot refugees killed in 1996 during 
demonstrations in the United Nations Buffer Zone near Deryneia. 
134
 A reference to perceived Turkish designs on Greek Western Thrace. 
135
 A reference to disputes over territorial waters and maritime borders in the Aegean Sea. 
136
 Such expressions of solidarity did not go uncontested, however. When one Greek user responded to 
the video ‘19 May Pontian-Greek Genocide’ by writing, ‘[e]ven until this day, Kurds go through the 
same… because they are Kurds, may God stand by them’, he was reprimanded by another Greek user in 
the following terms: 
Do not forget that [at] those period[s] of time Kurds were included in the Ottoman army and 
Kurds killed a lot of Greeks since the genocide was based in religion. Of course it is wellknown 
that today in Turkey Kurds are second-class citizens… but we can’t compare what Greeks had 
gone through with the current oppression of Kurds. 
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Most YouTube viewers do not post responses to the videos they watch, but amongst 
those who do comment the level of interaction is high (Thelwall, Sud and Vis 2012:617, 
627).
137
 This pattern was borne out in the videos I analysed, in which multiple back-
and-forth exchanges between relatively small groups of interlocutors were 
commonplace. As other studies of YouTube comments have found, whilst these posts 
were typically characterised not by productive dialogue but by a crude ‘quest for one-
upmanship’ (Goode, McCullough, and O’Hare 2011:610), they were nevertheless often 
simultaneously ‘structured by a desire for understanding by the readers of these 
comments’ (Carpentier 2014:1011). In other words, YouTube commenters were driven 
by a desire not only to provoke reactions and belittle their opponents, but also to be 
perceived by other interlocutors and onlookers as having won the argument, leading to 
what Goode et al. aptly referred to as a ‘Monty Python-esque juxtaposition of 
substantive reasoning and extreme personal attack’ (2011:611). As both individual 
comments and the lifespan of extended dialogues on YouTube tended to be short, there 
was an imperative for users to make their case in the most concise, compelling, and 
over-the-top manner possible, leading to the repetition of certain tropes that were 
‘deployed to trigger reactions and to capture attention’ (Goode, McCullough, and 
O’Hare 2011:603). This, in turn, seemed to encourage YouTube users to borrow the 
memories of other communities in order to maximise the scale of the suffering they 
accused others of inflicting, and to analogise with infamous and widely recognisable 
events from history such as Nazi genocide (conforming to Godwin’s Law of Nazi 
Analogies, which states that ‘[a]s an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a 




In an analysis of First World War poetry, Geoff Dyer argued that the image of war as 
horrific had become so clichéd that it had lost its power to express that horror: ‘[w]ar 
may be horrible’, he wrote, ‘but that should not distract us from acknowledging what a 
horrible cliché this has become’ (1995:27). Dyer termed these instinctive clichés ‘[o]ff-
the-peg formulae [that] free you from thinking for yourself about what is being said’, 
and warned that ‘[w]henever words are bandied about automatically and easily, their 
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 According to Mike Thelwall et al.’s study, which was based on a large sample of YouTube videos, 
whilst just 0.5% of viewers who watched a video left a comment, almost a quarter of those comments 
were replies to earlier posts (2012:617, 627). 
138
 Mike Godwin developed his Law of Nazi Analogies in an effort to create a ‘counter-meme’ that would 
highlight, and perhaps ultimately curtail, the gratuitous use of Nazi analogies in online discussion (1994). 
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meaning is in the process of leaking away or evaporating’ (1995:29).
139
 References to 
the Armenian and Assyrian genocides, the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, and Nazi genocide 
in YouTube comments might similarly be described as ‘off-the-peg memories’, 
abstracted and simplified formulae, often accompanied by little historical baggage, that 
were temporarily borrowed to validate, contextualise, and emphasise Greek suffering. 
Like Dyer’s clichéd horrors, these off-the-peg memories typically came across as 
automatic or knee-jerk reactions to particular discursive situations, and often stood in 
for substantive independent thinking about Greek-Turkish relationships and histories of 
violence more generally. Greek YouTube users attempted to bolster antagonistic 
arguments during quickfire debates, and to confirm perceived ‘patterns’ of ‘Turkish’ 
behaviour, by name-dropping persecuted communities and totemically citing de-
contextualised atrocities, in the process simultaneously entrenching hostility towards the 
Turks and eliding the specificity of different historical events. At the same time, 
however, off-the-peg memories freed Greek Internet users from thinking about history 
on their own. On the one hand, the construction of parallel histories with Armenians, 
Assyrians, and Kurds served to endorse and rationalise Greek victimhood, by 
suggesting that other communities had similar experiences at the hands of the same 
perpetrators. Meanwhile, analogising with other, more well-known historical atrocities 
such as Nazi genocide made these claims evocative and intelligible in transnational 
cyberspace.  
 
My intention here is not to imply a contrast with ‘bespoke’ or ‘tailor-made’ memories – 
to reinforce, in other words, Landsberg’s problematic distinction between ‘natural’ and 
‘prosthetic’ memories (see also Silverman 2013:176) – nor to develop a prescriptive 
model that would be used to classify different transcultural references. Rather, I aim to 
draw attention to the fact that not every act of transcultural cross-referencing is evidence 
of complex and deep-rooted entanglements between different histories, but may 
sometimes reflect more superficial opportunities for comparison that occur within quite 
specific discursive contexts (cf. Silverman 2013:18). In other words, there is a 
distinction to be made between the adornment of narratives of persecution with motifs 
borrowed from other communities, and the more complex processes of remediation, 
premediation, and superimposition through which past histories, sometimes quite 
imperceptibly, leave their mark on contemporary representations. This is a discussion to 
which I return at the end of the chapter. 
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 I am grateful to Sebastian Owen for this reference. 
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It is, perhaps, unsurprising that we should find such transcultural cross-referencing in 
the ‘de-territorialized world of the Internet’ (Drinot 2011:372), where individuals from 
diverse backgrounds are able to interact and gain access to each other’s mnemonic 
repertoires. Indeed, it is notable that both Greek and Turkish YouTube users commonly 
drew on online sources – in particular, news media sites, Wikipedia, and other YouTube 
videos – and quite often assigned other users ‘reading lists’ in the form of a series of 
web links, indicating that they had been ‘shopping’ for or ‘Googling’ appropriate 
material to append to their narratives. Transcultural cross-referencing, nevertheless, 
predates the ‘connective turn’ and the advent of interactive web 2.0 platforms (Confino 
2012; Cubitt 2007b; Erll 2011a:4-5; Erll 2011b:11; Rothberg 2010:9, 35; Shlapentokh 
1999): Geoff Cubitt, for instance, has explored how nineteenth-century French 
polemicists detected ‘contemporary French meanings in references to England’s 
turbulent seventeenth-century history’ (2007b:74); whilst Confino has demonstrated 
that in the 1930s and 1940s opponents and proponents alike often measured the Nazi 
rise to power against the values of the French Revolution (2012:7). In the rest of this 
chapter, I accordingly focus on how expatriate writers and activists in offline contexts, 
in common with the YouTube users cited above, often articulated their narratives of 
persecution within a transcultural frame of reference. 
 
Parallel histories: Armenians and Kurds 
 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, the newspapers O Polítis and Ίmvros have since 
their foundation been engaged in a struggle to counteract the marginalisation of the 
Greeks of Turkey in Greek society, history, and diplomacy, and to represent, publicise, 
and preserve their memories of persecution in Greek, European, and international 
forums. These efforts have frequently involved the adoption and adaptation of 
archetypes from Greek national history (see chapter 5) and/or stereotypes of Turkish 
aggression or barbarity (see chapter 4), which served to give expatriate local histories 
meaning and intelligibility by assimilating them to a broader, diachronic Greek-Turkish 
conflict. For many expatriate writers and activists, nevertheless, it also made sense to 
interpret and present the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey within a broader frame of 
reference that included the experiences of other minority communities in Turkey. 
Particularly from the mid- to late-1970s onwards, against the backdrop of the rise of the 
PKK and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) as well as 
increasing activism by Armenian and Kurdish diaspora communities, the expatriate 
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newspapers began to carry sympathetic articles discussing the 1915 Armenian genocide, 
Armenian efforts to obtain international recognition for its occurrence, and the armed 
conflict between Turkey and the PKK. In 1975, for instance, O Polítis responded to 
reports in the Turkish press that Armenian, Greek, and Kurdish diaspora groups were 
working cooperatively in opposition to Turkey, by declaring on its front page that 
Greeks should support the efforts of these other communities: 
 
It is about time for these two ancient peoples [the Armenians and the Kurds] to 
be vindicated. The Turkish chauvinists for centuries now since their arrival in 
Asia Minor, have thought of nothing but how to exterminate the ethnicities that 
they found on the land that they conquered by fire and sword. The genocide of 
the Armenians 60 years ago is known throughout the world just like the 
persecutions of the Hellenes and the Kurds that have been committed for 
centuries by the Turks with disregard for morality and humanity, starting with 
that barbarous devşirme that formed the Janissaries, after the Fall of 
Constantinople and the dissolution of the Hellenic Byzantine Empire, the 
stronghold of this civilization (O Polítis September 1975). 
 
This article appeared in the specific context of a discussion about intercommunal 
corporation, but before long both the Armenians and the Kurds were making regular 
appearances in expatriate writing, even when the article in question had no direct 
relevance to either community. In 1997, for example, O Polítis printed an article entitled 
‘History Repeats Itself’, which began by enumerating on Greek victories against the 
Persians – the Battle of Marathon, the Battle of Salamis, and the campaigns of 
Alexander the Great and Eastern Roman Emperor Heraclius – before equating these 
confrontations with a contemporary conflict between Greeks and Turks. Within this 
protracted narrative of Greek-Turkish antagonism, the Armenians and Kurds featured as 
fellow victims of Turkish aggression: 
 
The place of the Great King [Persian Xerxes I] has been taken by the Turkish 
invader. For 500 years he has pillaged Hellenic Asia Minor and the Aegean. 
Various circumstances prevented Hellenism from giving the appropriate lesson 
to that conqueror. By contrast [due to] their conflicting interests various 
[presumably Western] countries did not only support [the Turk] but also covered 
up the genocides he committed against the Hellenes, the Armenians, and the 
Kurds, genocides that still cast their shame on our world today. And we arrive at 
the drama of Cyprus and the disregard by the Turkish invaders of all of the votes 
and decisions of the United Nations […] Kurds, Armenians and Hellenes ask for 
justice, awaiting the liberation of their lands on which they have inalienable 
rights (O Polítis September 1977). 
 
Creating links across huge swathes of history, the author of this article drew 
equivalences between the Persian Wars, the Greek-Turkish conflict of 1919-1922, the 
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Armenian Genocide, the Kurdish-Turkish struggle, and Turkish military action on 
Cyprus in 1974, casually eliding the drastically different historical circumstances 
surrounding these various moments. A comparable (if less chronologically ambitious) 
narrative was articulated in a 1983 Ίmvros article entitled ‘From Lausanne to Cyprus’, 
in which the author wrote of Turkish actions on Imbros: 
 
Same formula, same execution. Lausanne and afterwards our uprooting. [The 
London and] Zurich [Agreements] and after 40% of Cyprus under occupation. 
Similar of course applies both for the Armenians previously and the Kurds more 
recently […] Turkey found in the following decade the opportunity to achieve 
the final blow on Imbros (the events of 1964, the expropriations, the closure of 
the schools, terrorism, and much more) (Ίmvros September 1983). 
 
Equating the experiences of the 1923 Greek refugees, the Cypriots, the Armenians, the 
Kurds, and the Imvriótes, the author of this article sought to identify a demonstrable 
pattern in Turkish foreign and domestic policy, and in this way to develop a schema into 
which the persecution of the Greeks of Imbros could be placed. The Constantinopolitan 
Society, in its efforts to publicise the occurrence of the Istanbul Riots in 1955 (see 
chapter 5), likewise drew equivalences between Armenian, Greek, and Kurdish 
histories. On the 40
th
 anniversary of the Septemvrianá, for example, the Society issued 
the following declaration: 
 
Although five years separate us from the twenty-first century, even if Turkey 
tries to put on a European Mask, it continues to be indifferent and to 
unreservedly trample on human rights. Despite the international outcry, it 
continues its expansive politics, invading Iraq, as Cyprus in 1974 and Syria in 
1938, with the intention on that occasion of exterminating the Kurds. Those 
measures constitute a continuation of the ethnic cleansing programme of the 
Turkish government. That programme began to be applied from 1908 and had as 
its consequence the genocide of millions of Armenians, Hellenes and other 
people in Asia Minor. The final phase of that schedule was the annihilation of 
the Hellenism of Constantinople. The application of the programme against the 
Hellenes of Constantinople continues still today when their numbers are few. 
Those are the perceptions of today’s “democratic Turkey” as regards human 
rights. For that reason: 
THE CONSTANTINOPOLITAN ASSOCIATIONS: appeal once again to 
Greek and international Public Opinion, Governments, and Parliaments of all 
civilised countries (Constantinopolitan Society 1995a). 
 
A particularly systematic effort to parallel the experiences of the Armenians, the 
Greeks, and the Kurds in this manner can be found in Leonidas Koumakis’ semi-
autobiographical novel The Miracle (first published in Greek in 1993). Koumakis was 
born in Istanbul in c.1950, where he lived until his father was expelled from Turkey as a 
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Greek citizen in 1964. According to the blurb on the inside cover of the 1996 English-
language reprint, he wrote The Miracle in order ‘to communicate, through both 
historical evidence and my personal experience, the Turkish policy against Hellenism 
and beyond’ (Koumakis 1996). The book accordingly incorporates both the personal 
experiences of the author and his father, and extended historical narratives, the latter 
typically delivered by characters within the story. In one passage, for instance, the 
author reconstructs his father’s inner monologue as he sits waiting to learn of his fate at 
a Turkish police station on one Tuesday in 1964, a day that ‘my father had always 
considered to be an unlucky day because 29 May, 1453, when Constantinople fell to the 
Turks, was a Tuesday’ (Koumakis 1996:19). In the book, Koumakis senior ruminates at 
length on the plight of the Greeks of Turkey whilst he waits, ultimately arriving at the 
conclusion that the Armenian genocide and the persecution of the Greeks of Istanbul 
were components of a broader Turkish policy: 
 
Any decisive blows meted out by Turkey during the course of the twentieth 
century have been inflicted by taking advantage of a “suitable opportunity”. The 
Armenian genocide that took place during the First World War, the Capital Tax 
known as Varlık Vergisi that was imposed mainly on Turkey’s Greek population 
in the Second World War, the pogrom of 1955 and the expulsions in 1964 – all 
these occurred at times when circumstances were “suitable”. 
“Are you Gerasimos Koumakis?” a stern voice asked in Turkish, bringing my 
father back from his thoughts with a bump. It was the afternoon of 9
th
 July, 1964 
(Koumakis 1996:24). 
 
Historical interludes of this sort recur throughout The Miracle. The longest occurs 
towards the end of the story, as the Koumakis family are preparing to leave Istanbul for 
good. A young Leonidas Koumakis is unexpectedly summoned to the apartment of an 
elderly Greek neighbour, Mr Kleopas, who proceeds to deliver an extended lecture on 
Turkish history from which the author quotes verbatim for 18 pages. I reproduce here an 
abridged version of this narrative: 
 
For 600 years continuously the Turks have practised the only skill nature has 
endowed them with: destruction and pillage […] 
What followed [the Hamidian massacres of 1894-1896] was the greatest cold-
blooded genocide in the history of mankind. Within the space of just a few 
months [in 1915], one and a half million Armenians were mercilessly wiped out 
at the hands of the Turks […]  
Here Mr Kleopas paused again, quite clearly overcome, drank a few more sips 
of water and then went on: 
[…] On 9
th
 September, 1922 the Turks invaded Smyrna and spent the next five 
days in a frenzy of destruction, conflagration and slaughter. Over 150,000 
Greeks were massacred by the Young Turks when Kemal entered Smyrna. 
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Between 1914 and 1922 they killed 323,000 Greeks in the Pontus region and 
more than 400,000 living on the Asia Minor coast […] 
Next it was the turn of the Kurds, but they proved to be considerably tougher. 
After holding out for 79 days, the Kurdish revolution ended in a bloodbath in 
July, 1924. The Kurds are an ancient and historic people who are mentioned by 
Xenophon […] The Kurdish uprisings began long before the Greek Revolution 
of 1821 […] they paid with their blood for their longing for freedom […] 
[T]he age–old Turkish philosophy that applies at any time and in any place 
occupied by the Turks: ‘The Turks are the only masters in this country. Anyone 
who is not a genuine Turk has only one right in this country: the right to be a 
servant, the right to be a slave.’ 
And the Kurds who are still living in Turkey today, my boy, have this right only. 
The Greeks who stayed on in Turkey were all wiped out after the events of 
1955. The final act of this terrible Greek tragedy is now being played out […] 
Sooner or later, having resolved the Kurdish problem by massacring innocent 
civilians, they will turn their attention to Cyprus, Western Thrace, and to the 
Greek islands in the Aegean. The next generation of Greeks will have to do 
better than the previous one […] (Koumakis 1996:77-92). 
 
In common with the style of the book generally, this section weaves together two 
different narrative modes: the first a personal story of how the author left Turkey and 
bid farewell to his neighbour, and the second an historical narrative that uses this 
farewell as a means to place Koumakis’ personal and familial memory within a broader 
history. The latter narrative systematically assimilates personal experiences of the 
Istanbul Riots in 1955 and the expulsion of Greek citizens in 1964 to a chronic history 
of repression, injustice, and bloodshed in Turkish lands. 
 
In narratives of this sort, the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish-Turkish conflict filled 
in the empty background space surrounding seminal moments in Greek nationalist 
history, thereby providing expatriate narratives of persecution with greater spatial 
breadth and temporal depth. The memories of others served as tropes through which 
expatriate writers sought to validate, explicate, and communicate their own experiences 
and ideological stances, both to themselves and to unfamiliar third-parties, and to 
reassure themselves that they had not suffered alone, but were rather victims of a 
diachronic Turkish policy of national homogenisation. Similar expressions of 
commonality and/or solidarity with the Armenians and Kurds were in evidence in some 
personal testimonies. When I asked Istanbul-born Imvriótis Loukas if he had had any 
Kurdish acquaintances whilst living in Turkey, for instance, he replied, ‘I have never 
met anyone in my life speaking Kurdish. They were afraid, of course. As I was afraid to 
speak Greek in the street, so they too were afraid to speak Kurdish’ (08/05/2013). 
Reminiscing about the Kurds who used to work in his shop in Istanbul, meanwhile, 
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Spyros exclaimed that, ‘the Kurds are another race, they are not Turks. Now they are 
trying to make them into Turks […] we also had two Armenians [in the shop], and great 
damage befell them also, the Armenians: 1.5 million’ (02/12/2011). Fotis, born in 
Istanbul in 1950, likewise proclaimed that the Kurds ‘are a different people, they should 
have their own country’ (01/02/2012). Nevertheless, in the case of my interviewees, at 
least, such transcultural analogies were somewhat less prevalent than in formal written 
discourse.  
 
Comparisons with Armenian and Kurdish experience offered expatriate writers and 
activists something that the Greek national framework alone could not: resonance and 
intelligibility on an international level. Indeed, the articulation of such parallel histories 
was commonplace in expatriate activism directed at a European or international 
audience. In addition to the Greek-language declaration cited above, the 
Constantinopolitan Society marked the 40
th
 anniversary of the Septemvrianá by issuing 
a resolution in English with the aim of exposing Turkey ‘in the eyes of global opinion’ 
(Constantinopolitan Society 1995b). They wrote: 
 
WE PROTEST Turkish expansionist policies, militarist practices and flagrant 
violations of international treaties regarding the basic human rights of minority 
populations as well as the ethnic cleansing this country is presently undertaking 
against minority populations such as the Kurds, the Armenians and the 
(remnants of) Greeks and a number of religious denominations which are denied 
the free assertion of their identity (Constantinopolitan Society 1995b). 
 
In a 1994 English-language article, Ίmvros likewise name-dropped both the Armenians 
and the Kurds alongside other Greek victims of Turkish actions: 
 
[T]o the civilized World: the Treaty of Lausanne must be respected by Tur[key], 
RESPONSIBLE FOR TWO EXTERMINATIO[N]S in our century: of the 
Armenians in 1915, and of Greeks of Pontus in 1922. Although only 551 years 
dates the presence of the Turks in the land, that was glorified for 1000 years by 
the Byzantine Empire, and for another 1000 years before the byzantines by the 
Ancient Greeks – now it is time for the Tur[key] to be initiated to the 
Civilization, guarantor of the human rights. IMBROS and TENEDOS, 
CYRPUS, the KURDS – a TOUCHSTONE fo[r] the Civilized World to taste his 
civilization (Ίmvros May-June 1994d). 
 
In a 1995 article discussing Turkey’s relationship with the EU under the headline ‘Let’s 
Not Allow the European to Forget the Atrocities of the Turk’, O Polítis similarly wrote 
that, ‘[o]ur neighbours [i.e. the Turks] do not change tactic. Only the people and the 
victims change: Armenians, Greeks, Kurds’ (O Polítis April 1995). In 1997, meanwhile, 
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it printed a gruesome cartoon in which a caricatured Turk, complete with fez and a 
blooded scimitar, stands at the gates of Europe proclaiming to be European, whilst 
behind him lie four severed heads labelled, respectively, as the Cypriots, the Kurds, the 
Armenians, and the Greeks (O Polítis November 1997; see fig. 5). There is, in this 
illustration, no effort to prioritise the suffering of the Greeks – who, lying in the 
background, are in fact the least visible of the victims – because the implication that the 
‘true nature’ of the Turks is hidden behind a European façade is made more arresting by 
broadening the field of victims, and subsuming Greek victimhood within historical 
atrocities more recognisable to European ears. 
 
 
Fig. 5 ‘Open the gate. I’m a European!’ Cartoon from O Polítis November 1997. Reproduced with the 
permission of Ekdóseis Tsoukátou. 
 
Transcultural cross-referencing of this sort increased in frequency in expatriate 
discourse throughout the 1980s, and by the 1990s had become commonplace. Although 
comparatively considered and detailed treatments of Armenian and Kurdish history 
were sometimes on offer, these references more typically appeared as formulaic motifs, 
which persistently cropped up in discussions that largely remained focused on Greek 
suffering, quite often accompanied by little (if any) explanatory context (thus 
resembling, in many ways, the ‘off-the-peg memories’ on YouTube). Expatriate writers 
were evidently confident that their readers would immediately understand the relevance 
of bringing up these two communities, so much so that they were often content simply 
to mention them in passing by name, as in a 1990 Polítis article that referred to the 
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‘characteristic acquaintance of the Turkish race with genocide (Hellenes, Armenians, 
Kurds)’ (O Polítis March 1990; my emphasis), or a 1996 editorial from Ίmvros that 
characterised the uprooting of the Imvriótes as one of the ‘“works of love” of the Turks 
whose sensitivities have been registered in history towards the minorities of the 
twentieth century (Armenians, Pontics, Hellenes, Kurds et cetera)’ (Ίmvros October-
November-December 1996; my emphasis). Repeatedly name-dropped as fellow 
sufferers of Turkish atrocity, the Armenians and Kurds became part of a regular cast of 
persecuted minorities totemically cited by expatriate writers whenever they had cause to 
articulate their own grievances with Turkey. 
 
Analogous histories: Jews and Nazis 
 
For expatriate writers, the histories of the Armenians and the Kurds represented a 
compelling framework within which to situate Greek narratives of persecution, not least 
because the accused was the same in all three cases. The connections they envisaged 
confirm that memory of the Holocaust is not unique as a point of reference through 
which persecuted communities attempt to understand and represent their own 
experiences (see review essay II). Nevertheless, a perception of the Holocaust as ‘a 
standard of evaluation for judging the evility of other threatening acts’ (Alexander 
2009:58) did sometimes incline expatriate activists to draw analogies between Turkish 
actions and the Nazi genocide. In a 1979 article entitled ‘the Holocaust’, for example, O 
Polítis paralleled the experiences of the Greeks and the Jews as victims of persecution, 
and likened the Turks to the Germans as perpetrators of genocide (O Polítis May 1979). 
In June 1988 the newspaper similarly stated that Turkish military action on Cyprus in 
1974 ‘resembles Nazi methods, such as when Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia to 
liberate, allegedly, the Sudeten Germans’ (O Polítis June 1988), and in April 1994 
commented that the recent arrest of seven Kurdish deputies by Turkey ‘takes us back to 
the era of Hitlerism’ (O Polítis April 1994). More rarely, explicit comparisons were 
made between Nazi violence and the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey. A 1992 
English-language article in Ίmvros aimed at younger Imvriótes living outside Greece 
thus dubbed the anti-Greek policies on Imbros the Turks’ ‘“final solution”’ for the 
island (Ίmvros June 1992), whilst in a 1993 speech reprinted in Ίmvros Yiannis Politis 
declared that Turkish policy towards the Greeks of Imbros was so crafty that ‘even 
Hitler’s Nazi regime against the Jews would envy it’ (Ίmvros November-December 
1993). In a 2015 press release to coincide with the 60
th
 anniversary of the Istanbul Riots, 
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meanwhile, the Constantinopolitan Society wrote that the Septemvrianá ‘can be 
compared only to the atrocities of the Nazis of Germany’ (Constantinopolitan Society 
2015).  
 
Generally, however, expatriate newspapers shied away from explicit comparisons 
between their own experiences and the Holocaust of the Jews.
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 In common with many 
Greek YouTube users (see above), expatriate writers often preferred to draw analogies 
with Nazi genocide implicitly, by placing the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey in the 
same narrative sequence as the Holocaust without ostensibly voicing a direct 
comparison or likeness between the two events. In a 1977 article, O Polítis thus 
associated Turkish genocidal actions against the Armenians and the Cypriots with the 
Nazi genocide of the Jews, before segueing into Turkish actions in Istanbul, on Imbros, 
and in the Kurdish regions of Anatolia, which, though not explicitly labelled as 
genocidal acts, were by association likened to more infamous events that were identified 
as such. The newspaper wrote: 
 
The Armenian genocide found its mimic in the face of Hitler who followed the 
Turkish example with the genocide of the Jews during the Second World War. 
Another genocide was committed by the Turks against the Cypriot people, and 
by the very same [Turks] human rights have been flagrantly violated in Cyprus, 
Constantinople, Imbros, [and] in Anatolia against the Kurds (O Polítis June 
1977). 
 
In a 1985 piece entitled ‘And Yet … The Nazi-esque Crimes Continue’, O Polítis 
similarly ‘established polluting analogies with Nazism’ (Alexander 2009:45) by once 
again likening the Holocaust to the Armenian genocide and the invasion of Cyprus. The 
author of the article rhetorically asked the reader to consider: 
 
What differences are there between the Nazi crimes and those that have been 
committed and continue to be committed, for twenty years now, against the 
Cypriots by the Turks? Perhaps Turkey is excused, as the first teacher of 
genocide, with the extermination of the Armenians, whose blood still asks for 
justice, and we must leave her free to commit crimes against humanity? (O 
Polítis June 1985). 
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 Much to the dismay of expatriate writer Vasilis Kyratzopoulos (see below), expatriate narrators were 
also often cautious in their use of the term ‘genocide’. In 1984, for instance, O Polítis characterised the 
conscription of non-Muslims into forced labour battalions as an attempt to conduct ‘a “mini genocide” of 
the Romioí in the depths of Anatolia’, foiled only by ‘the victory of the Allies against [the Turks’] 
“soulmate” the Nazis’ (O Polítis June 1984), and even more tentatively in 1988 referred to the 




In such examples, expatriate writers sought to demonstrate the extremity of Turkish 
actions in Istanbul and Imbros not by directly equating their own experiences to those of 
the Jews under Nazi occupation, but rather by likening Nazi genocide to Turkish actions 
elsewhere, and thereby establishing the alleged genocidal propensities of those they 




There was, nevertheless, one particular analogy between the Nazi Holocaust and 
Turkish persecution of the Greeks of Turkey that emerged more persistently and 
explicitly in expatriate discourse: the comparison between the 1955 Septemvrianá and 
the 1938 Kristallnacht. This was, as we saw in chapter 5, an analogy often pursued by 
the Federation of Constantinopolitans. In the proceedings for the inaugural anniversary 
conference in 2008, for instance, the Federation observed that the Istanbul Riots have 
been ‘described by some as the “kristallnacht of Romiosyni”’ (Federation of 
Constantinopolitans 2008:104). In a presentation authored in 2012, they similarly wrote 
that the ‘size of the pogrom is comparable to the Crystal Night in Nazi Germany against 
the Jewish community 9-10 November 1938’ (Federation of Constantinopolitans 
2012:2), whilst in a 2014 presentation marking the 50
th
 anniversary of the 1964 
expulsions the Istanbul Riots were described as ‘very much resembling the 1938 Crystal 
Night in Nazi Germany’ (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2014a). In 2013 and again 
in 2014, the Federation in fact advertised their annual conference on the Istanbul Riots 
as the ‘anniversary of the Kristallnacht 6-7/9/1955 for the Hellenism of Constantinople’ 
(Federation of Constantinopolitans 2013b; Federation of Constantinopolitans 2014b). A 
2007 English-language presentation by the Federation, meanwhile, contained the 
following slide that made a particularly systematic effort to compare 1955 to 1938: 
 
THE SIMILARITY OF THE “SEPTEMBRIANA” WITH THE KRISTAL 
NIGHT OF NAZI GERMANY 
• There is a very high degree of similarity between the Kristal Night Riots 
[that] occurred against the Jewish Minority in Nazi Germany in 8-
9/11/1938 and the Events of 6-7/9/1955 in Constantinople. 
• The similarities are: 
– The involvement of Provocation 
– Action of Para-state mechanisms and use of storming troops 
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 As with references to the Armenians and the Kurds, analogies between expatriate experience and Nazi 
genocide were comparatively rare in my interviewees’ personal testimonies, with a few notable 
exceptions: Gerasimos, for instance, accused the Turks of implementing ‘Hitler-esque methods’ in their 
attempts to eradicate Kurdish ethnic identity, and likened Mustafa Kemal to Adolf Hitler (06/02/2012), 
whilst Markos, discussing Turkish actions during the 1919-1922 war with Greece, remarked ‘you win a 
war, but you do not kill everyone, we are not Hitler, only Hitler killed people. But the Turks did that: they 
slaughtered, they killed, they burned’ (04/05/2012). 
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– Attack to pre-marked shops and houses 
– The attack to sacred Places and Cemeteries 
– The orders of not massacres (Federation of Constantinopolitans 
2007). 
 
The next slide of the presentation staged a photographic dialogue between Kristallnacht 
and the Septemvrianá, juxtaposing an image of the broken shop window of a Jewish 
business in Berlin in 1938 with one depicting rioters throwing merchandise from a shop 
into the streets in Istanbul in 1955, and a photograph of the ruined Fasanenstrasse 
Synagogue in Berlin with one of Patriarch Athenagoras I standing in the looted Church 
of Saints Constantine and Helen in Istanbul (see fig. 6).  
 
 
Fig. 6 ‘Germany 1938-Istanbul 1955’. Slide taken from the Federation of Constantinopolitans’ 
PowerPoint presentation The Tragic Anniversary of the 6-7 September 1955 Turkish State Organised 
Ethnic Cleansing Night of the Greek Community of Istanbul (2007). Reproduced with permission. 
 
The Federation of Constantinopolitans has argued that identifying commonalities 
between events like 1938 and 1955 might contribute to academic understanding of how 
state-sponsored acts of mob violence are organised and put into practice, in order that 
similar incidents might be averted in the future (Federation of Constantinopolitans 




[T]he amazing similarity between Kristallnacht, organized and executed by the 
Nazi regime against the Jewish minority on 8-9/11/1938, and the Septemvrianá, 
which happened on 6-7/9/1955 in Constantinople […] is an interesting subject of 
study for researchers, which may reveal interesting facts about the planners of 
the Septemvrianá (Ouzounoglou 2013a). 
 
In his interview with me, Ouzounoglou further suggested that there was possibly a 
direct knowledge exchange between the SS organisers of Kristallnacht and the 
architects of the Istanbul Riots, reflected in some of the similar techniques deployed in 
both incidents (Ouzounoglou 2014a). 
 
It seems probable, however, that there is more to these analogic references to Nazism in 
expatriate awareness-raising materials and public pronouncements than academic 
curiosity. Like the recasting of the Septemvrianá as the ‘Third Fall of Constantinople’ 
(see chapter 5), presenting the Istanbul Riots as ‘Kristallnacht in Constantinople’ is an 
act of premediation that, consciously or otherwise, helps to ‘make the past intelligible’ 
(Erll 2011c:143), both for those who were there (insofar as it provides them with an 
established language and imagery through which to interpret their experiences, or a 
sense that they are not alone in having suffered such persecution) and for unfamiliar 
external audiences (who, in the West at least, are more likely to be familiar with 
Kristallnacht, and for whom the comparison will likely direct an interpretation of the 
events in Istanbul in 1955). The latter was put forward by former president of the 
Constantinopolitan Society Isaakidis in his interview with me, as an explanation for 
why expatriate organisations might draw analogies with the Nazi Holocaust: 
 
The whole world knows about the Jews. There is not a corner of the world that 
does not know that the Jews were burned by the Germans. About the rest? About 
the Roma, the homosexuals, about Greece that they burned, about Yugoslavia 
that they destroyed, about Russia where they killed 3 million. Next to the Jewish 
Holocaust, that – nobody knows […] Somebody from China, for instance, will 
not know about the slaughter of the Armenians or the Christians of Anatolia, but 
he knows that the Jews were burned in Germany […] For someone who is 
foreign, a third party, one must make a comparison (Isaakidis 2014). 
 
Levy and Sznaider suggested that because ‘Jewish victims can come to represent 
victimhood in general’ (2006:43) it becomes possible for ‘diverse oppressed groups to 
recognise themselves in the role of the Jewish victims’ (2006:46). Equally significant, 
however, is that diverse oppressed groups can also recognise their antagonists in the 
role of the Nazis, and thereby establish the culpability and villainy of their oppressors 
within a widely-intelligible narrative framework.  
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Kristallnacht, for some expatriates, thus constituted a compelling archetype with which 
to interpret and represent the Istanbul Riots of 1955. For one expatriate writer, however, 
such comparisons between anti-Semitic mob violence and the experiences of the Greeks 
of Turkey were insufficient, and risked obfuscating the particularity and severity of 
expatriate suffering. In his 2006 book Unregistered Genocide: Constantinople 
September 1955, Vasilis Kyratzopoulos wrote disapprovingly of the tendency for Greek 
and foreign writers to use the terms ‘pogrom’ or ‘Kristallnacht’ to characterise the 
Septemvrianá, which, he felt, generated a distorted impression of the Istanbul Riots 
(2006:22, 79). He suggested that the Polítes were wrong to assume that ‘because I am 
alive, there was no genocide’, and argued that the Septemvrianá should be classified as 
a genocide in terms of international law (Kyratzopoulos 2006:20, 23). He accordingly 
embarked upon an extensive effort to demonstrate how the Istanbul Riots, along with 
other measures targeting the Greeks of Turkey, satisfied the definitions of genocide as 
laid out by the International Criminal Court and by Genocide Watch (Kyratzopoulos 
2006:100-103, 115-131), which finished with a controversial (to say the least) statistical 
comparison with the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide: 
 
[L]et’s compare in numbers the Genocide of the Septemvrianá with its 
counterparts of the Holocaust (1933-1945) and Rwanda (1959-1963, 1993-
1994). 
During the Holocaust the Jewish population was to be found in the lands of 33 
modern-day European countries. The number of their victims ranges from 
3,800,000 to 6,500,000. Taking into account both of these figures, and the 
number of Jews who live today in the same areas (1,375,000), we see that 
around 3% of the population is Jewish. So, by 2005 the Jewish population had 
been replenished by between 21% and 36% respectively. 
At the beginning of the 1990s the population of Rwanda amounted to around 
7,000,000 of which around 1,800,000 were Tutsi. Today, the number of Tutsi 
amounts to 1,250,000 around 15% of the total population. The population has 
been replenished by 66%. At the beginning of 1950 the number of Hellenes in 
Turkey amounted to around 145,000 and constituted around 6.9% of the total 
population of Turkey. Today the Hellenes comprise 0.025% of the total 
population of Turkey (Kyratzopoulos 2006:129). 
 
Kyratzopoulos proceeded to make further comparisons based on the contemporary 
economic situation of these three groups, before concluding that ‘in the second half of 
the twentieth century the genocide of the Constantinopolitan Ethnic Group is, from a 
sociological perspective and in terms of International Jurisprudence and in substance, a 
reality’ (2006:130-131). Whilst other expatriate writers seemed to envisage (tentative) 
comparisons with the Nazi Holocaust as a vehicle for interpreting and articulating their 
own experiences of suffering, Kyratzopoulos was not prepared to assimilate the 
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Septemvrianá to other more infamous acts of violence for the sake of demonstrating 
commensurability. In his effort to ensure that memories of the Septemvrianá were 
‘written into global history as befits them’ (Kyratzopoulos 2006:18), he accordingly 
placed the expatriation of the Greeks of Turkey into explicit competition with the 
genocide of the Jews and the Tutsi, hoping in this way to demonstrate its reality as an 
act of genocide in the face of alleged indifference from the European community. 
Kyratzopoulos’ argument vividly reminds us that competition is always a possible 




When Silverman concluded his study of Francophone representations of the Holocaust 
and colonialism by arguing for a ‘cosmopolitical’ understanding of memory as 
composed of ‘hybrid and overlapping rather than separate pasts’ that would facilitate the 
elaboration of ‘new democratic solidarities in the future across the lines of race and 
nation commensurate with the interconnected world of the new millennium’ (2013:179), 
he expressed the hopes of many recent scholars that the transcultural dynamics they 
were identifying might represent a more ‘ethical’ way of remembering histories of 
violence (see review essay II). The examples of transcultural cross-referencing 
considered in this chapter suggest that there is some validity in such a position, but also 
point to the limitations of a cosmopolitical optimism. 
 
As Rothberg observed, it has often been assumed that the memories of different victim 
communities must interact competitively in a battle over the scarce mnemonic resource 
of public recognition; that ‘[a]s I struggle to achieve recognition of my memories and 
my identity, I necessarily exclude the memories and identities of others’ (2009a:5). If 
this assumption were accurate, we might expect the juxtaposition of different memories 
of atrocity in the examples presented above to generate a competitive hierarchy of 
suffering, what the author Daniel Mendelsohn has aptly termed the ‘my-genocide-was-
worse-than-your-genocide thing’ (Hartman, Hoffman, Mendelsohn and Miller 
2011:119). Competitive victimhood is certainly an aspect of memory’s 
multidirectionality (Rothberg 2011), as we saw through Kyratzopoulos’ efforts to raise 
the profile of the Septemvrianá in European discourse by arguing that Turkey’s 
persecution of its Greek minority ultimately had a more severe demographic impact on 
its target population than did the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide. Generally, 
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however, expatriate cross-referencing with Armenian and Kurdish experience actually 
appeared to be anti-hierarchical: expatriate writers were more concerned with 
constructing rhetorical solidarities premised on the equality and interchangeability of 
victimhood than with establishing competitive victim stratification, and, accordingly, 
routinely compromised the specificity of their own experience by asserting its 
commensurability with that of other ethnic groups within Turkey (that the accused is the 
same in all three cases is, of course, hugely significant). This provided them with a 
means to legitimate their narratives of persecution by asserting that other communities 
had similar experiences at the hands of the same perpetrators, and to visualise and 
represent the comparatively imperceptible day-to-day discrimination of the Greeks of 
Turkey through the more concrete analogies of war and genocide. In a December 1990 
article, O Polítis archetypally wrote that: 
 
Our neighbouring Turkey solved the problem of minorities with the Armenians 
through genocide from 1915 to 1923, with the Hellenes with another genocide 
from 1914 to 1922 and with repressions and expulsions from 1955 and later […] 
the same genocide was also used against the Kurds, many millions of people (O 
Polítis December 1990). 
 
In narratives of this sort, the writer was not compelled to explicitly label the persecution 
of the Polítes as genocidal, but rather was able to implicitly co-opt the arresting 
narrative framework of genocide by bracketing expatriate experience with that of the 
Armenians, the Greeks of Asia Minor and the Pontus, and the Kurds. Equating the 
experiences of the three communities also gave the expatriates a quantifiable human 
cost with which to represent their comparatively unquantifiable psychological trauma. 
In the June 1995 edition of O Polítis, one expatriate was thus able to enlarge the number 
of victims of – and, by consequence, the number of witnesses to – Turkish actions, 
precisely by not distinguishing between ‘our’ suffering and ‘their’ similar suffering: 
 
It is lamentable that U.S. policymakers ignore the fact that during the last 70 
years, three genocidal campaigns in my native Turkey have left 7.5 million 
innocent victims among the Armenian, Greek and Kurdish populations (O 
Polítis June 1995). 
 
If parallels with Armenian and Kurdish history thus functioned much like the references 
to Greek national history discussed in chapter 5, helping expatriate writers to both 
rationalise their own experiences and communicate them to others, they additionally 
gave expatriate narratives meaning and intelligibility beyond a Greek-Turkish national 
conflict, and therefore resonated more strongly with European or even international 
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audiences. In this sense, placing their experiences of persecution alongside other, more 
well-known histories of violence emphasised expatriate suffering rather than 
minimising or diluting its severity. 
 
The question remains, however, as to whether such transnational analogic thinking 
simply served to structure and buttress narratives about the self, or whether it also had a 
transformative effect on expatriate perceptions of Armenian and Kurdish others. In her 
discussion of the ways in which individuals acquire mass-mediated memories from 
other times and places, Landsberg maintained that because such ‘prosthetic’ memories 
‘feel real’ they can influence peoples’ perceptions and actions, and even contribute to 
the articulation of ‘an ethical relation to the other’ (2004:21; see review essay II). 
Indeed, expatriate invocations of the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish independence 
struggle were by no means restricted to casual name-dropping within narratives of 
Greek suffering, and sometimes found expression in impassioned proclamations of 
empathy, angry denunciations of Turkish actions (and international indifference) 
towards these communities, or appeals for readers and the Greek public to support their 
campaigns for recognition or liberation. In 1999, for instance, when PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan was captured by Turkish intelligence services in Kenya en route from 
the Greek Embassy in Nairobi to the airport, there was a strong outpouring of support 
for the Kurdish leader in O Polítis. In the March edition, one writer responded to the 
arrest – and to rumours of Greek complicity – as follows: 
 
Although many years have passed I remember like it was yesterday, when as an 
adolescent I was passing by the University, along with my mother and she 
stopped at the set-up tables of the foreign students – and not just that – also 
signed in favour of human rights, which were being trampled on in various 
countries of Asia and Africa, against Apartheid, in favour of Amnesty 
International, against the repression of the Kurds […] The years passed and the 
repressed people who found themselves taking shelter in our country multiplied. 
And I was vexed about why they did not stay in their own country to fight for 
their rights. However, my parents, who knew many times over the repression of 
Hellenic minorities in hostile countries and finally hunted took refuge in the 
mother patrída, told me to look upon them with sympathy and to help them as 
much as possible. Because they too as hunted refugees came here supported only 
by their strong souls and their few friends. 
– But they are dirty, they smell, I said to them, they will give us lice. 
– They do not have anything to wash with, they do not have homes or jobs, as 
soon as they straighten things out they will change immediately. We were the 
same when we first came as little children to the patrída [i.e. Greece]. 
[…] And yesterday I found my mother shedding tears whilst watching the news. 
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– We ended up handing him over, we forced him to leave the embassy, 
everything has been revealed. Poor Öcalan, the Turks are torturing him now. 
I, however, did not believe it and I sat down […] and watched the news, for 
many hours […] searching to find an explanation, which would justify our 
actions. And then I saw Aro [nickname for Öcalan] the powerful leader of 30 
million repressed people, fatigued, distressed and with the look of a small child 
who had become lost and was afraid. And I too began to cry. And I know that 
shortly, when the noise has died down […] I too will have forgotten that look 
[…] 
There is, however, that burning that remains in the stomach and the guilt that 
weighs heavily on me. And I know that every time my gaze meets that Kurd, 
that Iranian, that Albanian and whichever repressed person on this planet, I will 
be the first one to bow her head in shame. And that hurts. Good morning 
Kurdistan, good morning Aro. One thousand times sorry (O Polítis March 
1999). 
 
As Landsberg suggested, when we hear the testimony of another we ‘construct a 
memory triggered by the testimony that also is closely connected to our own archive of 
experience’ (2004:137). In this extract, it was precisely by equating the past experiences 
of her parents as Greeks in Turkey with the contemporary plight of the Kurds that the 
author of the article came to re-evaluate her prejudice towards Kurdish refugees in 
Greece: a postmemory (Hirsch 2012) of her parents’ suffering acted as a cipher for 
engaging with the otherwise intangible suffering of others. We might, in this sense, 
follow Landsberg in describing the author’s mass-mediated interaction with Kurdish 
experience in terms of a prosthesis that, facilitated by the equation between the Kurds 
and her own Greek parents, became ‘a more personal, deeply felt memory’ with the 
potential ‘to shape that person’s subjectivity and politics’ (Landsberg 2004:2). 
 
The discursive practice of paralleling Greek and Armenian experience with that of the 
Kurds, furthermore, lends some credence to Landsberg’s suggestion that the 
transcultural circulation of memories ‘might serve as the grounds for unexpected 
alliances across chasms of difference’ (2004:3). Both Armenian and Greek writers and 
activists have in the past commonly held the Kurds accountable for participating in both 
Ottoman-era and later Turkish anti-minority persecution, in particular the Armenian 
genocide, the Pontic genocide, and – to a lesser degree – the Septemvrianá (although cf. 
the discussion in chapter 4). From this perspective, incorporating the experiences of all 
three communities into a narrative of shared victimhood might help to promote 
intercommunal reconciliation, by stressing their commonality as victims over their 
differences as antagonists. Indeed, the rhetorical solidarities extended to the Armenians 
and Kurds by expatriate newspapers and community organisations were commonly 
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reciprocated by Armenian and Kurdish diaspora organisations in Greece. On the 78
th
 
anniversary of the Armenian genocide, for instance, the Armenian National Committee 
of Greece wrote the following in their newsletter: 
 
The chain of the Turkish expansionist policy begins in 1915 with the 
extermination of 1.5 million Armenians. 1916-1923 is the turn of 700,000 
Hellenes of the Pontus. 1922 the catastrophe of Smyrna and the civilisation of 
the Hellenes of Asia Minor. 1955 catastrophe in Constantinople and the 
extermination of 250,000 [sic] Hellenes. 1974 invasion of Cyprus and the 
occupation of 40% of its land. 1980-1990 a decade of persecution and 
extermination of the Kurdish people. 1993 threats against Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh (Armeniká Chroniká April 1993). 
  
In January 1997, the Balkan branch of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan 
(ERNK) sent words of support to the Constantinopolitan Society that similarly 
paralleled the experiences of the Polítes and the Kurds: 
 
The peoples who were victims of Turkish Kemalist racism do not differ from 
one another. We are the children of the same land of Asia Minor, whatever 
religion and whatever language we might have. Victims of the same barbarity, 
we strongly believe that every Kurd is today also a Constantinopolitan of 1941-
44, of 1955, of 1964 […] The Kurdish rebel of the National Liberation Front of 
Kurdistan carries in his heart the pain and the hope of the Constantinopolitan 
(Phoní tou Kourdistán January-February 1997). 
 
In this extract, contemporary Kurdish guerrilla fighters were portrayed as embodying 
the persecuted Polítes of the past, or as present-day auxiliaries for past Greek victims, 
carrying into their fight with Turkey not just their own pain but also an affiliative 
postmemory (Hirsch 2012:36; see review essay II) of Greek suffering in mid-twentieth-
century Istanbul. As such examples demonstrate, by the 1990s writers representing all 
three communities had become fluent in each other’s languages of victimhood, trading 
iconic dates such as 1915 and 1955 from each other’s mnemonic repertoires and 
displaying them as badges of solidarity and tropes to demonstrate the universality of 
minority experience in Turkey. In line with Landsberg’s predictions, such rhetorical 
solidarities could also be translated into real-world actions: in 1988, for instance, the 
expatriated Greeks worked collaboratively with Armenian and Kurdish diaspora groups 
in Athens to organise a protest to coincide with the diplomatic visit of Turkish Prime 





There are, nevertheless, reasons to be cautious about Landsberg’s somewhat optimistic 
portrayal of a prosthetic memory that has the ability ‘to produce empathy and social 
responsibility’ and ‘challenge the essentialist logic of many group identities’ through a 
‘sensuous engagement with the past’ (2004:9, 21). To begin with, the chasm of 
difference between the Armenians and the Greeks, on the one hand, and the Kurds, on 
the other, is not always so easily overcome, and historical enmities may continue to 
simmer beneath the surface in spite of rhetorical and public expressions of solidarity 
and communality. Former president of the Constantinopolitan Society Isaakidis, for 
instance, had the following recollections of planning meetings between the three 
communities for the 1988 protest: 
 
What is the funny thing, however? The Armenians were slaughtered by the 
Kurds! So when we had the first meetings, the representatives of the Armenians 
were sitting next to me, and the Kurds were sitting opposite […] I said to the 
Armenian woman, “now we are all sitting down together and we are speaking in 
a friendly manner, but don’t forget that those Kurds opposite us slaughtered you, 
and others during the Septemvrianá” (Isaakidis 2014). 
 
Narratives that cut across boundaries and call received historical knowledge into 
question may encounter severe resistance, and it cannot necessarily be assumed that the 
historical analogies individuals draw in particular discursive contexts will carry over 
into other social situations and become a permanent prosthesis to individual subjectivity 
(see below). As Jim House has observed, whilst ‘for some people, there are connections 
between historical events that appear “self-evident”’, for others these links ‘are either 
refused (due to “competing memories”) or genuinely not understood as being 
connected’ (2010:37).  
 
Landsberg also maintained that prosthetic memories ‘do not erase differences’ but 
rather create ‘the conditions for ethical thinking precisely by encouraging people to feel 
connected to, while recognising the alterity of, the “other”’ (2004:9). In some expatriate 
writing, however, the particularity of Armenian and Kurdish others was sacrificed for 
the sake of creating commonality of experience with the Greeks. The Armenian 
genocide and the Kurdish independence struggle were in such cases treated not as 
distinctive historical occurrences with which, due to their own experiences, the 
expatriates could empathise, but rather as a direct reflection of Greek experience. In a 
1995 Polítis article paralleling the histories of the Greeks and the Kurds, for instance, 
Koumakis (author of The Miracle, see above) was keen to emphasise that ‘the dramatic 
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moments that the Kurdish people are currently experiencing do not differ from those 
that the Armenians in 1915 or the Greeks of Asia Minor lived through’ (O Polítis May 
1995; my emphasis), whilst in 1999 another author in the same newspaper asserted that 
the Septemvrianá could be described as ‘a “photocopy” from Pontus, Asia Minor, 
Erzurum with the Armenians’ (O Polítis September 1999). Just like the characterisation 
of the Septemvrianá in terms of the Fall of Constantinople (see chapter 5), in such 
examples old or distant mnemonic forms were reactivated but simultaneously 
evacuated in the service of new contemporary meanings. As Erll put it, ‘[i]n their 
displacement, memory figures tend to be stripped of their complexity, detached from 
the details and contextual meanings they originally referred to’ (Erll 2011b:14; see also 
Cubitt 2007a:15, 17).  
 
From this perspective, transcultural cross-references might sometimes be as much (if 
not more) about the subject who is making the connections as about the objects of those 
connections. During his discussion of how Greeks and Turks are represented in each 
other’s literature, Millas described a ‘naïvely positive character’, who might 
superficially appear to be a positive representation of the other, but on closer inspection 
‘is effectively devoid of the ethnic characteristics of the abstract Other; he or she is 
practically assimilated into “our” group and is not one of “them” anymore’ (2004:143; 
2006:49-50). In some of the examples considered in this chapter, the Armenians and 
Kurds might likewise be characterised as ‘naïvely positive’ others, insofar as they 
appeared not so much as idiosyncratic communities with distinctive identities and 
histories, but rather as hollowed-out extensions of the Greek self, fleshing out and 
providing depth to a protracted narrative of Greek suffering. It does not automatically 
follow that such expressions of solidarity were ‘disingenuous’, but rather that the 
solidarities they envisaged were not necessarily based on a deep understanding of 
others’ experiences. As Silverman cautioned, whilst ‘imaginative and emotional 
investment in others’ traumas may allow for new solidarities across the lines of race, 
nation and culture’, there is an inherent risk of ‘clothing ourselves in others’ 
victimhood, which we have neither experienced nor properly understood, for the 
purpose of identity and, consequently, participating in a banal culture of empathy which 
is often more self- than other-oriented’ (2013:174). In such cases, expatriate narrators 
did not ‘suture [themselves] into a larger history’ (Landsberg 2004:2) so much as they 
sutured compelling off-the-peg motifs onto their own history: a history that was perhaps 
augmented but was not radically transformed by this interaction. 
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The depth and superficiality of multidirectional memory 
 
Elaborating upon his theory of multidirectional memory, Rothberg proposed that 
different texts or discourses (specifically those involving transcultural analogy) might 
be plotted along both an ‘axis of comparison’ – with equation at one extreme and 
differentiation at the other – and an ‘axis of political affect’ – ranging from solidarity to 
competition (2011:525). He examined, for instance, a controversial email circulated by 
an American sociology professor in 2009 entitled ‘Gaza is Israel’s Warsaw’, which was 
accompanied by a photo essay (taken from the website of Norman Finkelstein) claiming 
that the ‘grandchildren of Holocaust survivors [i.e. the Israelis] … are doing to the 
Palestinians exactly what was done to them’ (Rothberg 2011:537). Both the email and 
the photo essay equated Palestinian with Jewish suffering, and placed these victims in 
direct competition, and could therefore be located in the equation-competition quadrant 
on a map of multidirectional memory. On the other hand, texts such as ‘The Negro and 
the Warsaw Ghetto’ by W. E. B. Du Bois and ‘Les Deux Ghettos’ by Marguerite Duras, 
which, Rothberg felt, explored the relationships between the Holocaust and colonialism 
without ‘erasing their differences or fetishizing their uniqueness’, could be plotted in the 
differentiation-solidarity quadrant (Rothberg 2011:526-537). Rothberg argued that 
whilst discourses located in the competition-equation quadrant were distortive and 
potentially harmful, those in the differentiation-solidarity quadrant, ‘in which 
transcultural comparison does not simply produce commensurability out of difference’, 
had greater potential to create ‘arenas where injustices are recognized and new 
frameworks are imagined that are necessary, if not sufficient, for their redress’ 
(2011:538). 
 
I have adopted Rothberg’s mapping of multidirectional memory in order to reflect on 
some of the key examples pursued in this chapter (see fig. 7). Such a diagram, as 
Rothberg himself stressed, is necessarily ‘schematic’, but might nevertheless ‘provide 
orientation’ for a wider discussion about the implications of historical and transcultural 





Fig. 7 Mapping multidirectional memory based on the parameters described by Rothberg (2011). 
Discourses taken from my research are plotted in black, Rothberg’s examples are in blue, and examples 
drawn from the research of others are in red. The relative placement of different items within each 
quadrant is purely notional. 
 
Most references to the Armenians and the Kurds considered in this chapter can be 
placed in the solidarity-equation quadrant, as, in the process of articulating solidarity 
between the three communities, they tended to a greater or lesser degree to elide the 
historical particularities of their respective experiences. They are joined here by the 
‘off-the-peg memories’ of YouTube and Koumakis’ The Miracle, both of which, despite 
greatly varying levels of detail, equated the experiences of the Armenians, Greeks, and 
Kurds in order to more forcefully articulate their own grievances towards Turkey. A 
competitive logic was also discernible, both in those discourses that disrupted the 
solidarity between the three communities by equating contemporary Kurdish suffering 
with that allegedly inflicted by the Kurds on the Armenians and Greeks (competition-
equation), and in Kyratzopoulos’ controversial efforts to demonstrate the severity of 
Greek suffering through competitive contrast with other historical atrocities 
(competition-differentiation). The 1999 Polítis article ‘Dozmpas Kurdistan, Sorry Aro’ 
that proclaimed solidarity with Öcalan and the Kurds, meanwhile, might tentatively be 
plotted in the solidarity-differentiation quadrant. Although at first glance it may seem 
that this text was in the business of equation, the author likening her parents’ 
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experiences to those of Kurdish political refugees, there was also a sense in which the 
author did not simply compare Greek and Kurdish histories in order to reaffirm a 
preconceived perception of the Turkish other, but rather drew on the experiences of her 
parents as Polítes to reappraise her perspective on Kurdish suffering and that of other 
persecuted communities. As such, the text seemed to harbour greater potential for 
developing a more differentiated awareness of victimhood generally (Rothberg 
2011:526). At any rate, however, it is notable (amongst my material at least) that 
discourses which could be placed in Rothberg’s coveted solidarity-differentiation 
quadrant were few as compared to those that tended towards competition and, 
particularly, equation. This suggests that although (rhetorical) solidarities may indeed 
be a ‘frequent – if not guaranteed – outcome of the remembrance of suffering’ 
(Rothberg 2010:11), the ‘harnessing of the[se] legacies of violence in the interests of a 
more egalitarian future’ (Rothberg 2009a:21) may be comparatively uncommon as 
compared to the harnessing of these solidarities in a manner that distorts or blurs 
different histories and/or risks perpetuating historical enmities in relation to a common 
antagonist. 
 
There is, moreover, another significant way in which we might map multidirectional 
memory: the relative depth of the ‘knotting’ (Rothberg 2010:7; Silverman 2013:8) that 
occurs at the intersection between different histories or memories. Both Rothberg and 
Silverman maintained that their approaches, to use Silverman’s terms, dealt not simply 
with ‘parallel histories for the purposes of comparison’, but rather with the fact that the 
‘historical and physical basis of cultural memory is a genuinely composite affair’ 
(Silverman 2013:18). Accordingly, a consideration of memory’s inherent 
multidirectionality should consider not only moments at which different histories are 
consciously placed alongside one another in particular discursive contexts (the terrain of 
Rothberg’s multidirectional map), but also the more imperceptible journeys across time 
and space that memory has taken to arrive at its present configuration. These are the 
relatively unnoticeable processes, in other words, through which old mnemonic forms 
have persisted in novel, contemporary settings, such that even ‘the very fundaments of 
what we assume to be Western cultural memory are the product of transcultural 
movements’, from the ‘Persian influence on the Old Testament’ to the ‘French origins 
of what the Grimm brothers popularized as “German” fairy tales’ (Erll 2011b:11). In 
this sense, the transcultural movements of memory could also be notionally plotted 
along a single axis of depth ranging from entanglement to superficiality. Superficiality 
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in this sense does not denote meaninglessness (see also Landsberg 2004:20-21; 
Theodossopoulos 2006:3) or even, necessarily, lack of ‘genuineness’, any more than 
entanglement indicates premeditation or authenticity. The distinction, rather, has to do 
with the relative strength or solubility of the knotting that connects different memories 
and histories.  
 
At the entangled end of the spectrum, we would find attachments between different 
times and places such as the Persian influence on the Old Testament, so deeply 
entwined that they probably cannot be untangled. At the superficial end, meanwhile, we 
could place the sort of connections often envisaged by Greek YouTube users and 
expatriate activists in this chapter, analogies and parallels typically drawn in rather 
specific discursive contexts: that is, when their originator was attempting to 
communicate or assert the severity and authenticity of their own suffering. Such 
superficial memory knots may sometimes be evidence of deeper knotting. The 
discursive linkage between the Septemvrianá and the Fall of Constantinople discussed 
in chapter 5, for example, drew on the connections constructed by Greek nation-builders 
between the Byzantine Empire and modern Greece, and between the Ottoman Empire 
and the Turkish Republic; and even the more cursory analogies between Turkish and 
Nazi perpetrators were dependent upon the multidirectional engagements through which 
Nazism came to be seen by many communities as an archetype of evil (Rothberg 
2009a:244). Many of these shallower connections, however, are notable for their 
disposability, transience, and intermittency, and could likely be abandoned or reneged 
upon if necessary without greatly destabilising the narrator’s understanding of self or 
history. Though they might provide frameworks and schemata through which 
experiences are interpreted and represented in particular contexts, they will not always 
or necessarily generate deep, lasting knotting in the tissue of memory. Acknowledging 
the differentiated depth of multidirectional mnemonic attachments has implications for 
our understanding of everyday transcultural memory, insofar as superficial memory 
knots – particularly those that have no counterpart on the deeper level – may be 
comparatively unlikely to be internalised by individuals and to impact significantly 







The connections between the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey and the histories of 
other communities envisaged by expatriate writers and activists in their efforts to 
rationalise and represent their own experiences confirm the implausibility of 
‘maintain[ing] a wall, or cordon sanitaire, between different histories’ (Rothberg 
2009a:313). Whilst broadening the field of victims to include the Armenians and the 
Kurds helped to explicate, visualise, and substantiate expatriate narratives of 
victimisation by multiplying the witnesses able to ‘testify’ to the accused’s record of 
atrocity, analogies with Nazism made these claims resonant and intelligible to 
unfamiliar audiences and sought to establish the indisputability and severity of Greek 
suffering and Turkish guilt. Such transcultural cross-referencing might draw certain 
national groups closer together – perhaps even promoting reconciliation between 
historical antagonists such as the Armenians and the Kurds – as well as helping to bring 
comparatively marginalised or poorly-recognised histories to light. Yet there is also a 
danger that such comparison will ‘simply block insight into specific local histories’ 
(Huyssen 2003:14), particularly insofar as the elision of historical particularity is often a 
prerequisite for demonstrations of communality. Even worse, it might import ‘a 
dangerous model of victimization’ (Rothberg 2011:534) from one context to another, as, 
for instance, in the risk that equating frozen or ongoing conflicts, like the division of 
Cyprus or the Kurdish struggle for independence, with atrocities like the Armenian 
genocide or the Holocaust might make the former seem intractable and condemned to 
an escalating cycle of violence.  
 
There is, moreover, ample evidence in this chapter to suggest that the transcultural 
circulation of memories might be as likely to strengthen as to abrogate nationalist 
discourses and national frameworks of remembrance. Staging expatriate suffering as 
part of a broader and unchanging pattern of Turkish behaviour stretching from the 
Armenian genocide to the contemporary repression of the Kurds, and drawing implicit 
or explicit parallels between Republican Turkey and Nazi Germany, only served to 
fortify hostility towards the Turks as a homogenous community of violent perpetrators, 
and to consolidate the rhythms of Greek nationalist history. Transcultural cross-
referencing, in other words, typically reaffirmed what expatriate writers thought they 
already knew about the Turks, and made the articulation of more differentiated 
representations of the Turkish other less likely. Sharing memories of suffering may thus 
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also involve sharing abstract enmities, and perpetuate rather than dissolve national 
conflicts and distinctions. In Silverman’s terms, the ‘perceived solidarities across the 
lines of race and nation and the construction of hybrid memory are no more progressive 
per se than the ethnic or national stories they attempt to replace’ (2011:627).  
 
Memories are characterised and marked by their ‘incessant wandering’ both across and 
within boundaries and borders (Erll 2011b:11). If it is thus inevitable that different 
histories will be ‘implicated in each other’ (Rothberg 2009a:313), it is nevertheless 
important to recognise that the depth of this knotting is variable. Some connections and 
superimpositions are so complexly knotted together that they cannot be disentangled, 
whilst others are more superficial and may be undone with minimal pressure. 
Comparatively superficial memory knots have been a feature of this chapter. Whether in 
online debates, formal and public expressions of grievance, awareness-raising materials, 
or (more rarely) in personal testimony, transcultural historical analogies were typically 
drawn in rather particular discursive contexts: that is, when people were attempting to 
validate their narratives and make them intelligible to others. Insofar as these 
transcultural flows of memory have been internalised by individuals, it was more as a 
language for talking about suffering than as ‘privately felt public memories’ (Landsberg 
2004:19) that might drastically restructure their perceptions of history, others, or their 
own identity. It is in this sense that we might characterise such discourses not as 
‘prosthetic memories’ but as ‘off-the-peg memories’, compelling yet comparatively 
hollow and ‘returnable’ motifs that could be temporarily borrowed as explanatory 
devices, but could also be disregarded or ‘placed back on the peg’ if necessary without 
major surgery to self-understanding or received historical knowledge. 
 
* * * 
 
In part II, I have explored how the Greeks of Turkey drew analogies between their own 
experiences and aspects of both Greek national history and the histories of other 
communities. The references to national archetypes such as Leonidas’ Spartans and the 
Fall of Constantinople in chapter 5 have much in common with the transcultural cross-
references to Armenian and Kurdish experiences in chapter 6, in that they gave broader 
meaning and significance to contemporary occurrences, and made them intelligible and 
communicable to others. There was, nevertheless, a potentially significant difference to 
be discerned between the national linkages explored in chapter 5 and the transcultural 
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connections developed in chapter 6. Responding to Alexander’s discussion of the 
universalisation of Holocaust discourse (see review essay II), Robert Manne remarked 
that whilst it might indeed be misleading to speak of ‘“Jewish ownership of the 
Holocaust”’, it is equally inaccurate ‘to deny that a claim to ownership is indeed often 
made’ (2009:144). Although the transcultural dynamics of memory identified in recent 
scholarship certainly demonstrate that literal ‘ownership’ over mnemonic forms is a 
fallacy that ignores, amongst other things, the ways in which old memories are put to 
new purposes (Erll 2011b:14), it is also clear that claims to ownership over particular 
historical legacies may continue undiminished. It could be said, for instance, that 
expatriate linkages between 1453 and 1955 involved a claim to ownership over the 
Byzantine past, in a way that comparisons with the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish 
independence struggle, drawn to demonstrate that other communities had similar 
experiences at the hands of the same perpetrator, did not. This does not mean that 
‘national’ connections are more ‘authentic’ than ‘transcultural’ connections, for as we 
saw in chapter 5 national memories are in themselves inherently transcultural, even if 
this is ostensibly hidden from view. It does, however, reflect the likelihood that those 
transcultural connections which exert their influence most strongly on individuals’ lives 










Welcome to Gökçeada 
The Greek return to Imbros 
 
When a visitor arrives on the island that the Greeks call Imbros, they are likely to be 
greeted with the Turkish words: Gökçeada’ya hoşgeldiniz, ‘welcome to Gökçeada’. In 
the casual summer tourist, this gesture is unlikely to provoke any negative reaction. For 
many Imvriótes, however, returning to their place of birth after years or even decades of 
exile, to be welcomed to Gökçeada, by residents who mostly arrived on the island after 
1964, represents an affront to their sense of belonging on the island as natives. Two 
elderly returnees described this sentiment as follows: 
 
I will not allow anybody to say to me “welcome”. Where are you welcoming 
me? You are welcoming me to my own house? […] Who are you welcoming? I 
who have been here for 3000 years? (Antonis 10/08/2013). 
 
[When I come to the island] I feel both like a native and like a foreigner. When I 
come and they welcome me to the place, it offends me. Because he who is 
welcoming me really is a foreigner. And I say to him, “welcome to you too! I 
was born here, I have been here for 4000 years. How long have you been here? 




Since the early 1990s, after restrictions on travel to Imbros were eased, there has been a 
growing return movement amongst the expatriated Greeks of the island, primarily 
seasonal but also semi-permanent and even permanent (see below).
143
 In this chapter, I 
explore narratives of belonging and legitimacy in the Greek return to Imbros, based on 
oral and written expatriate testimonies as well as my own visit to the island in the 
company of the Imbriot Society in August 2013. The possibility of return has had a 
significant influence on the Imbriot expatriate community, reconfiguring their 
relationship with Greece and Greek nationalist history, facilitating the transmission of 
an Imbriot identity to the Greek-born generation, and permitting a reconnection not just 
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 These claims to ancestral belonging phrased in the first person singular recall Amira Hass’ anecdote 
about an elderly Jewish settler in the West Bank who, asked how long he had lived there by an American 
journalist, reportedly answered, ‘[d]o you see the wad (valley) below? From up here I used to watch 
Adam and Eve playing with each other’ (2011:177). 
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 There has been no comparable large-scale seasonal or permanent return of Greeks to Istanbul, although 
many former residents of the Princes’ Islands do return to spend their summer vacations in their former 
places of residence. Unlike the Imvriótes, the Polítes have not typically kept possession of their properties 
in Turkey, and many of the former Greek neighbourhoods of Istanbul have changed beyond recognition, 
such that there are no places in Istanbul comparable to the Greek villages on Imbros in which to ‘stage’ an 
en masse communal return. 
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with lost places but between long-estranged people. Yet the return has also been laden 
with anxiety and ambivalence, as the community faces everyday challenges to their 
sense of belonging on Imbros, villages reinvigorated by people but still littered with 
ruins, and a resurgent but uncertain future on the island. 
 
Scholarship on the Imbriot return has focused in particular detail on the festival for the 
Assumption of the Virgin Mary celebrated in the village of Agrídia on 15 August. At 
this festival, oxen – donated or paid for by members of the community – are sacrificed 
as offerings to the Virgin Mary, and their meat, cooked overnight, is freely distributed 
in the yard of the village church after the morning liturgy on 15 August.
144
 Babül and 
Tsimouris have explored how the festival, since the beginnings of the Greek return, has 
emerged as a site of contestation for competing claims over history and belonging. On 
the one hand, the 15 August celebration constitutes a symbolic demonstration of Imbriot 
belonging on the island, a ritual ‘re-membering’ of place in Tsimouris’ words (Babül 
2004:11; Babül 2006a:58-59; Babül 2006b:48-49; Tsimouris 2001:6; Tsimouris 
2008:194; Tsimouris 2014:41-43, 48-50). The attendance of Turkish officials at the 
festival as guests of the Greek hosts provides an opportunity for the Imvriótes to 
establish belonging on the island as natives, and to forge cordial relationships with the 
local authorities so as to facilitate the continuing return movement (Babül 2004:11; 
Babül 2006a:59; Babül 2006b:49; Tsimouris 2008:237-239). The Turkish authorities, 
on the other hand, promote the festival as a demonstration of the island’s cultural 
diversity, and – in light of the permits they issue for the event each year – as evidence 
for their tolerance of minority communities (Babül 2004:11; Babül 2006a:58-59; Babül 
2006b:48-49; Tsimouris 2008:240; Tsimouris 2014:42). Babül has also explored Greek 
returnees’ claims to belonging in relation to official Turkish discourse, arguing that 
whilst the Turkish state’s claims to ownership over the island are premised on 
sovereignty and law, Imbriot counter-claims draw on memory and narratives of nativity 
(Babül 2004:2-3, 10-14, 15-19; Babül 2006a:50-51, 57-64; Babül 2006b:45-46, 48-51). 
 
My focus, however, is not on the ‘self-conscious memory site[]’ (Schudson 1997:3) of 
the annual festival in Agrídia as a ritual of belonging, nor on official or legal channels 
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 Traditionally the sacrifices were performed by the villagers themselves in the village, although in 
recent years the animals have been killed in a slaughterhouse in the capital on the insistence of the 
authorities. Since the early 1990s, the composition of the festival’s attendees has transformed 
dramatically, as increasing numbers of ‘outsiders’ – Greek and Turkish tourists, Turkish residents of the 
island, foreign researchers – began to attend, such that by 2000 the Imvriótes were somewhat ‘lost in the 
crowd of tourists’ (Tsimouris 2008:228). 
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of belonging, but rather on the negotiation and contestation of belonging in the 
everyday experience of the return. This is in part because the size and permanence of 
the return movement, and by extension the range of settings in which belonging is 
asserted or called into question, has grown far beyond the centrepiece on 15 August. 
More broadly, however, it reflects an interest in how belonging is experienced and made 
meaningful in the mundane settings of daily life, rather than more specifically how it is 
represented in (or around) public ceremony and official discourse (see review essay II). 
Though Tsimouris focused on narratives surrounding the 15 August celebration as a 
reflection of contests over belonging on the island, he also touched upon the ways in 
which ‘the past is painfully actualized’ on a daily basis for the returning Imvriótes as 
they walk familiar routes, meet familiar faces, and repair their damaged properties 
(2014:54-55). It is this aspect of the Greek return to Imbros with which I am primarily 
concerned in this chapter. I explore how the Imvriótes themselves talk about the return 
and the ruins they see around them, the internal debates and schisms that emerge in the 
course of everyday life, and feelings of belonging and alienation expressed in banal 
rather than exceptional commemorative settings. In particular, I consider the quotidian 
challenges to returnee belonging that emerged from the demographic and topographic 
changes that have taken place on the island, the returnees’ relationships both with the 
extant local Imvriótes and the island’s Muslim settlers, and – especially for the summer 
vacationers – the manner of their return as visitors rather than permanent residents. 
 
 
Fig. 8 Cartoon from Ίmvros May 1985. A family of Imvriótes is depicted standing in the Aegean Sea 
contemplating two signposts, one labelled ‘New Imbros’ the other ‘Imbros’. Reproduced with the 




Between ‘New Imbros’ and ‘Old Imbros’ 
 
When the Greeks of Imbros left the island in droves during the 1960s and 1970s, many 
feared that they would never be able to return. In 1973, the newspaper of the Imbriot 
Society wrote that those remaining on the island in anticipation of a reversal of fortunes 
were living with a ‘futile hope’ (Imvriakí Ichó March 1973). The 1970s and 1980s were 
for the Imvriótes the decades of exile, during which time it was difficult to make even 
brief return visits. Aside from financial and psychological barriers, return journeys were 
complicated because Turkey had designated the island a restricted military zone. In 
order to set foot on Imbros, any returning Imvriótes were obliged to obtain a special 
permit from Çanakkale, and to surrender their passports for the duration of their stay. 
According to informants who did make the trip, those who were successful in obtaining 
visas for Imbros were commonly permitted only short stays on the island, whilst others 
were turned away altogether. Those who did make it to Imbros often recalled a sense of 
indignation at having to obtain permits to visit the place of their birth. As Vasillis – born 
on Imbros in 1938 – put it, remembering his visits to the island from Germany in the 
1970s: 
 
I came here and I had to go to Çanakkale to take a visa, to come to my home. 
Those were difficult times […] You come to your house and they keep your 
passport. Because I had come to my house. My house! […] That bothered us a 
great deal (12/08/2013). 
 
Moreover, male expatriates who had left Turkey before undergoing their military 
service and had not yet acquired Greek citizenship were unable to return to Turkey lest 
they be detained by the authorities and compelled to fulfil their obligations as Turkish 
citizens (Christoforidis 1993:165). During this period, the Greek villages on Imbros 
suffered from decline and neglect: few of the departing Imvriótes sold their (remaining) 
properties, and with no one to look after the empty residences many buildings fell into 
disrepair (through a combination of natural causes and looting/vandalism). 
 
Faced with the prospect of permanent estrangement from their place of origin, the 
Imvriótes set about reconstructing their community in their new places of settlement. 
They founded a cultural association, congregated in coffee shops owned by compatriots, 
wrote and read nostalgic pieces about Imbros in their community newspaper, recreated 
traditions such as 15 August festival, and discussed the establishment of a ‘New 
Imbros’ in Greece where they could return to a rural style of life. In doing so, they were 
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adhering to the well-established Greek ideology of ‘lost homelands’ (chaménes 
patrídes), which emerged from a nostalgic longing for place expressed in the memories, 
writings, and toponyms of Greek refugees displaced by the Greek-Turkish population 
exchange, and had by the 1960s become a central feature of Greek nationalist discourse 
(Liakos 1998; Liakos 2007:214-215).
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 In February 1965, in light of the deteriorating 
situation on Imbros, the Imbriot Society took the decision that the construction of a New 
Imbros was the only way to ensure the community’s survival (Ίmvros September-
October-November 1995), and began to appeal to the Greek government to grant them 
agricultural land in Western Thrace where the Imvriótes could ‘revive our lost patrída 
from its ashes, offering to Mother Greece a New Imbros’ (Ίmvros April 1977). This 
ambition was premised on the notion that ‘Old Imbros’ was a lost cause, as was made 
plain in the October 1972 edition of Imvriakí Ichó: 
 
[U]nited and tightly bounded, with one belief and one conviction, one hope and 
one dream: to acquire a second patrída, a “NEW IMBROS”. Let us not wilfully 
blind ourselves with false hopes and comforts to the sick. The game is lost. 
Imbros has escaped our hands […] A “NEW IMBROS” must howsoever be 
established (Imvriakí Ichó October 1972a). 
 
By 1980, a rural area near Komotini in Western Thrace had been earmarked as the 
future location for New Imbros (Ίmvros March 1980), which was first visited by the 
Imbriot Union of Macedonia-Thrace in May 1980 (Ίmvros July-August 1980a), and 
afterwards by the Imbriot-born Archbishop Iakovos of America alongside the societies 
of Athens and Thessaloniki in August 1981 (Ίmvros September 1981). The land, it was 
hoped, would be granted to the Imvriótes by the Greek state (Ίmvros April 1977; Pavlos, 
pers. comm., 4 November 2015), and in November 1981 Ίmvros printed the prototype 
plans for the first and second phases of the settlement, intended to cover over 400,000 
m
2
 (Ίmvros November 1981). The Imbriot community associations had even begun to 
solicit applications from expatriated Imvriótes who were interested in being allocated 
plots of land in New Imbros (Asanakis 2016b; Ίmvros July-August 1980b). 
 
The large-scale resettlement of the Imvriótes in Thrace, however, never came to fruition 
(Ίmvros May-June 1994a), and ultimately the idea of New Imbros disappeared from the 
agenda altogether. Financial and practical difficulties were in the main decisive,
146
 but 
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 The Athenian neighbourhood Néa Smýrni (‘New Smyrna’) in which many Imvriótes settled is itself a 
reflection of this ideology. 
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 The Imbriot Society laid the blame firmly with the Greek authorities for prematurely withdrawing their 
support for the establishment of a New Imbros near Komotini. In a strongly-worded article in the 
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the demise of the New Imbros movement also coincided with the re-emergence of ‘Old 
Imbros’ (Stelios 27/05/2013). After 1988, many of the impediments that had prevented 
the Imvriótes from visiting their island began to dissipate. Since the early 1980s, the 
Greek government had begun to grant citizenship to the Greeks of Turkey (see chapter 
2), permitting those who had lost their Turkish citizenship, and/or left without 
completing their military service, to cross the border into Turkey without fear of arrest. 
In around 1993, the Turkish authorities lifted the restricted access to the island, marking 
the transition of Gökçeada in the eyes of the Turkish government from a military zone 
to a touristic area (Babül 2004:7; Babül 2006a:56; Babül 2006b:48).
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 By this point, 
the open prisons near Schoinoúdi (see chapter 2) had also been closed down, and the 
prisoners relocated off the island (Ίmvros March 1992). A brief period of Greek-Turkish 
reconciliation after the 1988 Davos process also helped to give expatriates the courage 
to return to Turkey. In line with these developments, the Imvriótes began to make 
tentative return visits, first in the late 1980s (Tsimouris 2001:5), then with increasing 
frequency throughout the 1990s.  
 
These early returnees were mostly those born in the late 1950s or 1960s, who had 
migrated either to Istanbul or abroad at a young age (Tsimouris 2001:6; Xeinos 
2011:203). Many had not seen each other since childhood, and they congregated on the 
island during the month of August. Such inaugural visits were marked by caution and 
nervousness. For many, the first return provoked a reliving of the trauma of their 
original departure, as described by Kostas, who returned in 1989 having left Imbros as a 
teenager in 1981: 
 
[When I left for Greece] there was a climate of fear. [On the bus] I was waiting 
to pass the border to be free […] The return had similar characteristics. When I 
return, my eyes are trying to be very keen. I am afraid once again, about what I 
will encounter, how they will treat me […] For the first ten years, every time 
that we crossed the bridge on the way back to Greece from Turkey, we said 
“oof! We have been saved again!” (07/06/2013). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
December 1982 issue of Ίmvros, they complained that the state had failed in its duty to the Imvriótes: 
‘[w]e wish firstly’, they wrote, ‘to remind everyone that Imbros is the latest in a series of ‘lost patrídes’ 
[…] and afterwards to express our bitterness about the disregard for [our] sacrifice on the altar of the 
national interest in difficult hours’ (Ίmvros December 1982). The movement finally foundered in the 
early 1990s, when migrants of Greek descent from post-Soviet states settled in the area that had been 
earmarked for New Imbros (Asanakis 2016b). 
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 Babül dated the lifting of the restricted zone to 1993, although a March 1992 Ίmvros article included 




Unsure of how long the favourable climate would last, the young returnees were 
initially relishing the moment rather than making long-term plans, but when these 
fleeting pilgrimages became a regular summer tradition the returnees started to look to 
the future. In the words of Giorgos, a contemporary of Kostas, who first returned in 
1991: 
 
We had the impression that we probably wouldn’t come again. And so we got on 
very well in those years, because in essence we were just relaxing […] We had 
parties, every day. But when Greek-Turkish relations improved and we realised 
that we will continue to come to Imbros, all that was shelved. We became 
serious (14/08/2013). 
 
In August 1992, a group of 104 young returnees drafted and signed an open letter 
appealing for others to join them in following summers (Christoforidis 1993:167-169), 
couched in terms of a return to roots and a simpler way of life: 
 
Friends, we are a group of young people whose only common characteristic is 
our Imbriot identity. This identity did not mean much for most of us and this 
appeal letter might never have been written. This year, however, we experienced 
something extraordinary: we came to Imbros […] As young people we all face 
every day the problems placed upon us by stress, pollution, commercialism and 
even human relationships. We believe that this place, with its unique 
genuineness, its pure soul, and its – as yet – unpolluted nature, provides a unique 
opportunity for us to escape and simultaneously re-evaluate the impersonal 
society of our age. Come to our patrída so that we can get to know one another, 
so that we can discover human warmth again and feel the ancient soul of Imbros 
[…] Let us meet in the land of our fathers. Come to Imbros (Ίmvros September-
October 1992). 
 
As the return movement became larger and more sustained, many Imvriótes set about 
rebuilding and refurbishing their family houses that had fallen into disrepair, in order to 
make them habitable for seasonal or even permanent residence. The mountainous 
Agrídia and its neighbour Άgios Theódoros – birthplace of Ecumenical Patriarch 
Bartholomew I – have probably seen the most dramatic revival, and although there are 
still ruined houses many have been restored: the Imbriot Society calculated that by 2007 
in Agrídia alone around 180 houses had been rebuilt at a cost of over €4 million 
(Imbriot Society 2007). A greater proportion of the properties lie in ruin in the 
sprawling Schoinoúdi (Ίmvros May 1991; over 80% according to Tsimouris 2014:47), 
although here too many returnees have taken pains to rebuild damaged family homes. In 
these three villages, a summer visitor is thus confronted by an incongruous blend of 





Fig. 9 Panoramic view of Schoinoúdi (Imbros), 2013. Note the juxtaposition between renovated and 
whitewashed houses and those lying in disrepair and ruin. Photograph by the author. 
 
The number of summer returnees increased throughout the 1990s, and by the turn of the 
century between 2000 and 3000 Imvriótes could be found on the island in mid-August, 
travelling not just from Greece but also from Australia, Germany, North America, and 
elsewhere, and usually staying for between one and four weeks (Tsimouris 2001:5). A 
growing number of these are drawn from the Greek-born generation, who visit the 
island with their families during the summer vacation, and are henceforth referred to as 
the ‘young generation’. Many developed an emotional relationship to Imbros (and to 
one another) before their first physical encounter with the island through their 
attendance at Imbriot cultural associations (Xeinou 1993:190), although for others it 
was the visits themselves that prompted an interest in their origins and a stronger sense 
of commonality with their Imbriot compatriots (see below). Since the 1990s, an 
increasing number of Imvriótes – particularly retirees – have made a semi-permanent 
return, coming to the island at Easter and staying until October, then wintering in 
Greece or elsewhere; these returnees are known locally as ‘six-monthers’. Others – 
again predominantly retirees – have returned to live permanently on the island; I call 
these individuals ‘permanent returnees’, distinguished from ‘local Imvriótes’, which is 
commonly used by expatriates to refer to those who never left.
148
 A significant number 
of expatriates, nevertheless, have never returned to the island, or did so only to 
sell/claim whatever remaining property they possessed or to collect sick and elderly 
relatives (Tsimouris 2008:212). Many of these non-returnees are those who left as 
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 My use of the term ‘local’ to distinguish those who never left from those who have returned is purely 
for semantic clarity, and is in no way intended to be a qualitative assessment of the returnees’ legitimacy 
as natives on Imbros. 
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adults, who prefer to preserve their memories of the island as it was before they left 




If at the beginning of the 1980s Imbros seemed lost to its expatriate population, by the 
year 2000 seasonal and even permanent return had thus become a real possibility: as 
Imbriot Society president Christoforidis put it in a speech in 1997, for the young 
returnees ‘Imbros is not a nostalgic past that we are attempting to revive’, but ‘a reality, 
a substantial portion of our life’ (Ίmvros April-May-June 1997). This, in turn, led to a 
re-evaluation of the discourse of ‘lost homelands’ and of the community’s relationship 
to the Greek state. On 8 March 1988, the president of the Imbriot Society met with 
Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Yiannis Kapsis to express his frustration that Imbros 
had not been raised by the Greek side during recent bilateral meetings between the 
Greek and Turkish prime ministers Papandreou and Ozal (the aforementioned Davos 
process). Kapsis responded to this criticism by assuring the Imbriot Society that the 
plight of the Imvriótes had not been forgotten, and would be brought to the attention of 
the Turkish authorities in future meetings (although he also declared that the 
expropriations of land and property on Imbros were a matter of Turkish domestic policy 
in which Greece could not intervene, much to the dismay of the Society) (Ίmvros March 
1988a). Ίmvros cautiously welcomed Kapsis’ pledge, but also expressed concern as to 
whether or not the Greek authorities considered the situation on Imbros to be an ‘open 
question’ and one that might yet be reversible, and accordingly appealed to the Greek 
government to recognise that ‘Imbros and Tenedos do not constitute “lost patrídes”’ 
(Ίmvros March 1988b). In a 1991 article calling on the Imvriótes to pull together to 
‘rebuild our patrída’ rather than selling their remaining property on the island, and 
appealing for support from the Greek state and tolerance from the Turkish state, the 
Imbriot Society likewise declared that, ‘THE IMVRIÓTES do not accept “lost patrídes”’ 
(Ίmvros July-August 1991). In 1994, meanwhile, Ίmvros complained that Greece 
‘prematurely and without a fight, included Imbros and Tenedos in the lost patrídes’ 
(Ίmvros May-June 1994a). As the return movement became a reality, representatives of 
the Imbriot Society became increasingly dissatisfied with the assimilation of the 
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 According to estimates by the president of the Imbriot Society, after the opening of the minority 
schools in Άgios Theódoros in 2013 and in Agrídia in 2015 (on which, see below), the number of 
permanent Greek residents on the island reached 350 (of which around 50 are those who never left). 
Those Greeks who are resident on the island for six months or more of the year now number over 100, 
and in August there are typically between 2000 and 3000 Greeks on the island. In 2016, Greek residents 
were in a majority in the villages Agrídia, Άgios Theódoros, Glyký, and Schoinoúdi (significantly fewer 
Greeks remained in, or returned to, the capital Panagía and the villages Kástro and Evlámpio, the latter of 
which has become part of the capital) (Asanakis 2016a). 
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Imvriótes and their recent history to a nationalist discourse of ‘lost homelands’, which 
they identified as both a symptom and possible cause of Greek government indifference. 
Many came to feel that their only true patrída was to be found on Imbros, not in a ‘New 
Imbros’ within the Greek patrída (see fig. 10 below): as the Society declared in a 
banner that appeared in the newspaper in 1993, ‘the Imvriótes have a patrída. They have 
an identity and a 3000 year history’ (Ίmvros March-April 1993a). 
 
 
Fig. 10 Two photographs from Ίmvros October-November 1987. The caption reads: ‘The tragic fate of 
the majority of Imvriótes who live today in some big city: The houses do not differ greatly from jails, 
whilst those that they were compelled to leave by force, have already converted to ‘beautiful ruin’. Left: 
an elderly Imvriótissa in her ‘home’, in Athens. (Photograph G. Xeinos). Right: That was once her real 
HOME. (Photograph Vaso Xeinou).’ Reproduced with the permission of the Imbriot Society. 
 
Confronting ‘the real Imbros’: challenges and prospects 
 
It is the great hope of the Imbriot Society and many of the expatriated Imvriótes that the 
summer pilgrimages to Imbros by its former inhabitants might be metamorphosed into a 
larger, more permanent and sustained presence for the community on the island. 
Realising this ambition requires the expatriates to confront what Pavlos – born in Άgios 
Theódoros on Imbros in 1970, and a regular seasonal returnee since the late 1980s – 
called ‘the real Imbros’. I asked Pavlos whether he had considered making a permanent 
return to the island, to which he responded: 
 
I have thought about it, and not just now that I have a family, but always […] On 
the other hand, things are not simple […] All of us have the image of the 
holiday: in August you go, there are people in the villages, all of the doors are 
open, you go to the sea, et cetera. Yes. But if I return, it means that I will be 
there for at least eleven months, and for one month I will go on vacation 




Once the month of August is over, the population in the Greek villages dwindles, 
dropping off dramatically during the winter months.
 
According to residents of Agrídia, 
for instance, whilst there might be as many as 500 people in the village in the summer, 
in winter there are just 25 (Miltos 06/08/2013; Orestis 06/08/2013; Stamatios 
07/08/2013). As permanent returnee Antonis put it, in the winter in Schoinoúdi, ‘it is the 
wind that keeps you company’ (10/08/2013). 
 
There were several practical obstacles standing in the way of the re-establishment of a 
sizeable year-round Greek population on the island. First and foremost, there was the 
struggle to retain whatever property titles had remained in the hands of the Imvriótes 
after the expropriations of the 1960s. In 1994, Turkey embarked upon a cadastral survey 
on the island, requiring property owners to present themselves and prove that they had 
been the legal owners for at least 20 years and were continuing to make active use of the 
property (Babül 2004:11-12; Council of Europe Resolution 1625 (2008); Imbriot 
Society no date-b; Ίmvros March-April-May 1995; Tsimouris 2008:126). Their long-
term exile, coupled with the loss of Turkish citizenship by many, greatly complicated 
this endeavour for the Imvriótes (Babül 2004:12; Babül 2006a:57; Babül 2006b:48; 
Tsimouris 2008:126-127). Properties that were not successfully claimed in this manner 
passed into the ownership of the state, and challenging such decisions through the 
courts was an expensive process with no guarantee of success (Babül 2004:12; Babül 
2006a:58; Council of Europe Resolution 1625 (2008)). The Imbriot Society has 
accordingly urged each individual to take personal responsibility for their own estates, 
and to ensure that their properties do not pass into the hands of any non-Imbriot, 
maintaining that ‘[n]obody has the right to be indifferent’ about property ownership on 
the island (Ίmvros March-April-May 1995; see also Tsimouris 2008:126, 211-212). It 
was in order to ensure that they had the right to claim or inherit property that many 
expatriates retained, or took pains to re-acquire, their Turkish citizenship, and the 
Imbriot Society called on all those who could reacquire Turkish citizenship ‘without 
great sacrifices’ to do so (Ίmvros July-August 1992). 
 
Preserving property titles in the Greek villages greatly facilitates the return of retirees 
and vacationers in the summer months, but a more sustainable Greek community would 
also have to encourage working people and their children to (re)establish themselves on 
Imbros. Language, citizenship, and socio-cultural differences between urban centres 
such as Athens and Thessaloniki and rural Imbros are all pertinent issues in this regard, 
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but the two obstacles most consistently identified by potential Imbriot returnees 
concerned work and education. Although a handful of returnees were able to work in 
agriculture – Christos, for instance, has assisted with his father’s animal husbandry 
since his permanent return in 2011 (08/08/2013) – the majority of the cultivatable fields 
and olive groves owned by the Imvriótes were confiscated by the state during the 1960s 
and 1970s, making the re-establishment of a large-scale agricultural economy amongst 
the returning Greeks difficult. The recent touristic awakening of the island might 
provide alternative employment opportunities, and indeed some returnees have 
established small businesses on the island: Savvas, for instance, has opened a cafe in 
one of the Greek villages (14/08/2013). In a paper delivered at an Imbriot Society 
conference on the future of Imbros in 1993, Yiannis Politis correspondingly urged his 
compatriots not to visit the island only as ‘guests-tourists’, but to take part in the 
tourism industry as ‘entrepreneurs’ (1993:155). There is, however, some concern 
amongst the community that Greek involvement in business might create tensions with 
the resident Turkish population. As café owner Savvas put it: 
 
Many people want us to form large businesses here […] [But] if three or four of 
our people open businesses and become competitors [with the Turkish 
residents], I think there will be a problem. They will look at us a bit like, “ah, we 
did this and this to get you to leave, and now you return and raise your head 
again.” For that reason I would prefer people like me to set up small shops, so as 
not to bother other people so much (14/08/2013). 
 
As I detailed in chapter 2, the abolition of Greek-language education on Imbros was 
arguably the most significant trigger for the exodus of its Greek-speaking population, 
and for most young Greek families who might resettle on the island it is a precondition 
that their children would be able to receive an education taking place half in Greek in 
accordance with the Lausanne provisions. In September 2013, after almost 50 years 
without any Greek-language education on the island, the Turkish authorities granted a 
permit for the opening of a new minority primary school in Άgios Theódoros. This 
development was the result of many years of negotiations involving both Greek and 
Turkish officials, the expatriate societies, the European Union, and the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate in Istanbul. It was followed by the opening of a secondary school and a 
high school in September 2015, and for the academic year 2015-2016 there are at least 
14 students attending the minority schools on the island. The opening of the schools was 
a hugely significant moment for the community both symbolically and practically, a 
‘dream of half a century [that has] become a reality’, in the words of the Imbriot 
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Society, which provides ‘hope for a new beginning on the troubled land of Imbros’ 
(Imbriot Society 2013b). The reopening of the minority schools has been a cause for 
great optimism for many, but has also provoked anxieties about the community’s long-
term prospects on the island. Some returnees expressed to me their fears that they would 
not be able to attract sufficient numbers of students to make the schools viable. 
Speaking in 2013 before the opening of the primary school in Άgios Theódoros, 
permanent Schoinoúdi resident Antonis speculated that the granting of the permit might 
be a ploy of the Turkish authorities: 
 
I am afraid. Maybe I am wrong, but I’m afraid it will remain an anecdote […] 
The Turks behaved cleverly here. “They [the Imvriótes] want the school, we [the 
Turks] will issue a permit to open their own school”. Now they will say, “come 
on, you were shouting for so many years about how you don’t have a school. I 
have opened one for you. What is going on? Where are the children?” 
(10/08/2013) 
 
It is hard to overstate, however, the enthusiasm with which the new schools have been 
received by many Imvriótes, for whom the presence of children on Imbros is a 
necessary and exciting first step towards creating a future for the Greek community on 
the island. As six-monther and Agrídia resident Kleopas argued: 
 
It is a chain, one thing will bring another. When you start something, you have 
to build upon it slowly, you cannot do everything in one go […] If those 
children spend their childhood years on the island, they will always come, even 
50 years later (09/08/2013). 
 
In this section, I have sought to demonstrate that the post-1988 Greek return to Imbros 
has been a time of great optimism for the expatriated Imbriot community, tempered, 
however, by a sense of anxiety regarding its sustainability. As I prepared to take my 
leave from the Imbriot Society in Athens after a research expedition in June 2013, news 
filtered through from the island of the murder of a Greek woman by a Turkish woman 
in Schoinoúdi. The attack was a ‘crime of passion’ unrelated to broader Greek-Turkish 
relations or the problems of the past (Imbriot Society 2013a), but nevertheless triggered 
an immediate concern amongst Society members that the tragic incident might damage 
intercommunal relationships and jeopardise the position of the Greek community. The 
Imbriot Society moved quickly to issue a press release the following day, stressing that 
‘this isolated incident should not affect the efforts for reestablishing the links of the 
Imvrian Community with its native island and the return of as many Imvriotes to the 
island as possible’ (Imbriot Society 2013a). To the best of my knowledge, no wider 
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repercussions emerged from the murder, but the incident testifies to an unshakeable fear 
amongst the Imvriótes that at any moment something might occur to destabilise the 
precarious momentum of the return movement. 
 
‘Native tourists’: belonging in the Imbriot return 
 
Since 1988, the returning Imvriótes have been engaged in a struggle not only to address 
the practical difficulties associated with seasonal and permanent return, but also to re-
establish their own sense of belonging on an island greatly transformed during their 
period of exile. The renovation of family homes (see above) was an important 
component of this effort. Indeed, many returnees recalled great distress when they were 
unable to stay in their own homes on their first return to the island. Panagiota – born in 
1927 and a migrant to Greece in 1980 – made a return journey to the island in 1989, but 
was compelled to stay in a hotel as her own house in Panagía was leased to a Turkish 
resident. She described the experience as follows: 
 
One year, we came with my son, and we stayed in a hotel. And when I went out 
walking and saw our [family] home up there, whilst I was staying in the hotel, I 
went crazy. I said, “my son, I am leaving, I cannot stay here. Either find me a 
house to stay in until the rental term is up, or I am leaving” (Panagiota 
07/08/2013). 
 
It was to avoid this feeling of alienation that Vasillis – returning to visit the island in 
1993 after a 15 year absence – chose to sleep amongst the ruins of his family home in 
Agrídia rather than seek out rented accommodation: as he explained it to me, ‘I could 
not pick up my suitcase and go to another house; I wanted to sleep here’ (12/08/2013). 
 
Even once individual family homes were renovated, however, returnees still faced daily 
reminders of the island’s traumatic recent history through their encounters with ruined 
houses whose owners never returned, and expropriated lands that used to belong to the 
community. When I asked Dimitra – who was born in 1939 and is now a six-monther on 
the island – how the ruins in Agrídia made her feel, she responded with a rich 
description of life in the village in the 1950s and 1960s, before making the following 
contrast with the contemporary situation: 
 
I remember all of that, you understand? Good things, lovely things. And 
yesterday, when I passed by the house of my cousin, I lent on the fence of the 
yard with both of my hands, and I thought, “what is man, and what becomes of 
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him?” The buildings, and the houses, everybody leaves, the people die, and the 
houses have become ruins. What can you say? I remembered the olden days, at 
that moment (09/08/2013). 
 
Antigoni – born in Schoinoúdi in 1975, a resident of Greece since 1983, and today a 
seasonal returnee to Imbros – similarly described how the ruins and expropriated areas 
provoked in her a feeling of disinheritance: 
 
My feelings are mixed […] You feel that the house in which you live is yours: 
that is mine and nobody can touch it. You see, however, the ruins, the bits that 
they have taken, and I don’t know if they can ever become ours once again […] 
I mean, it is theirs. As much as we might want to believe otherwise, it used to be 
Hellenic but they have conquered it (13/08/2013). 
 
Panagiota recalled with anger and dismay one particular summer when she spotted one 
of her father’s former fields out of a bus window, which had been expropriated by the 
state and given to Turkish settlers to cultivate. She told the story as follows: 
 
I mentioned that it was our field, and somebody on the bus said to me, “get 
down there and harvest it, if it belongs to you”. I said, “I should go down there 
and steal from my own field?” I was struck by tears. There was a pear tree in 
that field, which my father had planted. Below the field they [the new owners] 
had a grocery, and I asked those Turkish ladies, “that tree, did it bear fruit this 
year?” “It was full,” they replied. And I said, “did you not leave one pear for me 
to eat, it was my father that planted that tree. It is our field”. And they said to 
me, “it was yours; now it is ours” (Panagiota 07/08/2013). 
 
On one afternoon during my own stay on Imbros, I went out walking with summer 
returnee Kostas in Agrídia, who beckoned me to follow him along a short-cut. After we 
had struggled up a narrow, ascending gap between two ruined houses littered with roof 
tiles and fallen masonry, Kostas turned to me and said, ‘sorry I brought you this way. I 
always remember it from when I was a child, as a path lined with people drinking 
coffees’ (fieldnotes 8 August 2013; see fig. 11). Operating in the 2010s on memories 
from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the returning Imvriótes experience an uncanny 
encounter with a place in which familiarity and strangeness collide awkwardly 
(Tsimouris 2008:212). For the returnees, the ruins literally and figuratively disrupt the 
flow of everyday life in the villages, conjuring up unbidden memories of the past and 





Fig. 11 Looking back along the path in Agrídia (Imbros) walked by Kostas and the author in August 
2013. Photograph by the author. 
 
Surveying the juxtaposition between the lively streets bustling with tourists and the 
ruined houses of Άgios Theódoros in mid-August, Pavlos remarked to me that 
‘sometimes you have the unpleasant feeling of being a tourist’ (fieldnotes 8 August 
2013). Indeed, for seasonal returnees such as Pavlos, the brevity of the summer 
sojourns, and the fact that they coincided with the peak of the tourism season on the 
island, often heightened the disorientating notion that they had become, in the words of 
one writer in Ίmvros, a ‘foreigner in the land where you were born and became a man, 
in your own patrída!’ (Ίmvros July-August 1992). Panagiota coined the term ‘native 
tourists’ to describe these concurrent and paradoxical sentiments of belonging and 
alienation: 
 
Panagiota: Now people come, as you know, from all the corners of the earth. 
Native tourists [chuckles]. 
Halstead: Native tourists? 
Panagiota: I call them native tourists, because they left for faraway places, yet 
most come in the summer. Some have houses, some ruined, some do not […] 
Halstead: Do you feel like that, like a tourist? 
Panagiota: Yes, yes. I mean, I feel like a foreigner. When we meet [Turkish 
people] on the boat, and they ask, “where are you from? Are you natives or 
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not?” I say “I was born here, where are you from?” […] This is our patrída, 
home (07/08/2013). 
 
It was not uncommon for the local Imvriótes who never left the island to characterise 
the summer returnees in comparable terms (Tsimouris 2008:217). These few hundred, 
primarily elderly islanders are proud at having remained on the island, and have often 
for years resisted their relatives’ attempts to transport them to Greece (Tsimouris 
2001:9). When I asked Patroklus, a nonagenarian and local resident of Άgios Theódoros, 
whether he had ever considered leaving, he replied in no uncertain terms, thumping the 
table for emphasis: ‘I leave? I never once thought that I could leave from here [thumps 
table]. I did not think once [thumps table] about leaving from here. And nor did I leave. 
I did not go anywhere’ (08/08/2013). Katerina, a local resident of Agrídia, similarly 
exclaimed to me in jest: ‘I say, “until the last, I will hold aloft the flag, I will not 
abandon the Hellenic flag!”’ (06/08/2013) These local Imvriótes experience a somewhat 
ambivalent relationship to the summer returnees. Though they are undoubtedly happy to 
see old familiar faces, particularly returning relatives and children who have resettled 
abroad, it was often suggested to me by both returnees and elderly locals that the 
summer sojourners spoil the serenity for those that remained: as Katerina put it, when I 
asked if she was pleased that the Imvriótes had started to return, ‘I will tell you: I am not 
so much because, you know, when you have become accustomed to your peace and 
quiet [laughter]’ (06/08/2013). For many of these local Imvriótes, yearly witnesses to 
the disjuncture between the carnivalesque month of August and the hardships of winter, 
the summer returnees were simply ‘tourists’. Fokas, who left for Greece in 1975 but 
now once again lived permanently on the island, recalled that in the 1990s, 
 
the older people saw us as strangers, even our own people. “The tourists have 
come,” they would say. Old people. Our people. Of course, they had lived many 
years here alone, and they saw us as tourists (13/08/2013). 
 
Babis – who emigrated to Australia in 1970 and now returns on-and-off in half-year 
stints – reported a similar indifference amongst the local population towards the 
returnees, suggesting that the former felt the latter had acquired pretensions in their host 
countries: 
 
Now the old people say, “ah, they [the returnees] will all leave. They are 
tourists”. [But] they don’t think of me as a tourist, they see me as a local. Why 
do they see me as a local? Because I don’t return as though I went to Australia 




The perception that the presence of the seasonal returnees is purely recreational and 
makes little contribution to the long-term prospects of the community was even shared 
by permanent returnee Miltos, who had left the island for Greece in 1969 in his twenties 
but now resides on Imbros permanently. He had the following to say: 
 
Now people come to the village, but they come as tourists. And tourism is not 
what we want, for me to come to my patrída as a tourist. I have to come to do 
something, to sow something, to take advantage of whatever has remained. Not 
the 10 days, “tra la la, bla la la”, we come, we sing and dance, and we leave 
again, and we throw our money about. If I was coming for tourism, I would go 
to some other island […] Six-monthers are tourists [too]. If they want a touristic 
programme, they should go elsewhere. They do not help at all (Miltos 
06/08/2013). 
 
Not surprisingly, many returnees vociferously rejected their appellation as ‘tourists’. In 
the words of permanent Schoinoúdi returnee Mimis: 
 
I never felt like a tourist, because a man does not feel like a tourist at home. He 
must not feel so. Regardless of the fact that some of our people called us tourists 
[…] The older people called us tourists, for them of course we are tourists, but I 
do not accept being a tourist in my house (13/08/2013). 
 
Permanent Schoinoúdi resident Antonis similarly remarked that, ‘I never felt like a 
tourist, I didn’t allow myself to feel like a tourist’ (10/08/2013), whilst seasonal returnee 
Babis, asked if he had ever felt like a tourist, responded ‘no, I feel like a real Imvriótis, 
because I am real’ (12/08/2013). Running through statements of this sort was not only a 
strong sentiment of belonging to Imbros, but also a defiant insistence in not allowing 
that sense of belonging to be called into question. 
 
The returnees’ daily interactions with the island’s Muslim settlers, as well as the 
former’s perception of how the latter saw the returning Greeks, presented further 
occasions for the assertion and contestation of belonging. Since 1960, the island has 
been extensively settled by Anatolian Turks and Kurds, who took up residence in the 
capital, five new settlements, and some of the Greek villages (particularly Kástro, but 
also in smaller numbers in villages with extant Greek populations such as Άgios 
Theódoros and Schoinoúdi) (Babül 2004:14-16). My interviewees almost unanimously 
agreed that the island’s Muslim residents were friendly and welcoming towards the 
returning Imvriótes, and several observed that the opportunity for the returnees to 
interact with Turks on a daily basis had helped to replace a negative image of the 
generalised Turk as a hostile other with a more positive impression of particularised 
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Turks as human beings (Theodossopoulos 2006:9; see chapter 4). In Istanbul-born 
Imviotis Loukas’ terms: 
 
We gather together there [on Imbros] in the summer, and we recycle not just the 
bad things and the hatred and such, but also new experiences and needs. And we 
have our houses, and you must get a builder, a Turk, [you must] speak to the taxi 
driver, as a friend, afterwards at your wedding his wife brings you a present, she 
knits a jacket for your child, and after that they become people (08/05/2013). 
 
For their part, the island’s Turkish authorities have formally welcomed the return of the 
Greeks, portraying their presence as a demonstration of Gökçeada’s multiculturalism (in 
a manner that nevertheless typically sidelines Imbriot experiences of persecution and 
expatriation in favour of a narrative of equality and tolerance) (Babül 2006a:60, 63; 
Babül 2006b:50; Tsimouris 2014:40-41, 47-48). In a 2013 interview with the newspaper 
Çanakkale Olay, for instance, Gökçeada’s Turkish mayor Yücel Atalay encouraged the 
Imvriótes to return and take their place in the local economy: 
 
That is our biggest dream. With luck they will come. It is our great expectation. 
At the moment, we are able to accommodate around 500 families […] We must 
make them entrepreneurs […] With them Imbros will move forward […] We 
have always treated everyone equally, we have not separated anyone. We 
behaved the same towards everyone. We gave everyone the opportunity to work. 
Until now no incident has occurred. Imbros can become a very beautiful model, 
a model applicable across the whole country (Gökçeada Gazetesi 10 June 2013; 
translated by Valeria Antonopoulou). 
 
The returnees’ reactions to such expressions of welcome are somewhat ambivalent. On 
the one hand, cordial intercommunal relationships have greatly facilitated the return 
movement, and invitations for the Greeks to participate in the touristic development of 
the island present a possible means by which the seasonal return might be made more 
permanent and sustainable (echoing Politis’ arguments at the 1993 Imbriot Society 
conference (see above)). As we saw at the outset, however, accepting this invitation also 
meant tacitly acknowledging that it is the Turkish authorities who have the right to 
welcome or ‘accommodate’ the Imvriótes rather than vice versa, an implicit challenge to 
the returnees’ sense of historical belonging and nativity on the island. As permanent 
Schoinoúdi resident Mimis put it when I asked about his relationships with the village’s 
Muslim inhabitants: ‘they have welcomed us. Now, you will say to me, “they have 




The returning Greeks also provide a significant seasonal injection into the local 
economy (Babül 2004:10; Babül 2006a:57; Babül 2006b:48), buying produce from 
shopkeepers and stallholders in the capital, hiring local labour to renovate their houses, 
travelling around the island in taxis driven by Turks, and when necessary renting hotel 
rooms operated by settlers. This fact is not lost on the returnees, many of whom felt that 
the island’s Muslim population saw them as visiting tourists rather than returning 
natives. In the words of six-monther Vasillis: 
 
Now they want us. Especially those that have businesses and shops. They wait 
for us, saying “when will August arrive when all of those Hellenes will come?” 
[…] Many say, “if you Hellenes don’t come, the following year we will leave” 
[…] Especially us six-monthers, every Sunday we go to the market 
(12/08/2013). 
 
Cafe owner Savvas concurred, attributing the settlers’ positive reception of the 
Imvriótes to the latter’s economic contribution: ‘the Turks have accepted our return’, he 
declared, ‘because they think of us as tourists. They say, “great, come here, leave your 
money”. That was the idea of the authorities. We come for three or four weeks, spend 
plenty of money, and we leave’ (14/08/2013). 
 
If the returnees were thus afraid that they were nothing more than touristic consumers in 
the eyes of the island’s authorities and settler populace, they simultaneously had to 
confront the possibility that they themselves had become objects of touristic curiosity. 
As Politis remarked in his 1993 speech (see above): 
 
As strange as it may seem to you, the only touristic interest which Imbros has to 
offer, are the half-ruined houses and the handful of Christian traditions of the 
few inhabitants of the island (1993:151). 
 
Gökçeada’s mayor estimated that, in the year 2012, 320,000 Turkish tourists visited the 
island (Gökçeada Gazetesi 10 June 2013; translated by Valeria Antonopoulou). Though 
it would be inaccurate to suggest that these huge numbers were drawn solely by the 
island’s Greek history (most come for the beaches and the windsurfing), it is 
nonetheless part of the appeal for many Turkish tourists (Babül 2004:7), who not only 
attend ceremonial events like that on the 15 August in Agrídia, but also make daily 
visits to the Greek villages throughout the month of August, soaking up the atmosphere 
and taking photographs of the Greek houses (reflecting something of a broader 
multicultural nostalgia in contemporary Turkey (Babül 2004:8; on which, see Komins 
2002; Mills 2005; Mills 2006; Pamuk 2005; Türeli 2010)). Characteristically, a Turkish 
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journalist who visited the island in 2012 affectionately wrote about the ‘picturesque’ 
backstreets of Agrídia and the cheerful Greek-speaking old ladies (Today’s Zaman 3 
June 2012). As Babül has discussed, a number of Istanbul Turks have even bought 
houses in some of the Greek villages, and see themselves as part of the effort to 
preserve the Greek cultural heritage of the island (2004:9). Permanent returnee Christos 
spoke favourably to me about the ‘cultivated’ and ‘educated’ Turks who had recently 
acquired former Greek houses in Άgios Theódoros, observing that, 
 
they attempt to preserve the physiognomy of the village in the old-style, for it to 
be recognisable as a Hellenic village. They too do not want it to change from 
that perspective: I can tell you that they work harder to preserve it than our 
people! (08/08/2013).  
 
Several of my interviewees also saw the influx of Turkish tourists as an opportunity to 
inform ordinary Turks about the plight of the island’s Greek community that is 
conspicuously absent from official pronouncements and tourist brochures: Antonis, 
Fokas, and Savvas each had stories of eliciting sympathetic and even tearful responses 
from visiting Turks who had sought an explanation for the ruined and abandoned Greek 
villages (Antonis 10/08/2013; Fokas 13/08/2013; Savvas 14/08/2013). Nevertheless, 
these visitations were sometimes a cause of discomfort for the returnees. Yiannis, a 
member of the young Greek-born generation summering in Agrídia, offered me the 
following impressions about the presence of Turkish tourists in the village: 
 
First of all I think it is good because the island becomes more well-known, 
tourism will increase […] On the other hand, I can say that I don’t like it so 
much, sometimes when I see them taking photographs, because I feel that they 
are doing it because we are something totally different from them, something so 
strange, with the negative meaning of strange (15/08/2013). 
 
Pavlos similarly lamented that when he sees Turkish tourists circulating with cameras in 
Άgios Theódoros he sometimes feels ‘like the Native Americans on their reserve’ 
(fieldnotes 08/08/2013). As we walked together through the village on an August 
afternoon, we passed a delicatessen blaring out Greek music. When I remarked that it 
was interesting that the Imvriótes had started to open businesses like these, Pavlos 
corrected me: ‘that is a Turkish shop. It is run by Turks. They probably play the 
Hellenic music to appeal to the Turkish tourists’ (fieldnotes 08/08/2013). Six-monther 
Themis, meanwhile, explaining his reservations about the 15 August celebration in 




We come here, for parties and dances, I see it and I am saddened even more. I 
don’t know how other people see it. They go and they force themselves to 
dance. Where did they find that good humour? Inside their souls are crying. It is 
like they put us on a stage, the Turks put us on a stage to watch us, and when the 
performance finishes they leave (11/08/2013). 
 
The Greek returnees to Imbros experience an island transformed not only by the decay 
of its Greek villages, but also by its touristic awakening. Whilst the possibility of 
participating in this tourism industry might provide the Imvriótes with employment 
opportunities and therefore make permanent return more feasible, it also generates 
anxieties amongst those uncomfortable with the notion that their return to the place of 
their birth is simply feeding the local Turkish economy. Equally, though they may feel 
affronted by the suggestion that it is they who must be welcomed by the settlers rather 
than the other way around, in turn the flow of Turkish tourists into the Greek villages 
provides the Imvriótes with the opportunity to themselves play the role of hosts to 
Turkish outsiders. In this sense, the returnees’ everyday interactions with the growing 
tourism industry simultaneously undermine and strengthen their sense of belonging on 
the island: treated as tourists in the capital, they are themselves visited as natives in their 
villages. 
 
‘When you return to your patrída’: the young generation 
 
In a 2012 speech given in Istanbul to mark the publication by a Turkish university of a 
monograph about the Imvriótes, Imbriot Society president Christoforidis described what 
he called a ‘modern Imbriot identity’ that had been inculcated amongst foreign-born and 
foreign-raised Imvriótes through the ‘to-and-fro between foreign countries and the 
village on the island’ (Christoforidis 2013). For Christoforidis, it was hugely significant 
that this second-generation Imbriot identity had been developed through physical 
encounters with the island rather than purely in cultural associations abroad, permitting 
the young generation to develop their own relationship to Imbros as a contemporary 
place (Christoforidis 2013).
150
 Indeed, interviewees from the young generation who 
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 There is something of a contrast to be made here with the Greek-born generation of Polítes, who have 
typically not had the same opportunities to frequent their parents’ former places of residence in Istanbul. 
Accordingly, whilst the young generation Imvriótes spoke about Imbros as a contemporary, living 
environment and often eschewed lengthy historical narratives, young generation Polítes tended to invoke 
Istanbul not as a place but as a history: as Mitsos – born in Istanbul in 1976 but raised in Greece from a 
young age – put it, ‘the community is here [in Greece], but the history is there [in Istanbul]’ (06/06/2013). 
The possibility of ‘return’ for the young generation Imvriótes has, nevertheless, exerted its influence even 
on those who have not yet been able to visit, who frequently described developing an emotional 
attachment to the island through the Imbriot Society in Athens – dubbed a ‘little Imbros’ by Natasha 
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were regular visitors to the island unanimously concurred that they had developed a 
strong sense of belonging on Imbros derived from their summer experiences. Eva, for 
instance, who visited the island for the first time in 2011, explained that, ‘when I come 
to Imbros I feel very at ease […] It may not be my home here, but I feel like I am at 
home on the island. And there may be Turks here, and I may not know the language or 
be able to talk, but I feel very nice, I do not feel like I am in a foreign place’ 
(13/08/2013). Yiannis – born in Thessaloniki in 1996, and a regular visitor since 2000 – 
described how he developed a similar feeling of homeliness in Agrídia as the summer 
population grew larger: 
 
Halstead: How would you describe your first trip to Imbros? 
Yiannis: I think it was amongst my favourite visits […] When you return to your 
patrída, both the trip and the memories that it brings are lovely. 
Halstead: And have you ever felt at all like a tourist when you come here? 
Yiannis: Look, in the beginning, I felt like a guest, because most of the houses 
were in ruins, and the Turkish population was dominant […] Now, in the last 
few years, because most of the houses are inhabited again, and with the six-
monthers the Greek population has become more prevalent, especially in our 
village, I feel like I belong to this community (15/08/2013). 
 
Later on in the same interview, Yiannis explained that he had decided to apply for 
Turkish citizenship in order to be able to inherit his family home in the future. I asked 
him whether he had any fears that his friends in Greece would react badly to this 
decision, to which he responded: 
 
If we had had this conversation two years ago, I would have been very certain 
that I did not want to take Turkish citizenship, because I believed that I would 
“become a Turk”. But afterwards I sat down and thought about it, and, slowly 
slowly, I came to feel more Imbriot than Hellenic. So I thought that whatever 
they may say in Greece, it doesn’t bother me […] Because as I told you the 
Hellenes behaved towards the Imvriótes as though they were Turks, and the 
Imvriótes isolated themselves somewhat, they became like a different family, 
embedded, of course, within the Hellenic community, but somehow different. 
And now that we come to the island, and I start to learn the history and meet 
other young people, I feel Imbriot […] So I feel Hellenic, of course, but 
increasingly I feel Imbriot (Yiannis 15/08/2013). 
                                                                                                                                               
(07/06/2013) – and a yearning to make the journey to Imbros. As Christina put it, ‘hearing constantly 
about Imbros, seeing photographs of the island, we feel like we are on the island when we come here [to 
the Society]’ (07/06/2013); or, in Paschalis’ terms, ‘I think of it [Imbros] as my patrída, even if I was not 
born there and have not been’ (07/06/2013). When I asked Maximos – who was born in Athens in 1999, 
and had origins from both Imbros and Tenedos, but had by 2013 only managed to visit the latter – where 
he would say he was from, he responded: 
Maximos: From Imbros, I think of myself as being from Imbros, it is more in my heart than 
Tenedos. If somebody asks me, the first word I will say is “Imbros”’. 
Halstead: And Athens, when would you say that? 
Maximos: Athens? Towards the end (06/06/2013). 
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Through the experiences and friendships he has gained on the island, Yiannis has 
developed a local Imbriot ‘inflection’ (Cowan and Brown 2000:20; see review essay I) 
to his Hellenic ethnic identity, which has not led him to drastically re-evaluate his 
relationship to the country of his birth, but rather allowed him to feel distinctive within 
it; Hellenic, that is to say, but different from other Hellenes (see chapter 3). In his own 
words: 
 
[My grandfather told me] that the Hellenes [of Greece] were very ambivalent, 
and treated the Imvriótes not as Hellenes but as Turks […] Us, as Imvriótes, we 
belong: we are Hellenes, we simply didn’t have the fortune to join the Hellenic 
state […] We are in some way, not different exactly, simply as Imvriótes we are 
otherwise united [i.e. they have a distinctive kind of solidarity]. When you see 
an Imvriótis you think of him as your fellow countryman more than you would a 
Hellene […] So certainly I feel that Imbros is my patrída, and Thessaloniki too, 
simply Imbros is something separate (Yiannis 15/08/2013). 
 
Christoforidis, in his 2012 speech in Istanbul, expressed his hope that this second-
generation Imbriot identity, ‘precisely because it continues to be developed also in 
Turkey’, might enable the Imvriótes to ‘continue in some way to remain a part of 
modern Turkish society and attempt to establish a dialogue with Turkish society’ 
(Christoforidis 2013). For him, the permanent resettlement of young generation 
Imvriótes on the island ‘constitutes perhaps the last opportunity for the rebirth of a 
culture that belongs to Turkey that it might continue to offer something to Turkey’ 
(Christoforidis 2013). Regardless of whether or not this represents a plausible scenario 
for the future, however, it was clear that for my young generation interviewees the 
prospect of acquiring a wider sense of belonging to contemporary Turkish society was 
some way off. In common with their Turkish-born parents and grandparents, they 
tended to mentally separate Imbros from the rest of Turkey, or even, more specifically, 
to separate the Greek villages on the island from the rest of Gökçeada. In summer 
visitor Lia’s words, ‘as familiar as we feel in the village, where we feel like natives, 
when we are at the border we feel foreign, I personally feel like a foreigner’ (in 
interview with Eva 13/08/2013). Eleni likewise observed that, ‘I do not feel like a 
tourist here [in my village], but if I go across to Çanakkale I am a tourist’ (15/08/2013), 
whilst Takis, during the same conversation, explained that, ‘when I am in my village 
[…] and I feel that I am with Hellenes, and people that I know, I do not feel like a 
tourist […] I feel like I am in my place, but when I am with the Turks, I feel like I am in 
another country’ (15/08/2013). This somewhat spatially constricted sense of belonging 
made it harder for the young generation Imvriótes to envisage their permanent 
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resettlement on the island, and although all expressed a desire to continue their seasonal 
visits, most were hesitant about the prospect of living on Imbros permanently. Some of 
the obstacles they cited were common to Greeks all over Greece whose parents or 
grandparents migrated from rural to urban settings (such as the lack of employment 
opportunities, or the cultural differences between Greek cities and Imbriot villages), but 
others were particular to the case of Imbros (the language barrier, for instance, and the 
scarcity of Greek residents on the island). In Eva’s terms, ‘it is not the same thing to live 
alone with the Hellenes, and to live with the Turks that you do not know well’ 
(13/08/2013). In this sense, we might say that the youth of Imbros is torn between a 
desire to belong to Imbros and the seeming impossibility of belonging to Gökçeada. 
 
The participation of the younger generation in the Greek return to Imbros was a source 
of great enthusiasm for many of my older interviewees. Retired six-monther Stamatios, 
for instance, approvingly pointed out to me that on one day in August 2013 he had been 
able to count 45 children in the central square of Agrídia, more than the total number of 
permanent residents in the winter months (07/08/2013). Permanent Schoinoúdi returnee 
Mimis likewise praised the efforts of the young generation, even if their exuberance 
might spoil the peace and quiet of the older returnees: 
 
Because I have spent many Augusts here – celebrations, parties for the youth, all 
of that – I guess you could say that I’m tired of it […] It is lovely because it 
enlivens the island […] It is lovely regardless of the fact that I have grown tired 
of it. But it must happen. It is our culture and tradition, and our patrída is 
brought to life by its traditions (13/08/2013). 
 
There was, nevertheless, for some of my interviewees a nagging concern that the young 
generation’s presence on the island was impermanent, and that their youthful parties 
would not outlast the passing of their parents and grandparents. Antonis, for example, 
felt it most unlikely that many of the summer visitors would become permanent 
residents: 
 
The young people come here. On 13 August [at a party for the youth in 
Schoinoúdi] you will find a dámpa doúmpa [i.e. deafening club music]. Nothing 
more […] It would be a great surprise if two or three of those – it won’t be more 
than two or three who will take root here. It is not possible […] Eh, as long as it 
lasts (10/08/2013). 
 
Permanent returnee Miltos concurred, suggesting that the young generation would cease 
to visit Imbros once their parental safety net disappears: 
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They like to come here for the freedom of the la la la, bla bla bla. Within a 
month, they want to leave, they become bored […] If I leave, I who does the 
cooking, looks after the house, et cetera et cetera, and they cannot come and 
find everything ready, they will not come again (06/08/2013). 
 
For their part, the second-generation Imvriótes readily acknowledge that the character of 
their visits differs somewhat from that of their parents and grandparents, but also 
emphasise that their desire to prolong their relationship with the island is genuine. As 
Lia put it: 
 
Lia: For us young people it is a bit different, because the truth is we come for 
holidays. But we get on very well because kids from all over the world come. 
We might not socialise during the year but we gather every summer here, and 
we make very close friends […] and a summer does not pass that we do not 
think of going to Imbros.  
Halstead: So for you it is tourism? 
Lia: Yes, truth be told it is more touristic in my mind than [for] my mother who 
comes here for work, to do things with the house and such, whilst we come for 
holidays, because we go swimming, we see our friends: it is different, certainly. 
But there are other parameters, because this house will pass to us when we grow 
up, we want to continue to come, even if our parents cannot (13/08/2013). 
 
Indeed, to dismiss the young generation’s attachment to Imbros as purely recreational 
would be to do them a disservice. Their own accounts of the role that they play in the 
summer return were marked by a clear self-awareness as regards both the ways in which 
their activities might be perceived by older Imvriótes and the inevitability that they must 
connect with the island on their own terms. In Yiannis’ words: 
 
The older people, who were born here, who lived the traditions traditionally, for 
them it was a reality. Now we who come here, we want to live them as they 
lived them, but simply things have changed […] We never lived the times that 
they lived, and nor was there video for us to be able to see how they lived, how 
they celebrated, we simply know the tradition. And so we, as young people, 
celebrate in our own manner, as Imvriótes who are coming back to their patrída 
(15/08/2013). 
 
As Christoforidis argued in Istanbul in 2012, in order for the Imbriot community ‘to 
envision a new future on the island’ it is essential that the young generation be able ‘to 








Discussing international policy on refugee repatriation, Elazar Barkan lamented that the 
right to return for refugees enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had 
become a rite of return, a rhetorical stance rather than a practical response to 
expatriation: ‘[t]he right of return’, he wrote, ‘becomes more of a rite than a right when 
politicians support the demand rhetorically and use it as an easy escape from finding an 
actual solution to real crisis’ (2011:236). Such rites of return have certainly been 
practised by Turkish politicians as regards Turkey’s expatriated Greek minority: 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has on several occasions invited the 
Greeks to return to Turkey (Federation of Constantinopolitans 2012:8), and as we saw 
above Gökçeada’s Turkish mayor has specifically called on the Imvriótes to come back 
to the island. Over the last quarter of a century, the expatriated Greeks of Imbros have 
been engaged in a struggle to turn these rites of return into a concrete and sustainable 
right to return. This has involved addressing not only practical difficulties relating to 
property rights, citizenship, language, education, and employment, but also the question 
of how to reconcile a sense of belonging to Imbros with the contemporary reality of 
Gökçeada: the ruins, the tourists, the expropriated lands and those who now live and 
work there, the perception of the returnees in the eyes of the local Imvriótes and Turks 
alike, and the ways in which the young generation’s Imbros might differ from that of 
their parents and grandparents. Recalling his first return to Imbros in 1996 after a 20 
year absence, six-monther Themis spoke of the difficulty he had retracing once familiar 
paths: 
 
I went to our buildings, our outhouses, I went to our fields: unrecognisable. 
Because I knew the area very well – I even used to know what trees were where 
– I used to be able to walk the path at night without lights. But now I go there in 
the day and I cannot walk it, because everything has fallen into ruin 
(11/08/2013). 
 
Since 1988, the expatriated Imvriótes have walked once again on the island of their 






Greeks without Greece 
 
Coming here [to Greece], the first thing you feel is the freedom that you are in 
your place: a Hellene in Greece. Because that is how we felt over there: Hellenes 
without Greece. When we came here, suddenly we were Hellenes in Greece, 
wherever you went it was Hellenic, in the churches, in the schools, in the 
hospitals, wherever. You constantly hear and speak Greek, you are not afraid 
(Markos 04/05/2013). 
 
The mentality of the Hellene was totally different from the Romiós […] They 
called us “seeds of the Turks”. We left there as infidels, and we came here as 
seeds of the Turks […] We are a group of people who essentially have two 
patrídes and no patrída (Maria 09/05/2013). 
 
In this thesis, I have explored how the expatriated Greeks of Turkey interpreted and 
represented their disorientating and often fragmentary experiences of belonging and 
alienation in two nation-states: Turkey, the country of their birth, where they were 
periodically persecuted on the basis of their ethnic and religious identity; and Greece, 
their purported national patrída, in which they encountered both reassuring similarities 
and striking differences between themselves and the Greeks of Greece, who were 
sometimes ill-acquainted with their plight or viewed them with suspicion due to their 
Turkish birthplace. Part II of the thesis focused on how they responded to these 
ambivalent experiences by emphasising the specificities of their own recent and more 
distant local historical heritages. As I documented in chapter 3, members of the 
expatriated community self-defined, variably, as Romioí and as Hellenes. For some, 
especially those with particular grievances towards the Greek state, a Romaic identity 
separated the expatriates from the Hellenic residents of Greece, a discursive position 
that prompted others within the community, fearful of opening up a chasm between the 
Greeks of Turkey and the Greeks of Greece, to eschew the label Romioí and emphasise 
their Hellenic selves. For many Polítes, however, a Romaic self-identification rooted in 
the Byzantine legacy – officially sidelined yet popularly resonant within Greece, and 
according to Greek nationalist history the period when pagan Hellenism merged with 
Orthodox Christianity, a cornerstone of modern Greek identity – served as a means to 
simultaneously differentiate themselves from the inhabitants of Greece and affirm that 
they themselves were particularly Hellenic. My informants from the agriculturalist 
Imbriot community were generally less inclined to characterise themselves as 
cosmopolitan Romioí, but nonetheless drew on the particularities of their own locality in 
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an effort to demonstrate the authenticity, specificity, and venerability of their Hellenic 
credentials through tales of their island’s colonisation by Ancient Athenians, and the 
preservation of its Hellenic traditions in spite of repeated occupations and the absence 
of protection from the Greek state. These narratives of ‘inclusive particularity’ indicate 
that national belonging may be constructed through attachment to the local rather than 
simply in opposition to it, and through the accentuation of local heterogeneity as well as 
the assertion of national commonality, and accordingly highlight the limitations not 
only of approaches premised on the existence of coherent and uniform ethnic 
communities, but also those based on an antithesis between the supposed simplicity of 
national identity and the complexity of local or diasporic identities. 
 
In chapter 4, I discussed how the Greeks of Turkey claimed a ‘privileged knowledge’ of 
the Turkish other acquired through their personal experiences of living in Turkey, and 
how they deployed ethnic stereotypes supposedly derived from this intimate knowledge 
to both explicate historical occurrences and substantiate contemporary claims about self 
and other. In some contexts, members of the expatriate community endorsed Greek 
nationalist stereotypes through representations of the ‘bad Turks’ who are violent, 
impulsive, and readily roused by nationalist ideologues. This served not only to explain 
their experiences of popular persecution in Turkey by individuals that sometimes 
included those they had thought of as friends, but also to counteract a perceived 
indifference on the part of the Greek state and populace by depicting the expatriates as 
martyrs to Greece’s quintessential other. At other times, however, expatriates placed 
emphasis upon the virtues of the ‘good Turk’ who is honourable, respectful, and 
industrious, a representation which commonly functioned as a means to critically 
appraise the alleged untrustworthiness, crudeness, and idleness of the inhabitants of 
Greece. These contrasting stereotypes of the Turkish other were not necessarily targeted 
at separate and clearly demarcated groups within Turkish society, but were rather used 
to explain the contingent behaviour of others in particular situations, such that an 
individual who was said to exhibit the tendencies of the ‘good Turk’ in one context 
might be depicted as complicit in the violence of the ‘bad Turks’ in another. By the 
internal logic of such stereotypes, it was the same fanatical sense of honour amongst the 
Turks that accounted for both extremes of violence and extremes of courtesy, in much 
the same way as the Greeks’ archetypal love of individual liberty and democratic 
equality clarified their irreverent and anarchic tendencies. From this point of view, 
ethnicity and ethnic stereotypes can be viewed not simply as static and immutable 
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categorisations, but as components of a more malleable mental apparatus through which 
individuals seek to interpret the behaviour of others and represent their own 
understandings of self. 
 
Part III of the thesis concentrated on the efforts of expatriate activists and writers to 
represent the persecution of the Greeks of Turkey through historical analogy, and 
considered what an analysis of these narratives might contribute to recent scholarly 
interest in the transcultural dynamics of remembrance. In chapter 5, I explored how the 
Greeks of Turkey sought to counteract their marginalisation within Greek history and 
diplomacy by casting themselves in the likeness of exemplary heroes and martyrs from 
Greek nationalist history. In the late 1970s, the Constantinopolitan Society began to 
publicly mark the anniversaries of the Istanbul Riots and the Fall of Constantinople, 
hoping in this manner to raise awareness amongst the Greek public of the expatriates’ 
experiences of discrimination in Turkey. In these commemorative ceremonies, as well 
as in associated publicity materials and articles printed in community newspapers, 
expatriate memory activists often compared their own experiences during the riots in 
1955 to the last stand of the Byzantines against the Ottoman Empire in 1453, and 
presented the latter as a necessary precursor to the Greek revolution in 1821. The 
Greeks of Imbros, meanwhile, drew comparable analogies between the political and 
demographic changes instituted by Turkey on Imbros during the 1960s and the 
aftermath of Turkish military action on Cyprus in 1974, and between the few hundred 
remaining elderly residents of their island and the 300 Spartan warriors of Leonidas 
who stayed to defend Thermopylae from the Persians. Such discourses reframed local 
experience as a national cause, but also carried an implicit criticism of contemporary 
Greek diplomacy for its failure to live up to the archetypes of the past, providing further 
evidence for the malleable and subversive potential of nationalist rhetoric. The dynamic 
interplay, moreover, between spatially and temporally distant moments contained in 
these commemorative narratives illustrates that the mobility of memory identified in 
recent scholarship applies equally to the construction and reconfiguration of the past 
within nation-states, and not just to memories that conspicuously traverse artificial 
national, cultural, or social boundaries (themselves often erected through the 
multidirectional memory work of nation-builders who equated contemporary 




Chapter 6, nevertheless, considered historical cross-referencing that did explicitly cut 
across ethnic and national distinctions. I focused on the ways in which members of the 
expatriated Greek communities drew parallels between their own experiences and those 
of other minority communities within Turkey (in particular, the Armenians, the 
Assyrians, and the Kurds), and how they analogised between Turkey’s treatment of 
these minorities and Nazi persecution of the Jews. Such discourses confirm that 
memories, often thought of as being aligned with particular groups of people or rooted 
in certain temporal or spatial contexts, frequently migrate and interact with one another. 
Moreover, they do so in a manner that might generate solidarities or even promote 
intercommunal reconciliation, rather than leading inevitably to competitive and 
acrimonious clashes over the singularity or specificity of victimhood. I cautioned, 
however, against interpreting references to other times and places as necessarily 
reflecting complex and deep-rooted mnemonic entanglements that might significantly 
impact upon people’s understandings of self, others, and history in local and everyday 
contexts. References by expatriates to the experiences of others tended to appear in 
quite specific discursive contexts, and in fairly invariant and interchangeable forms. 
Whether in online peer-to-peer debates, public awareness-raising materials, or formal 
historical accounts, expatriate writers and commenters typically had recourse to 
abstracted or ‘off-the-peg’ motifs borrowed from the histories of other communities 
when they felt the need to more forcefully and recognisably articulate their own 
grievances towards Turkey. In this guise, transcultural cross-referencing was liable to 
reinforce existing nationalist understandings of the past rather than encouraging new 
and more ethical or cosmopolitan histories, and to perpetuate negative representations of 
a shared antagonistic other in spite of (or, in this case, perhaps because of) its capacity 
to simultaneously facilitate intercommunal solidarities between different groups of 
victims. 
 
In part IV, I developed my broader discussion of the relationship between the locality 
and the nation through a specific case study: the return of the Greeks to Imbros. During 
the 1970s and 1980s, when even short-term return to Imbros seemed implausible, the 
expatriated Imvriótes, in common with other Greek communities with origins outside 
the territory of the contemporary Greek state, focused on commemorating their locality 
as part of the national pantheon of ‘lost patrídes’, and attempting to establish a ‘New 
Imbros’ on Greek soil. After 1988, however, circumstances on Imbros began to change, 
facilitating seasonal, semi-permanent, and even permanent return, and precipitating a 
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struggle not only to tackle the practical obstacles involved in the re-establishment of a 
Greek community on the island, but also to confront a multitude of daily challenges to 
the returnees’ sense of belonging in a locality greatly transformed by changes to its 
demographics, its built environment, and its touristic status. The possibility of returning 
to a locality with (at least in the summers) an active Greek community somewhat sets 
the Imvriótes apart from the Greeks of Istanbul, and has had a noticeable impact upon 
the former’s relationship to Greece and the identities of their Greek-born descendants. 
For first-generation Imbriot activists, the realisation that Imbros might not be ‘lost’ to 
its former Greek inhabitants provoked an increased sense of dissatisfaction with the 
diplomacy of the Greek state. This led not so much to the abandonment of the rhetoric 
of ‘lost patrídes’, but rather its redeployment as a discursive device for criticising a 
perceived inactivity or fatalism on the part of Greek politicians and diplomats. For the 
younger, Greek-born generation, meanwhile, experiences of visiting Imbros alongside 
their parents and grandparents have fostered a greater emotional identification with the 
island as a contemporary physical place as opposed to a bygone cultural or historical 
inheritance. This did not necessarily prompt them to supplant a national Hellenic sense 
of self with a local Imbriot one, but rather inclined them to reimagine their Hellenic 
identity in terms of a different locality (i.e. Imbros rather than Athens or Thessaloniki). 
Even for those born inside Greece, national identity and statehood were not inextricably 
bound together, and the relationship between the locality and the nation was not 
invariably a zero-sum conflict between competing and incompatible claims on 
individual belonging and selfhood. 
 
* * * 
 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate the limitations not only of a methodological 
nationalism that reflexively places the nation at the centre of scholarly analyses of 
identity and memory (see chapter 1), but also of a methodological cosmopolitanism that 
exclusively locates heterogeneity and complexity between and beyond rather than within 
established categories. The evidence presented in part II did not necessarily call into 
question the salience of ethnicity and nationhood as prominent paradigms through 
which the Greeks of Turkey orientated their identities and memories: for many of my 
interviewees, these categories formed something of a conceptual and explanatory 
horizon within which their life experiences were habitually plotted and made 
meaningful. What my discussion did suggest, however, is that there is greater room for 
manoeuvre within these horizons than is sometimes supposed, and that ethnicity and 
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nationhood can be reworked and re-tasked by ‘ordinary people’ in order to articulate a 
fairly diverse range of discursive positions, some of which may be partially or wholly at 
odds with the identities or histories formally proliferated by the organs of the state. 
Nationhood, like memory, is multidirectional, and our analyses should pay attention to 
the different and mutable ways in which it becomes meaningful (or otherwise) in 
diverse local contexts. 
 
As I observed at the beginning of part III, memory studies has been driven in important 
new directions in recent years, particularly by scholars working in the fields of 
literature, media studies, and Holocaust studies, who have posited more dynamic, 
interconnected, and transcultural understandings of social memory and its relationship 
to group identity, and have even suggested that these perspectives might herald novel, 
post-national, and/or more morally productive ways for people to understand the past 
(and the present). Historians and anthropologists can make an important contribution to 
this analytical paradigm shift, by writing an everyday history of multidirectional 
memory (see review essay II) that more systematically considers how these theoretical 
models – developed in large part through reference to macro-level socio-historical 
processes, and literary or mass-mediated representations of the past – might apply to the 
study of particular local communities in particular historical contexts. Part III of this 
thesis argued that such a research agenda should not focus solely on memories that 
happen to cross artificial social or cultural borders, but rather begin by recognising that 
the multidirectional dynamics of memory might be as complicit in the maintenance of 
























































































































Fotinib 1943 Istanbul F 1973 
Deteriorating 
situation 














Gerasimos 1949 Istanbul M 1964 
Father expelled 









Iraklis 1947 Istanbul M 1964 
Father expelled 




Konstantinos 1944 Istanbul M 1959 
Father expelled 











































































































































Sotiris 1946 Istanbul M 1970 Love (érotas) Turkish 08/02/12 



















Tasos 1949 Istanbul M 1964 
Father expelled 




























































* Dates in italics are approximate. a Interviewed together. b Interviewed together. c 1971 (school in Greece); 1975 (as a family). 
d 1973 (studies in England); 1976 (to Greece). 
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Appendix 2 – List of interviewees: Imvriótes* 



























Antonis 1941 Istanbul M 

















































































































































































































































Mirela 1947 Imbros F 1973 
























































































































































































Zoe 1957 Istanbul F 1975 
Felt oppression 








Appendix 2 – List of interviewees: Imvriótes (continued)* 
Pseudonym First return Current frequency of return 
Amarillisb Not specified Not specified 
Antigoni 1990 Seasonal 
Antonis 1989 - 1999 Permanent resident 
Argyrisa 1990s Permanent resident 
Aris 1999 Not specified 
Babis 1992 Six months of the year 
Christos 1988 Permanent resident (since 2011) 
Damon Immediately Nine months of the year 
Despoinac 2002 Six months of the year 
Dimitra 1987 Six months of the year (or more) 
Dimosthenis Not specified Seasonal 
Eleni 2001 Seasonal 
Evangeliad (1972) 2000 Seasonal 
Fani 1987 Seasonal 
Fokas 1988 Permanent resident 
Giorgos 1991 Seasonal 
Ilias Immediately Seasonal 
Katerina n/a Never 
Kleopas 1990 Six months of the year 
Kostas 1989 Seasonal 
Kyriakic After 2002 Seasonal 
Leonidas n/a Ten months of the year 
Loukas mid 1990s Seasonal 
Markos 1990 Seasonal 
Miltos 1989 Permanent resident 
Mimis 2011 Permanent resident 
Minos Immediately (never left Turkey) Ten months of the year (since 2000) 
Mirela 1991 Seasonal (until 2009) 
Orestis 1995 Six months of the year 
Panagiota Immediately Seasonal 
Pantelis 1989 Seasonal 
Pavlos 1987 Seasonal 
Petroklos n/a Never 
Pyrros 1993 Not specified 
Sakis 1982 Permanent resident 
Savvas 1988 Not specified 
Sokratis 2001 Infrequently, if ever 
Stamatios 1989 Six months of the year 
Stelios Never Never 
Themis (1969, 1973, 1975) 1996 Six months of the year (since 2000) 
Tryfonb Not specified Not specified 
Vasiaa 1990s Permanent resident 
Vasilis 1993 Six months of the year 
Voulad (1972) 2000 Seasonal 
Zacharias 1988 Seasonal 
Zoe Not specified Not specified 
* Dates in italics are approximate. a Interviewed together. b Interviewed together. c Interviewed together. d Interviewed together. 
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Appendix 3 – List of interviewees: Greek-born generation* 
Pseudonym D.O.B. Place of birth Descent Gender 
Frequency 





Christinaa 1985 Greece (Athens) 
Imbros 
(mother) 
F Periodic Greek 07/06/13 







Not specified 10/05/13 
Elenib 1991 Greece (Athens) 
Imbros 
(mother) 
F Seasonal Greek 15/08/13 






F Seasonal Greek 13/08/13 
Filiposb 1993 Greece (Athens) 
Imbros 
(mother) 
M Seasonal Greek 15/08/13 












M Seasonal Greek 31/05/13 




M Once Greek 30/05/13 
Lia 1991 Greece (Athens) 
Imbros 
(mother) 
F Seasonal Greek 13/08/13 




M Never Turkish 06/06/13 
Militiadis 1986 Greece 
Imbros 
(mother) 
M Seasonal Greek 06/06/13 
Natasha 1987 Greece 
Imbros 
(father) 
F Periodic Greek 07/06/13 











M Never Turkish 07/06/13 


















M Seasonal Greek 15/08/13 
* Dates in italics are approximate. a Interviewed together. b Interviewed together.   
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Asia Minor Greeks/Asia Minor refugees: Orthodox Christian refugees forcibly expelled 
from Turkey and relocated to Greece as a result of the Convention Concerning the 
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations agreed upon by Greece and Turkey in 
1923. 
 
Elladítis (m.)/Elladítissa (f.)/Elladítes (pl.): Greek(s) of Greece (or, sometimes, those in 
possession of Greek citizenship). 
 
expatriates/expatriated Greek community of Turkey: Orthodox Christians from Istanbul 
and Imbros, exempted from the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, 
who left Turkey and resettled in Greece (particularly between the 1950s and the 1980s). 
 
expellees: Greek citizens expelled from Turkey in 1964. 
 
Hellene (m.)/Hellene (f.)/Hellenes (pl.)/Hellenism (noun)/Hellenic (adj.): Translations 
of the Greek words Έllinas (m.)/Ellinída (f.)/Έllines (pl.)/ellinismós (noun)/ellinikós 
(adj.). Sometimes used to refer collectively to all Greeks, and sometimes used 
specifically to designate the Greeks of Greece, or those in possession of Greek 
citizenship. 
 
Imvriótis (m.)/Imvriótissa (f.)/Imvriótes (pl.)/Imbriot (adj.): Greek(s) of Imbros. 
 
omogéneia (noun)/omogeneís (adj.): Literally ‘homogeneity’ or ‘homogenous’, these 
terms are typically used to refer to individuals of Greek descent born or living outside 
Greece. 
 
native Greeks: Translation of the Greek dópioi Έllines, used to distinguish Greeks born 
in – or with roots in – the Greek state from the omogéneia, i.e. those of Greek descent 
born outside Greece (and their descendants). Amongst my interviewees, the term was 
sometimes used to differentiate those with roots in Greece from those with roots in 
Anatolia (including the Asia Minor refugees and their descendants), and sometimes 
more generally to refer to all of the Greeks of Greece whom the expatriates encountered 
when they relocated from Turkey. 
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Polítis (m.)/Polítissa (f.)/Polítes (pl.)/Constantinopolitan (adj.): Greek(s) of Istanbul. 
 
Romiós (m.)/Romiá (f.)/Romioí (pl.)/romiosýni (noun)/Romaic (adj.): Sometimes used 
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